litigation privilege in Maryland

2024To be sure, this Court has recognized that the scope of the litigation privilege may be expanded when “a broad reading of absolute privilege makes sense from a policy perspective.” Mixter, 215 Md.

2024App. 536 (2013), counter that the litigation privilege now extends to other tort claims, including these allegations under the MDCDA and MCPA that Collectors made “false claims in a debt collection lawsuit.” In Collectors’ view, restricting the privilege “to ‘defamation-like torts’ is mistaken” because “[t]his Court has made clear that ‘the policy behind the privilege would be severely undercut if the absolute privilege were to be regarded as less than a bar to all actions arising out of the ‘conduct of parties and/or witnesses in connection with a judicial proceeding.’” See id. at 547 (quotin

2024With respect to Innovations Surgery Center and Innovative GYN Care, the circuit court also held that “the litigation privilege extends to them as parties[.]” Citing O’Brien & Gere Eng’rs, Inc. v. City of Salisbury, 447 Md. 394 (2016), aff’g, 222 Md.

2024With respect to Innovations Surgery Center and Innovative GYN Care, the circuit court also held that “the litigation privilege extends to them as parties[.]” Citing O’Brien & Gere Eng’rs, Inc. v. City of Salisbury, 447 Md. 394 (2016), aff’g, 222 Md.

2024Law § 14-202(8) based on mortgage lender Nationstar’s “claim of a right to assess a property inspection fee, the illegality of the fee that Nationstar claimed, and Nationstar’s knowledge that the right did not exist.” • In Cain, 475 Md. at 13, 29-30 , the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that a defendant- collector who purchased consumer debts could be held liable under MCDCA § 14- 202(8), subject to a three-year limitations period, for improper debt collection activities in connection with money judgments it obtained against consumers at a time when the debt collector “was not licensed as a co

2024Law § 14-202(8) based on mortgage lender Nationstar’s “claim of a right to assess a property inspection fee, the illegality of the fee that Nationstar claimed, and Nationstar’s knowledge that the right did not exist.” • In Cain, 475 Md. at 13, 29-30 , the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that a defendant- collector who purchased consumer debts could be held liable under MCDCA § 14- 202(8), subject to a three-year limitations period, for improper debt collection activities in connection with money judgments it obtained against consumers at a time when the debt collector “was not licensed as a co

2024See Komarova v. Nat’l Credit Acceptance, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 324, 336-37 (2009); Scott v. Am.

2024See Komarova v. Nat’l Credit Acceptance, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 324, 336-37 (2009); Scott v. Am.

2024As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he statutory text makes clear that there is no blanket common law litigation immunity from the requirements of the FDCPA.” Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 23031 (explaining that “common law immunities cannot trump the [FDCPA’s] clear application to the litigating activities of attorneys”); see also Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995) (holding that the FDCPA “applies to attorneys who ‘regularly’ engage in consumer-debt- collection activity, even when that activity consists of litigation”); Allen ex rel.

2024As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he statutory text makes clear that there is no blanket common law litigation immunity from the requirements of the FDCPA.” Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 23031 (explaining that “common law immunities cannot trump the [FDCPA’s] clear application to the litigating activities of attorneys”); see also Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995) (holding that the FDCPA “applies to attorneys who ‘regularly’ engage in consumer-debt- collection activity, even when that activity consists of litigation”); Allen ex rel.

2024App. 536 (2013), counter that the litigation privilege now extends to other tort claims, including these allegations under the MDCDA and MCPA that Collectors made “false claims in a debt collection lawsuit.” In Collectors’ view, restricting the privilege “to ‘defamation-like torts’ is mistaken” because “[t]his Court has made clear that ‘the policy behind the privilege would be severely undercut if the absolute privilege were to be regarded as less than a bar to all actions arising out of the ‘conduct of parties and/or witnesses in connection with a judicial proceeding.’” See id. at 547 (quotin

2024App. 536 (2013), counter that the litigation privilege now extends to other tort claims, including these allegations under the MDCDA and MCPA that Collectors made “false claims in a debt collection lawsuit.” In Collectors’ view, restricting the privilege “to ‘defamation-like torts’ is mistaken” because “[t]his Court has made clear that ‘the policy behind the privilege would be severely undercut if the absolute privilege were to be regarded as less than a bar to all actions arising out of the ‘conduct of parties and/or witnesses in connection with a judicial proceeding.’” See id. at 547 (quotin

2024Law § 14-202(8) based on mortgage lender Nationstar’s “claim of a right to assess a property inspection fee, the illegality of the fee that Nationstar claimed, and Nationstar’s knowledge that the right did not exist.” • In Cain, 475 Md. at 13, 29-30 , the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that a defendant- collector who purchased consumer debts could be held liable under MCDCA § 14- 202(8), subject to a three-year limitations period, for improper debt collection activities in connection with money judgments it obtained against consumers at a time when the debt collector “was not licensed as a co

