core defense in Delaware

2021As the Superior Court found, “the fact that the defendants [had] conflicting versions of what 60 Id. at A93-94 (citing Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993) (“[W]hen defendants properly have been joined under Rule 8(b), a district court should grant severance . . . only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.”)). 61 Id. at A94. 62 Opening Br. at 20. 63 Phillips, 154 A.3d at 1157 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitt

2017Otis argues that the differences between his and Jeffrey’s cross-examination strategies for Allen created antagonistic defenses that compelled severance. “[T]he presence of hostility between a defendant and his codefendant or ‘mere inconsistencies in defenses or trial strategies’ do not require a severance.”10 Jeffrey wanted to explore Allen’s witness protection agreement on cross-examination Otis did not want to address Allen’s participation in the witness protection program. 9 Id. (internal quotations omitted). '° owen v. Szare, 650 A.2d 1291, 1298 (Del. 1994). 10 Their differing positions o

1998In Bradley , this Court held that a defendant is entitled to severance when “ ‘the jury can reasonably accept the core of the defense offered by either defendant only if it rejects the core of the defense offered by his eodefendant ....’” Bradley v. State, 559 A.2d at 1241 (quoting State v. Vinal, Conn.Supr., 198 Conn. 644 , 504 A.2d 1364, 1368 (1986)). “[T]he presence of hostility between a defendant and his co-defendant or ‘mere inconsistencies in defenses or trial strategies,’ ” however, does not require severance per se.

1998In Bradley , this Court held that a defendant is entitled to severance when “ ‘the jury can reasonably accept the core of the defense offered by either defendant only if it rejects the core of the defense offered by his eodefendant ....’” Bradley v. State, 559 A.2d at 1241 (quoting State v. Vinal, Conn.Supr., 198 Conn. 644 , 504 A.2d 1364, 1368 (1986)). “[T]he presence of hostility between a defendant and his co-defendant or ‘mere inconsistencies in defenses or trial strategies,’ ” however, does not require severance per se.

1998In Bradley , this Court held that a defendant is entitled to severance when “ ‘the jury can reasonably accept the core of the defense offered by either defendant only if it rejects the core of the defense offered by his eodefendant ....’” Bradley v. State, 559 A.2d at 1241 (quoting State v. Vinal, Conn.Supr., 198 Conn. 644 , 504 A.2d 1364, 1368 (1986)). “[T]he presence of hostility between a defendant and his co-defendant or ‘mere inconsistencies in defenses or trial strategies,’ ” however, does not require severance per se.

1998In Bradley , this Court held that a defendant is entitled to severance when “ ‘the jury can reasonably accept the core of the defense offered by either defendant only if it rejects the core of the defense offered by his eodefendant ....’” Bradley v. State, 559 A.2d at 1241 (quoting State v. Vinal, Conn.Supr., 198 Conn. 644 , 504 A.2d 1364, 1368 (1986)). “[T]he presence of hostility between a defendant and his co-defendant or ‘mere inconsistencies in defenses or trial strategies,’ ” however, does not require severance per se.

2025Nov. 30, 2017) (“It is reasonably conceivable that the transactions on which the core claim is premised were not the product of fair dealing, since they were engineered and approved by conflicted fiduciaries.”); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1173 (Del. 1995) (“The independence of the bargaining parties is a well- recognized touchstone of fair dealing.” (citations omitted)). 40 they breached their duty of care.

2017See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1173 (Del. 1995) (“The independence of the bargaining parties is a well- recognized touchstone of fair dealing.”).

2020Highland Equity Fund, L.P. v. Motient Corp., 922 A.2d 415 (Del. 2007) (“None of these revisions adequately address the court’s concern as to the breadth of the original demand sued upon or the scope of relief Highland Select continues to seek.”). 270 Paraflon, 2020 WL 1655947 , at *6 (“Striking the proper balance between a stockholders’ inspection rights and the right of a company’s board to manage the corporation without undue interference from stockholders is a core principle in our Section 220 jurisprudence.

