litigation privilege in Washington

2025App. 2d 500 , 503, 533 P.3d 123 (2023).

2024App. 2d 500 , 509, 533 P.3d 123 (2023), review denied, 2 Wn.3d 1008 (2023).

2025App. 2d 803 , 835, 497 P.3d 431 (2021), which declined to apply the privilege to an abuse of process claim.

2024App. 2d 803 , 834, 497 P.3d 431 (2021), review denied, 199 Wn.2d 1005 , 506 P.3d 638 (2022); see also Scott v. Am.

2025Id. (quoting Twelker v. Shannon & Wilson, Inc., 88 Wn.2d 473, 476 , 564 P.2d 1131 (1977)).

2021Litigation privilege as applied to “witnesses in judicial proceedings” protects witnesses “from suit based on their testimony.” Id. at 125 .

2025McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wn.2d 265, 267 , 621 P.2d 1285 (1980). “[A]ttorneys and law firms have absolute immunity from liability for acts arising out of representing their clients.” Jeckle v. Crotty, 120 Wn.

2022Litigation privilege was extended to attorneys because, as officers of the court, they must be afforded “the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients.” McNeal, 95 Wn.2d at 267 .

2025While stated broadly, the litigation privilege is “limited to situations in which authorities have the power to discipline as well as strike from the record statements which exceed the bounds of permissible conduct.” Twelker v. Shannon & Wilson, Inc., 88 Wn.2d 473, 476 , 564 P.2d 1131 (1977).

2025While stated broadly, the litigation privilege is “limited to situations in which authorities have the power to discipline as well as strike from the record statements which exceed the bounds of permissible conduct.” Twelker v. Shannon & Wilson, Inc., 88 Wn.2d 473, 476 , 564 P.2d 1131 (1977).

2024However, as to the third parties’ acts suborning the perjured statements, the Rice court held, “[T]hese reasons [justifying the litigation privilege] do not apply to a stranger to the suit, who procures and suborns false witnesses, and the rule should not be extended beyond those cases which are within its reasons.” Id. 11 No. 84292-7-I/12 Franco also points to the court’s reasoning in a 1939 federal case, Ewald v. Lane, that if A induces B to act, “the fact that the law gives an immunity to B need not make A immune.” 104 F.2d 222, 224 (D.C.

2024However, as to the third parties’ acts suborning the perjured statements, the Rice court held, “[T]hese reasons [justifying the litigation privilege] do not apply to a stranger to the suit, who procures and suborns false witnesses, and the rule should not be extended beyond those cases which are within its reasons.” Id. 11 No. 84292-7-I/12 Franco also points to the court’s reasoning in a 1939 federal case, Ewald v. Lane, that if A induces B to act, “the fact that the law gives an immunity to B need not make A immune.” 104 F.2d 222, 224 (D.C.

2024The Laun court reversed the lower court’s application of the litigation privilege because it “should not be extended so as to include the instant defendants and the position they are alleged to occupy in the circumstances.” Id. (citing reasoning from Rice and Ewald). 10 MacQuarie argues Franco’s arguments are barred by the invited error doctrine because it never distinguished among the defendants in argument about the litigation privilege and it was plaintiffs who proposed that the jury not be instructed about the privilege and the court direct a verdict if the jury relied on the Delaware comp

2024The Laun court reversed the lower court’s application of the litigation privilege because it “should not be extended so as to include the instant defendants and the position they are alleged to occupy in the circumstances.” Id. (citing reasoning from Rice and Ewald). 10 MacQuarie argues Franco’s arguments are barred by the invited error doctrine because it never distinguished among the defendants in argument about the litigation privilege and it was plaintiffs who proposed that the jury not be instructed about the privilege and the court direct a verdict if the jury relied on the Delaware comp

2026Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 1998), and Kearney v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 582 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2009), as support for his argument that the litigation privilege should not apply to the law firm’s statements.

2026Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 1998), and Kearney v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 582 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2009), as support for his argument that the litigation privilege should not apply to the law firm’s statements.

2025Deatherage v. Examining Bd. of Psychology, 134 Wn.2d 131, 135 , 948 P.2d 828 (1997) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 588 (AM.

2025Valve claims, and the trial court agreed, the litigation privilege does not apply here because its scope is “limited to situations where some power to discipline remains available.” Deatherage v. Examining Bd. of Psychology, 134 Wn.2d 131, 136 , 948 P.2d 828 (1997).

