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10 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Proctor v. Messinagreen2 sentences2015Proctor v. Messina, decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri. 43 In that case, the court narrowly defined the litigation exception's leading language: "in the course of a judicial . . . proceeding . "44 As a result, the court concluded that disclosure 41 See, e.g., Messina, 320 S.W.3d at 150 ("This federal regulation's use of the term oral communication clearly includes ex parte 'oral' communications with a physician . . . ."). 42 Scott Aripoli, Comment, Hungry Hungry HIPAA: Has The Regulation Bitten Off More Than it Can Chew By Prohibiting Ex parte Communication With Treating Physicians?, 75 2015Proctor v. Messina, decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri. 43 In that case, the court narrowly defined the litigation exception's leading language: "in the course of a judicial . . . proceeding." 44 As a result, the court concluded that disclosure 41 See, e.g., Messina, 320 S.W.3d at 150 ("This federal regulation's use of the term oral communication clearly includes ex parte 'oral' communications with a physician . . . ."). 42 Scott Aripoli, Comment, Hungry Hungry HIPAA: Has The Regulation Bitten Off More Than it Can Chew By Prohibiting Ex parte Communication With Treating Physicians?, 75 U | 2 | 2 |
Primm v. Isaacgreen2 sentences2015Indeed, Castro argues he has met this low standard by obtaining the order at issue, even though by its own terms the order withholds authorization for the disclosure of protected health information and does not meet the required 55 Primm v. Isaac, 127 S.W.3d 630, 634 (Ky. 2004) ("Generally, control of discovery is a matter of judicial discretion."). 56 45 C.F.R. § 165.512 (e)(1)(ii)(A)-(B); Arons, 880 N.E.2d at 842 ("As a practical matter, this means that the attorney who wishes to contact an adverse party's treating physician must first obtain a valid HIPAA authorization or a court of adminis 2015Indeed, Castro argues he has met this low standard by obtaining the order at issue, even though by its own terms the order withholds authorization for the disclosure of protected health information and does not meet the required 55 Primm v. Isaac, 127 S.W.3d 630, 634 (Ky. 2004) ("Generally, control of discovery is a matter of judicial discretion."). 56 45 C.F.R. § 165.512 (e)(1)(ii)(A)-(B); Arons, 880 N.E.2d at 842 ("As a practical matter, this means that the attorney who wishes to contact an adverse party's treating physician must first obtain a valid HIPAA authorization or a court of adminis | 2 | 2 |
Arons v. Jutkowitzgreen2 sentences2015Unfortunately, no two jurisdictions seem to have found a uniform line of reasoning with regard to answering this question."). 43 320 S.W.3d 145 (2010) (en banc). 44 Id. at 156 . 15 under that exception "must be under the supervisory authority of the court either through discovery or through other formal court procedures." 45 Because the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide a mechanism for courts to oversee ex parte communications, the court held 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (e), which permits disclosures in the course of judicial proceedings, does not apply to a meeting for ex parte communi 2015Unfortunately, no two jurisdictions seem to have found a uniform line of reasoning with regard to answering this question."). 43 320 S.W.3d 145 (2010) (en banc). 44 Id. at 156 . 15 under that exception "must be under the supervisory authority of the court either through discovery or through other formal court procedures." 45 Because the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide a mechanism for courts to oversee ex parte communications, the court held 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (e), which permits disclosures in the course of judicial proceedings, does not apply to a meeting for ex parte communi | 2 | 2 |
Holman v. RASAKgreen2 sentences2015Unfortunately, no two jurisdictions seem to have found a uniform line of reasoning with regard to answering this question."). 43 320 S.W.3d 145 (2010) (en banc). 44 Id. at 156 . 15 under that exception "must be under the supervisory authority of the court either through discovery or through other formal court procedures." 45 Because the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide a mechanism for courts to oversee ex parte communications, the court held 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (e), which permits disclosures in the course of judicial proceedings, does not apply to a meeting for ex parte communi 2015Unfortunately, no two jurisdictions seem to have found a uniform line of reasoning with regard to answering this question."). 43 320 S.W.3d 145 (2010) (en banc). 44 Id. at 156 . 15 under that exception "must be under the supervisory authority of the court either through discovery or through other formal court procedures." 45 Because the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide a mechanism for courts to oversee ex parte communications, the court held 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (e), which permits disclosures in the course of judicial proceedings, does not apply to a meeting for ex parte communi | 2 | 2 |
