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37 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1988–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Elygreen2 sentences2024"The statute of limitations applicable to a legal malpractice claim begins to run when a client 'knows or reasonably should know that he or she has sustained appreciable harm as a result of the lawyer's conduct.'" Lyons v. Nutt, 436 Mass. 244, 247 (2002), quoting Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 473 (1996). "[A]ppreciable harm is 'injury, loss or detriment' that is 'capable of being measured or perceived.'" Vinci v. Byers, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 139 (2005), quoting Kennedy v. Goffstein, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 230, 233 (2004). 2023"The statute of limitations applicable to a legal malpractice claim begins to run when a client 'knows or reasonably should know that he or she has sustained appreciable harm as a result of the lawyer's conduct.'" Lyons, 436 Mass. at 247 , quoting Williams, 423 Mass. at 473 . "[A]ppreciable harm is 'injury, loss or detriment' that is 'capable of being measured or perceived.'" Vinci, 65 Mass. App. Ct. at 139 , quoting Kennedy v. Goffstein, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 230, 233 (2004). | 6 | 7 |
Fishman v. Brooksgreen2 sentences2002To succeed on a legal malpractice claim based on negligence in failing to communicate a defendant’s request for a demand below $400,000 and in failing to communicate other matters material to a plaintiffs decision whether to seek to settle and at what amount, the plaintiff must prove, in addition to deviation from the standard of care, that she “probably would have obtained a better result had the attorney exercised adequate skill and care.” Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 647 (1986). 1994As we have recently said regarding a legal malpractice claim: “The original or underlying action is presented to the trier of fact as a trial within a trial.” Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 647 (1986). | 6 | 6 |
Lyons v. Nuttgreen2 sentences2026"The statute of limitations applicable to a legal malpractice claim begins to run when a client 'knows or reasonably should know that he or she has sustained appreciable harm as a result of the lawyer's conduct."' Lyons v. Nutt, 436 Mass. 244,247 (2002), quoting Williams v. Ely. 23 Mass.' 467, 473 (1996). 2024"The statute of limitations applicable to a legal malpractice claim begins to run when a client 'knows or reasonably should know that he or she has sustained appreciable harm as a result of the lawyer's conduct.'" Lyons v. Nutt, 436 Mass. 244, 247 (2002), quoting Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 473 (1996). "[A]ppreciable harm is 'injury, loss or detriment' that is 'capable of being measured or perceived.'" Vinci v. Byers, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 139 (2005), quoting Kennedy v. Goffstein, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 230, 233 (2004). | 3 | 5 |
Vinci v. Byersgreen2 sentences2025See Massachusetts 6 Electric Co. v. Fletcher, Tilton & Whipple, P.C., 394 Mass. 265, 268 (1985) ("A conclusion that the [plaintiffs'] cause of action accrued only when the . . . case was settled would be inconsistent with the general rule in negligence actions that a cause of action accrues when some harm has occurred even though the full extent and nature of that harm has not been and cannot be established immediately"); Frankston, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 375 ("That a case is ongoing and not finally adjudicated through the trial or appellate stage does not mean that there is no duty of inquiry i 2024"The statute of limitations applicable to a legal malpractice claim begins to run when a client 'knows or reasonably should know that he or she has sustained appreciable harm as a result of the lawyer's conduct.'" Lyons v. Nutt, 436 Mass. 244, 247 (2002), quoting Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 473 (1996). "[A]ppreciable harm is 'injury, loss or detriment' that is 'capable of being measured or perceived.'" Vinci v. Byers, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 139 (2005), quoting Kennedy v. Goffstein, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 230, 233 (2004). | 3 | 4 |
Frankston v. Dennistongreen2 sentences2026The fact that the issue remained live (insofar as concerned its ultimate judicial resolution) did not preclude a running of the statute of limitations on the plaintiff's malpractice claims: "That a case is-ongoing and not finally adjudicated through the trial or appellate stage does not mean that there is no duty of inquiry into the harm and its connection to the attorney's conduct and no accrual of a legal malpractice claim; the risks of a statute of limitations bar on a legal malpractice claim are not left back stage, suspended to the final curtain call." Frankston, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 375 2026It is well settled ''that accrual of a legal malpractice claim does not necessarily depend on the ultimate outcome of the underlying litigation." Id. at 376 , -8- citing Massachusetts Elec. | 3 | 4 |
