core principle in Georgia

2025See Middleton v. State, 309 Ga. 337, 345 (3) ( 846 SE2d 73 ) (2020) (It is “a core principle of statutory interpretation that changes in statutory language generally indicate an intent to change the meaning of the statute.”); Barrow v. Raffensperger, 308 Ga. 660, 672 (3) (c) ( 842 SE2d 884 ) (2020) (“When constitutional language is substantively changed, we must give that change effect.”); Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 236 (2) (c) (i) (2017) (in interpreting a constitutional provision, “the text is always our starting point . . . (and often our ending point, as well),” with “the broader contex

2025See Middleton v. State, 309 Ga. 337, 345 (3) ( 846 SE2d 73 ) (2020) (It is “a core principle of statutory interpretation that changes in statutory language generally indicate an intent to change the meaning of the statute.”); Barrow v. Raffensperger, 308 Ga. 660, 672 (3) (c) ( 842 SE2d 884 ) (2020) (“When constitutional language is substantively changed, we must give that change effect.”); Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 236 (2) (c) (i) (2017) (in interpreting a constitutional provision, “the text is always our starting point . . . (and often our ending point, as well),” with “the broader contex

2021See Ford, 477 U. S. at 410 (III) (plurality portion of opinion) (“Once a substantive right or restriction is recognized in the 59 Like the Atkins Court did regarding intellectual disability, the majority in Ford began with the conclusion that the execution of mentally incompetent persons violated the Eighth Amendment.

2021See Ford, 477 U. S. at 410 (III) (plurality portion of opinion) (“Once a substantive right or restriction is recognized in the 59 Like the Atkins Court did regarding intellectual disability, the majority in Ford began with the conclusion that the execution of mentally incompetent persons violated the Eighth Amendment.

2014Cf. Brown, 290 Ga. at 52 (2) (holding that waiver-of-rights form adequately conveyed core principles of “the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination” through use of other wording); Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 55 , 55-56 & n.2 ( 685 SE2d 281 ) (2009) (holding that defendant was adequately advised by trial court of his right against self-incrimination despite use of other wording, and noting that defendant had also signed a statement as to his understanding that he was waiving the right not to incriminate himself); Foster v. State, 319 Ga. App. 815, 817 (2) (a) ( 738 SE2d 651 ) (2013) (“[T]

2014Cf. Brown, 290 Ga. at 52 (2) (holding that waiver-of-rights form adequately conveyed core principles of “the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination” through use of other wording); Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 55 , 55-56 & n.2 ( 685 SE2d 281 ) (2009) (holding that defendant was adequately advised by trial court of his right against self-incrimination despite use of other wording, and noting that defendant had also signed a statement as to his understanding that he was waiving the right not to incriminate himself); Foster v. State, 319 Ga. App. 815, 817 (2) (a) ( 738 SE2d 651 ) (2013) (“[T]

2022“Such a reading of course violates a core principle of statutory interpretation that changes in statutory language generally indicate an intent to change the meaning of the statute.” GeorgiaCarry.Org, 306 Ga. at 836 (3).

2020However, such a reading would “violate[ ] a core principle of statutory interpretation that changes in statutory language generally indicate an intent to change the meaning of the statute.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) GeorgiaCarry.Org, 306 Ga. at 836 (3).

2018But we have disapproved the core analysis of those decisions and expressly disapproved Parker , noting that "both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have squarely held that a peremptory strike based upon a juror's demeanor during voir dire may be race-neutral at Batson step two." Toomer , 292 Ga. at 54 (2) (b), 734 S.E.2d 333 ; see also Littlejohn v. State , 320 Ga. App. 197 , 202 (1) (c) n. 3, 739 S.E.2d 682 (2013) (noting Toomer 's disapproval of standard employed in George ). 7 Turning to the trial court's ultimate determination at step three, Taylor argues that the prosecutor's

2018But we have disapproved the core analysis of those decisions and expressly disapproved Parker , noting that "both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have squarely held that a peremptory strike based upon a juror's demeanor during voir dire may be race-neutral at Batson step two." Toomer , 292 Ga. at 54 (2) (b), 734 S.E.2d 333 ; see also Littlejohn v. State , 320 Ga. App. 197 , 202 (1) (c) n. 3, 739 S.E.2d 682 (2013) (noting Toomer 's disapproval of standard employed in George ). 7 Turning to the trial court's ultimate determination at step three, Taylor argues that the prosecutor's

2018At the third step of the Batson analysis, the trial court "makes credibility determinations, evaluates the persuasiveness of the strike opponent's prima facie showing and the explanations given by the strike proponent, and examines all other circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity." Coleman , 301 Ga. at 723 (4), 804 S.E.2d 24 (citation and punctuation omitted).

