litigation privilege in California

2026As appellants recognize, “Peniche contends that CHP was negligent when the criminal investigation team did not seal or partition her sexual photos and videos.” The failure to seal and partition is not “communicative in nature.” Second, for the litigation privilege to apply, a communication must not only relate to the proceeding but must also be made “to achieve the objects of the litigation.” (Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 212 .) Appellants do not explain, and we do not see, how Hammond’s conversation with Guzman, or any sharing of Peniche’s sexual material outside the investigat

2026Code, § 47.) It applies to communications made (1) in judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants; (3) to achieve litigation objectives; (4) with “some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 .) “To effect its purposes—access to the courts without fear of later harassment by derivative tort actions, . . . giving finality to judgments, and avoiding endless litigation—the litigation privilege ‘is absolute and applies regardless of malice,’ and ‘ “has been given broad application.” ’ ” (Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan L

2026This privilege is absolute in nature, applying ‘to all publications, irrespective of their maliciousness.’ [Citation.] ‘The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to 17 any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.’ [Citation.]” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241 .) The litigation privilege “ ‘derives from common law principles establishing a

2026Because the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action was derivative of the previous causes of action, it too was based on the complaint, the settlement negotiations, or both, all of which were protected activity. 18 litigation privilege precludes a defendant’s liability on the claims.’”’” (Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 361 , 382; see Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 115 .) Under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), a “privileged publication or broadcast is one made” in any “judicial

2026Code, § 47.) It applies to communications made (1) in judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants; (3) to achieve litigation objectives; (4) with “some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 .) “To effect its purposes—access to the courts without fear of later harassment by derivative tort actions, . . . giving finality to judgments, and avoiding endless litigation—the litigation privilege ‘is absolute and applies regardless of malice,’ and ‘ “has been given broad application.” ’ ” (Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan L

2026Code, § 47.) It applies to communications made (1) in judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants; (3) to achieve litigation objectives; (4) with “some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 .) “To effect its purposes—access to the courts without fear of later harassment by derivative tort actions, . . . giving finality to judgments, and avoiding endless litigation—the litigation privilege ‘is absolute and applies regardless of malice,’ and ‘ “has been given broad application.” ’ ” (Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan L

2026Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) provides, in relevant part: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] … [¶] … [i]n any … judicial proceeding, [and/or] in any other official proceeding authorized by law[.]” The litigation privilege “is relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323 .) Thus, if the litigation privilege precludes a finding of liability for breach on the part of Mario and Sienna, Stockdale cann

2026(Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 323 [litigation privilege “may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing”]; Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 793, 814 [“ ‘A plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing [in responding to a special motion to strike] if the litigation privilege precludes the defendant’s liability on the claim’ ”].) DISPOSITION The trial court’s order granting the special motion to strike is affirmed.

2026(See Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1249 [“We contemplate no communication that is more clearly protected by the litigation privilege than the filing of a legal action.”]; Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1195 [“we can 19 imagine few communicative acts more clearly within the scope of the [litigation] privilege than . . . filing the complaint and subsequent pleadings in the litigation”]; see also Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1058 [the “‘[p]leadings and process in a case are generally viewed as privileged communications’”]; Herter

2025(Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 784 ; Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1194-1195 .) Appellants’ arguments concerning Business and Professions Code section 16600 again fail to show error, because even meritless litigation is protected activity and is covered by the litigation privilege.