2024Law § 14-202(8) based on mortgage lender Nationstar’s “claim of a right to assess a property inspection fee, the illegality of the fee that Nationstar claimed, and Nationstar’s knowledge that the right did not exist.” • In Cain, 475 Md. at 13, 29-30 , the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that a defendant- collector who purchased consumer debts could be held liable under MCDCA § 14- 202(8), subject to a three-year limitations period, for improper debt collection activities in connection with money judgments it obtained against consumers at a time when the debt collector “was not licensed as a co

2024The Court expressly disapproved the argument, echoed here in the circuit court’s reasoning that the litigation privilege is necessary to preserve access to the courts, that applying these statutory consumer protections to “attorney debt collectors” who litigate claims with knowledge that a debt is not owed would “‘chill legitimate advocacy and interfere with the attorney-client relationship.’” Id. at 570, 571. 29 • NationStarMortg., LLC v. Kemp, 476 Md. 149, 161, 193 (2021), held that a mortgagee stated a viable claim under Com.

2024The Court expressly disapproved the argument, echoed here in the circuit court’s reasoning that the litigation privilege is necessary to preserve access to the courts, that applying these statutory consumer protections to “attorney debt collectors” who litigate claims with knowledge that a debt is not owed would “‘chill legitimate advocacy and interfere with the attorney-client relationship.’” Id. at 570, 571. 29 • NationStarMortg., LLC v. Kemp, 476 Md. 149, 161, 193 (2021), held that a mortgagee stated a viable claim under Com.

2024As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he statutory text makes clear that there is no blanket common law litigation immunity from the requirements of the FDCPA.” Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 23031 (explaining that “common law immunities cannot trump the [FDCPA’s] clear application to the litigating activities of attorneys”); see also Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995) (holding that the FDCPA “applies to attorneys who ‘regularly’ engage in consumer-debt- collection activity, even when that activity consists of litigation”); Allen ex rel.

2024As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he statutory text makes clear that there is no blanket common law litigation immunity from the requirements of the FDCPA.” Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 23031 (explaining that “common law immunities cannot trump the [FDCPA’s] clear application to the litigating activities of attorneys”); see also Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995) (holding that the FDCPA “applies to attorneys who ‘regularly’ engage in consumer-debt- collection activity, even when that activity consists of litigation”); Allen ex rel.

2024See generally Faulk v. State’s Att’y for Harford Cnty., 299 Md. 493, 506 (1984) 25 (“Where the purpose and language of a federal statute are substantially the same as that of a later state statute, interpretations of the federal statute are ordinarily persuasive.”).

2024See generally Faulk v. State’s Att’y for Harford Cnty., 299 Md. 493, 506 (1984) 25 (“Where the purpose and language of a federal statute are substantially the same as that of a later state statute, interpretations of the federal statute are ordinarily persuasive.”).

2024With respect to Innovations Surgery Center and Innovative GYN Care, the circuit court also held that “the litigation privilege extends to them as parties[.]” Citing O’Brien & Gere Eng’rs, Inc. v. City of Salisbury, 447 Md. 394 (2016), aff’g, 222 Md.

2024Affirming this Court, the Supreme Court held that the litigation privilege covered statements denigrating the professional competency of the engineering firm, made by the City’s witnesses during third-party litigation with a non-settling construction manager, because the challenged “statements were essential to the City’s case that [the manager] breached its contract with the City” and “were made in the mutually anticipated court proceedings in which both parties clearly contemplated that [the engineering firm’s] work would be discussed.” Id. at 398-414, 417 .

2024As our Supreme Court has explained, “if the General Assembly 6 Consumers and Amici also direct our attention to extra-jurisdictional cases as additional persuasive authority for declining to recognize a litigation privilege for prohibited consumer debt collection claims because “[u]nfair debt collection practices could be immunized merely by filing suit on the debt.” People v. Persolve, LLC., 218 Cal. App. 4th 1267, 1275 (2013).

2024As our Supreme Court has explained, “if the General Assembly 6 Consumers and Amici also direct our attention to extra-jurisdictional cases as additional persuasive authority for declining to recognize a litigation privilege for prohibited consumer debt collection claims because “[u]nfair debt collection practices could be immunized merely by filing suit on the debt.” People v. Persolve, LLC., 218 Cal. App. 4th 1267, 1275 (2013).

