10 Alaska opinions name it 1 courts 1992–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shaw v. State, Department of Administration, Public Defender Agencygreen2 sentences2014Defender Agency, 816 P.2d 1358, 1361 (Alaska 1991) (“[W]e note the desirability of allowing a criminal defendant with a valid post-conviction relief claim to pursue that remedy without the distraction of also filing a legal malpractice claim.”)). -54- 6868 against Jones and to litigate against his insurance broker at the same time. 2014Defender Agency, 816 P.2d 1358, 1361 (Alaska 1991) (“[W]e note the desirability of allowing a criminal defendant with a valid post-conviction relief claim to pursue that remedy without the distraction of also filing a legal malpractice claim.”)). -54- 6868 against Jones and to litigate against his insurance broker at the same time. | 4 | 5 |
Weisberg v. Williams, Connolly & Califanogreen1 sentence2025In jurisdictions where it has been adopted, the continuous representation rule tolls statutes of limitations applicable to malpractice claims until the end of the attorney’s representation in the matter in which the alleged malpractice occurred.38 In Wettanen v. Cowper we observed that the continuous representation rule has “much to 36 See Wettanen v. Cowper, 749 P.2d 362, 365 (Alaska 1988); Beesley v. Van Doren, 873 P.2d 1280 , 1283 n.4 (Alaska 1994). 37 Wettanen, 749 P.2d at 365 (quoting Weisberg v. Williams, Connolly & Califano, 390 A.2d 992, 995 (D.C. 1978)). 38 See, e.g., Janicki Logging | 1 | 1 |
Wettanen v. Cowpergreen2 sentences2025In jurisdictions where it has been adopted, the continuous representation rule tolls statutes of limitations applicable to malpractice claims until the end of the attorney’s representation in the matter in which the alleged malpractice occurred.38 In Wettanen v. Cowper we observed that the continuous representation rule has “much to 36 See Wettanen v. Cowper, 749 P.2d 362, 365 (Alaska 1988); Beesley v. Van Doren, 873 P.2d 1280 , 1283 n.4 (Alaska 1994). 37 Wettanen, 749 P.2d at 365 (quoting Weisberg v. Williams, Connolly & Califano, 390 A.2d 992, 995 (D.C. 1978)). 38 See, e.g., Janicki Logging 2025In jurisdictions where it has been adopted, the continuous representation rule tolls statutes of limitations applicable to malpractice claims until the end of the attorney’s representation in the matter in which the alleged malpractice occurred.38 In Wettanen v. Cowper we observed that the continuous representation rule has “much to 36 See Wettanen v. Cowper, 749 P.2d 362, 365 (Alaska 1988); Beesley v. Van Doren, 873 P.2d 1280 , 1283 n.4 (Alaska 1994). 37 Wettanen, 749 P.2d at 365 (quoting Weisberg v. Williams, Connolly & Califano, 390 A.2d 992, 995 (D.C. 1978)). 38 See, e.g., Janicki Logging | 1 | 1 |
Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikosgreen1 sentence2021IV, § 15 (vesting power to govern practice of law in this court). 12 Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Ind. 1991) (“Today, it seems anachronistic to resolve the issue of the assignability of a legal malpractice claim by deciding whether such a claim would survive the client’s death . . . . | 1 | 1 |
Bohna v. HUGHES, THORSNESS, GANTZgreen1 sentence2021Lastly, involuntary assignment of a legal malpractice claim to the client’s litigation adversary, as is sought here, may erode public confidence in the judicial system by “sanctioning an abrupt and shameless shifting of positions.”40 A legal malpractice case generally requires a “trial within a trial”: to prove that the client’s damage was proximately caused by legal malpractice, the client must show that the client’s claim or defense would have been successful but for the attorney’s breach of duty.41 When the 38 Id. (quoting Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83 , 87 (Cal. App. 1976 | 1 | 1 |
Kommavongsa v. Haskellgreen1 sentence2021As is sometimes the case with the common law, the rule has outlived the reason for its creation.”), abrogated on other grounds by Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 2007). 13 Id.; see also Kommavongsa v. Haskell, 67 P.3d 1068, 1072 , 1072 n.2 (Wash. 2003) (noting that state survival statutes and survival rule suggested that legal malpractice claims could be assigned, but recognizing that public policy considerations may dictate a different result); Wagener v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn. App. 1993) (“[This court] consider[s] issues of public policy rather than the statutory surviva | 1 | 1 |
Gefre v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLPgreen1 sentence2021But attorneys already practice in the shadow of potential malpractice claims; our ethics rules, in fact, require attorneys to either maintain 30 Gray, 943 N.W.2d at 625 (quoting Kracht, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 641 n.6). 31 See Gefre v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, 306 P.3d 1264, 1280 (Alaska 2013). 32 Alaska R. | 1 | 1 |
Wagener v. McDonaldgreen1 sentence2021As is sometimes the case with the common law, the rule has outlived the reason for its creation.”), abrogated on other grounds by Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 2007). 13 Id.; see also Kommavongsa v. Haskell, 67 P.3d 1068, 1072 , 1072 n.2 (Wash. 2003) (noting that state survival statutes and survival rule suggested that legal malpractice claims could be assigned, but recognizing that public policy considerations may dictate a different result); Wagener v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn. App. 1993) (“[This court] consider[s] issues of public policy rather than the statutory surviva | 1 | 1 |
United States National Bank of Oregon v. Daviesgreen2 sentences2014E.g., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So.2d 1323, 1326 (Fla.1990); United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Davies, 274 Or. 663 , 548 P.2d 966, 970 (1976); Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.1991). . 565 So.2d at 1326 . . 2014E.g., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So.2d 1323, 1326 (Fla.1990); United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Davies, 274 Or. 663 , 548 P.2d 966, 970 (1976); Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.1991). . 565 So.2d at 1326 . . | 1 | 1 |