2026Our Supreme Court has already held “the [litigation] privilege protects against all tort causes of action except for malicious prosecution, including those alleging invasion of privacy.” (Jacob B. v. County of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 952 , italics added (Jacob B.); see also Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 215 .) It squarely “bars a privacy cause of action whether labeled as based on common law, statute, or Constitution.” (Jacob B., at p. 962; see also Ribas, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 364– 365 [privilege bars common law and statutory invasion of privacy].) In Jacob B., the Supreme Court con

2026Fowler Construction . . . formulated . . . is defective and inadequate . . . .” She further alleges that “the only motivating purpose” of the contract between Fowler Construction and Sakai “was to perform the necessary repairs to prevent water intrusion to Plaintiff’s property.” The litigation privilege is found in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), which provides that a “publication” or “broadcast” made in any judicial proceeding is privileged. “‘The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants o

2025(See id. at pp. 23–25.) The trial court granted motions in limine to exclude, pursuant to the litigation privilege and the parol evidence rule, “all prelitigation communications made by [certain defendants]” to plaintiffs—including the reports plaintiffs alleged “had fraudulently induced [plaintiffs] to execute the [settlement and] releases.” (Id. at p. 26.) This ruling had the effect of excluding virtually all communications supporting plaintiffs’ fraud and related claims.

2024A. Litigation Privilege “A plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on the merits of a cause of action for anti-SLAPP purposes where the cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege codified in Civil Code section 47. [Citations.] ‘The litigation privilege precludes liability arising from a publication or broadcast made in a judicial proceeding or other official proceeding. “ ‘The usual 20 formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve th

2026(Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 211 ; Mero v. Sadoff (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1480 .) Jesse is also correct that the litigation privilege generally “applies only to communicative acts and does not privilege tortious courses of conduct.” (Kupiec v. American Internat.

2026(Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 209 ; see Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1492 [“the litigation privilege has been held to apply broadly to all but a very few types of tort actions based on a privileged communication”].) This includes claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with prospective economic advantage, and invasion of privacy, among others.

2026Fowler Construction . . . formulated . . . is defective and inadequate . . . .” She further alleges that “the only motivating purpose” of the contract between Fowler Construction and Sakai “was to perform the necessary repairs to prevent water intrusion to Plaintiff’s property.” The litigation privilege is found in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), which provides that a “publication” or “broadcast” made in any judicial proceeding is privileged. “‘The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants o

2026The litigation privilege is “ ‘interpreted expansively.’ ” (Timothy W. v. Julie W. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 648 , 662.) “Any doubt about whether the privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it.” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 913 .) Here, Cruz alleged causes of action for obstruction of an easement, interference with sale of property, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment against the Dingizians.3 As discussed, the alleged bases for these causes of action included the Dingizians’ “legal threats” or “threats of frivolo

2025(Brown, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 727 .) Both communications are also not subject to the litigation privilege because defendants did not make the statements with the intent they would assist the Title IX investigation. ( Hagberg, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 360-361.) Neither communication is subject to the fair and true reporting privilege because the communications do not reference a potential Title IX proceeding.

2025Co. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 521 , 544.) “[T]he critical question is the aim of the communication, not the forum in which it takes place.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 368 .) “If the communication is made ‘in anticipation of or [is] designed to prompt official proceedings, the communication is protected.’” (Ibid.) Assuming, without deciding, the litigation privilege applies to 1099 forms filed with the IRS, it does not bar plaintiff’s contract claim.

2025Even if we could construe the allegations in the draft complaint to be sufficiently menacing, Hagele’s complaint still lacked minimal merit because 9 the allegations were protected by the litigation privilege.2 “ ‘[C]ommunications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) [citation],[3] [and] such statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16.’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 .) “ ‘ “

2023Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 .) “ ‘Filing a lawsuit is an act in furtherance of the constitutional right of petition, regardless of whether it has merit.’ ” (Trapp v. Naiman (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 113, 120 .) In addition, filing a legal action is protected by the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47.

2026(Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 209 ; see Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1492 [“the litigation privilege has been held to apply broadly to all but a very few types of tort actions based on a privileged communication”].) This includes claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with prospective economic advantage, and invasion of privacy, among others.