2025That is so, they argue, for two reasons: first, their conduct is protected as a matter of law by the litigation privilege; and second, Valve has not pleaded—and cannot properly plead—various elements of its claims, such as a viable duty of non-interference, as required to state a cause of action for tortious interference, 4 and initiating legal proceedings to “accomplish an end” outside of those proceedings, as required to 4 See, e.g., Pleas v. City of Seattle, 112 Wn.2d 794, 804 , 774 P.2d 1158 (1989) (quoting Straube v. Larson, 287 Or. 357, 361 , 600 P.2d 371 (1979); Libera v. City of Port A

2025That is so, they argue, for two reasons: first, their conduct is protected as a matter of law by the litigation privilege; and second, Valve has not pleaded—and cannot properly plead—various elements of its claims, such as a viable duty of non-interference, as required to state a cause of action for tortious interference, 4 and initiating legal proceedings to “accomplish an end” outside of those proceedings, as required to 4 See, e.g., Pleas v. City of Seattle, 112 Wn.2d 794, 804 , 774 P.2d 1158 (1989) (quoting Straube v. Larson, 287 Or. 357, 361 , 600 P.2d 371 (1979); Libera v. City of Port A

2025That is so, they argue, for two reasons: first, their conduct is protected as a matter of law by the litigation privilege; and second, Valve has not pleaded—and cannot properly plead—various elements of its claims, such as a viable duty of non-interference, as required to state a cause of action for tortious interference, 4 and initiating legal proceedings to “accomplish an end” outside of those proceedings, as required to 4 See, e.g., Pleas v. City of Seattle, 112 Wn.2d 794, 804 , 774 P.2d 1158 (1989) (quoting Straube v. Larson, 287 Or. 357, 361 , 600 P.2d 371 (1979); Libera v. City of Port A

2025That is so, they argue, for two reasons: first, their conduct is protected as a matter of law by the litigation privilege; and second, Valve has not pleaded—and cannot properly plead—various elements of its claims, such as a viable duty of non-interference, as required to state a cause of action for tortious interference, 4 and initiating legal proceedings to “accomplish an end” outside of those proceedings, as required to 4 See, e.g., Pleas v. City of Seattle, 112 Wn.2d 794, 804 , 774 P.2d 1158 (1989) (quoting Straube v. Larson, 287 Or. 357, 361 , 600 P.2d 371 (1979); Libera v. City of Port A

2025That is so, they argue, for two reasons: first, their conduct is protected as a matter of law by the litigation privilege; and second, Valve has not pleaded—and cannot properly plead—various elements of its claims, such as a viable duty of non-interference, as required to state a cause of action for tortious interference, 4 and initiating legal proceedings to “accomplish an end” outside of those proceedings, as required to 4 See, e.g., Pleas v. City of Seattle, 112 Wn.2d 794, 804 , 774 P.2d 1158 (1989) (quoting Straube v. Larson, 287 Or. 357, 361 , 600 P.2d 371 (1979); Libera v. City of Port A

2025App. 669, 676-77 , 316 P.3d 1064 (2013). 12 No. 86585-4-I state a cause of action for abuse of process. 5 We agree with the first argument and therefore do not reach the second.

2023Indeed, one of the examples Bender gives of an absolute privilege, contrasted with the qualified privilege extending to statements made by law enforcement officers that was in dispute, is the litigation privilege. 99 Wn.2d at 600 .8 occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and malicious statements.” “[T]he possibility of incurring the costs and inconvenience associated with defending a [retaliatory] suit might well deter a citizen with a legitimate grievance from filing a complaint.” 283 Conn. 338 , 343 927 A.2d 304 (2007) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Chadha v

2023App. 21 , 521 P.2d 964 (1974), to support the idea that an abuse of process claim may lie against an attorney unhindered by the litigation privilege. 19 Wn.

2023Indeed, one of the examples Bender gives of an absolute privilege, contrasted with the qualified privilege extending to statements made by law enforcement officers that was in dispute, is the litigation privilege. 99 Wn.2d at 600 .8 occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and malicious statements.” “[T]he possibility of incurring the costs and inconvenience associated with defending a [retaliatory] suit might well deter a citizen with a legitimate grievance from filing a complaint.” 283 Conn. 338 , 343 927 A.2d 304 (2007) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Chadha v

2023Indeed, one of the examples Bender gives of an absolute privilege, contrasted with the qualified privilege extending to statements made by law enforcement officers that was in dispute, is the litigation privilege. 99 Wn.2d at 600 .8 occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and malicious statements.” “[T]he possibility of incurring the costs and inconvenience associated with defending a [retaliatory] suit might well deter a citizen with a legitimate grievance from filing a complaint.” 283 Conn. 338 , 343 927 A.2d 304 (2007) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Chadha v