Kennedy v. Goffsteingreen2 sentences2024"The statute of limitations applicable to a legal malpractice claim begins to run when a client 'knows or reasonably should know that he or she has sustained appreciable harm as a result of the lawyer's conduct.'" Lyons v. Nutt, 436 Mass. 244, 247 (2002), quoting Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 473 (1996). "[A]ppreciable harm is 'injury, loss or detriment' that is 'capable of being measured or perceived.'" Vinci v. Byers, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 139 (2005), quoting Kennedy v. Goffstein, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 230, 233 (2004). 2023"The statute of limitations applicable to a legal malpractice claim begins to run when a client 'knows or reasonably should know that he or she has sustained appreciable harm as a result of the lawyer's conduct.'" Lyons, 436 Mass. at 247 , quoting Williams, 423 Mass. at 473 . "[A]ppreciable harm is 'injury, loss or detriment' that is 'capable of being measured or perceived.'" Vinci, 65 Mass. App. Ct. at 139 , quoting Kennedy v. Goffstein, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 230, 233 (2004). | 3 | 3 |
Meyer v. Wagnergreen2 sentences2023See id. at 411 . 2013See Meyer v. Wagner, 429 Mass. 410, 423 (Mass. 1999) (declining to decide whether emotional distress damages are ever recoverable for a legal malpractice claim). | 3 | 3 |
Colucci v. ROSEN, GOLDBERG, SLAVET, LEVENSONgreen2 sentences2012See Frullo v. Landenberger, 61 MassApp.Ct. 814, 818-19 (2004) (expert testimony required to prove that attorney’s failure to conduct certain discovery and to bring c. 93A claim caused plaintiff loss); see also, Atlas Tack Corp. v. Donabed, 47 Mass.App.Ct. 221, 226 (1999) (“In some circumstances, expert testimony is necessary to prove the element of causation in a legal malpractice claim”); Colucci, 25 Mass.App.Ct. at 112-16 (expert testimony necessary to establish standard of care and causation, that attorney’s negligence prevented plaintiff from obtaining restraining order against labor picke 2012Colucci v. Rosen, Goldberg Slavet Levenson & Wekstein, 25 Mass.App.Ct. 107, 109 (1987). | 3 | 3 |
Massachusetts Electric Co. v. Fletcher, Tilton & Whipple, P.C.green2 sentences2025See Massachusetts 6 Electric Co. v. Fletcher, Tilton & Whipple, P.C., 394 Mass. 265, 268 (1985) ("A conclusion that the [plaintiffs'] cause of action accrued only when the . . . case was settled would be inconsistent with the general rule in negligence actions that a cause of action accrues when some harm has occurred even though the full extent and nature of that harm has not been and cannot be established immediately"); Frankston, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 375 ("That a case is ongoing and not finally adjudicated through the trial or appellate stage does not mean that there is no duty of inquiry i 2009Co. v. Fletcher, Tilton & Whipple, P.C., 394 Mass. 265, 268 (1985), in which the court established that accrual of a legal malpractice claim does not necessarily depend on the ultimate outcome of the underlying litigation. | 2 | 2 |
Atlas Tack Corp. v. Donabedgreen2 sentences2016“Proximate cause is an essential element[,] . . . [and] in some circumstances, expert testimony is necessary to prove the element of causation in a legal malpractice claim.” Atlas Tack v. Donabed, 47 Mass.App.Ct. 221, 226 (1999). 2012See Frullo v. Landenberger, 61 MassApp.Ct. 814, 818-19 (2004) (expert testimony required to prove that attorney’s failure to conduct certain discovery and to bring c. 93A claim caused plaintiff loss); see also, Atlas Tack Corp. v. Donabed, 47 Mass.App.Ct. 221, 226 (1999) (“In some circumstances, expert testimony is necessary to prove the element of causation in a legal malpractice claim”); Colucci, 25 Mass.App.Ct. at 112-16 (expert testimony necessary to establish standard of care and causation, that attorney’s negligence prevented plaintiff from obtaining restraining order against labor picke | 2 | 2 |
New Hampshire Insurance v. McCanngreen2 sentences2022The Supreme Judicial Court has rejected the argument that assignment of a legal malpractice claim to one's former adversary in litigation would demean confidence in the legal profession because "[t]he fact that an attorney might be called on to defend against an assigned malpractice claim does not always mean that the attorney's former adversary will compromise the strength of his underlying claim." McCann, supra at 211 . 2003In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court did not consider judicial estoppel principles in allowing the assignment of the legal malpractice claim in McCann, supra, because the underlying proceeding resulted in a settlement between the parties. | 1 | 3 |
Spilios v. Cohengreen2 sentences2026In that matter, "the defendant continued to represent the wife [through the trial], 'a decisive fact,' which '[brought] the case within the continuing representation doctrine[.)"' Swasey v. Barron, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 127, 132 (1999), quoting Spilios, 38 Mass. App. Ct. at 341 . 2026Tolling agreements provide advantages that make them attractive to both client and counsel, and ... have the benefit of ensuring an attorney has timely notice of a legal-malpractice claim, so evidence may be preserved and the attorney afforded a fair opportunity to mount a defense."). [13] For the same reasons, this case is distinguishable from Spilios v. Cohen, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 338 (1995), cited in Pls.' Opp. at p. 8. | 1 | 2 |
Greenspun v. Boghossiangreen1 sentence2026See Greenspun v. Boghossian, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 335, 339 (2019). | 1 | 1 |
Swasey v. Barrongreen1 sentence2026In that matter, "the defendant continued to represent the wife [through the trial], 'a decisive fact,' which '[brought] the case within the continuing representation doctrine[.)"' Swasey v. Barron, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 127, 132 (1999), quoting Spilios, 38 Mass. App. Ct. at 341 . | 1 | 1 |
McStowe v. Bornsteingreen1 sentence2026See McStowe v. Bornstein, 377 Mass. 804, 807 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Correia v. Fagangreen1 sentence2025Correia v. Fagan, 452 Mass. 120, 127 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