2020Highland Equity Fund, L.P. v. Motient Corp., 922 A.2d 415 (Del. 2007) (“None of these revisions adequately address the court’s concern as to the breadth of the original demand sued upon or the scope of relief Highland Select continues to seek.”). 270 Paraflon, 2020 WL 1655947 , at *6 (“Striking the proper balance between a stockholders’ inspection rights and the right of a company’s board to manage the corporation without undue interference from stockholders is a core principle in our Section 220 jurisprudence.

2021As the Superior Court found, “the fact that the defendants [had] conflicting versions of what 60 Id. at A93-94 (citing Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993) (“[W]hen defendants properly have been joined under Rule 8(b), a district court should grant severance . . . only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.”)). 61 Id. at A94. 62 Opening Br. at 20. 63 Phillips, 154 A.3d at 1157 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitt

2021Mr. Shackelford, in statements made to the police, claimed that he only wanted Mr. Brisco’s help to offer help to the Victim, his ex- 13 Manley, 709 A.2d at 652 . 14 Id. 15 Bradley v. State, 559 A.2d 1234, 1241 (Del. 1989). 16 Jenkins. v. State, 230 A.2d 262 (Del. 1967). 17 Cf. Id. with Anderson, 2021 WL 1205908 , at *3. 7 girlfriend, and claimed that she would be too embarrassed to see him under those circumstances.

2021As the Superior Court found, “the fact that the defendants [had] conflicting versions of what 60 Id. at A93-94 (citing Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993) (“[W]hen defendants properly have been joined under Rule 8(b), a district court should grant severance . . . only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.”)). 61 Id. at A94. 62 Opening Br. at 20. 63 Phillips, 154 A.3d at 1157 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitt

2021As the Superior Court found, “the fact that the defendants [had] conflicting versions of what 60 Id. at A93-94 (citing Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993) (“[W]hen defendants properly have been joined under Rule 8(b), a district court should grant severance . . . only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.”)). 61 Id. at A94. 62 Opening Br. at 20. 63 Phillips, 154 A.3d at 1157 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitt

2021As the Superior Court found, “the fact that the defendants [had] conflicting versions of what 60 Id. at A93-94 (citing Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993) (“[W]hen defendants properly have been joined under Rule 8(b), a district court should grant severance . . . only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.”)). 61 Id. at A94. 62 Opening Br. at 20. 63 Phillips, 154 A.3d at 1157 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitt

2021As the Superior Court found, “the fact that the defendants [had] conflicting versions of what 60 Id. at A93-94 (citing Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993) (“[W]hen defendants properly have been joined under Rule 8(b), a district court should grant severance . . . only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.”)). 61 Id. at A94. 62 Opening Br. at 20. 63 Phillips, 154 A.3d at 1157 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitt

2019Ch. 1990) (identifying this core principle of “established American legal doctrine” that “arises from the law of torts” and discussing its utility in the corporate dispute before the Chancellor). 52 Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. Burrows, 435 A.2d 716, 718 (Del. 1981). -12- Consistent with the Restatement, Delaware courts incorporate the principle of foreseeability to delineate one’s duty.53 Thus, whether the law will impose a duty on the Bromwells will turn on whether the harm to Ms. McGrellis was foreseeable —whether reasonable persons in the Bromwells’ position should have recognized that fa

2019In the context of a negligence claim, Delaware courts determine the existence of an “unreasonable risk” by analyzing whether the risk of a particular consequence is “sufficiently great to lead a reasonable [person] to anticipate them, and to guard against them.”54 Comment g to Section 290 of the Restatement provides that “[a] reasonable [person] is required to have such knowledge of the habits of animals as is customary in his community.”55 At trial, Ms. McGrellis testified that Tara’s conduct caused her to become frightened because Tara barked and came out of the Bromwells’ front door by 53 S

2019Thus, while the defenses were somewhat antagonistic, they were nothing more than the usual attempts by co-conspirators to minimize their roles. “['l`]he presence of hostility between a defendant and his co-defendant or ‘mere inconsistencies in defenses or trial strategies’ do not require a severance.”'3 In Bradley v. State, the Court held that a defendant is entitled to severance when the jury can reasonably accept the core of the defense offered by either the defendant only if it rejects the core of the defense '3 Phl'llips v. State, 154 A.3d 1146, 1157 (Del. 2017). 12 offered by his co-defen

