core principle in California

2024Code, § 1791.1.) ‘“The core test of merchantability is fitness for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ (Isip v. Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 19, 26 .) Such fitness is shown if the product ‘is “in safe condition and substantially free of defects” . . . .’ (Id. at p. 27.) [¶] ‘When there has been a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, a buyer “may bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief.” (Civ.

2022Code, § 1791.1, subd. (a).)” (Isip v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 19, 26 .) This implied warranty “ ‘arises by operation of law’ and ‘ “provides for a minimum level of quality.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “The core test of merchantability is fitness for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. ([Cal. U. Com.

2015Code, § 1795.5.) Pursuant to Civil Code section 1791.1, subdivision (a), the implied warranty of merchantability requires “that the goods meet each of the following: [¶] (1) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description. [¶] (2) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. [¶] (3) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled. [¶] (4) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label.” “The core test of merchantability is fitness for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. [Citation.]” (Atkinson v. Elk Corporat

2015Code, § 1795.5.) Pursuant to Civil Code section 1791.1, subdivision (a), the implied warranty of merchantability requires “that the goods meet each of the following: [¶] (1) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description. [¶] (2) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. [¶] (3) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled. [¶] (4) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label.” “The core test of merchantability is fitness for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. [Citation.]” (Atkinson v. Elk Corporat

2026(Ibid., citing Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 308 (Luis M.).) The core principle relied upon by these and other courts is that there must be a “ ‘factual nexus’ between the amount sought and the evidence of [the defendant’s] actual conduct.” (A.W., supra, at p. 948; see Luis M., supra, at p. 309 ; In re Kyle T. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 707, 716 (Kyle T.).) Here, such a “ ‘factual nexus’ ” exists between defendant’s conduct and the window installation costs.

2025(Ibid., citing Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 308 (Luis M.).) The core principle relied upon by these and other courts is that there must be a “ ‘factual nexus’ between the amount sought and the evidence of [the defendant’s] actual conduct.” (A.W., supra, at p. 948; see Luis M., supra, at p. 309 ; In re Kyle T. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 707, 716 (Kyle T.).) Here, such a “ ‘factual nexus’ ” exists between defendant’s conduct and the window installation costs.

2026(See Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 777 [decision to “red flag” professor not protected conduct]; Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1072-1073 [finding claims based on a university denying a professor tenure are not protected conduct].) Defendant effectively concedes constructive discharge is a core claim of the challenged causes of action because these allegations are the sole focus of defendant’s second-step analysis. 8 Defendant argues there: “The trial court erroneously concluded [plaintiffs] met their burden of establishing a prima facie ca

2026(See Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 777 [decision to “red flag” professor not protected conduct]; Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1072-1073 [finding claims based on a university denying a professor tenure are not protected conduct].) Defendant effectively concedes constructive discharge is a core claim of the challenged causes of action because these allegations are the sole focus of defendant’s second-step analysis. 8 Defendant argues there: “The trial court erroneously concluded [plaintiffs] met their burden of establishing a prima facie ca

2026(See Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 777 [decision to “red flag” professor not protected conduct]; Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1072-1073 [finding claims based on a university denying a professor tenure are not protected conduct].) Defendant effectively concedes constructive discharge is a core claim of the challenged causes of action because these allegations are the sole focus of defendant’s second-step analysis. 8 Defendant argues there: “The trial court erroneously concluded [plaintiffs] met their burden of establishing a prima facie ca

2026(See Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 777 [decision to “red flag” professor not protected conduct]; Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1072-1073 [finding claims based on a university denying a professor tenure are not protected conduct].) Defendant effectively concedes constructive discharge is a core claim of the challenged causes of action because these allegations are the sole focus of defendant’s second-step analysis. 8 Defendant argues there: “The trial court erroneously concluded [plaintiffs] met their burden of establishing a prima facie ca

2026(Ibid., citing Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 308 (Luis M.).) The core principle relied upon by these and other courts is that there must be a “ ‘factual nexus’ between the amount sought and the evidence of [the defendant’s] actual conduct.” (A.W., supra, at p. 948; see Luis M., supra, at p. 309 ; In re Kyle T. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 707, 716 (Kyle T.).) Here, such a “ ‘factual nexus’ ” exists between defendant’s conduct and the window installation costs.

