litigation bar in Pennsylvania

2020The PCRA defines a matter as having been previously litigated when “the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue.” Id. “[T]he fact that a petitioner presents a new argument or advances a new theory in support of a previously litigated issue will not circumvent - 15 - J-S26013-20 the previous litigation bar.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa.Super.2010)[.] Commonwealth v. Roane, 142 A.3d 79, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016).

2020The PCRA defines a matter as having been previously litigated when “the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2). “[T]he fact that a petitioner presents a new argument or advances a new theory in support of a previously litigated issue will not circumvent the previous litigation bar.” Commonwealth v. Roane, 142 A.3d 79, 94 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citations omitted).

2020The PCRA defines a matter as having been previously litigated when “the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue.” Id. “[T]he fact that a petitioner presents a new argument or advances a new theory in support of a previously litigated issue will not circumvent - 15 - J-S26013-20 the previous litigation bar.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa.Super.2010)[.] Commonwealth v. Roane, 142 A.3d 79, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016).

2020The PCRA defines a matter as having been previously litigated when “the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue.” Id. “[T]he fact that a petitioner presents a new argument or advances a new theory in support of a previously litigated issue will not circumvent the previous litigation bar.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa.Super. 2010), citing Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50 (Pa.Super. 2000).

2016See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 56-58 , 888 A.2d 564, 570-71 (2005) (discussing such lapses in the context of permutations of the previous litigation doctrine deemed to encompass claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted at the post-conviction stage).

2016See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 56-58 , 888 A.2d 564, 570-71 (2005) (discussing such lapses in the context of permutations of the previous litigation doctrine deemed to encompass claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted at the post-conviction stage).

2019An issue had been previously litigated for PCRA purposes if “the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue.” Id., at 9544(a)(2); Commonwealth v. Beasley, 678 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. 1996). “[T]he fact that a petitioner presents a new argument or advances a new theory in support of a previously litigated issue will not circumvent the previous litigation bar.” Commonwealth v. Roane, 142 A.3d 79, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). ____________________________________________ 4At the time Glover’s petition was

2005Consistent with this perspective, I do not believe that the codification of the previous litigation doctrine requires the Court to strip it of its prudential character. [2] Although my position would not require the Court to abandon the understanding that mere layering alone is not sufficient to overcome previous litigation, I would not continue to employ the rubric that previous litigation can never be overcome by presenting new theories of relief, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Beasley, 544 Pa. 554, 565 , 678 A.2d 773, 778 (1996), because I believe that such formulation is overbroad. [1] It is m

2005In his Concurring Opinion in this case, Mr. Justice Saylor adverts to a statement in Commonwealth v. Uderra, 862 A.2d 74 (Pa.2004), in which the Court, after noting differences among Justices concerning the scope of the PCRA’s previous litigation provision, suggested that, “[a]ll Justices are in alignment ... that at least where the Court’s reasoning and holding on direct appeal encompass the claim sought to be raised on collateral review, and there is no irrefutable, manifest error in the disposition, the previous litigation doctrine should be deemed to apply.” Id. at 93-94 (citing Commonweal

2005In his Concurring Opinion in this case, Mr. Justice Saylor adverts to a statement in Commonwealth v. Uderra, 862 A.2d 74 (Pa.2004), in which the Court, after noting differences among Justices concerning the scope of the PCRA’s previous litigation provision, suggested that, “[a]ll Justices are in alignment ... that at least where the Court’s reasoning and holding on direct appeal encompass the claim sought to be raised on collateral review, and there is no irrefutable, manifest error in the disposition, the previous litigation doctrine should be deemed to apply.” Id. at 93-94 (citing Commonweal

2012Specifically, we held that the previous litigation bar of the PCRA did not function as a “never-yielding bar to the possibility of collateral relief’ and granted Cruz relief under the PCRA “in the particularized circumstances presented.” Id. at 878.

2006See id. at 271 , 851 A.2d at 875 .

2005In his Concurring Opinion in this case, Mr. Justice Saylor adverts to a statement in Commonwealth v. Uderra, 862 A.2d 74 (Pa.2004), in which the Court, after noting differences among Justices concerning the scope of the PCRA’s previous litigation provision, suggested that, “[a]ll Justices are in alignment ... that at least where the Court’s reasoning and holding on direct appeal encompass the claim sought to be raised on collateral review, and there is no irrefutable, manifest error in the disposition, the previous litigation doctrine should be deemed to apply.” Id. at 93-94 (citing Commonweal

2005In his Concurring Opinion in this case, Mr. Justice Saylor adverts to a statement in Commonwealth v. Uderra, 862 A.2d 74 (Pa.2004), in which the Court, after noting differences among Justices concerning the scope of the PCRA’s previous litigation provision, suggested that, “[a]ll Justices are in alignment ... that at least where the Court’s reasoning and holding on direct appeal encompass the claim sought to be raised on collateral review, and there is no irrefutable, manifest error in the disposition, the previous litigation doctrine should be deemed to apply.” Id. at 93-94 (citing Commonweal

2020The PCRA defines a matter as having been previously litigated when “the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue.” Id. “[T]he fact that a petitioner presents a new argument or advances a new theory in support of a previously litigated issue will not circumvent the previous litigation bar.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa.Super. 2010), citing Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50 (Pa.Super. 2000).

