9 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brady v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Id. at 19 . 2009We have previously noted that the litigation exception of the Act somewhat inexplicably "limits access to otherwise public records." Brady v. State, 965 P.2d 1, 18 (Alaska 1998). | 1 | 2 |
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Duhongreen1 sentence2025In Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., we affirmed dismissal of an IIED claim by corporate shareholders against a corporation, reasoning “to the extent that the IIED claim is based on [the corporation’s] lawsuit against the [shareholders], filing that lawsuit is privileged and cannot be the basis of IIED liability.” 31 We cited with approval a Texas decision holding that “the institution and prosecution of a civil suit afford no cause of action for damages against the party suing except in cases of malicious prosecution or abuse of process.”32 If filing a lawsuit cannot be the basis for intentional inf | 1 | 1 |
Kallstrom v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025In Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., we affirmed dismissal of an IIED claim by corporate shareholders against a corporation, reasoning “to the extent that the IIED claim is based on [the corporation’s] lawsuit against the [shareholders], filing that lawsuit is privileged and cannot be the basis of IIED liability.” 31 We cited with approval a Texas decision holding that “the institution and prosecution of a civil suit afford no cause of action for damages against the party suing except in cases of malicious prosecution or abuse of process.”32 If filing a lawsuit cannot be the basis for intentional inf | 1 | 1 |
Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc.green2 sentences2025In Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., we affirmed dismissal of an IIED claim by corporate shareholders against a corporation, reasoning “to the extent that the IIED claim is based on [the corporation’s] lawsuit against the [shareholders], filing that lawsuit is privileged and cannot be the basis of IIED liability.” 31 We cited with approval a Texas decision holding that “the institution and prosecution of a civil suit afford no cause of action for damages against the party suing except in cases of malicious prosecution or abuse of process.”32 If filing a lawsuit cannot be the basis for intentional inf 2025In Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., we affirmed dismissal of an IIED claim by corporate shareholders against a corporation, reasoning “to the extent that the IIED claim is based on [the corporation’s] lawsuit against the [shareholders], filing that lawsuit is privileged and cannot be the basis of IIED liability.” 31 We cited with approval a Texas decision holding that “the institution and prosecution of a civil suit afford no cause of action for damages against the party suing except in cases of malicious prosecution or abuse of process.”32 If filing a lawsuit cannot be the basis for intentional inf | 1 | 1 |
Dimeff v. Estate of Robert Merle Cowangreen1 sentence2022CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the superior court’s order to dismiss the claim of “rape by fraud.” But we REVERSE the superior court’s grant of summary judgment and REMAND to the superior court for determination of whether Notti’s remaining claims are barred by the litigation waiver. 45 (...continued) 300 P.3d 1, 11 (Alaska 2013) (quoting Peterson v. Wirum, 625 P.2d 866, 870 (Alaska 1981)). | 1 | 1 |
Peterson v. Wirumgreen1 sentence2022CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the superior court’s order to dismiss the claim of “rape by fraud.” But we REVERSE the superior court’s grant of summary judgment and REMAND to the superior court for determination of whether Notti’s remaining claims are barred by the litigation waiver. 45 (...continued) 300 P.3d 1, 11 (Alaska 2013) (quoting Peterson v. Wirum, 625 P.2d 866, 870 (Alaska 1981)). | 1 | 1 |
Lawson v. Helmergreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., Gilbert v. Sperbeck, 126 P.3d 1057, 1059-60 (Alaska 2005); Lawson v. Helmer, 77 P.3d 724, 726-28 (Alaska 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Flisock v. State, Division of Retirement & Benefitsgreen1 sentence2017Cf. Flisock v. State, Div. of Ret. & Benefits, 818 P.2d 640, 645 (Alaska 1991) ("The interpretation of legislation by ... the agency that sponsored the bill is entitled to be given weight by the court in construing the intent of the statute.”). 37 . | 1 | 1 |