2026Applying the litigation privilege to the breach of contract cause of action “furthers the policy of allowing access to the courts without fear of harassing derivative actions.” (Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1498 ; see id. at p. 1497 [litigation privilege barred a breach of contract cause of action where the “same communicative conduct formed the basis for the tort and breach of contract causes of action”].) 20 The litigation privilege also bars Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak’s causes of action for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentat

2026Our Supreme Court has already held “the [litigation] privilege protects against all tort causes of action except for malicious prosecution, including those alleging invasion of privacy.” (Jacob B. v. County of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 952 , italics added (Jacob B.); see also Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 215 .) It squarely “bars a privacy cause of action whether labeled as based on common law, statute, or Constitution.” (Jacob B., at p. 962; see also Ribas, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 364– 365 [privilege bars common law and statutory invasion of privacy].) In Jacob B., the Supreme Court con

2026GenMark responds that given its limited 10 Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355 , 365—which held that the privilege did not bar the pursuit of a statutory remedy by a victim of telephonic eavesdropping that occurred before a judicial proceeding was commenced— and Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202 , 205–206, 209—which deemed the privilege inapplicable to the noncommunicative act of secretly recording telephone conversations—cited by Landlords to suggest that illegal acts are not protected by the privilege are readily distinguishable. 15 role as a subpoenaed party, any proposed torts would be

2020The Litigation Privilege, Overview The litigation privilege, codified at Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), “states the long-established rule that publications made in the course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged.” (Albertson v. Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 379 [former Civ.

2019Code, § 47, subd. (b).) The principle purpose of this litigation privilege is to "afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions." ( Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205 , 213, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 ( Silberg ).) *243 The privilege applies to all tort actions except malicious prosecution. ( Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 216 , 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 .) Malicious prosecution actions are excluded because the " 'policy of encouraging free access to the courts ...

2026As to the first prong, the court noted: “Stockdale agrees its breach of contract claim arises from petitioning activity and the court’s analysis requires review of prong two under the [a]nti-SLAPP Statute. [¶] As both parties agree prong one is satisfied, a discussion is not necessary here.” (i) Defendants’ Disclosures Were Not Protected by the Litigation Privilege With respect to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court observed: “[Stockdale] argues that while [Mario and Seanna] raise several ancillary arguments in their [a]nti-SLAPP [m]otion, the central claim is essentially th

2026In analyzing this issue, the trial court further stated: “[Stockdale] contends that in reaching this decision [Wentland] relied on the reasoning of ‘the Supreme Court majority in [Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 94 ] that a defendant who contracts not to speak or petition has waived the right to anti-SLAPP protection if he later breached the contract.’ ([ Wentland, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th] at p. 1492 [citing [Navellier], supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 94 ].)” The court added: “Wentland also relied on the finding in a later Navellier decision that ‘the litigation privilege would not bar [a] breach

2026(Cf. Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1144, fn. 3 [in dicta, reasoning that Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d) does not apply to statements made in anticipation of litigation].) Wilson correctly notes that the litigation privilege found in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) protects prelitigation activity.

2024Although the specific conclusion reached in Rothman—that “the litigation privilege should not be extended to ‘litigating in the press’” (Rothman, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1149 )—is not directly 4 The Silberg court cited three cases for this proposition: Washer v. Bank of America (1943) 21 Cal.2d 822 , overruled on other grounds in MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 536, 551 ; Carpenter v. Ashley (1906) 148 Cal. 422 ; and Irwin v. Newby (1929) 102 Cal.App. 110 .

2026In analyzing this issue, the trial court further stated: “[Stockdale] contends that in reaching this decision [Wentland] relied on the reasoning of ‘the Supreme Court majority in [Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 94 ] that a defendant who contracts not to speak or petition has waived the right to anti-SLAPP protection if he later breached the contract.’ ([ Wentland, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th] at p. 1492 [citing [Navellier], supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 94 ].)” The court added: “Wentland also relied on the finding in a later Navellier decision that ‘the litigation privilege would not bar [a] breach

2026Allowing such comments to be made in litigation, shielded by the privilege, invites further litigation as to their accuracy and undermines the settlement reached in the Parkview Terrace matter.” (Wentland, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1494 .) Wentland cited Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 94 in noting, “Just as one who validly contracts not to speak waives the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute [citation], so too has he waived the protection of the litigation privilege.” (Wentland, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1494 .) Wentland also cited Navellier II, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at page 774