2024Servs., Ltd., 44 F. Supp. 3d 84, 92 (D.D.C. 2014) (declining to “broaden the application of the District of Columbia’s litigation privilege doctrine to include the Debt Collection Practices Act”); Campos v. Brooksbank, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278 (D.N.M. 2000) (recognizing that litigation privilege would allow debt collector to “be insulated from defending a . . . claim simply because the alleged misrepresentations and abuses occurred within an otherwise sanctioned activity”); Sykes v. Mel Harris &Assocs., LLC, 757 F. Supp. 2d 413, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Because plaintiffs have not claimed defam

2024Servs., Ltd., 44 F. Supp. 3d 84, 92 (D.D.C. 2014) (declining to “broaden the application of the District of Columbia’s litigation privilege doctrine to include the Debt Collection Practices Act”); Campos v. Brooksbank, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278 (D.N.M. 2000) (recognizing that litigation privilege would allow debt collector to “be insulated from defending a . . . claim simply because the alleged misrepresentations and abuses occurred within an otherwise sanctioned activity”); Sykes v. Mel Harris &Assocs., LLC, 757 F. Supp. 2d 413, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Because plaintiffs have not claimed defam

2024Servs., Ltd., 44 F. Supp. 3d 84, 92 (D.D.C. 2014) (declining to “broaden the application of the District of Columbia’s litigation privilege doctrine to include the Debt Collection Practices Act”); Campos v. Brooksbank, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278 (D.N.M. 2000) (recognizing that litigation privilege would allow debt collector to “be insulated from defending a . . . claim simply because the alleged misrepresentations and abuses occurred within an otherwise sanctioned activity”); Sykes v. Mel Harris &Assocs., LLC, 757 F. Supp. 2d 413, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Because plaintiffs have not claimed defam

2024Servs., Ltd., 44 F. Supp. 3d 84, 92 (D.D.C. 2014) (declining to “broaden the application of the District of Columbia’s litigation privilege doctrine to include the Debt Collection Practices Act”); Campos v. Brooksbank, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278 (D.N.M. 2000) (recognizing that litigation privilege would allow debt collector to “be insulated from defending a . . . claim simply because the alleged misrepresentations and abuses occurred within an otherwise sanctioned activity”); Sykes v. Mel Harris &Assocs., LLC, 757 F. Supp. 2d 413, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Because plaintiffs have not claimed defam

2024Servs., Ltd., 44 F. Supp. 3d 84, 92 (D.D.C. 2014) (declining to “broaden the application of the District of Columbia’s litigation privilege doctrine to include the Debt Collection Practices Act”); Campos v. Brooksbank, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278 (D.N.M. 2000) (recognizing that litigation privilege would allow debt collector to “be insulated from defending a . . . claim simply because the alleged misrepresentations and abuses occurred within an otherwise sanctioned activity”); Sykes v. Mel Harris &Assocs., LLC, 757 F. Supp. 2d 413, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Because plaintiffs have not claimed defam

2024Servs., Ltd., 44 F. Supp. 3d 84, 92 (D.D.C. 2014) (declining to “broaden the application of the District of Columbia’s litigation privilege doctrine to include the Debt Collection Practices Act”); Campos v. Brooksbank, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278 (D.N.M. 2000) (recognizing that litigation privilege would allow debt collector to “be insulated from defending a . . . claim simply because the alleged misrepresentations and abuses occurred within an otherwise sanctioned activity”); Sykes v. Mel Harris &Assocs., LLC, 757 F. Supp. 2d 413, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Because plaintiffs have not claimed defam

2021Id. (quoting Boyd v. Bowen, 145 Md.

2005Boyd, 145 Md.App. at 656 , 806 A.2d 314 .

2016In Wentland , the California intermediate appellate court concluded, in part, that the litigation privilege “should not apply in this breach of contract case” because “one who validly contracts not to speak ... has [ ] waived the protection of the litigation privilege.” Id. at 116.

2016See, e.g., Rain, 626 F.3d at 377 ; Wentland, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d at 114 . 15 Drawing from these courts, we now inquire “whether applying the litigation privilege in this case would promote the due administration of justice and free expression by participants in judicial proceedings.” Rain, 626 F.3d at 378 .

2016See, e.g., Rain, 626 F.3d at 377 ; Wentland, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d at 114 . 15 Drawing from these courts, we now inquire “whether applying the litigation privilege in this case would promote the due administration of justice and free expression by participants in judicial proceedings.” Rain, 626 F.3d at 378 .

2016See, e.g., Rain, 626 F.3d at 377 ; Wentland, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d at 114 . 15 Drawing from these courts, we now inquire “whether applying the litigation privilege in this case would promote the due administration of justice and free expression by participants in judicial proceedings.” Rain, 626 F.3d at 378 .

2016Co., 70 Cal.App.4th 494 , 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 726, 731 (1999) prohibited the use of the litigation privilege in the face of a breach of contract claim.

2016Co., 70 Cal.App.4th 494 , 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 726, 731 (1999) prohibited the use of the litigation privilege in the face of a breach of contract claim.