2018Thus, I dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty to the extent it relies on those purported breaches.67 The aiding and abetting claim survives, however, to the extent it rests on the core claim in this case: that the “Control Defendants engineered a series of transactions between RCAP and AR Capital that allegedly siphoned value away from RCAP and to AR Capital.”68 The Plaintiff brings its aiding and abetting count 64 RBS Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 861 (Del. 2015). 65 Cumming v. Edens, 2018 WL 992877 , at *26 (Del.

2018Plan v. Baiera, 119 A.3d 44, 63 (Del.

2017Being "within a whisker” of Section 273 ignores the core principle that "[t]he legislative body is presumed to have inserted every provision for some useful purpose and construction, and when different terms are used in various parts of a statute it is reasonable to assume that a distinction between the terms was intended.” Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).

2017Being “within a whisker” of Section 273 ignores the core principle that “[t]he legislative body is presumed to have inserted every provision for some useful purpose and construction, and when different terms are used in various parts of a statute it is reasonable to assume that a distinction between the terms was intended.” Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).

2017Joinder of 0jfenses Proper Prejudice from joinder of offenses may arise in the following three situations: [F]irst, when the jury might cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not so find; second, when the jury might use the evidence of one of the crimes to infer a general criminal disposition of the defendant in order to find guilt of the other crime or crimes; and, third, when the defendant might be subject to embarrassment or confusion in presenting different and separate defenses to different charges.14 11 Bradley v. S¢are

2017Capital Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 536 (Del. 2011) (holding that courts must “accept even vague allegations in the Complaint as ‘well-pleaded’ if they provide the defendant notice of the claim”). 172 ARC Parties’ Opening Br. 32. 35 The prospectus for RCAP’s initial public offering disclosed, for example, that RCAP “generally receives up to 3.0% of the gross proceeds from the sale of common stock as a dealer manager fee and also receives fees from the sale of common stock through registered investment advisors.”173 But the prospectus did not discuss a key aspect of the Plaintiff’s core claim: t

2017Joinder of 0jfenses Proper Prejudice from joinder of offenses may arise in the following three situations: [F]irst, when the jury might cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not so find; second, when the jury might use the evidence of one of the crimes to infer a general criminal disposition of the defendant in order to find guilt of the other crime or crimes; and, third, when the defendant might be subject to embarrassment or confusion in presenting different and separate defenses to different charges.14 11 Bradley v. S¢are

2015Because of this court’s unchallenged Ledda-ruling it need not reach these issues. 48 the core privilege against self-incrimination.”92 Foremost among these is the proverbial landmark 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona. 93 Before Miranda the admissibility of a confession was determined solely on the basis whether it was “voluntary” as that term was understood under the Due Process Clause.94 The Miranda Court “presumed that interrogation in certain custodial circumstances is inherently coercive and that statements made under those circumstances are inadmissible unless the suspect is specificall

2015Because of this court’s unchallenged Ledda-ruling it need not reach these issues. 48 the core privilege against self-incrimination.”92 Foremost among these is the proverbial landmark 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona. 93 Before Miranda the admissibility of a confession was determined solely on the basis whether it was “voluntary” as that term was understood under the Due Process Clause.94 The Miranda Court “presumed that interrogation in certain custodial circumstances is inherently coercive and that statements made under those circumstances are inadmissible unless the suspect is specificall

2014See April 14D-9, at I-43. 49 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 50 McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 921 (Del. 2000) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 51 In re Caremark Int‟l Inc. Deriv.

2014See April 14D-9, at I-43. 49 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 50 McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 921 (Del. 2000) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 51 In re Caremark Int‟l Inc. Deriv.

1989See also Smith v. Kelso, 11th Cir., 863 F.2d 1564, 1568 (1989); United States v. Romanello, 5th Cir., 726 F.2d 173, 177 (1984).