litigation privilege in New Jersey

2026A-2726-23 7 The litigation privilege applies to "'any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.'" Hawkins v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207, 216 (1995) (quoting Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205 , 369 (1990)). "[L]awyers and litigants must 'be permitted to speak and write freely without the restraint of fear of an ensuing defamation action.'" Loigman v. Twp.

2026Given the importance to our justice system of ensuring free access to the courts, promoting complete and truthful testimony, encouraging zealous advocacy, giving finality to judgments, and avoiding unending litigation, it is not surprising that . . . the litigation privilege[] has been referred to as "the backbone to an effective and smoothly operating judicial system." [Hawkings v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207, 222 (1994) (citing Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 370 (1990)).] Likewise, the Legislature recognized an overriding need to encourage the reporting of child abuse, by not only providing imm

2025Comm. of Middletown, 185 N.J. 566 (2006), the litigation privilege applied, thereby creating absolute immunity against Daugherty's claims.

2022Comm. of Middletown, 185 N.J. 566, 585 (2006), the protective shield of the litigation privilege applies to "any communication . . . made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings" (emphasis added).

2026Ferrara's email [was] within the ambit of the litigation privilege and [was] protected." The litigation privilege grants "absolute privilege to statements or communications made by attorneys in the course of judicial and quasi -judicial proceedings." Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J. Super. 282, 297 (App. Div. 2001).

2020A-5645-17T1 23 However, "[t]he one tort excepted from the reach of the litigation privilege is malicious prosecution, or malicious use of process." Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J. Super. 282, 297 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 564-65 (1995)); see also Loigman, 185 N.J. at 584 n.4 (explaining "the litigation privilege is not available in a malicious prosecution action"). 185 N.J. at 584 n.4.

2020A-5645-17T1 23 However, "[t]he one tort excepted from the reach of the litigation privilege is malicious prosecution, or malicious use of process." Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J. Super. 282, 297 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 564-65 (1995)); see also Loigman, 185 N.J. at 584 n.4 (explaining "the litigation privilege is not available in a malicious prosecution action"). 185 N.J. at 584 n.4.

2006The panel relied on the litigation privilege in affirming the dismissal of the lawsuit, observing that “an attorney must be free to advance the strengths of his or her client’s case in a candid and objective way, unfettered by the fear that the attorney may be the subject of a tort action, whether sounding in defamation or any other *589 ‘action under a different label.’ ” Id. at 133-34 , 654 A.2d 1002 (quoting Rainier's Dairies, supra, 19 N.J. at 564 , 117 A.2d 889 ).

2026A-2726-23 7 The litigation privilege applies to "'any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.'" Hawkins v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207, 216 (1995) (quoting Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205 , 369 (1990)). "[L]awyers and litigants must 'be permitted to speak and write freely without the restraint of fear of an ensuing defamation action.'" Loigman v. Twp.

2026Given the importance to our justice system of ensuring free access to the courts, promoting complete and truthful testimony, encouraging zealous advocacy, giving finality to judgments, and avoiding unending litigation, it is not surprising that . . . the litigation privilege[] has been referred to as "the backbone to an effective and smoothly operating judicial system." [Hawkings v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207, 222 (1994) (citing Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 370 (1990)).] Likewise, the Legislature recognized an overriding need to encourage the reporting of child abuse, by not only providing imm

2026Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 563 (1990).

2024While Hughes is correct that there is an absolute privilege, known as the litigation privilege, afforded to statements made in the course of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 563 (1990), that privilege logically does not extend to statements made outside of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.

2021Notwithstanding plaintiffs' narrow view to the contrary, the litigation privilege is not confined to the courtroom and "extends to all statements or communications in connection with the judicial proceeding." Ruberton v. Gabage, 280 N.J.

2007This litigation privilege "`extends to all statements or communications in connection with the judicial proceeding.'" Ibid. (quoting Ruberton v. Gabage, *132 280 N.J.Super. 125, 133 , 654 A. 2d 1002 (App.Div.1995)).

