litigation privilege in New Jersey

2026Given the importance to our justice system of ensuring free access to the courts, promoting complete and truthful testimony, encouraging zealous advocacy, giving finality to judgments, and avoiding unending litigation, it is not surprising that . . . the litigation privilege[] has been referred to as "the backbone to an effective and smoothly operating judicial system." [Hawkings v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207, 222 (1994) (citing Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 370 (1990)).] Likewise, the Legislature recognized an overriding need to encourage the reporting of child abuse, by not only providing imm

2026A-2726-23 7 The litigation privilege applies to "'any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.'" Hawkins v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207, 216 (1995) (quoting Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205 , 369 (1990)). "[L]awyers and litigants must 'be permitted to speak and write freely without the restraint of fear of an ensuing defamation action.'" Loigman v. Twp.

2025Comm. of Middletown, 185 N.J. 566 (2006), the litigation privilege applied, thereby creating absolute immunity against Daugherty's claims.

2022Comm. of Middletown, 185 N.J. 566, 585 (2006), the protective shield of the litigation privilege applies to "any communication . . . made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings" (emphasis added).

2026Given the importance to our justice system of ensuring free access to the courts, promoting complete and truthful testimony, encouraging zealous advocacy, giving finality to judgments, and avoiding unending litigation, it is not surprising that . . . the litigation privilege[] has been referred to as "the backbone to an effective and smoothly operating judicial system." [Hawkings v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207, 222 (1994) (citing Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 370 (1990)).] Likewise, the Legislature recognized an overriding need to encourage the reporting of child abuse, by not only providing imm

2026A-2726-23 7 The litigation privilege applies to "'any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.'" Hawkins v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207, 216 (1995) (quoting Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205 , 369 (1990)). "[L]awyers and litigants must 'be permitted to speak and write freely without the restraint of fear of an ensuing defamation action.'" Loigman v. Twp.

2024While Hughes is correct that there is an absolute privilege, known as the litigation privilege, afforded to statements made in the course of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 563 (1990), that privilege logically does not extend to statements made outside of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.

2024While Hughes is correct that there is an absolute privilege, known as the litigation privilege, afforded to statements made in the course of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 563 (1990), that privilege logically does not extend to statements made outside of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.

2021Notwithstanding plaintiffs' narrow view to the contrary, the litigation privilege is not confined to the courtroom and "extends to all statements or communications in connection with the judicial proceeding." Ruberton v. Gabage, 280 N.J.

2007This litigation privilege "`extends to all statements or communications in connection with the judicial proceeding.'" Ibid. (quoting Ruberton v. Gabage, *132 280 N.J.Super. 125, 133 , 654 A. 2d 1002 (App.Div.1995)).

2020Super. 282, 297 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 564-65 (1995)); see also Loigman, 185 N.J. at 584 n.4 (explaining "the litigation privilege is not available in a malicious prosecution action"). 185 N.J. at 584 n.4.

2006The panel relied on the litigation privilege in affirming the dismissal of the lawsuit, observing that “an attorney must be free to advance the strengths of his or her client’s case in a candid and objective way, unfettered by the fear that the attorney may be the subject of a tort action, whether sounding in defamation or any other *589 ‘action under a different label.’ ” Id. at 133-34 , 654 A.2d 1002 (quoting Rainier's Dairies, supra, 19 N.J. at 564 , 117 A.2d 889 ).

2026This privilege shields "any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by A-0773-24 13 litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." Buchanan v. Leonard, 428 N.J.

2024The litigation privilege protects "any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the A-0273-21 60 litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." Buchanan v. Leonard, 428 N.J.

2026The litigation privilege "may be extended to statements made in the course of judicial proceedings even if the words are written or spoken maliciously, without any justification or excuse, and from personal ill will or anger against the party defamed." DeVivo v. Ascher, 228 N.J.

2021The litigation privilege "may be extended to A-0110-20 6 statements made in the course of judicial proceedings even if the words are written or spoken maliciously, without any justification or excuse, and from personal ill will or anger against the party defamed." DeVivo v. Ascher, 228 N.J.

2026Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.

2025Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.

2025The privilege precludes "liability for statements made . . . [during] judicial, administrative, or legislative proceedings by a litigant or other trial participant." Russo v. Nagel, 358 N.J.

2021Comm. of Twp. of Middletown, 185 N.J. 566, 579 (2006); Dello Russo v, Nagel, 358 N.J.

1995Holding Corp., 47 N.J.Super. 110 , 135 A.2d 346 (App.Div.1957), the late Chief Justice Hughes, then sitting in the Appellate Division, explained our adherence to the doctrine of litigation immunity: The doctrine that an absolute immunity exists in respect of statements, even those defamatory and malicious, made in the course of proceedings before a court of justice, and having some relation thereto, is a principle firmly established, and is responsive to the supervening public policy that persons in such circumstances be permitted to speak and write freely without the restraint of fear of an e

1995Holding Corp., 47 N.J.Super. 110 , 135 A.2d 346 (App.Div.1957), the late Chief Justice Hughes, then sitting in the Appellate Division, explained our adherence to the doctrine of litigation immunity: The doctrine that an absolute immunity exists in respect of statements, even those defamatory and malicious, made in the course of proceedings before a court of justice, and having some relation thereto, is a principle firmly established, and is responsive to the supervening public policy that persons in such circumstances be permitted to speak and write freely without the restraint of fear of an e

2021See Feggans v. Billington, 291 N.J.