Hughes v. Mahaney & Higginsgreen1 sentence2014E.g., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So.2d 1323, 1326 (Fla.1990); United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Davies, 274 Or. 663 , 548 P.2d 966, 970 (1976); Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.1991). . 565 So.2d at 1326 . . | 1 | 1 |
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lanegreen2 sentences2014E.g., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So.2d 1323, 1326 (Fla.1990); United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Davies, 274 Or. 663 , 548 P.2d 966, 970 (1976); Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.1991). . 565 So.2d at 1326 . . 2014E.g., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So.2d 1323, 1326 (Fla.1990); United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Davies, 274 Or. 663 , 548 P.2d 966, 970 (1976); Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.1991). . 565 So.2d at 1326 . . | 1 | 1 |
Tush v. Pharrgreen1 sentence2005Tush v. Pharr, 68 P.3d 1239, 1244 (Alaska 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 21 . | 1 | 1 |
Continental Insurance Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc.green2 sentences1992Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281, 286 (Alaska 1980). 1992Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281, 286 (Alaska 1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Beesley v. Van Doren
green
1 sentence2025In jurisdictions where it has been adopted, the continuous representation rule tolls statutes of limitations applicable to malpractice claims until the end of the attorney’s representation in the matter in which the alleged malpractice occurred.38 In Wettanen v. Cowper we observed that the continuous representation rule has “much to 36 See Wettanen v. Cowper, 749 P.2d 362, 365 (Alaska 1988); Beesley v. Van Doren, 873 P.2d 1280 , 1283 n.4 (Alaska 1994). 37 Wettanen, 749 P.2d at 365 (quoting Weisberg v. Williams, Connolly & Califano, 390 A.2d 992, 995 (D.C. 1978)). 38 See, e.g., Janicki Logging | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Kenneth Arnoult v. Melissa Webster, DMD
green
1 sentence2025Equitable estoppel provides that when a party “fraudulently conceals from a plaintiff the existence of a cause of action,” then that party “may be estopped [from pleading] the statute of limitation if the plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit was occasioned by reliance on the false or fraudulent representation.” 62 In other words, equitable estoppel applies when the delay in filing suit is the result of fraud.63 But the policies behind the continuous representation rule — allowing the client to give the attorney a chance to fix the mistake without forgoing a malpractice suit — apply even 59 See g | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021Lastly, involuntary assignment of a legal malpractice claim to the client’s litigation adversary, as is sought here, may erode public confidence in the judicial system by “sanctioning an abrupt and shameless shifting of positions.”40 A legal malpractice case generally requires a “trial within a trial”: to prove that the client’s damage was proximately caused by legal malpractice, the client must show that the client’s claim or defense would have been successful but for the attorney’s breach of duty.41 When the 38 Id. (quoting Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83 , 87 (Cal. App. 1976 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Kracht v. Perrin, Gartland & Doyle
green
1 sentence2021But attorneys already practice in the shadow of potential malpractice claims; our ethics rules, in fact, require attorneys to either maintain 30 Gray, 943 N.W.2d at 625 (quoting Kracht, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 641 n.6). 31 See Gefre v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, 306 P.3d 1264, 1280 (Alaska 2013). 32 Alaska R. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon
green
1 sentence2021Lastly, involuntary assignment of a legal malpractice claim to the client’s litigation adversary, as is sought here, may erode public confidence in the judicial system by “sanctioning an abrupt and shameless shifting of positions.”40 A legal malpractice case generally requires a “trial within a trial”: to prove that the client’s damage was proximately caused by legal malpractice, the client must show that the client’s claim or defense would have been successful but for the attorney’s breach of duty.41 When the 38 Id. (quoting Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83 , 87 (Cal. App. 1976 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Liggett v. Young
green
1 sentence2021As is sometimes the case with the common law, the rule has outlived the reason for its creation.”), abrogated on other grounds by Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 2007). 13 Id.; see also Kommavongsa v. Haskell, 67 P.3d 1068, 1072 , 1072 n.2 (Wash. 2003) (noting that state survival statutes and survival rule suggested that legal malpractice claims could be assigned, but recognizing that public policy considerations may dictate a different result); Wagener v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn. App. 1993) (“[This court] consider[s] issues of public policy rather than the statutory surviva | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Shaw v. State, Department of Administration
green
2 sentences1996COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL In Shaw v. State, Department of Administration, 861 P.2d 566 (Alaska 1993) (Shaw II), the court held that a defendant in a legal malpractice claim “may raise the issue of the plaintiffs actual guilt as an affirmative defense.” Id. at 572 . 1996COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL In Shaw v. State, Department of Administration, 861 P.2d 566 (Alaska 1993) (Shaw II), the court held that a defendant in a legal malpractice claim “may raise the issue of the plaintiffs actual guilt as an affirmative defense.” Id. at 572 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.