2026(Ibid., citing Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 308 (Luis M.).) The core principle relied upon by these and other courts is that there must be a “ ‘factual nexus’ between the amount sought and the evidence of [the defendant’s] actual conduct.” (A.W., supra, at p. 948; see Luis M., supra, at p. 309 ; In re Kyle T. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 707, 716 (Kyle T.).) Here, such a “ ‘factual nexus’ ” exists between defendant’s conduct and the window installation costs.

2024Code, § 1794, subd. (a).)’ (Mocek v. Alfa Leisure, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 402, 406 [, fn. omitted.] (Mocek ).)” (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1303 (Mexia).) “. . . [W]hile under a manufacturer’s express warranty the buyer must allow for a reasonable number of repair attempts within 30 days before seeking rescission (§ 1793.2, subds. (b), (d)), that is not the case for the implied warranty of merchantability’s bulwark against fundamental defects.

2009Code, § 1794, subd. (a).)” (Mocek v. Alfa Leisure, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 402, 406 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 546 ] (Mocek).) Although the Uniform Commercial Code provides a similar warranty of merchantability (Cal. U. Com.

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2013(Id. at p. 190; see also People v. Fabert, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d at p. 610 [“comments that penalize the defendant for the exercise of her right to counsel, and that also strike at the core of her defense, cannot be considered harmless error”]; but see People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 66 [brief and mild reference to the defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel was harmless error]; People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 199 .) The prosecutor’s comments here equating Kennedy’s consultation with a defense counsel with guilt would clearly constitute a “penalty” on Kenne

2013(Id. at p. 190; see also People v. Fabert, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d at p. 610 [“comments that penalize the defendant for the exercise of her right to counsel, and that also strike at the core of her defense, cannot be considered harmless error”]; but see People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 66 [brief and mild reference to the defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel was harmless error]; People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 199 .) The prosecutor’s comments here equating Kennedy’s consultation with a defense counsel with guilt would clearly constitute a “penalty” on Kenne

2010Constitutionally based prophylactic rules, such as a prior-immunity requirement in some cases, have arisen to protect the core privilege, but the right against self-incrimination is not itself violated until statements obtained by compulsion are used in criminal proceedings against the person from whom the statements were obtained. ( Chavez, supra, 538 U.S. 760, 767-773 (plur. opn. of Thomas, J.); see also id. ... at pp. 777-778 (conc. opn. of Souter, J.).)" ( 45 Cal.4th at p. 727 .) We do not understand the court's opinion in Spielbauer to be inconsistent with our analysis.

2010Constitutionally based prophylactic rules, such as a prior-immunity requirement in some cases, have arisen to protect the core privilege, but the right against self-incrimination is not itself violated until statements obtained by compulsion are used in criminal proceedings against the person from whom the statements were obtained. ( Chavez, supra, 538 U.S. 760, 767-773 (plur. opn. of Thomas, J.); see also id. ... at pp. 777-778 (conc. opn. of Souter, J.).)" ( 45 Cal.4th at p. 727 .) We do not understand the court's opinion in Spielbauer to be inconsistent with our analysis.

2007The core test of merchantability is fitness for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. (§ 2314.)” (Atkinson v. Elk Corporation of Texas (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 212, 228 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 247 ], fn. omitted; see also Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104, 117-118 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 681 , 534 P.2d 377 ].) *27 The instruction given by the trial court in this action fairly sets forth the principles in the above cited authorities.

2007The core test of merchantability is fitness for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. (§ 2314.)” (Atkinson v. Elk Corporation of Texas (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 212, 228 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 247 ], fn. omitted; see also Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104, 117-118 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 681 , 534 P.2d 377 ].) *27 The instruction given by the trial court in this action fairly sets forth the principles in the above cited authorities.

2024(Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234 , 1246– 1247; CACI No. 3210; § 1794.) “Merchantability, as pertinent here, means that the goods ‘[p]ass without objection in the trade under the contract description,’ and are ‘fit for the ordinary 29 purposes for which such goods are used.’ (§ 1791.1, subd. (a).)” 5 (Brand, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1545 .) “ ‘ “The core test of merchantability is fitness for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used.” ’ ” (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1303 .) An unmerchantable vehicle is typ

2021Code, § 1791.1(a).)’” (Isip v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 19, 26 .) “‘The core test of merchantability is fitness for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Such fitness is shown if the product is “‘in safe condition and substantially free of defects.’” (Id. at p. 27.) “[A] new car need not ‘be perfect in every detail’; rather, its implied merchantability ‘requires only that a vehicle be reasonably suited for ordinary use.’” (Brand v. Hyundai Motor America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1546 (Brand).) 6 In its motion, respondent

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2015Constitutionally based prophylactic rules, such as a prior-immunity requirement in some cases, have arisen to protect the core privilege, but the right against self-incrimination is not itself violated until statements obtained by compulsion are used in criminal proceedings against the person from whom the statements were obtained.” (Spielbauer, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 727 .) Therefore, the court concluded Spielbauer’s dismissal was constitutionally valid.

