legal malpractice claim in Montana

2010An action against an attorney licensed to practice law in Montana ... based upon the person’s alleged professional negligent act or for error or omission in the person’s practice must be commenced within 3 years after the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the act, error, or omission, whichever occurs last, but in no case may the action be commenced after 10 years from the date of the act, error, or omission. ¶12 In Ereth v. Cascade County, 2003 MT 328 , 318 Mont. 355 , 81 P.3d 463 (Cotter & Regnier, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in p

2010An action against an attorney licensed to practice law in Montana ... based upon the person’s alleged professional negligent act or for error or omission in the person’s practice must be commenced within 3 years after the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the act, error, or omission, whichever occurs last, but in no case may the action be commenced after 10 years from the date of the act, error, or omission. ¶12 In Ereth v. Cascade County, 2003 MT 328 , 318 Mont. 355 , 81 P.3d 463 (Cotter & Regnier, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in p

2003Hauschulz v. Michael Law Firm, 2001 MT 160, ¶ 11 , 306 Mont. 102, ¶ 11 , 30 P.3d 357, ¶ 11 . ¶18 While this Court has thoroughly discussed the appropriate standard for determining when the statute of limitations begins to run in the context of legal malpractice in civil matters (see Spolar v. Datsopoulos, 2003 MT 54 , 314 Mont. 364 , 66 P.3d 284 ; Johnson v. Barrett, 1999 MT 176 , 295 Mont. 254 , 983 P.2d 925 ; Uhler v. Doak (1994), 268 Mont. 191 , 885 P.2d 1297 ; and Peschel v. Jones (1988), 232 Mont. 516 , 760 P.2d 51 ), this Court has not had the opportunity to address when the statute of l

2003Hauschulz v. Michael Law Firm, 2001 MT 160, ¶ 11 , 306 Mont. 102, ¶ 11 , 30 P.3d 357, ¶ 11 . ¶18 While this Court has thoroughly discussed the appropriate standard for determining when the statute of limitations begins to run in the context of legal malpractice in civil matters (see Spolar v. Datsopoulos, 2003 MT 54 , 314 Mont. 364 , 66 P.3d 284 ; Johnson v. Barrett, 1999 MT 176 , 295 Mont. 254 , 983 P.2d 925 ; Uhler v. Doak (1994), 268 Mont. 191 , 885 P.2d 1297 ; and Peschel v. Jones (1988), 232 Mont. 516 , 760 P.2d 51 ), this Court has not had the opportunity to address when the statute of l

2022We conclude, as in Fang, that Terronez cannot prove the causation and damages elements of a legal malpractice claim against Foster or his negligent supervision claim against DHHT. ¶17 Terronez cites Clark v. Baines, 84 P.3d 245 (Wash. 2004) for the proposition that his Alford plea does not sever the chain of causation here.

2021Smith v. Fender, No. OP 16-0205, 384 Mont. 551 , 384 P.3d 40 (Apr. 12, 2016). ¶4 On February 18, 2020, Smith filed a Complaint essentially asserting a legal malpractice claim against Sheehy.

2021Smith v. Fender, No. OP 16-0205, 384 Mont. 551 , 384 P.3d 40 (Apr. 12, 2016). ¶4 On February 18, 2020, Smith filed a Complaint essentially asserting a legal malpractice claim against Sheehy.

2014Guest v. McLaverty, 2006 MT 150, ¶ 5 , 332 Mont. 421 , 138 P.3d 812 (citations omitted). ¶11 Svaleson argues that his claim for legal malpractice was timely filed on February 6, 2012, because the three-year statute of limitations under § 27-2-206, MCA, did not begin to run until his guilty plea was actually withdrawn by the District Court on December 16, 2009.

2014Guest v. McLaverty, 2006 MT 150, ¶ 5 , 332 Mont. 421 , 138 P.3d 812 (citations omitted). ¶11 Svaleson argues that his claim for legal malpractice was timely filed on February 6, 2012, because the three-year statute of limitations under § 27-2-206, MCA, did not begin to run until his guilty plea was actually withdrawn by the District Court on December 16, 2009.

2012DOT, 2012 MT 35, ¶ 12 , 364 Mont. 175 , 272 P.3d 66 . ¶18 Only two of the four elements of a legal malpractice claim are at issue in this appeal.

2012DOT, 2012 MT 35, ¶ 12 , 364 Mont. 175 , 272 P.3d 66 . ¶18 Only two of the four elements of a legal malpractice claim are at issue in this appeal.

2009Watkins Trust v. Lacosta, 2004 MT 144, ¶ 40 , 321 Mont. 432 , 92 P.3d 620 . ¶ 8 In this case, the District Court concluded that the documents Torske drafted and the actions he took to create the Foundation and transfer College assets to the Foundation were sufficiently clear so that the College should have known that it was being damaged at the time these documents were created in the early 1990's.

