litigation exception in Texas

2017Id.

2007Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp. , 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992).

2025Section 552.104: Information Relating to Competition or Bidding Section 552.104 of the Government Code provides as follows: (a) Information is excepted from the requirements of Section 552.021 if a governmental body demonstrates that release of the information would harm its interests by providing an advantage to a competitor or bidder in a particular ongoing competitive situation or in a particular competitive situation where the governmental body establishes the situation at issue is set to reoccur or there is a specific and demonstrable intent to enter into the competitive situation again i

2025Section 552.104: Information Relating to Competition or Bidding Section 552.104 of the Government Code provides as follows: (a) Information is excepted from the requirements of Section 552.021 if a governmental body demonstrates that release of the information would harm its interests by providing an advantage to a competitor or bidder in a particular ongoing competitive situation or in a particular competitive situation where the governmental body establishes the situation at issue is set to reoccur or there is a specific and demonstrable intent to enter into the competitive situation again i

2016Any other policy “would dilute the vigor with which Texas attorneys represent their clients, which would .not be in the best interests of justice.” Bradt, 892 S.W.2d at 72 . [The plaintiff/appellant]- argues that his claims against the Attorney Appel-lees are not barred by the litigation privilege because they arise from fraudulent conduct, which is “foreign to the duties of an attorney.” Poole v. Houston & T.C.

2016Youngkin’s. trial-court memorandum and his brief include this quotation: The litigation privilege protects an attorney from personal liability stemming from conduct that the “attorney engages in as part of the discharge of his duties in representing a party in a lawsuit.” Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 72 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (op. on reh’g).

2023They also disagree as to whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to examine the documents in camera. 9 The Texas Supreme Court’s test for the litigation exception to the physician- patient privilege recognizes that “just because a condition may be ‘relevant’ to a claim or defense does not mean a party ‘relies upon the condition as a part of the party’s claim or defense.’” Id. at 842 (emphasis omitted).

2022Nearly thirty years ago, our supreme court announced the course a trial court must take to properly address these important privileges and the litigation exception to them. –10– In R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding), R.K. was a physician-defendant in a medical malpractice case.

2019Texas courts recognize a narrow exception “when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim” and thus “are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14; see In re Lesikar, 285 S.W.3d 577, 585 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“If a legal service necessary to the litigation of a claim for which attorneys’ fees are available also advanced a claim for which attorneys’ fees are not recoverable, then the exception to the general fee-segregation rule applies, and the amount of time or money that was reasonable to expend in

2016Texas courts recognize a narrow exception “when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim” and thus “are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Id. at 313-14 ; ■see In re Lesikar, 285 S.W.3d 577, 585 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“If a legal service necessary to the litigation of a claim for which attorneys’ fees are available also advanced a claim for which attorneys’ fees are not recoverable, then the exception to the general fee-segregation rule applies, and the amount of time or money that was reasonable to expend in performing th

2025Cornyn v. City of Garland, 994 S.W.2d 258, 265 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.).

2002See City of Garland, 994 S.W.2d at 265 ; Tex. Att’y Gen.

2016See Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ) (holding attorney liable for assisting client in perpetrating fraudulent business scheme involving sale of apartment complex); Bourland v. State, 528 S.W.2d 350, 357 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding attorney liable for misrepresentations made to investors in client’s fraudulent real estate scheme).

2009See Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II Ltd. , 696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ) (holding attorney liable for assisting client in perpetrating fraudulent business scheme involving sale of apartment complex); Bourland v. State , 528 S.W.2d 350, 357 (Tex. Civ.

2016See Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ) (holding attorney liable for assisting client in perpetrating fraudulent business scheme involving sale of apartment complex); Bourland v. State, 528 S.W.2d 350, 357 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding attorney liable for misrepresentations made to investors in client’s fraudulent real estate scheme).

2009See Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II Ltd. , 696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ) (holding attorney liable for assisting client in perpetrating fraudulent business scheme involving sale of apartment complex); Bourland v. State , 528 S.W.2d 350, 357 (Tex. Civ.

