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22 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1956–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
CRIBERG v. Raymondgreen2 sentences2025The litigation privilege protects an attorney from liability for publishing false and defamatory matter when publication is "in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation thereto." Sriberg v. Raymond, 370 Mass. 105, 108 (1976). 2025Furthermore, the litigation privilege "extends beyond statements that are made in the court room itself to 'communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding.'" Bassichis, 490 Mass. at 150, quoting Sriberg v. Raymond, 370 Mass. 105, 108 (1976) (adopting construction of privilege as laid out in Restatement [Second] of Torts). | 9 | 9 |
Aborn v. Lipsongreen2 sentences2025See Correllas, 410 Mass. at 319 - 320, 323 (privilege applies to defamatory statements made when "police and prosecutors were contemplating a criminal action"); Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 72-73 (1970) (privilege applies to defamatory statements having "some reasonable relation or reference" to proceeding); Giuffrida v. High Country Investor, Inc., 73 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 242-243 (2008) (privilege applies to defamatory statements when "legal action was contemplated when the allegedly defamatory statements were made"). 5 "The privilege applies not only to defamation claims brought against the 2025Specifically, the privilege ensures that statements made by witnesses during judicial proceedings, as long as they are relevant to the case, are "absolutely privileged, even if uttered maliciously or in bad faith." Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 72 (1970), quoting Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 236 (1954). | 2 | 2 |
Kurker v. Hellgreen2 sentences2024In Sriberg, supra, the Supreme Judicial Court applied the privilege to statements in a demand letter because they related to a proceeding that was "contemplated in good faith and . . . under serious consideration." The litigation privilege does not, however, "encompass . . . attorneys' conduct in counselling and assisting their clients in business matters generally." Kurker v. Hill, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 184, 192 (1998). 2024In Sriberg, supra, the Supreme Judicial Court applied the privilege to statements in a demand letter because they related to a proceeding that was "contemplated in good faith and . . . under serious consideration." The litigation privilege does not, however, "encompass . . . attorneys' conduct in counselling and assisting their clients in business matters generally." Kurker v. Hill, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 184, 192 (1998). | 2 | 2 |
Nguyen v. Massachusetts Institute of Technologygreen1 sentence2026See Dzung Duy Nguyen, 479 Mass. at 461 . 3. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Brunogreen2 sentences2025See Bruno, supra. Because "a proceeding that include[s] the right to counsel, the right to present evidence, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the threat of perjury, constitute[s] a quasi judicial proceeding" (quotations and citation omitted), Patriot Group, LLC, supra at 485, the litigation privilege applies to probable cause hearings conducted pursuant to G. 2025See Bruno, 432 Mass. at 495-496 . [5] The updated report had twenty-seven paragraphs missing from the initial report. [6] At oral argument, Mackie reiterated his claim that Rouse-Weir is not a State actor, emphasizing that she was not hired by the court. [7] At oral argument before the Appeals Court for Joss's case, appellee counsel stated that, for both cases, they "will argue" for "either or" with respect to quasi judicial immunity and qualified immunity. [8] When the court asked for further clarification as to when counsel for the appellees briefed the litigation privilege issue, counsel st | 1 | 1 |
Giuffrida v. High Country Investor, Inc.green1 sentence2025See Correllas, 410 Mass. at 319 - 320, 323 (privilege applies to defamatory statements made when "police and prosecutors were contemplating a criminal action"); Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 72-73 (1970) (privilege applies to defamatory statements having "some reasonable relation or reference" to proceeding); Giuffrida v. High Country Investor, Inc., 73 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 242-243 (2008) (privilege applies to defamatory statements when "legal action was contemplated when the allegedly defamatory statements were made"). 5 "The privilege applies not only to defamation claims brought against the | 1 | 1 |