2018At the third step of the Batson analysis, the trial court "makes credibility determinations, evaluates the persuasiveness of the strike opponent's prima facie showing and the explanations given by the strike proponent, and examines all other circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity." Coleman , 301 Ga. at 723 (4), 804 S.E.2d 24 (citation and punctuation omitted).

2018But we have disapproved the core analysis of those decisions and expressly disapproved Parker , noting that "both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have squarely held that a peremptory strike based upon a juror's demeanor during voir dire may be race-neutral at Batson step two." Toomer , 292 Ga. at 54 (2) (b), 734 S.E.2d 333 ; see also Littlejohn v. State , 320 Ga. App. 197 , 202 (1) (c) n. 3, 739 S.E.2d 682 (2013) (noting Toomer 's disapproval of standard employed in George ). 7 Turning to the trial court's ultimate determination at step three, Taylor argues that the prosecutor's

2018But we have disapproved the core analysis of those decisions and expressly disapproved Parker , noting that "both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have squarely held that a peremptory strike based upon a juror's demeanor during voir dire may be race-neutral at Batson step two." Toomer , 292 Ga. at 54 (2) (b), 734 S.E.2d 333 ; see also Littlejohn v. State , 320 Ga. App. 197 , 202 (1) (c) n. 3, 739 S.E.2d 682 (2013) (noting Toomer 's disapproval of standard employed in George ). 7 Turning to the trial court's ultimate determination at step three, Taylor argues that the prosecutor's

2015See Jackson v. State, 276 Ga. at 412, n. 5 .

2015See Jackson v. State, 276 Ga. at 412, n. 5 .

2014Cf. Brown, 290 Ga. at 52 (2) (holding that waiver- of-rights form adequately conveyed core principles of “the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination” through use of other wording); Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 55 , 55-56 & n.2 ( 685 SE2d 281 ) (2009) (holding that defendant was adequately advised by trial court of his right against self-incrimination despite use of other wording, and noting that defendant had also signed a statement as to his understanding that he was waiving the right not to incriminate himself); Foster v. State, 319 Ga. App. 815, 817 (2) (a) ( 738 SE2d 651 ) (2013) (“[T

2014Cf. Brown, 290 Ga. at 52 (2) (holding that waiver- of-rights form adequately conveyed core principles of “the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination” through use of other wording); Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 55 , 55-56 & n.2 ( 685 SE2d 281 ) (2009) (holding that defendant was adequately advised by trial court of his right against self-incrimination despite use of other wording, and noting that defendant had also signed a statement as to his understanding that he was waiving the right not to incriminate himself); Foster v. State, 319 Ga. App. 815, 817 (2) (a) ( 738 SE2d 651 ) (2013) (“[T

2014Cf. Brown, 290 Ga. at 52 (2) (holding that waiver-of-rights form adequately conveyed core principles of “the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination” through use of other wording); Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 55 , 55-56 & n.2 ( 685 SE2d 281 ) (2009) (holding that defendant was adequately advised by trial court of his right against self-incrimination despite use of other wording, and noting that defendant had also signed a statement as to his understanding that he was waiving the right not to incriminate himself); Foster v. State, 319 Ga. App. 815, 817 (2) (a) ( 738 SE2d 651 ) (2013) (“[T]

2014Cf. Brown, 290 Ga. at 52 (2) (holding that waiver-of-rights form adequately conveyed core principles of “the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination” through use of other wording); Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 55 , 55-56 & n.2 ( 685 SE2d 281 ) (2009) (holding that defendant was adequately advised by trial court of his right against self-incrimination despite use of other wording, and noting that defendant had also signed a statement as to his understanding that he was waiving the right not to incriminate himself); Foster v. State, 319 Ga. App. 815, 817 (2) (a) ( 738 SE2d 651 ) (2013) (“[T]

2014Cf. Brown, 290 Ga. at 52 (2) (holding that waiver- of-rights form adequately conveyed core principles of “the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination” through use of other wording); Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 55 , 55-56 & n.2 ( 685 SE2d 281 ) (2009) (holding that defendant was adequately advised by trial court of his right against self-incrimination despite use of other wording, and noting that defendant had also signed a statement as to his understanding that he was waiving the right not to incriminate himself); Foster v. State, 319 Ga. App. 815, 817 (2) (a) ( 738 SE2d 651 ) (2013) (“[T

2014Cf. Brown, 290 Ga. at 52 (2) (holding that waiver-of-rights form adequately conveyed core principles of “the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination” through use of other wording); Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 55 , 55-56 & n.2 ( 685 SE2d 281 ) (2009) (holding that defendant was adequately advised by trial court of his right against self-incrimination despite use of other wording, and noting that defendant had also signed a statement as to his understanding that he was waiving the right not to incriminate himself); Foster v. State, 319 Ga. App. 815, 817 (2) (a) ( 738 SE2d 651 ) (2013) (“[T]

2013See Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 55, 56 ( 685 SE2d 281 ) (2009) (underlying purpose of Boykin — to ensure defendant’s receipt of adequate information about his rights so that he can make an intelligent and voluntary decision about pleading guilty — is met if language used during plea proceeding adequately conveyed to him the core principles of the Boykin rights); Hawes, 281 Ga. at 824 (“[T]he focus, upon review, is whether the record shows that the trial court explained or referred to the right in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant.