2026(See Rittiman v. Public Utilities Com. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1018 , 1033 [“We . . . are bound to follow Supreme Court precedent.”].) In fact, the Komarova court itself analyzed the litigation privilege bar differently for the two causes of action before it: a novel cause of action and an intentional infliction of emotional distress tort. ( Komarova, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 337, 341.) Despite concluding an exception was warranted for the former, it readily acknowledged the latter was barred because “[i]t is well settled that the litigation privilege bars causes of action for intentional i

2025To be sure, the litigation privilege will not bar liability imposed by a different state statute if 14 applying the privilege would ““‘effectively immunize conduct that the [other statute] prohibits’” . . . thereby encouraging, rather than suppressing “‘the mischief at which it was directed.’”’” (Winslett v. 1811 27th Ave., LLC (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 239 , 254- 255.) On this basis, courts have held the litigation privilege does not bar statutory claims for retaliatory eviction (ibid.), litigation abuse by debt collectors (Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324,

2026However, this issue need not be considered here because appellants’ claim cannot overcome litigation privilege as discussed herein. 14 1127, citations omitted.) “[T]he assertion of liens as authorized by validly enacted California statutes is shielded by the litigation privilege.” (Olszewski v. Scripps Health (2003) 30 Cal.4th 798, 832 .) “To succeed in an action for abuse of process, a litigant must establish two elements: that the defendant (1) contemplated an ulterior motive in using the process; and (2) committed a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of

2024Agreeing with Brown, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 40 , which held that the litigation privilege applied to seeking a writ of execution and the subsequent levy on property, and thus disagreeing with a more narrow application of the privilege in Drum v. Bleau, Fox & Associates (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1009 , the Rusheen court concluded that “where the gravamen of the complaint is a privileged communication (i.e., allegedly perjured declarations of service) the privilege extends to necessarily related noncommunicative acts (i.e., act of levying).” ( Rusheen, supra, at p 1062 .) The high court explained th

2026Further, conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP statute does not equate with conduct covered by the litigation privilege (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 737 ) and, therefore, the applicability of the litigation privilege does not resolve whether a communication is a protected activity under section 425.16(e)(1) or (2) (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255 , 1263).

2026Further, conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP statute does not equate with conduct covered by the litigation privilege (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 737 ) and, therefore, the applicability of the litigation privilege does not resolve whether a communication is a protected activity under section 425.16(e)(1) or (2) (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1263 ).

2015The litigation privilege “operate[s] as [a] limitation[] upon liability” that “bars certain tort causes of action which are predicated on a judicial statement or publication itself.” (Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1168 (Oren Royal Oaks Venture); Fuhrman v. California Satellite Systems (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 408, 419-420 (Fuhrman), overruled on other grounds in Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205 ; 212; Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 364 .) It “has never been thought to bar the evidentiary use of every ‘statement or publication’ made i

2007The litigation privilege “derives from common law principles establishing a defense to the tort of defamation.” ( {Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1163 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 728 P.2d 1202 ].) “Its placement in the Civil Code immediately following the statutory provisions defining the elements of the twin defamation torts of libel and slander [citations] makes clear that, at least historically, the section was primarily designed to limit an individual’s potential liability for defamation.” {Ibid.) Beginning with Albertson v. Raboff, whi

2026Moussazadeh Did Not Show a Probability of Success Because the Litigation Privilege Bars Its Causes of Action At the second step of the analysis under section 425.16 “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt 17 (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 .) “The litigation privilege is ‘relevant to the second step in the [section 425.16] analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.’” (Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 415 ; see Fl

2026Because the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action was derivative of the previous causes of action, it too was based on the complaint, the settlement negotiations, or both, all of which were protected activity. 18 litigation privilege precludes a defendant’s liability on the claims.’”’” (Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 361 , 382; see Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 115 .) Under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), a “privileged publication or broadcast is one made” in any “judicial