Labovitz v. Feinberggreen1 sentence2025Id. at 314 (successful motion to withdraw guilty plea is "a predicate to a legal malpractice action"). | 1 | 1 |
Parr v. Rosenthalgreen1 sentence2024See Parr v. Rosenthal, 475 Mass. 368, 383-384 (2016) ("actual knowledge that an attorney caused a client appreciable harm generally means actual knowledge that the attorney committed legal malpractice"). | 1 | 1 |
Taygeta Corp. v. Varian Associates, Inc.green1 sentence2023"The plaintiff need not know the full extent of [his] injury for a cause of action to accrue and for the statute of limitations to begin running." Taygeta Corp. v. Varian Assocs., 436 Mass. 217, 229 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Wagener v. McDonaldgreen2 sentences2022See Wagener v. McDonald, Page 578 509 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). [Note 11] The judge allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss the original complaint pursuant to rule 12 (b) (6), holding that the assignment of the legal malpractice claim was prohibited under Minnesota law. 2022See Wagener v. McDonald, Page 578 509 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). [Note 11] The judge allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss the original complaint pursuant to rule 12 (b) (6), holding that the assignment of the legal malpractice claim was prohibited under Minnesota law. | 1 | 1 |
Segal v. Rochellegreen1 sentence2017Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
Chiao-Yun Ku v. Town of Framinghamgreen1 sentence2017Contrast Chiao Yun Ku v. Framingham, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 731 (2002) ("At the summary judgment stage, a court will look beyond the complaint to the entire record"). | 1 | 1 |
Poly v. Moylangreen1 sentence2016It is, of course, well settled that a legal malpractice claim requires proof that the plaintiff “probably would have obtained a better result had the [defendant] attorney exercised adequate skill and care.” Poly v. Moylan, 423 Mass. 141, 145 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Harlow v. Chingreen1 sentence2016Accord Harlow v. Chin, 405 Mass. 697, 702 (1989) (“causal link generally must be established by expert testimony that the injury was more probably than not a result of the [defendant’s] negligence”). | 1 | 1 |
Symmons v. O'Keeffegreen1 sentence2013Without a duly, the plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim against Taylor, Ganson & Per-rin must be dismissed. 9 See Symmons v. O’Keefe, 419 Mass. 288, 299-300 (1995) (affirming grant of summary judgment where no duty existed between attorney and trust beneficiaries). | 1 | 1 |
Sibley v. Nasongreen1 sentence2010See Sibley v. Nason, 196 Mass. 125, 130 (1907). | 1 | 1 |
Pederson v. Time, Inc.green1 sentence2005Co., 424 Mass. at 232 , citing Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17 (1989). 10 “The statute of limitations applicable to a legal malpractice claim begins to run when a client ‘knows or reasonably should know that he or she has sustained appreciable harm as a result of the lawyer’s conduct.’ ” Lyons, 436 Mass. at 247 , quoting from Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 473 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Fanaras Enterprises, Inc. v. Doanegreen1 sentence2005Fanaras Ent., Inc. v. Roger Allen Doane et al., 423 Mass. 121, 124-25 (1996) (discussing the elements necessary to bring a legal malpractice claim). | 1 | 1 |
| Stevens v. Walker & Dextergreen | 1 | 1 |
| WASSALL v. DeCAROgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Belford v. McHale Cook & Welchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Connecticut Junior Republic v. Dohertygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fall River Savings Bank v. Callahangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Leone v. Security Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coffey Ex Rel. Collins v. Jefferson County Board of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Pancake House, Inc. v. Redmond Ex Rel. Redmondgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Butner v. United States
green
1 sentence2017A legal malpractice claim is part of a bankruptcy estate if either (a) under State law, it has accrued as of the bankruptcy petition date, 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(1) (2012); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979), or (b) regardless of whether it has accrued under State law, it is "sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past and so little entangled with the bankrupts' ability to make an unencumbered fresh start that it should be regarded as 'property'" of the estate. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Highlands Insurance v. Aerovox Inc.
green
1 sentence2005Co., 424 Mass. at 232 , citing Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17 (1989). 10 “The statute of limitations applicable to a legal malpractice claim begins to run when a client ‘knows or reasonably should know that he or she has sustained appreciable harm as a result of the lawyer’s conduct.’ ” Lyons, 436 Mass. at 247 , quoting from Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 473 (1996). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Murphy v. Smith green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Dipiero v. Goodman green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Bailey v. Tucker green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Thornton v. Kaye, Fialkow, Richmond & Rothstein neutral | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| One National Bank v. Joseph M. Antonellis green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.