Myers v. Pickering Firm, Inc.green1 sentence2025See Myers v. Pickering Firm, Inc., 959 S.W.2d 152, 162 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the litigation privilege applies -11- to a procurement or inducement of breach of a contract when the claim is “based on [] false and defamatory statements” made “in the course of judicial proceedings”); but see Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Imperial Premium Fin., LLC, 904 F.3d 1197, 1218-20 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that Florida’s litigation privilege did not apply to “the awarding of damages for breaches of agreements not to sue a contract counterparty”). | 1 | 1 |
Schmitt v. Manngreen1 sentence2025Id. (citing Maggard v. Kinney, 576 S.W.3d 559, 567 (Ky. 2019); and citing Schmitt v. Mann, 163 S.W.2d 281, 283 (1942)); Halle v. Banner Indus. of N.E., Inc., 453 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Ky. App. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Maggard v. Kinneygreen1 sentence2025Id. (citing Maggard v. Kinney, 576 S.W.3d 559, 567 (Ky. 2019); and citing Schmitt v. Mann, 163 S.W.2d 281, 283 (1942)); Halle v. Banner Indus. of N.E., Inc., 453 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Ky. App. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada v. Imperial Premium Finance, LLCgreen2 sentences2025See Myers v. Pickering Firm, Inc., 959 S.W.2d 152, 162 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the litigation privilege applies -11- to a procurement or inducement of breach of a contract when the claim is “based on [] false and defamatory statements” made “in the course of judicial proceedings”); but see Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Imperial Premium Fin., LLC, 904 F.3d 1197, 1218-20 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that Florida’s litigation privilege did not apply to “the awarding of damages for breaches of agreements not to sue a contract counterparty”). 2025In Sun Life, the 11th Circuit did not believe “a party [could] never face a breach of contract suit for its litigation activity [because that position] would create perverse incentives that would undermine the ‘strong public policy favoring freedom of contract’ that is ‘not to be lightly interfered with.’” Id. at 1220 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Halle v. Banner Industries of N.E., Inc.green1 sentence2025Id. (citing Maggard v. Kinney, 576 S.W.3d 559, 567 (Ky. 2019); and citing Schmitt v. Mann, 163 S.W.2d 281, 283 (1942)); Halle v. Banner Indus. of N.E., Inc., 453 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Ky. App. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Chandler v. Bullitt County Joint Planning Commissiongreen1 sentence2013Notwithstanding this exception, the Webster County Clerk argued that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act because KRS 61.815(1)(c) provides that “[n]o final action may be taken at a closed sessionf.]” Since the Board decided to authorize the action, the Webster County Clerk maintains the exception to discussion of litigation does not apply because authorizing its attorney to act was a “final action.” See Chandler v. Bullitt County Joint Planning Com’n, 125 S.W.3d 851, 856 (Ky.App.2002). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada v. Imperial Premium Finance, LLCgreen2 sentences2025See Myers v. Pickering Firm, Inc., 959 S.W.2d 152, 162 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the litigation privilege applies -11- to a procurement or inducement of breach of a contract when the claim is “based on [] false and defamatory statements” made “in the course of judicial proceedings”); but see Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Imperial Premium Fin., LLC, 904 F.3d 1197, 1218-20 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that Florida’s litigation privilege did not apply to “the awarding of damages for breaches of agreements not to sue a contract counterparty”). 2025In Sun Life, the 11th Circuit did not believe “a party [could] never face a breach of contract suit for its litigation activity [because that position] would create perverse incentives that would undermine the ‘strong public policy favoring freedom of contract’ that is ‘not to be lightly interfered with.’” Id. at 1220 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Beale v. Faultless Hardware