2009Watkins Trust v. Lacosta, 2004 MT 144, ¶ 40 , 321 Mont. 432 , 92 P.3d 620 . ¶ 8 In this case, the District Court concluded that the documents Torske drafted and the actions he took to create the Foundation and transfer College assets to the Foundation were sufficiently clear so that the College should have known that it was being damaged at the time these documents were created in the early 1990's.

2007In order to recover in a professional negligence action, “the plaintiff must prove that the professional owed him a duty, and that the professional failed to live up to that duty, thus causing damages to the plaintiff.” Merzlak, 252 Mont. at 529 , 830 P.2d at 1279 (emphasis added) (quoting Lorash v. Epstein, 236 Mont. 21, 24 , 767 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1989), in turn quoting Carlson, 229 Mont. at 238 , 745 P.2d at 1136 ); accord Hauschulz v. Michael Law Firm, 2001 MT 160, ¶ 11 , 306 Mont. 102, ¶ 11 , 30 P.3d 357, ¶ 11 (“To recover damages in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish eac

2007In order to recover in a professional negligence action, “the plaintiff must prove that the professional owed him a duty, and that the professional failed to live up to that duty, thus causing damages to the plaintiff.” Merzlak, 252 Mont. at 529 , 830 P.2d at 1279 (emphasis added) (quoting Lorash v. Epstein, 236 Mont. 21, 24 , 767 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1989), in turn quoting Carlson, 229 Mont. at 238 , 745 P.2d at 1136 ); accord Hauschulz v. Michael Law Firm, 2001 MT 160, ¶ 11 , 306 Mont. 102, ¶ 11 , 30 P.3d 357, ¶ 11 (“To recover damages in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish eac

2007In order to recover in a professional negligence action, “the plaintiff must prove that the professional owed him a duty, and that the professional failed to live up to that duty, thus causing damages to the plaintiff.” Merzlak, 252 Mont. at 529 , 830 P.2d at 1279 (emphasis added) (quoting Lorash v. Epstein, 236 Mont. 21, 24 , 767 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1989), in turn quoting Carlson, 229 Mont. at 238 , 745 P.2d at 1136 ); accord Hauschulz v. Michael Law Firm, 2001 MT 160, ¶ 11 , 306 Mont. 102, ¶ 11 , 30 P.3d 357, ¶ 11 (“To recover damages in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish eac

2007In order to recover in a professional negligence action, “the plaintiff must prove that the professional owed him a duty, and that the professional failed to live up to that duty, thus causing damages to the plaintiff.” Merzlak, 252 Mont. at 529 , 830 P.2d at 1279 (emphasis added) (quoting Lorash v. Epstein, 236 Mont. 21, 24 , 767 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1989), in turn quoting Carlson, 229 Mont. at 238 , 745 P.2d at 1136 ); accord Hauschulz v. Michael Law Firm, 2001 MT 160, ¶ 11 , 306 Mont. 102, ¶ 11 , 30 P.3d 357, ¶ 11 (“To recover damages in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish eac

2007In order to recover in a professional negligence action, “the plaintiff must prove that the professional owed him a duty, and that the professional failed to live up to that duty, thus causing damages to the plaintiff.” Merzlak, 252 Mont. at 529 , 830 P.2d at 1279 (emphasis added) (quoting Lorash v. Epstein, 236 Mont. 21, 24 , 767 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1989), in turn quoting Carlson, 229 Mont. at 238 , 745 P.2d at 1136 ); accord Hauschulz v. Michael Law Firm, 2001 MT 160, ¶ 11 , 306 Mont. 102, ¶ 11 , 30 P.3d 357, ¶ 11 (“To recover damages in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish eac

2007In order to recover in a professional negligence action, “the plaintiff must prove that the professional owed him a duty, and that the professional failed to live up to that duty, thus causing damages to the plaintiff.” Merzlak, 252 Mont. at 529 , 830 P.2d at 1279 (emphasis added) (quoting Lorash v. Epstein, 236 Mont. 21, 24 , 767 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1989), in turn quoting Carlson, 229 Mont. at 238 , 745 P.2d at 1136 ); accord Hauschulz v. Michael Law Firm, 2001 MT 160, ¶ 11 , 306 Mont. 102, ¶ 11 , 30 P.3d 357, ¶ 11 (“To recover damages in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish eac

2003Gomez v. State, 1999 MT 67, ¶ 25 , 293 Mont. 531, ¶ 25 , 975 P.2d 1258, ¶ 25 ; E.W. v. D.C.H. (1988), 231 Mont. 481, 484 , 754 P.2d 817, 819 . ¶17 Section 27-2-206, MCA, provides that an action against an attorney for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years after the “plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the act, error, or omission, whichever occurs last....” To recover damages in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish each of the following elements: first, that the professional owed him a duty of care; second, that