2026This privilege shields "any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by A-0773-24 13 litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." Buchanan v. Leonard, 428 N.J.

2024The litigation privilege protects "any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the A-0273-21 60 litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." Buchanan v. Leonard, 428 N.J. Super. 277, 286 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Loigman v. Twp.

2026The litigation privilege "may be extended to statements made in the course of judicial proceedings even if the words are written or spoken maliciously, without any justification or excuse, and from personal ill will or anger against the party defamed." DeVivo v. Ascher, 228 N.J.

2021The litigation privilege "may be extended to statements made in the course of judicial proceedings even if the words are written or spoken maliciously, without any justification or excuse, and from personal ill will or anger against the party defamed." DeVivo v. Ascher, 228 N.J.

2025The privilege precludes "liability for statements made . . . [during] judicial, administrative, or legislative proceedings by a litigant or other trial participant." Russo v. Nagel, 358 N.J.

2021Comm. of Twp. of Middletown, 185 N.J. 566, 579 (2006); Dello Russo v, Nagel, 358 N.J.

1995Holding Corp., 47 N.J.Super. 110 , 135 A.2d 346 (App.Div.1957), the late Chief Justice Hughes, then sitting in the Appellate Division, explained our adherence to the doctrine of litigation immunity: The doctrine that an absolute immunity exists in respect of statements, even those defamatory and malicious, made in the course of proceedings before a court of justice, and having some relation thereto, is a principle firmly established, and is responsive to the supervening public policy that persons in such circumstances be permitted to speak and write freely without the restraint of fear of an e

1995Holding Corp., 47 N.J.Super. 110 , 135 A.2d 346 (App.Div.1957), the late Chief Justice Hughes, then sitting in the Appellate Division, explained our adherence to the doctrine of litigation immunity: The doctrine that an absolute immunity exists in respect of statements, even those defamatory and malicious, made in the course of proceedings before a court of justice, and having some relation thereto, is a principle firmly established, and is responsive to the supervening public policy that persons in such circumstances be permitted to speak and write freely without the restraint of fear of an e

2026The court citing Heavner v. Uniroyal, 63 N.J. 130, 136 (1973), recognized that "utiliz[ing] the New Jersey 2 The CHRO issued a release of jurisdiction on May 10, 2022, and defendants were served Redmond's complaint on September 19, 2022.

2017Restatement (Second), supra, § 142 cmt. g; see also Heavner, supra, 63 N.J. at 134 n.3,141, 305 A2d 412 . “[E]gregious examples of forum shopping” will be discouraged when a forum state that has no interest in the litigation declines to apply its favorable statute of limitations.

2021See Feggans v. Billington, 291 N.J.

2021See Feggans v. Billington, 291 N.J.

2021Witnesses "might be reluctant to come forward to testify," and even if a witness took the stand, the witness "might be inclined to shade his testimony in favor of the potential plaintiff" for "fear of subsequent liability." [Ibid. (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333 (1983)).] A-5230-18 23 In support of his argument that the court erred in utilizing the litigation privilege, plaintiff cites King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 587 (6th Cir. 2017), where the Sixth Circuit distinguished the litigation privilege described in Rehberg by noting that the privilege did not apply to a grand jury wit

2006Briscoe, supra, 460 U.S. at 334-35 , 103 S.Ct. at 1115-16 , 75 L.Ed.2d at 107-08 . “[A]ll persons— governmental or otherwise—who were integral parts of the judicial process” were accorded absolute immunity from civil liability *583 because of the need “ ‘to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.’” Id. at 335 , 103 S.Ct. at 1115-16 , 75 L.Ed.2d at 108 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 , 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2913 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895, 919 (1978)) (emphasis added).

2001Lightning *840 Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F. 3d 1153, 1197 (3d Cir.1993).

2001Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1197 (3d Cir.1993).