green
2 sentences2000Davis and our previous decision in Beale v. Faultless Hardware, Ky., 837 S.W.2d 893 (1992), stand for the principle that a fact contained in an agreement to settle a workers’ compensation claim is not binding in the litigation of a claim for a subsequent injury. 1993However, in Beale, supra, the Kentucky Supreme Court specifically rejected the Court of Appeals res judicata analysis and overruled Parson “to the extent that in the litigation of a claim for a subsequent injury, it would make res judicata a fact contained in an agreement to settle a prior workers’ compensation claim.” The Beale Court continued to state that absent a re-opening or the litigation of a claim for a subsequent injury, an approved settlement of a workers’ compensation claim is final and binding on the parties to the agreement. | 2 | 1993–2000 |
Knotts v. Zurich Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2026On the sparse occasions where a clear violation of the order occurred and a proper objection was contemporaneously lodged, 17 “As the Knotts Court has explained, the word ‘claim’ has multiple definitions, ‘[b]ut at its most basic, the word means an assertion of a right, with the contours and specific nature of the right depending on context[,]’ and in the context of insurance, this means an assertion of a right to compensatory payment under the policy.” Old Republic Aerospace Inc. v. Louisville Aviation, LLC, No. 2023-CA-0111-MR, 2024 WL 4996722 , at *9 (Ky. App. Dec. 6, 2024), review denied ( | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Smith v. Martin
green
1 sentence2025Id. (citing Maggard v. Kinney, 576 S.W.3d 559, 567 (Ky. 2019); and citing Schmitt v. Mann, 163 S.W.2d 281, 283 (1942)); Halle v. Banner Indus. of N.E., Inc., 453 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Ky. App. 2014). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnerhship D/B/A Winchester Centre for Health and Rehabilitation N/K/A Fountain Circle Health and Rehabilitation v. Beverly Wellner Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Joe P. Wellner, and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Joe P. Wellner
green
2 sentences2024As to the litigation clause, we are mainly guided by our Supreme Court’s analysis of a strikingly similar clause in Wellner, supra. In Wellner, the POA granted the attorney-in-fact “1) the power ‘to demand, sue for, collect, recover and receive all debts, monies, interest and demands whatsoever now due or that may hereafter be or become due to me [the principal] (including the right to institute legal proceedings therefor)’ . . . .” Wellner, 533 S.W.3d at 193 . 2024As to the litigation clause, we are mainly guided by our Supreme Court’s analysis of a strikingly similar clause in Wellner, supra. In Wellner, the POA granted the attorney-in-fact “1) the power ‘to demand, sue for, collect, recover and receive all debts, monies, interest and demands whatsoever now due or that may hereafter be or become due to me [the principal] (including the right to institute legal proceedings therefor)’ . . . .” Wellner, 533 S.W.3d at 193 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Baglini v. Lauletta
green
2 sentences2014In Baglini v. Lauletta, 315 N.J.Super. 225 , 717 A.2d 449 (Law Div.1998), the Court expressed the sound reasoning that it would not further the legitimate purposes of the privilege to apply it to abuse of process. “[A]n abuse of process claim is inherently inimical to a litigation privilege and taken to its logical extreme, could emasculate the tort entirely.” Id. at 289 , 717 A.2d at 456 . 2014In Baglini v. Lauletta, 315 N.J.Super. 225 , 717 A.2d 449 (Law Div.1998), the Court expressed the sound reasoning that it would not further the legitimate purposes of the privilege to apply it to abuse of process. “[A]n abuse of process claim is inherently inimical to a litigation privilege and taken to its logical extreme, could emasculate the tort entirely.” Id. at 289 , 717 A.2d at 456 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Parson v. Union Underwear Co.
green
1 sentence1992We overruled Parson, supra, to the extent that it would, in the litigation of a claim for a subsequent injury, preclude litigation of facts contained in the agreement to settle the prior claim. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.