2003Gomez v. State, 1999 MT 67, ¶ 25 , 293 Mont. 531, ¶ 25 , 975 P.2d 1258, ¶ 25 ; E.W. v. D.C.H. (1988), 231 Mont. 481, 484 , 754 P.2d 817, 819 . ¶ 17 Section 27-2-206, MCA, provides that an action against an attorney for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years after the "plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the act, error, or omission, whichever *467 occurs last. . . ." To recover damages in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish each of the following elements: first, that the professional owed him a duty of care; sec

2003Hauschulz v. Michael Law Firm, 2001 MT 160, ¶ 11 , 306 Mont. 102, ¶ 11 , 30 P.3d 357, ¶ 11 . ¶18 While this Court has thoroughly discussed the appropriate standard for determining when the statute of limitations begins to run in the context of legal malpractice in civil matters (see Spolar v. Datsopoulos, 2003 MT 54 , 314 Mont. 364 , 66 P.3d 284 ; Johnson v. Barrett, 1999 MT 176 , 295 Mont. 254 , 983 P.2d 925 ; Uhler v. Doak (1994), 268 Mont. 191 , 885 P.2d 1297 ; and Peschel v. Jones (1988), 232 Mont. 516 , 760 P.2d 51 ), this Court has not had the opportunity to address when the statute of l

2003Hauschulz v. Michael Law Firm, 2001 MT 160, ¶ 11 , 306 Mont. 102, ¶ 11 , 30 P.3d 357, ¶ 11 . ¶18 While this Court has thoroughly discussed the appropriate standard for determining when the statute of limitations begins to run in the context of legal malpractice in civil matters (see Spolar v. Datsopoulos, 2003 MT 54 , 314 Mont. 364 , 66 P.3d 284 ; Johnson v. Barrett, 1999 MT 176 , 295 Mont. 254 , 983 P.2d 925 ; Uhler v. Doak (1994), 268 Mont. 191 , 885 P.2d 1297 ; and Peschel v. Jones (1988), 232 Mont. 516 , 760 P.2d 51 ), this Court has not had the opportunity to address when the statute of l

2003Gomez v. State, 1999 MT 67, ¶ 25 , 293 Mont. 531, ¶ 25 , 975 P.2d 1258, ¶ 25 ; E.W. v. D.C.H. (1988), 231 Mont. 481, 484 , 754 P.2d 817, 819 . ¶17 Section 27-2-206, MCA, provides that an action against an attorney for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years after the “plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the act, error, or omission, whichever occurs last....” To recover damages in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish each of the following elements: first, that the professional owed him a duty of care; second, that

2003Gomez v. State, 1999 MT 67, ¶ 25 , 293 Mont. 531, ¶ 25 , 975 P.2d 1258, ¶ 25 ; E.W. v. D.C.H. (1988), 231 Mont. 481, 484 , 754 P.2d 817, 819 . ¶ 17 Section 27-2-206, MCA, provides that an action against an attorney for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years after the "plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the act, error, or omission, whichever *467 occurs last. . . ." To recover damages in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish each of the following elements: first, that the professional owed him a duty of care; sec

2003Gomez v. State, 1999 MT 67, ¶ 25 , 293 Mont. 531, ¶ 25 , 975 P.2d 1258, ¶ 25 ; E.W. v. D.C.H. (1988), 231 Mont. 481, 484 , 754 P.2d 817, 819 . ¶17 Section 27-2-206, MCA, provides that an action against an attorney for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years after the “plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the act, error, or omission, whichever occurs last....” To recover damages in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish each of the following elements: first, that the professional owed him a duty of care; second, that

2003Gomez v. State, 1999 MT 67, ¶ 25 , 293 Mont. 531, ¶ 25 , 975 P.2d 1258, ¶ 25 ; E.W. v. D.C.H. (1988), 231 Mont. 481, 484 , 754 P.2d 817, 819 . ¶17 Section 27-2-206, MCA, provides that an action against an attorney for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years after the “plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the act, error, or omission, whichever occurs last....” To recover damages in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish each of the following elements: first, that the professional owed him a duty of care; second, that

2003Hauschulz v. Michael Law Firm, 2001 MT 160, ¶ 11 , 306 Mont. 102, ¶ 11 , 30 P.3d 357, ¶ 11 . ¶18 While this Court has thoroughly discussed the appropriate standard for determining when the statute of limitations begins to run in the context of legal malpractice in civil matters (see Spolar v. Datsopoulos, 2003 MT 54 , 314 Mont. 364 , 66 P.3d 284 ; Johnson v. Barrett, 1999 MT 176 , 295 Mont. 254 , 983 P.2d 925 ; Uhler v. Doak (1994), 268 Mont. 191 , 885 P.2d 1297 ; and Peschel v. Jones (1988), 232 Mont. 516 , 760 P.2d 51 ), this Court has not had the opportunity to address when the statute of l