Gilbert v. Sperbeckgreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., Gilbert v. Sperbeck, 126 P.3d 1057, 1059-60 (Alaska 2005); Lawson v. Helmer, 77 P.3d 724, 726-28 (Alaska 2003). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Miller v. CUTTY'S CAMPINGgreen1 sentence2017Miller v. Cutty’s Des Moines Camping Club, Inc., 694 N.W.2d 518, 526-28 (Iowa 2005); see also Conway v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 438 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Mo. 2014) (en banc) (construing “in connection with” to include “use of the enumerated deceptive practices if there is a relationship between the sale of the merchandise and the alleged unlawful conduct”). 58 Cozzetti did not raise the litigation privilege as an affirmative defense. | 1 | 1 |
Davis R. Conway and Sheri D. Conway v. CitiMortgage, Inc. and Federal National Mortgage Association, Inc.green1 sentence2017Miller v. Cutty’s Des Moines Camping Club, Inc., 694 N.W.2d 518, 526-28 (Iowa 2005); see also Conway v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 438 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Mo. 2014) (en banc) (construing “in connection with” to include “use of the enumerated deceptive practices if there is a relationship between the sale of the merchandise and the alleged unlawful conduct”). 58 Cozzetti did not raise the litigation privilege as an affirmative defense. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence2008As the supreme court stated in Johnson v. State, 577 P.2d 230, 234 (Alaska 1978), "In the absence of ... prejudice to a party [that is] likely to have a substantial effect on the outcome of the case, failure of counsel to comply with discovery orders should not be utilized as a basis for ultimate disposition of litigation." On the other hand, if the offending party has purposely withheld information that is central to the litigation of a claim or issue, so that the non-offending party's lack of opportunity to prepare to meet this information will substantially prejudice the party's ability to | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nizinski v. Currington
green
1 sentence2017Cf. Nizinski v. Currington, 517 P.2d 754 , 755 n.6 (Alaska 1974). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Beavers v. State
green
1 sentence2012Relying on the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Beavers v. State, 998 P.2d 1040 (Alaska 2000), and this Court's decision in Jones v. State, 65 P.3d 903 (Alaska App.2003), Berez-yuk argued that his waiver of Miranda rights was involuntary because he was essentially promised that he would not be charged with a drug-trafficking offense if he confessed, and he was told that his cooperation would make the difference between simply being deported and (on the other hand) serving 20 years in prison and then being deported. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Jones v. State
green
1 sentence2012Relying on the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Beavers v. State, 998 P.2d 1040 (Alaska 2000), and this Court's decision in Jones v. State, 65 P.3d 903 (Alaska App.2003), Berez-yuk argued that his waiver of Miranda rights was involuntary because he was essentially promised that he would not be charged with a drug-trafficking offense if he confessed, and he was told that his cooperation would make the difference between simply being deported and (on the other hand) serving 20 years in prison and then being deported. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Lee v. State
green
1 sentence2008Lee, 141 P.3d at 850-51 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Lee A. Newman v. Melton Truck Lines, Inc., and Bobby R. Bolton, Philip Mansour, Intervenor-Appellant
neutral
2 sentences1980Newman v. Melton Truck Lines, Inc., 443 F.2d 896 (5th Cir.1971); Potts v. Mitchell, 410 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D.N.C. 1976); Annot. 92 A.L.R.3d 702 -703 (1979). 1980Newman v. Melton Truck Lines, Inc., 443 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1971); Potts v. Mitchell, 410 F.Supp. 1278 (W.D.N.C.1976); Annot. 92 A.L.R.3d 702 -703 (1979). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Potts v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences1980Newman v. Melton Truck Lines, Inc., 443 F.2d 896 (5th Cir.1971); Potts v. Mitchell, 410 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D.N.C. 1976); Annot. 92 A.L.R.3d 702 -703 (1979). 1980Newman v. Melton Truck Lines, Inc., 443 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1971); Potts v. Mitchell, 410 F.Supp. 1278 (W.D.N.C.1976); Annot. 92 A.L.R.3d 702 -703 (1979). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.