2016Mere relevance to a claim or defense is not enough: “to fall within the litigation exception to the privilege, the condition itself must be of legal consequence to a party’s claim or defense.” Id.; In re Doe, 22 S.W.3d 601, 609 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, orig. proceeding). . . .

2016Id. at 133 ; see also In re Doe, 22 S.W.3d 601, 610 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, orig. proceeding) (holding litigation exception to physician-patient privilege inapplicable because plaintiffs claim of negligence, including request for mental-anguish damages, did not allege “severe emotional condition” to place mental condition at issue); In re Nance, 143 S.W.3d 506, 512-13 (Tex. App.-Austin *405 2004, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief because decedent’s mental-health records, though they might present intermediate fact issue, were not part of ultimate issues in medical negligence case); b

2015A party who prevails on a cause of action for which fees are recoverable must prove the fees that were necessary for the litigation of that claim. “[A] prevailing party must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable attorney’s fees in all cases.” Varner v. Cardenas, 218 S.W.3d 68, 69 (Tex. 2007) (citing Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 313 (Tex. 2006)).

2014A party who prevails on a cause of action for which fees are recoverable must prove the fees that were necessary for the litigation of that claim. “[A] prevailing party must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable attorney’s fees in all cases.” Varner v. Cardenas, 218 S.W.3d 68, 69 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (citing Tony Gullo Motors I, LP v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 313 (Tex. 2006)).

2020Can defendant Matterhorn’s attempt to prove a prima facie case supporting each element of their tort and contract claims be supported by (Tex. 2015)). “[T]he judicial-proceedings privilege applies to counsel, parties, and witnesses, among others.” Id. at 57 (citing James, 637 S.W.2d at 916–17).

2012He cites to no applicable case law suggesting that his actions cannot support a fraud claim.28 Accordingly, we overrule Sadeghian’s fourth point. 26 James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. 1982). 27 See Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (holding that acts taken by an attorney to facilitate the rendition of legal services to a party were not a basis for a fraud claim against the attorney by a third party absent legal privity or an independent duty to and justifiable reliance by the third party); Renfroe v. Jones & Assoc

2025Dist., 68 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, no pet.). 424 Open Records Decision No. 454 at 3 (1986). 425 Univ. of Tex. Law Sch. v. Tex. Legal Found., 958 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, orig. proceeding). 426 See Open Records Decision No. 677 at 2 (2002). 427 See Open Records Decision No. 677 at 2 (2002). 428 See Open Records Decision No. 677 at 4 (2002). 2024 Public Information Handbook • Office of the Attorney General 85 Exceptions to Disclosure either or both of the exceptions. 429 However, the governmental body must meet distinct burdens depending on the exception it is asse

2025Section 552.104: Information Relating to Competition or Bidding Section 552.104 of the Government Code provides as follows: (a) Information is excepted from the requirements of Section 552.021 if a governmental body demonstrates that release of the information would harm its interests by providing an advantage to a competitor or bidder in a particular ongoing competitive situation or in a particular competitive situation where the governmental body establishes the situation at issue is set to reoccur or there is a specific and demonstrable intent to enter into the competitive situation again i

2025Dist., 68 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, no pet.). 424 Open Records Decision No. 454 at 3 (1986). 425 Univ. of Tex. Law Sch. v. Tex. Legal Found., 958 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, orig. proceeding). 426 See Open Records Decision No. 677 at 2 (2002). 427 See Open Records Decision No. 677 at 2 (2002). 428 See Open Records Decision No. 677 at 4 (2002). 2024 Public Information Handbook • Office of the Attorney General 85 Exceptions to Disclosure either or both of the exceptions. 429 However, the governmental body must meet distinct burdens depending on the exception it is asse