Bartle v. Berrygreen1 sentence2025See Correllas, 410 Mass. at 319 - 320, 323 (privilege applies to defamatory statements made when "police and prosecutors were contemplating a criminal action"); Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 72-73 (1970) (privilege applies to defamatory statements having "some reasonable relation or reference" to proceeding); Giuffrida v. High Country Investor, Inc., 73 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 242-243 (2008) (privilege applies to defamatory statements when "legal action was contemplated when the allegedly defamatory statements were made"). 5 "The privilege applies not only to defamation claims brought against the | 1 | 1 |
Mezullo v. Maletzgreen1 sentence2025Specifically, the privilege ensures that statements made by witnesses during judicial proceedings, as long as they are relevant to the case, are "absolutely privileged, even if uttered maliciously or in bad faith." Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 72 (1970), quoting Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 236 (1954). | 1 | 1 |
Correllas v. Viveirosgreen1 sentence2025See Correllas, 410 Mass. at 319 - 320, 323 (privilege applies to defamatory statements made when "police and prosecutors were contemplating a criminal action"); Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 72-73 (1970) (privilege applies to defamatory statements having "some reasonable relation or reference" to proceeding); Giuffrida v. High Country Investor, Inc., 73 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 242-243 (2008) (privilege applies to defamatory statements when "legal action was contemplated when the allegedly defamatory statements were made"). 5 "The privilege applies not only to defamation claims brought against the | 1 | 1 |
Gabbidon v. Kinggreen1 sentence2024See Gabbidon v. King, 414 Mass. 685, 686 (1993) ("It is well established that, on appeal, we may consider any ground apparent on the record that supports the result reached in the lower court"). | 1 | 1 |
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimitedgreen1 sentence2021Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). [Note 16] The commission deferred to the hearing officer's findings, as is its duty when those findings are supported by substantial evidence. 804 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.23(1)(h) (1998). [Note 17] The employer's contention that Slive's statements to Shanahan's ex-wife fell within the litigation privilege is waived, as it was not raised in the Superior Court. | 1 | 1 |
Heacock v. Heacockgreen2 sentences2018See Heacock v. Heacock , 402 Mass. 21 , 23 n.2, 520 N.E.2d 151 (1988) (explanation of terminology and doctrines of claim and issue preclusion that comprise res judicata). 2018See Heacock v. Heacock , 402 Mass. 21 , 23 n.2, 520 N.E.2d 151 (1988) (explanation of terminology and doctrines of claim and issue preclusion that comprise res judicata). | 1 | 1 |
Visnick v. Caulfieldgreen1 sentence2011See Visnick v. Caulfield, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 809, 812-813 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Kobrin v. Gastfriendgreen1 sentence2008See Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 443 Mass. 327, 340-341 (2005) (anti-SLAPP inquiry and litigation privilege inquiry are distinct). | 1 | 1 |
Aronson v. Kinsellagreen1 sentence2007See Aronson v. Kinsella, 58 Cal.App.4th 254, 268 (1997) (noting that when defendant raised the litigation privilege in his motion for summary judgment, he attached attorneys’ declarations). | 1 | 1 |
Walsh v. Walshgreen1 sentence2004See also Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 216 (1st Cir. 2000), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 1159 (2001) (barring appeal is too harsh a sanction “in the absence of any showing that the fugitive status has impaired the rights of the other [party]”). | 1 | 1 |
Hansen v. Barkergreen1 sentence2004See also Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 216 (1st Cir. 2000), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 1159 (2001) (barring appeal is too harsh a sanction “in the absence of any showing that the fugitive status has impaired the rights of the other [party]”). | 1 | 1 |
Satoko Matsumoto v. Tatsuya Matsumotogreen1 sentence2004See Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 171 N.J. 110, 128 (2002) (fugitive disentitlement doctrine is appropriate “so long as the party’s fugitive status is sufficiently connected to the litigation in which the doctrine is sought to be invoked and so long as nothing less than dismissal will suffice”). | 1 | 1 |
Guleserian v. Pilgrim Trust Co.green1 sentence1956See further Guleserian v. Pilgrim Trust Co. 331 Mass. 431, 432-434 . *300 A fourth problem arises from an interlocutory decree made in the second case at an early stage in the litigation that the hearing on the merits proceed “without any claim for waste • • • [°r] damages to the plaintiff [MacNeil Bros.] arising out of the entry and possession of the premises ... by the defendant [State Realty] ... or any evidence pertaining to the alleged waste” and that the plaintiff (MacNeil Bros.) “reserves its right to press an action for waste or damages resulting from the entry and possession by the de | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Doe v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish
green
2 sentences2025“The privilege is absolute.” Doe v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 137 , 140–141 (1996), citing Theran v. Rokoff, 413 Mass. 590 , 591–592 (1982); Robert L. 2011For purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), it is enough to note that Harmon cannot show on the face of the Complaint that its communications and actions were “preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding” and that “legal action was contemplated when the allegedly [offending] statements [and actions] were made.” Giuffrida, 73 Mass.App.Ct. at 242 . 8 Without those showings, Harmon cannot claim the benefit of the holdings in Nutter, 41 Mass.App.Ct. at 140-41 , and Gtuffiida, 73 Mass.App.Ct. 242 -43, which otherwise might immunize its direct communications with the plaintiff and its activities in its capacit | 2 | 2011–2025 |
Filarsky v. Delia
green
1 sentence2025Rather, the motion judge discussed, but did not rely on, prosecutorial immunity in her decision granting the motion to dismiss. [10] In Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 393-394 , the Court extended qualified immunity to a private attorney temporarily retained by a city to assist in internal affairs investigations. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Theran v. Rokoff
green
1 sentence2025“The privilege is absolute.” Doe v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 137 , 140–141 (1996), citing Theran v. Rokoff, 413 Mass. 590 , 591–592 (1982); Robert L. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co.
green
1 sentence2024Here, in deciding the Motion To Dismiss, as stated, the Court must accept the factual allegations asserted in the Complaint as true, “even if doubtful in fact.” Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 625 n.7. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
DIST. ATT. FOR THE PLYMOUTH v. Board of Selectmen
green
1 sentence2018The litigation exception is one such exception, where "the Legislature contemplated the need for confidential discussion between attorneys and their public clients." Id. at 633 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Retirement Board
green
1 sentence2018Retirement Bd. , 412 Mass. 770 , 772, 592 N.E.2d 1325 (1992). 4 Any argument that the judgment of annulment has preclusive effect on the current litigation is in error. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Beaton v. Land Court
green
1 sentence2011As Beaton stated ( 367 Mass. at 390 ), proceedings under §532 “are not in themselves mortgage foreclosure proceedings,” “occur independently of the actual foreclosure itself and of any judicial proceedings determinative of the general validity of the foreclosure” and are not a prerequisite to the validity of the foreclosure “as to anyone not entitled to the protection of that act.” While the plaintiff therefore has a plausible argument that the litigation privilege does not apply at all to foreclosure by entiy, it would be premature to decide that question without further factual development a | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Lamare v. Basbanes
green
1 sentence2011Initiating the lawsuits on behalf of the consumer class, regardless of motive, violated no duty to the plaintiffs, under the principles of Lamare, 418 Mass. at 276 , as well as under the litigation privilege, and so did not constitute the improper means necessary to prove the plaintiffs’ interference claims. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Nova Assignments, Inc. v. Kunian
green
1 sentence2011The Jicks, however, argue that a recent decision of the Appeals Court, Nova Assignments, Inc. v. Kunian, 77 Mass.App.Ct. 34 (2010), has changed, or at least clarified, the litigation privilege doctrine in a manner that supports their claims. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Robert L. Sullivan, D.D.S., P.C. v. Birmingham
green
1 sentence2011For example, in Sullivan v. Birmingham, 11 Mass.App.Ct. 359 (1981), the issue before the Appeals Court was whether the inclusion of an ad damnum amount in a medical malpractice complaint could give rise to civil liability on the part of the plaintiff in that action or his attorneys. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Beecy v. Pucciarelli
green
1 sentence2011For example, in Beecy v. Pucciarelli, supra at 592-594 , the court suggested that an attorney who filed litigation without the client’s permission or who knowingly agreed to bring a ground less suit was not protected by the litigation privilege. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.