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9 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1991–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Neville v. CHUDACOFFgreen2 sentences2018The Neville court thereafter analyzed cases construing the scope of the litigation privilege because the litigation privilege and section 425.16(e)(2)"serve similar policy interests," in that both "protect the right of litigants to the utmost freedom of access to the courts without the fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions." 73 Cal.Rptr.3d at 388-89 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 2018The Neville court thereafter analyzed cases construing the scope of the litigation privilege because the litigation privilege and section 425.16(e)(2) "serve similar policy interests," in that both "protect the right of litigants to the utmost freedom of access to the courts without the fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions." 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 388-89 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). | 3 | 3 |
Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Browngreen2 sentences2020See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged in the trial court . . . is deemed to have been waived and will not be considered on appeal."). 4If UAIC wanted to challenge the validity of a judgment, it could have timely intervened before judgment to become a proper party to the litigation to challenge it under NRCP 60. 2020See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged in the trial court . . . is deemed to have been waived and will not be considered on appeal."). 4If UAIC wanted to challenge the validity of a judgment, it could have timely intervened before judgment to become a proper party to the litigation to challenge it under NRCP 60. | 2 | 2 |
Buchanan v. Leonardgreen2 sentences2014Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 712, 719 (Ct. App. 2006); Buchanan v. Leonard, 52 A.3d 1064, 1070 (N.J. 2014Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 712, 719 (Ct. App. 2006); Buchanan v. Leonard, 52 A.3d 1064, 1070 (N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Hugel v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, LLPgreen2 sentences2014See O'Neil v. Cunningham, 173 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1981) (applying a California statute to bar a client's defamation action against his attorney); Hugel v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes, & Lerach, LLP, 175 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying New Hampshire Law and concluding that the litigation privilege barred "legal malpractice claims"). 2014See O'Neil v. Cunningham, 173 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1981) (applying a California statute to bar a client's defamation action against his attorney); Hugel v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes, & Lerach, LLP, 175 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying New Hampshire Law and concluding that the litigation privilege barred "legal malpractice claims"). | 2 | 2 |
Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammertongreen2 sentences2014Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 712, 719 (Ct. App. 2006); Buchanan v. Leonard, 52 A.3d 1064, 1070 (N.J. 2014Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 712, 719 (Ct. App. 2006); Buchanan v. Leonard, 52 A.3d 1064, 1070 (N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoongreen2 sentences2014Fink v. Oshins, 118 Nev. 428, 432-33 , 49 P.3d 640, 643 (2002) (quoting Circus Circus Hotels v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56, 60 , 657 P.2d 101, 104 (1983)). 2014Fink v. Oshins, 118 Nev. 428, 432-33 , 49 P.3d 640, 643 (2002) (quoting Circus Circus Hotels v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56, 60 , 657 P.2d 101, 104 (1983)). | 2 | 2 |
O'NEIL v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences2014See O'Neil v. Cunningham, 173 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1981) (applying a California statute to bar a client's defamation action against his attorney); Hugel v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes, & Lerach, LLP, 175 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying New Hampshire Law and concluding that the litigation privilege barred "legal malpractice claims"). 2014See O'Neil v. Cunningham, 173 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1981) (applying a California statute to bar a client's defamation action against his attorney); Hugel v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes, & Lerach, LLP, 175 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying New Hampshire Law and concluding that the litigation privilege barred "legal malpractice claims"). | 2 | 2 |
Fink v. Oshinsgreen2 sentences2014Fink v. Oshins, 118 Nev. 428, 432-33 , 49 P.3d 640, 643 (2002) (quoting Circus Circus Hotels v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56, 60 , 657 P.2d 101, 104 (1983)). 2014Fink v. Oshins, 118 Nev. 428, 432-33 , 49 P.3d 640, 643 (2002) (quoting Circus Circus Hotels v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56, 60 , 657 P.2d 101, 104 (1983)). | 2 | 2 |
Hawkins v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2021Ct. App. 1984) (providing that there can be no civil action for slanderous statements made during the course of an action and the remedies for such slander "are left to the discipline of the courts, the bar association, and the state); Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) ("Although the public policy served by the absolute privilege immunizes the defamer from a civil damage action, the privilege does not protect against professional discipline for an attorney's unethical conduct."); Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 950 (Okla. 1990) (recognizing that the litigation privilege may 2021Ct. App. 1984) (providing that there can be no civil action for slanderous statements made during the course of an action and the remedies for such slander "are left to the discipline of the courts, the bar association, and the state); Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) ("Although the public policy served by the absolute privilege immunizes the defamer from a civil damage action, the privilege does not protect against professional discipline for an attorney's unethical conduct."); Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 950 (Okla. 1990) (recognizing that the litigation privilege may | 1 | 1 |
Kirschstein v. Haynesgreen2 sentences2021Ct. App. 1984) (providing that there can be no civil action for slanderous statements made during the course of an action and the remedies for such slander "are left to the discipline of the courts, the bar association, and the state); Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) ("Although the public policy served by the absolute privilege immunizes the defamer from a civil damage action, the privilege does not protect against professional discipline for an attorney's unethical conduct."); Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 950 (Okla. 1990) (recognizing that the litigation privilege may 2021Ct. App. 1984) (providing that there can be no civil action for slanderous statements made during the course of an action and the remedies for such slander "are left to the discipline of the courts, the bar association, and the state); Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) ("Although the public policy served by the absolute privilege immunizes the defamer from a civil damage action, the privilege does not protect against professional discipline for an attorney's unethical conduct."); Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 950 (Okla. 1990) (recognizing that the litigation privilege may | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
DANI v. MILLER
green
2 sentences2021Ct. App. 1984) (providing that there can be no civil action for slanderous statements made during the course of an action and the remedies for such slander "are left to the discipline of the courts, the bar association, and the state); Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) ("Although the public policy served by the absolute privilege immunizes the defamer from a civil damage action, the privilege does not protect against professional discipline for an attorney's unethical conduct."); Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 950 (Okla. 1990) (recognizing that the litigation privilege may 2021Ct. App. 1984) (providing that there can be no civil action for slanderous statements made during the course of an action and the remedies for such slander "are left to the discipline of the courts, the bar association, and the state); Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) ("Although the public policy served by the absolute privilege immunizes the defamer from a civil damage action, the privilege does not protect against professional discipline for an attorney's unethical conduct."); Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 950 (Okla. 1990) (recognizing that the litigation privilege may | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Sawyer v. Sugarless Shops, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991Cf. Sawyer v. Sugarless Shops, 106 Nev. 265 , 792 P.2d 14 (1990) (granting summary judgment was improper when there were conflicting affidavits, some doubt of operative facts, and no discovery had yet been conducted). 1991Cf. Sawyer v. Sugarless Shops, 106 Nev. 265 , 792 P.2d 14 (1990) (granting summary judgment was improper when there were conflicting affidavits, some doubt of operative facts, and no discovery had yet been conducted). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.