2023Indeed, one of the examples Bender gives of an absolute privilege, contrasted with the qualified privilege extending to statements made by law enforcement officers that was in dispute, is the litigation privilege. 99 Wn.2d at 600 .8 occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and malicious statements.” “[T]he possibility of incurring the costs and inconvenience associated with defending a [retaliatory] suit might well deter a citizen with a legitimate grievance from filing a complaint.” 283 Conn. 338 , 343 927 A.2d 304 (2007) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Chadha v

2023Indeed, one of the examples Bender gives of an absolute privilege, contrasted with the qualified privilege extending to statements made by law enforcement officers that was in dispute, is the litigation privilege. 99 Wn.2d at 600 .8 occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and malicious statements.” “[T]he possibility of incurring the costs and inconvenience associated with defending a [retaliatory] suit might well deter a citizen with a legitimate grievance from filing a complaint.” 283 Conn. 338 , 343 927 A.2d 304 (2007) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Chadha v

2023Indeed, one of the examples Bender gives of an absolute privilege, contrasted with the qualified privilege extending to statements made by law enforcement officers that was in dispute, is the litigation privilege. 99 Wn.2d at 600 .8 occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and malicious statements.” “[T]he possibility of incurring the costs and inconvenience associated with defending a [retaliatory] suit might well deter a citizen with a legitimate grievance from filing a complaint.” 283 Conn. 338 , 343 927 A.2d 304 (2007) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Chadha v

2023Indeed, one of the examples Bender gives of an absolute privilege, contrasted with the qualified privilege extending to statements made by law enforcement officers that was in dispute, is the litigation privilege. 99 Wn.2d at 600 .8 occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and malicious statements.” “[T]he possibility of incurring the costs and inconvenience associated with defending a [retaliatory] suit might well deter a citizen with a legitimate grievance from filing a complaint.” 283 Conn. 338 , 343 927 A.2d 304 (2007) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Chadha v

2023Indeed, one of the examples Bender gives of an absolute privilege, contrasted with the qualified privilege extending to statements made by law enforcement officers that was in dispute, is the litigation privilege. 99 Wn.2d at 600 .8 occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and malicious statements.” “[T]he possibility of incurring the costs and inconvenience associated with defending a [retaliatory] suit might well deter a citizen with a legitimate grievance from filing a complaint.” 283 Conn. 338 , 343 927 A.2d 304 (2007) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Chadha v

2023And in fact, Dexter declined to allow the plaintiff’s suit to proceed in part because “[a] cause of action for perjury is inconsistent with the principle that a witness, lay or expert, party or nonparty, is immune from tort damages arising out of his or her testimony.” 76 Wn.

2023Edwards, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 1068-72 .

2022As applied to attorneys, litigation privilege ensures that attorneys “have freedom to secure justice for clients.” Kearney v. Kearney, 95 Wn.

2018Because the fair report privilege is dispositive, we do not address the litigation privilege. -6- No. 77157-4-1/7 96 Wn.2d at 487 ; Alpine, 114 Wn.

2018Because the fair report privilege is dispositive, we do not address the litigation privilege. -6- No. 77157-4-1/7 96 Wn.2d at 487 ; Alpine, 114 Wn.

2018Because the fair report privilege is dispositive, we do not address the litigation privilege. -6- No. 77157-4-1/7 96 Wn.2d at 487 ; Alpine, 114 Wn.

2018Because the fair report privilege is dispositive, we do not address the litigation privilege. -6- No. 77157-4-1/7 96 Wn.2d at 487 ; Alpine, 114 Wn.

1997Based on that holding, the plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment of liability on the RCW 64.40 claim, arguing that because all it had to show to establish liability under RCW 64.40 was arbitrary and capricious behavior, the prior decision of the court in the writ of certiorari was "binding at this stage of the litigation under the doctrine of *1193 collateral estoppel." Id. at 112 , 829 P.2d 746 .

1997Based on that holding, the plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment of liability on the RCW 64.40 claim, arguing that because all it had to show to establish liability under RCW 64.40 was arbitrary and capricious behavior, the prior decision of the court in the writ of certiorari was "binding at this stage of the litigation under the doctrine of *1193 collateral estoppel." Id. at 112 , 829 P.2d 746 .