2014Constitutionally based prophylactic rules, such as a prior-immunity requirement in some cases, have arisen to protect the core privilege, but the right against self- incrimination is not itself violated until statements obtained by compulsion are used in 10 criminal proceedings against the person from whom the statements were obtained.” (Spielbauer, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 727 .) Spielbauer provides no support for defendant’s claim that the subdivision (b)(3) condition itself violated the Fifth Amendment.

2024Code, § 1794, subd. (a).)’ (Mocek v. Alfa Leisure, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 402, 406 [, fn. omitted.] (Mocek ).)” (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1303 (Mexia).) “. . . [W]hile under a manufacturer’s express warranty the buyer must allow for a reasonable number of repair attempts within 30 days before seeking rescission (§ 1793.2, subds. (b), (d)), that is not the case for the implied warranty of merchantability’s bulwark against fundamental defects.

2024(Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234 , 1246– 1247; CACI No. 3210; § 1794.) “Merchantability, as pertinent here, means that the goods ‘[p]ass without objection in the trade under the contract description,’ and are ‘fit for the ordinary 29 purposes for which such goods are used.’ (§ 1791.1, subd. (a).)” 5 (Brand, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1545 .) “ ‘ “The core test of merchantability is fitness for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used.” ’ ” (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1303 .) An unmerchantable vehicle is typ

2023The analysis of a suppression motion focuses on violations of the statutory procedures and not on constitutional violations, because while it is possible to violate a core principle of the statute without violating the Fourth Amendment it would not seem possible to violate the Fourth Amendment without also violating a core statutory principle.” (Jackson, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 149 , fns. omitted].) We adopt the Jackson three-prong inquiry to evaluate motions to suppress under the ECPA.

2013(See Jackson, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 146 [stating that in the context of motions to suppress wiretap evidence, “[t]he analysis . . . focuses on violations of the statutory procedures and not on constitutional violations, because while it is possible to violate a core principle of the [wiretap] statute without violating the Fourth Amendment it would not seem possible to violate the Fourth Amendment without also violating a core statutory principle.]”.) The dispositive issue here, then, is whether there was an adequate showing of necessity.

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2018The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.' " ( Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 , 793, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 288 P.3d 717 ; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 , 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 685 P.2d 1152 .) It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." ( *684 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Ca

2014The Court held that the governing IWC Wage Order “incorporate[d] a quantitative method for determining whether an employee is an outside salesperson that differs in some respect from the qualitative method employed under federal law.” (Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 798 .) The Court noted that “[t]he IWC’s distinct approach to defining categorical overtime exemptions can also be illustrated in its treatment of the exemption for administrative, executive, and professional employees. [Citation.] The federal exemption for this category of employees adopts a core test which focuses on the 24 emp

2013(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070, subd. 1(A).)” (Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 798, fn. 4.) With regard to such employees, “[t]he federal exemption for this category of employees adopts a core test which focuses on the employee’s ‘primary duty’; if the ‘primary duty’ test is met, then he or she is deemed exempt regardless of how much time the individual actually spends performing the primary duty. ( 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1 (f), 541.2(e)(2), and 541.3(e) (1998).) By contrast, the state law exemption, as in the case of ‘outside salespersons,’ adopts the requirement that the employee must be ‘enga

2013(People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1253 ; People v. Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 420 .) Solomon’s discussion of premeditation and deliberation emphasizes the extent of reflection on the decision to kill: “Defendant overlooks a core principle that has guided appellate courts in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and deliberation for over 60 years: „The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection.‟ [Citations.]” ( Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 812-813.) The speed by which such reflection takes place may not be as sh

2010(See Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 812-813 [“Defendant overlooks a core principle that has guided appellate courts in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and deliberation for over 60 years: ‘The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection.’ ”].) The speed by which such reflection takes place may not be as short as the flicker or twinkling of an eye (see Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 829 [“Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the prosecutor did not suggest premeditation and deliberation could occur in the ‘flick of an eye’ rath