2021See Feggans v. Billington, 291 N.J.

2021Witnesses "might be reluctant to come forward to testify," and even if a witness took the stand, the witness "might be inclined to shade his testimony in favor of the potential plaintiff" for "fear of subsequent liability." [Ibid. (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333 (1983)).] A-5230-18 23 In support of his argument that the court erred in utilizing the litigation privilege, plaintiff cites King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 587 (6th Cir. 2017), where the Sixth Circuit distinguished the litigation privilege described in Rehberg by noting that the privilege did not apply to a grand jury wit

2006Briscoe, supra, 460 U.S. at 334-35 , 103 S.Ct. at 1115-16 , 75 L.Ed.2d at 107-08 . “[A]ll persons— governmental or otherwise—who were integral parts of the judicial process” were accorded absolute immunity from civil liability *583 because of the need “ ‘to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.’” Id. at 335 , 103 S.Ct. at 1115-16 , 75 L.Ed.2d at 108 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 , 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2913 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895, 919 (1978)) (emphasis added).

2001Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1197 (3d Cir.1993).

2001Lightning *840 Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F. 3d 1153, 1197 (3d Cir.1993).

2017The litigation privilege protects "[c]ertain statements made in the course of judicial, administrative, or legislative proceedings . . . because of 'the need for unfettered expression critical to advancing the underlying government interest at stake in those settings.'" Zagami, LLC v. Cottrell, 403 N.J.

2017In Cottrell, supra, after analyzing the application of the privilege in a variety of contexts, we concluded: We discern from these cases the guiding principle that, outside the strictly judicial setting, application of the litigation privilege will depend on the nature of the administrative proceeding, the function performed, and the pertinency of the allegedly defamatory statement to the issues and contentions to be resolved.

2021As explained by our court, Given the importance to our justice system of ensuring free access to the courts, promoting complete and truthful testimony, encouraging zealous advocacy, giving finality to judgments, and avoiding unending litigation, it is not surprising that . . . the litigation privilege has been referred to as "the backbone to an effective and smoothly operating judicial system." [Peterson v. Ballard, 292 N.J.

2006For example, in Peterson v. Ballard, the Appellate Division applied the litigation privilege in dismissing a cause of action arising from an attorney’s interview of a witness in anticipation of trial. 292 N.J.Super. 575, 579-80 , 679 A.2d 657 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 147 N.J. 260 , 686 A.2d 761 (1996).

2017Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 563 (1990); see also Rabinowitz v. Wahrenberger, 406 N.J.

2009Rabinowitz v. Wahrenberger, 406 N.J.Super. 126 , 966 A. 2d 1091 (App.Div.2009) (holding that an attorney is not subject to suit based upon questions posed at a deposition).

2022Because we review orders and not opinions, Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 387 (2018), we affirm in part the trial court's order denying summary judgment on the tortious interference claims despite our disagreement with the reasons provided by the trial judge.

2022When the parties returned to court, the judge heard 3 The judge also remarked that once Molz claimed in the divorce action that the Seneca was premarital, "it shift[ed] the burden . . . to the other side to, therefore, produce the evidence that that's not true." But, as we noted in Molz's appeal from the JOD, "[t]he burden of establishing that an asset or any portion thereof is immune from distribution rests on the party claiming its immunity." Molz, slip op. at 16 (emphasis added) (citing Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 269 (2007)).

2021Plaintiff also cites Howlett By & Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 376-77 (1990), for the notion that state law cannot provide the basis for immunity for a federal claim.

2021Witnesses "might be reluctant to come forward to testify," and even if a witness took the stand, the witness "might be inclined to shade his testimony in favor of the potential plaintiff" for "fear of subsequent liability." [Ibid. (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333 (1983)).] A-5230-18 23 In support of his argument that the court erred in utilizing the litigation privilege, plaintiff cites King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 587 (6th Cir. 2017), where the Sixth Circuit distinguished the litigation privilege described in Rehberg by noting that the privilege did not apply to a grand jury wit

2020Comm. of Middletown, 185 N.J. 566, 585-87 (2006) (explaining the elements and application of the litigation privilege); (2) the CFA claim was time-barred under the six-year statute of limitations, see N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1; and (3) plaintiff failed to present evidence he suffered the ascertainable loss essential to a CFA claim, see Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557, 576 (2011) (explaining the elements of a CFA claim).

2020Id. at 583-85 ; see also Giles v. Phelan, Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, 901 F. Supp. 2d 509 , 526- 27 (D.N.J. 2012) (holding the litigation privilege barred a CFA claim alleging the defendants filed foreclosure lawsuits based on false statements of fact and without legal standing).

2019Immunity does not extend to statements published outside of a judicial proceeding to per sons not connected with it." Citizens State Bank of N.J. v. Libertelli, 215 N.J.