2020The PCRA defines a matter as having been previously litigated when “the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue.” Id. “[T]he fact that a petitioner presents a new argument or advances a new theory in support of a previously litigated issue will not circumvent the previous litigation bar.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa.Super. 2010), citing Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50 (Pa.Super. 2000).

2018In order to establish ineffectiveness, a petitioner must plead and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "(1) the underlying legal claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice because of counsel's ineffectiveness." Commonwealth v. Chmiel , 612 Pa. 333 , 30 A.3d 1111 , 1127 (2011).

2018In order to establish ineffectiveness, a petitioner must plead and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “(1) the underlying legal claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice because of counsel’s ineffectiveness.” Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (Pa. 2011).

2006Significantly, however, the petitioner also specifically invoked this Court's prior decision in Commonwealth v. Tyson, 535 Pa. 391, 394-95 , 635 A.2d 623, 624-25 (1993), in which this Court chose not to enforce the previous litigation bar in circumstances that it deemed extraordinary.

2006Significantly, however, the petitioner also specifically invoked this Court's prior decision in Commonwealth v. Tyson, 535 Pa. 391, 394-95 , 635 A.2d 623, 624-25 (1993), in which this Court chose not to enforce the previous litigation bar in circumstances that it deemed extraordinary.

2005Accord Commonwealth v. Moore, 580 Pa. 279 , 295 n. 5, 860 A.2d 88 , 98 n. 5 (2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500 , 746 A.2d 592 (2000), for the proposition that “where claim involving evidence involves other previously unchallenged evidence, claim was not previously litigated and merits will be reached”).

2005Accord Commonwealth v. Moore, 580 Pa. 279 , 295 n. 5, 860 A.2d 88 , 98 n. 5 (2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500 , 746 A.2d 592 (2000), for the proposition that “where claim involving evidence involves other previously unchallenged evidence, claim was not previously litigated and merits will be reached”).

2022Kohler v. McCrory Stores, 615 A.2d 27 , 32 (Pa. 1992).

2022Kohler v. McCrory Stores, 615 A.2d 27, 32 (Pa. 1992).

2017Thus, the previous litigation bar applies. -6- J-S58027-16 Since we may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Commonwealth v. Benner, 147 A.3d 915, 919 (Pa.Super. 2016), we deem the issue previously litigated and affirm the denial of PCRA relief.

2016Compare Majority Opinion, slip op. at 31 (indicating that “Appellant has failed to articulate any material difference between the instant claim of a due process violation resulting in an unfair trial and the substantive claim raised and rejected on direct appeal.”), with id. at 32 n.14 (asserting that, in his present brief, appellant presently “has not raised” the claim asserted on direct appeal).4 4 This Court has obviously had difficulty with a fair and just application of the previous litigation doctrine, which too frequently has been administered in a rote fashion, rather than with evaluat

2016See, e.g., Bonfitto, 391 Pa. at 188 , 137 A.2d at 278 .

2016See, e.g., Bonfitto, 391 Pa. at 188 , 137 A.2d at 278 .

2011Minn. Nov. 20,2008) (“claims that an attorney has violated the FDCPA do not implicate the litigation privilege”); Nutter v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., 500 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1223-24 (D.

2005See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bond, 572 Pa. 588 , 819 A.2d 33, 45-46 (2002) (noting that "[c]ounsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to introduce information uniquely within the knowledge of the defendant and his family which is not provided to counsel;" "[b]ecause appellant and his family, who were in a position to know about the additional childhood trauma to which appellant allegedly was exposed, failed to reveal that trauma to counsel, and appellant has not shown how counsel should otherwise have learned of it, counsel was not ineffective in this regard."); Roderick Johnson, supra ; Co

2005See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bond, 572 Pa. 588 , 819 A.2d 33, 45-46 (2002) (noting that "[c]ounsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to introduce information uniquely within the knowledge of the defendant and his family which is not provided to counsel;" "[b]ecause appellant and his family, who were in a position to know about the additional childhood trauma to which appellant allegedly was exposed, failed to reveal that trauma to counsel, and appellant has not shown how counsel should otherwise have learned of it, counsel was not ineffective in this regard."); Roderick Johnson, supra ; Co

2005See Majority Opinion, op. at 470-73, 872 A.2d at 1144-45 (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 538 Pa. 410, 427-28 , 648 A.2d 1177, 1185 (1994)).

2005See Majority Opinion, op. at 470-73, 872 A.2d at 1144-45 (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 538 Pa. 410, 427-28 , 648 A.2d 1177, 1185 (1994)).

2005See Majority Opinion, op. at ___-___, 872 A.2d at 1144 -45 (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 538 Pa. 410, 427-28 , 648 A.2d 1177, 1185 (1994)).

2005See Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 565 , 782 A.2d 517, 524 (2001). 2 With regard to the balance of the majority opinion, I respectfully concur in the result. .

2005See Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 565 , 782 A.2d 517, 524 (2001). 2 With regard to the balance of the majority opinion, I respectfully concur in the result. .

2005E.g., Commonwealth v. Bond, 572 Pa. 588 , 819 A.2d 33 (2002); Commonwealth v. McCall, 567 Pa. 165 , 786 A.2d 191 (2001); Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 555 Pa. 434 , 725 A.2d 154 (1999).

2005E.g., Commonwealth v. Bond, 572 Pa. 588 , 819 A.2d 33 (2002); Commonwealth v. McCall, 567 Pa. 165 , 786 A.2d 191 (2001); Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 555 Pa. 434 , 725 A.2d 154 (1999).