2025Dist., 68 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, no pet.). 424 Open Records Decision No. 454 at 3 (1986). 425 Univ. of Tex. Law Sch. v. Tex. Legal Found., 958 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, orig. proceeding). 426 See Open Records Decision No. 677 at 2 (2002). 427 See Open Records Decision No. 677 at 2 (2002). 428 See Open Records Decision No. 677 at 4 (2002). 2024 Public Information Handbook • Office of the Attorney General 85 Exceptions to Disclosure either or both of the exceptions. 429 However, the governmental body must meet distinct burdens depending on the exception it is asse

2019Texas courts recognize a narrow exception “when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim” and thus “are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14; see In re Lesikar, 285 S.W.3d 577, 585 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“If a legal service necessary to the litigation of a claim for which attorneys’ fees are available also advanced a claim for which attorneys’ fees are not recoverable, then the exception to the general fee-segregation rule applies, and the amount of time or money that was reasonable to expend in

2016Texas courts recognize a narrow exception “when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim” and thus “are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Id. at 313-14 ; ■see In re Lesikar, 285 S.W.3d 577, 585 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“If a legal service necessary to the litigation of a claim for which attorneys’ fees are available also advanced a claim for which attorneys’ fees are not recoverable, then the exception to the general fee-segregation rule applies, and the amount of time or money that was reasonable to expend in performing th

2011See Leggett , 257 S.W.3d at 462 .

2011See Leggett, 257 S.W.3d at 462 .

2008Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d at 843 ; In re Toyota Motor Corp., 191 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).

2008Ramirez , 887 S.W.2d at 843 ; In re Toyota Motor Corp ., 191 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).

2007See James , 637 S.W.2d at 916-17 (stating that communications made during the course of judicial proceedings “will not serve as the basis of a civil action for libel or slander”); Reagan , 166 S.W.2d at 912 (stating that privileged communication cannot constitute the basis “of a civil action in damages for slander or libel”); Davis v. Davis , 734 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (stating that privileged communication cannot serve as the basis for a civil action “for libel or slander”); see also Matta v. May , 118 F.3d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating tha

2007See James , 637 S.W.2d at 916-17 (stating that communications made during the course of judicial proceedings “will not serve as the basis of a civil action for libel or slander”); Reagan , 166 S.W.2d at 912 (stating that privileged communication cannot constitute the basis “of a civil action in damages for slander or libel”); Davis v. Davis , 734 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (stating that privileged communication cannot serve as the basis for a civil action “for libel or slander”); see also Matta v. May , 118 F.3d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating tha

2005See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 , 123 S.Ct. 1690, 1694 , 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003); Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 506-07 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813-14 .

2005See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 , 123 S.Ct. 1690, 1694 , 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003); Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 506-07 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813-14 .

2005See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 , 123 S.Ct. 1690, 1694 , 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003); Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 506-07 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813-14 .

2005See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 , 123 S.Ct. 1690, 1694 , 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003); Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 506-07 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813-14 .

2002In a letter ruling, the attorney general determined that while some of the responsive information was excepted from disclosure under the litigation exception, “completed reports,”4 expressly made public under the Act, and “basic information,” deemed public by Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. City of Houston, were public information that must be released. 531 S.W.2d 177, 186-87 (Tex. Civ. 3 See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 552.103, .108.

2002In a letter ruling, the attorney general determined that while some of the responsive information was excepted from disclosure under the litigation exception, "completed reports," (4) expressly made public under the Act, and "basic information," deemed public by Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. City of Houston , were public information that must be released. 531 S.W.2d 177, 186-87 (Tex. Civ.

2026See id.; Vasquez, 225 S.W.3d at 544-45. 26 We discussed the interrogation video and translation above at length and need not do so again.

2025See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 300 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“An assignee who has acquired the bare legal right to prosecute a claim but no right to the substantive recovery cannot show that he has a personal stake in the litigation.”). 9 Associations are now free to bring claims requiring member participation.

2025See Boeing Co., 466 S.W.3d at 837 .

2025“As a general rule, the Public Information Act requires a governmental body to raise and argue any applicable disclosure exception to the Attorney General as a prerequisite to judicial review.” Boeing Co. v. Paxton, 466 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tex. 2015).