2026Therefore, we determine the court properly concluded the lis pendens filing itself was not a violation of the lease terms because "it did not encumber the A-3784-23 45 [property] but [rather] put third parties on notice that there was a dispute over ownership of the [property]." Moreover, plaintiffs are correct the filing of a lis pendens is otherwise "entitled to the protection afforded by the litigation privilege." Id. at 467; see also Lone v. Brown, 199 N.J. Super. 420, 428 (App. Div. 1985).

2025A-2452-22 17 For the sake of completeness, we address the Tancevskis': (1) assertion that the Kellys' filing of the lis pendens is not protected by the litigation privilege; and (2) invitation to "take this opportunity to update the law to both prohibit and sanction any inappropriate use of lis pendens beyond the purposes provided by statute" and when a "lis pendens [is] filed beyond the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-6 [the filer is] not afforded any protections under the statute, [and] represents a slander of title, and the party abusing the procedure should be held responsible for compensat

2021As explained by our court, Given the importance to our justice system of ensuring free access to the courts, promoting complete and truthful testimony, encouraging zealous advocacy, giving finality to judgments, and avoiding unending litigation, it is not surprising that . . . the litigation privilege has been referred to as "the backbone to an effective and smoothly operating judicial system." [Peterson v. Ballard, 292 N.J.

2006For example, in Peterson v. Ballard, the Appellate Division applied the litigation privilege in dismissing a cause of action arising from an attorney’s interview of a witness in anticipation of trial. 292 N.J.Super. 575, 579-80 , 679 A.2d 657 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 147 N.J. 260 , 686 A.2d 761 (1996).

2017Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 563 (1990); see also Rabinowitz v. Wahrenberger, 406 N.J.

2009Rabinowitz v. Wahrenberger, 406 N.J.Super. 126 , 966 A. 2d 1091 (App.Div.2009) (holding that an attorney is not subject to suit based upon questions posed at a deposition).

2017In Cottrell, supra, after analyzing the application of the privilege in a variety of contexts, we concluded: We discern from these cases the guiding principle that, outside the strictly judicial setting, application of the litigation privilege will depend on the nature of the administrative proceeding, the function performed, and the pertinency of the allegedly defamatory statement to the issues and contentions to be resolved.

2017The litigation privilege protects "[c]ertain statements made in the course of judicial, administrative, or legislative proceedings . . . because of 'the need for unfettered expression critical to advancing the underlying government interest at stake in those settings.'" Zagami, LLC v. Cottrell, 403 N.J.

2026On de novo review, see Hedden v. Kean Univ., 434 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div. 2013), we discern no error in the motion A-0793-24 15 judge's conclusion that the Bederson defendants did not waive the litigation privilege.

2026On de novo review, see Hedden v. Kean Univ., 434 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div. 2013), we discern no error in the motion A-0793-24 15 judge's conclusion that the Bederson defendants did not waive the litigation privilege.

2026A fraud on the court occurs "where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability [to] impartially [] adjudicate a matter A-0024-24 44 by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense." Triffin v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 394 N.J. Super. 237, 251 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989)).

2026Unlike the Bederson defendants in the present matter, the defendant teachers in Hill raised the litigation privilege for the first time on appeal, following a jury trial on their supervisor's action for various tort claims. 342 N.J. Super. at 293 .

2026Citing our decision in Hill v. New Jersey Department of Corrections Commissioner Fauver, 342 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 2001), plaintiff maintained the Bederson defendants failed to timely assert the litigation privilege.

2026To establish a tortious inference with economic advantage claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) the "plaintiff was in pursuit of business"; (2) "the interference was done intentionally and with malice"; (3) "the interference caused the loss of the prospective gain"; and (4) "the injury caused damage." Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 751-52 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2026A fraud on the court occurs "where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability [to] impartially [] adjudicate a matter A-0024-24 44 by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense." Triffin v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 394 N.J. Super. 237, 251 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989)).