2026In analyzing this issue, the trial court further stated: “[Stockdale] contends that in reaching this decision [Wentland] relied on the reasoning of ‘the Supreme Court majority in [Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 94 ] that a defendant who contracts not to speak or petition has waived the right to anti-SLAPP protection if he later breached the contract.’ ([ Wentland, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th] at p. 1492 [citing [Navellier], supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 94 ].)” The court added: “Wentland also relied on the finding in a later Navellier decision that ‘the litigation privilege would not bar [a] breach

2026In analyzing this issue, the trial court further stated: “[Stockdale] contends that in reaching this decision [Wentland] relied on the reasoning of ‘the Supreme Court majority in [Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 94 ] that a defendant who contracts not to speak or petition has waived the right to anti-SLAPP protection if he later breached the contract.’ ([ Wentland, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th] at p. 1492 [citing [Navellier], supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 94 ].)” The court added: “Wentland also relied on the finding in a later Navellier decision that ‘the litigation privilege would not bar [a] breach

2026(See also O’Keefe v. Kompa (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 130 , 133- 134 [stating the litigation privilege has been expanded to bar virtually all tort action based on any publication or broadcast and applying the privilege to post-trial efforts to secure an attorney fee judgment by levying a bank account and filing an abstract of judgment].) Second, we rejected Olsen’s argument that Harbison was not a participant in the litigation at the time he made the alleged representations.

2023It is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.” (Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1057 ; see Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241 [“‘[t]he principal purpose of [the litigation privilege] is to afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions’”]; Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995 , 1006

2025Code, § 47, subd. (b)) bars any claim based on any communication “(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings[, which includes administrative proceedings]; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 216 ; Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 364-365 [though originating with tort actions, the litigation privilege is “no less relevant” to statutory claims]; Wise v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1296, 13

2024“The litigation privilege is not limited to the courtroom, but encompasses actions by administrative bodies and quasi-judicial proceedings.” (Wise, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1303 .) “An absolute privilege exists to protect citizens from the threat of litigation for communications to government agencies whose function it is to investigate and remedy wrongdoing.” (Ibid.) The privilege is based on the importance of providing to citizens free and open access to governmental agencies for the reporting of suspected illegal activity.

2023It is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.” (Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1057 ; see Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241 [“‘[t]he principal purpose of [the litigation privilege] is to afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions’”]; Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995 , 1006

2021It is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.” (Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 11 Civil Code section 47 provides in part: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] . . . [¶] (b) In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except as fo

2026Further, conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP statute does not equate with conduct covered by the litigation privilege (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 737 ) and, therefore, the applicability of the litigation privilege does not resolve whether a communication is a protected activity under section 425.16(e)(1) or (2) (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255 , 1263).

2026Further, conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP statute does not equate with conduct covered by the litigation privilege (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 737 ) and, therefore, the applicability of the litigation privilege does not resolve whether a communication is a protected activity under section 425.16(e)(1) or (2) (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1263 ).

2024(Crossroads, at p. 777–785.) Relying on section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2), the panel viewed the basis of these claims as protected “because (1) [Fannie Mae’s] response to the interrogatory was a ‘writing made’ in the bankruptcy action, and (2) its omissions were ‘made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by’ the bankruptcy court.” (Id. at p. 778.) At the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the panel went on to find the litigation privilege applicable to all of Crossroads’s tort theories. ( Crossroads, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 785–787, citing Seltzer v.

2024(Crossroads, at p. 777–785.) Relying on section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2), the panel viewed the basis of these claims as protected “because (1) [Fannie Mae’s] response to the interrogatory was a ‘writing made’ in the bankruptcy action, and (2) its omissions were ‘made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by’ the bankruptcy court.” (Id. at p. 778.) At the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the panel went on to find the litigation privilege applicable to all of Crossroads’s tort theories. ( Crossroads, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 785–787, citing Seltzer v.