2016See Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. v. Porro, 53 F.Supp.3d 325, 343-44 (D.Mass.2014) (applying Massachusetts law); Johnson v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 379 Ill.Dec. 626 , 7 N.E.3d 52 , 56 (Ill.App.Ct.2014); Vivian v. Labrucherie, 214 Cal.App.4th 267 , 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 707, 715 (2013); Rain v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 626 F.3d 372, 377-78 (7th Cir.2010) (applying Indiana law); Rickenbach v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 635 F.Supp.2d 389, 401-02 (D.N.J.2009) (applying New Jersey law); Crockett & Myers, Ltd. v. Napier, Fitzgerald & Kirby, LLP, 440 F.Supp.2d 1184, 1195-97 (D.Nev.2006) (applying Nevada law); Arts4All, Lt

2016In any event, the court in Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. v. Porro applied the litigation privilege even though the allegedly impermissible statements were made voluntarily. 53 F.Supp.3d 325 , 342 n. 3 (D.Mass.2014) ("This court recognizes that ... the defendants were not compelled by the ethical rules to file the challenged documents....”). 14 .

2016See Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. v. Porro, 53 F.Supp.3d 325, 343-44 (D.Mass.2014) (applying Massachusetts law); Johnson v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 379 Ill.Dec. 626 , 7 N.E.3d 52 , 56 (Ill.App.Ct.2014); Vivian v. Labrucherie, 214 Cal.App.4th 267 , 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 707, 715 (2013); Rain v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 626 F.3d 372, 377-78 (7th Cir.2010) (applying Indiana law); Rickenbach v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 635 F.Supp.2d 389, 401-02 (D.N.J.2009) (applying New Jersey law); Crockett & Myers, Ltd. v. Napier, Fitzgerald & Kirby, LLP, 440 F.Supp.2d 1184, 1195-97 (D.Nev.2006) (applying Nevada law); Arts4All, Lt

2016See Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. v. Porro, 53 F.Supp.3d 325, 343-44 (D.Mass.2014) (applying Massachusetts law); Johnson v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 379 Ill.Dec. 626 , 7 N.E.3d 52 , 56 (Ill.App.Ct.2014); Vivian v. Labrucherie, 214 Cal.App.4th 267 , 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 707, 715 (2013); Rain v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 626 F.3d 372, 377-78 (7th Cir.2010) (applying Indiana law); Rickenbach v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 635 F.Supp.2d 389, 401-02 (D.N.J.2009) (applying New Jersey law); Crockett & Myers, Ltd. v. Napier, Fitzgerald & Kirby, LLP, 440 F.Supp.2d 1184, 1195-97 (D.Nev.2006) (applying Nevada law); Arts4All, Lt

2016It sought this assurance because, OBG argues, “it would no longer be a party to the City’s continuing WWTP Litigation” *421 and “no longer have the ability or be in a position to effectively defend itself against aspersions cast upon it by the City.” OBG avers that the promise not to disparage “was clear, unqualified, and unlimited.” “We have defined waiver as ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right.’ ” Smith v. State, 394 Md. 184, 201 , 905 A.2d 315 (2006) (attorney-client privilege) (citations omitted); see Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 137 , 345 A.2d 830 (1975) (“[T]he intent to

2016It sought this assurance because, OBG argues, “it would no longer be a party to the City’s continuing WWTP Litigation” *421 and “no longer have the ability or be in a position to effectively defend itself against aspersions cast upon it by the City.” OBG avers that the promise not to disparage “was clear, unqualified, and unlimited.” “We have defined waiver as ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right.’ ” Smith v. State, 394 Md. 184, 201 , 905 A.2d 315 (2006) (attorney-client privilege) (citations omitted); see Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 137 , 345 A.2d 830 (1975) (“[T]he intent to

2016See Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. v. Porro, 53 F.Supp.3d 325, 343-44 (D.Mass.2014) (applying Massachusetts law); Johnson v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 379 Ill.Dec. 626 , 7 N.E.3d 52 , 56 (Ill.App.Ct.2014); Vivian v. Labrucherie, 214 Cal.App.4th 267 , 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 707, 715 (2013); Rain v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 626 F.3d 372, 377-78 (7th Cir.2010) (applying Indiana law); Rickenbach v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 635 F.Supp.2d 389, 401-02 (D.N.J.2009) (applying New Jersey law); Crockett & Myers, Ltd. v. Napier, Fitzgerald & Kirby, LLP, 440 F.Supp.2d 1184, 1195-97 (D.Nev.2006) (applying Nevada law); Arts4All, Lt

2016See Imperial, 351 Md. at 45, 716 A.2d 244 (“As a matter of public policy, the balance is struck heavily in favor of the free disclosure of information during a judicial proceeding.”).