2013See Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 55, 56 ( 685 SE2d 281 ) (2009) (underlying purpose of Boykin – to ensure defendant’s receipt of adequate information about his rights so that he can make an intelligent and voluntary decision about pleading guilty – is met if language used during plea proceeding adequately conveyed to him the core principles of the Boykin rights); Hawes, 281 Ga. at 824 (“[T]he focus, upon review, is whether the record shows that the trial court explained or referred to the right in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant.

2025See Middleton v. State, 309 Ga. 337, 345 (3) ( 846 SE2d 73 ) (2020) (It is “a core principle of statutory interpretation that changes in statutory language generally indicate an intent to change the meaning of the statute.”); Barrow v. Raffensperger, 308 Ga. 660, 672 (3) (c) ( 842 SE2d 884 ) (2020) (“When constitutional language is substantively changed, we must give that change effect.”); Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 236 (2) (c) (i) (2017) (in interpreting a constitutional provision, “the text is always our starting point . . . (and often our ending point, as well),” with “the broader contex

2025See Middleton v. State, 309 Ga. 337, 345 (3) ( 846 SE2d 73 ) (2020) (It is “a core principle of statutory interpretation that changes in statutory language generally indicate an intent to change the meaning of the statute.”); Barrow v. Raffensperger, 308 Ga. 660, 672 (3) (c) ( 842 SE2d 884 ) (2020) (“When constitutional language is substantively changed, we must give that change effect.”); Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 236 (2) (c) (i) (2017) (in interpreting a constitutional provision, “the text is always our starting point . . . (and often our ending point, as well),” with “the broader contex

2024One of the possible meanings that McNair attributed to the former statute was that it “requir[ed] the driver making the left turn to exit, i.e., leave, the intersection or other location while the turning vehicle then proceeds to travel in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available 13 to traffic moving in the same direction.” 285 Ga. at 517 (emphasis supplied).

2024One of the possible meanings that McNair attributed to the former statute was that it “requir[ed] the driver making the left turn to exit, i.e., leave, the intersection or other location while the turning vehicle then proceeds to travel in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction.” 285 Ga. at 517 (emphasis supplied).

2022Co. v. Price, 121 Ga. 651, 655 (1) (49 SE 683) (1905) (in personal injury action against railroad by employee, “it was for the jury to say whether or not the plaintiff, on this occasion, acted with due caution and circumspection”); Merchants’ Nat.

2022Co. v. Price, 121 Ga. 651, 655 (1) (49 SE 683) (1905) (in personal injury action against railroad by employee, “it was for the jury to say whether or not the plaintiff, on this occasion, acted with due caution and circumspection”); Merchants’ Nat.

2019Such a reading of course violates a core principle of statutory interpretation 15 that “changes in statutory language generally indicate an intent to change the meaning of the statute.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. Peach Trader Inc., 302 Ga. 504, 514 (III) ( 807 SE2d 840 ) (2017).

2019Such a reading of course violates a core principle of statutory interpretation 15 that “changes in statutory language generally indicate an intent to change the meaning of the statute.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. Peach Trader Inc., 302 Ga. 504, 514 (III) ( 807 SE2d 840 ) (2017).

2019See also Dept. of Transp., 255 Ga. at 132 (3) (b) (“After repeated references to ‘property,’ or ‘any property,’ we cannot ignore the legislature’s specific use of the adjective ‘private’ for the first time.”).

1996Because the justification charge given was inadequate and the requested charge went to the core of the defense with sufficient evidence to support it, a new trial is required. 2 Printup v. State, 217 Ga. App. 495, 496 (3) ( 458 SE2d 662 ) (1995). *867 Decided June 11, 1996 Reconsideration denied June 26, 1996 Michael E.

1996Because the justification charge given was inadequate and the requested charge went to the core of the defense with sufficient evidence to support it, a new trial is required. 2 Printup v. State, 217 Ga. App. 495, 496 (3) ( 458 SE2d 662 ) (1995). *867 Decided June 11, 1996 Reconsideration denied June 26, 1996 Michael E.