2003Hauschulz v. Michael Law Firm, 2001 MT 160, ¶ 11 , 306 Mont. 102, ¶ 11 , 30 P.3d 357, ¶ 11 . ¶18 While this Court has thoroughly discussed the appropriate standard for determining when the statute of limitations begins to run in the context of legal malpractice in civil matters (see Spolar v. Datsopoulos, 2003 MT 54 , 314 Mont. 364 , 66 P.3d 284 ; Johnson v. Barrett, 1999 MT 176 , 295 Mont. 254 , 983 P.2d 925 ; Uhler v. Doak (1994), 268 Mont. 191 , 885 P.2d 1297 ; and Peschel v. Jones (1988), 232 Mont. 516 , 760 P.2d 51 ), this Court has not had the opportunity to address when the statute of l

2003Gebhardt, 510 N.W.2d at 906-07 . ¶24 The Gebhardt court, while recognizing the complications inherent in the simultaneous prosecution of a legal malpractice claim and a postconviction relief claim, concluded that these considerations were outweighed by concerns with the indefinite tolling of the statute of limitations and the need to preclude stale claims.

2003Gebhardt, 510 N.W.2d at 906-07 . ¶ 24 The Gebhardt court, while recognizing the complications inherent in the simultaneous prosecution of a legal malpractice claim and a postconviction relief claim, concluded that these considerations were outweighed by concerns with the indefinite tolling of the statute of limitations and the need to preclude stale claims.

2003Hauschulz v. Michael Law Firm, 2001 MT 160, ¶ 11 , 306 Mont. 102, ¶ 11 , 30 P.3d 357, ¶ 11 . ¶18 While this Court has thoroughly discussed the appropriate standard for determining when the statute of limitations begins to run in the context of legal malpractice in civil matters (see Spolar v. Datsopoulos, 2003 MT 54 , 314 Mont. 364 , 66 P.3d 284 ; Johnson v. Barrett, 1999 MT 176 , 295 Mont. 254 , 983 P.2d 925 ; Uhler v. Doak (1994), 268 Mont. 191 , 885 P.2d 1297 ; and Peschel v. Jones (1988), 232 Mont. 516 , 760 P.2d 51 ), this Court has not had the opportunity to address when the statute of l

2003Hauschulz v. Michael Law Firm, 2001 MT 160, ¶ 11 , 306 Mont. 102, ¶ 11 , 30 P.3d 357, ¶ 11 . ¶18 While this Court has thoroughly discussed the appropriate standard for determining when the statute of limitations begins to run in the context of legal malpractice in civil matters (see Spolar v. Datsopoulos, 2003 MT 54 , 314 Mont. 364 , 66 P.3d 284 ; Johnson v. Barrett, 1999 MT 176 , 295 Mont. 254 , 983 P.2d 925 ; Uhler v. Doak (1994), 268 Mont. 191 , 885 P.2d 1297 ; and Peschel v. Jones (1988), 232 Mont. 516 , 760 P.2d 51 ), this Court has not had the opportunity to address when the statute of l

2003Additionally, the Shaw court highlighted the importance of developing a bright line test for purposes of assisting courts in applying the statute of limitations. ¶23 In Seevers v. Potter (Neb. 1995), 537 N.W.2d 505, 510 , the Nebraska Supreme Court, while noting, “[t]he simplicity of the [single track] rule appears attractive at first blush,” found that the Michigan Supreme Court’s “two-track” analysis in Gebhardt v. O’Rouke (Mich. 1994), 510 N.W.2d 900 , to be more persuasive.

2003Additionally, the Shaw court highlighted the importance of developing a bright line test for purposes of assisting courts in applying the statute of limitations. ¶ 23 In Seevers v. Potter (1995), 248 Neb. 621 , 537 N.W.2d 505, 510 , the Nebraska Supreme Court, while noting, "[t]he simplicity of the [single track] rule appears attractive at first blush," found that the Michigan Supreme Court's "two-track" analysis in Gebhardt v. O'Rourke (1994), 444 Mich. 535 , 510 N.W.2d 900 , to be more persuasive.

2003(Alaska 1991), 816 P.2d 1358 , the Alaska Supreme Court held that a convicted criminal defendant must obtain postconviction relief as a precondition to maintaining a legal malpractice claim against his or her attorney.

2003(Alaska 1991), 816 P.2d 1358 , the Alaska Supreme Court held that a convicted criminal defendant must obtain postconviction relief as a precondition to maintaining a legal malpractice claim against his or her attorney.