legal malpractice claim in Minnesota

2016See Blue Water Corp. v. O'Toole, 336 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Minn. 1983) (applying four malpractice elements to analysis of negligence-based 7 malpractice claim).

1984Elements of malpractice: The Minnesota Supreme Court set forth the elements of a legal malpractice claim in Blue Water Corp., Inc. v. O’Toole, 336 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Minn.1983).

2017Taylor, 435 N.W.2d at 129 .

1998Cf. Johnson v. Taylor, 435 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Minn.App.) (holding that a legal malpractice claim survived the death of the decedent), pet. for rev. denied, (Minn. Apr. 19, 1989).

2016See Padco, Inc. v. Kinney & Lange, 444 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Minn. App. 1989) (holding that a complaint alleging the elements of a legal-malpractice claim sufficiently alleged the elements of a breach-of- fiduciary-duty claim), review denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 1989).

2016See Padco, Inc. v. Kinney & Lange, 444 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Minn. App. 1989) (noting in a legal-malpractice claim, that a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim includes the same elements as a negligence claim).

2014But-for causation in a legal-malpractice claim, not involving a failed cause of action, requires proof that “but for defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff would have obtained a more favorable result . . . than the result obtained.” Jerry’s Enters., 711 N.W.2d at 819 .

2014The district court noted that the elements of legal malpractice are “(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) acts constituting negligence or breach of contract; (3) that such acts were the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damage; and (4) that but for defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff would have been successful in the prosecution or defense of the action.” Jerry’s Enters., Inc. v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., 711 N.W.2d 811, 816 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).

2011The Herrmann court held that the statute of limitations for a legal-malpractice claim began to run at the time a transaction creating immediate tax liability occurred; in that case, the plaintiffs’ action was based on the alleged failure to properly advise them about the transaction. 590 N.W.2d at 643-44 .

2007See Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Minn.1999) (holding that cause of action accrues in a legal malpractice claim when “some” damage occurs); see also Antone v. Mirviss, 720 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Minn.2006) (holding that “some” damage means “compensable” damage).

2006Wartnick, 490 N.W.2d at 113 ; see Glenna v. Sullivan, 310 Minn. 162, 170 , 245 N.W.2d 869, 872-73 (1976); accord Simko v. Blake, 448 Mich. 648 , 532 N.W.2d 842, 848 (1995) (affirming summary judgment for criminal-defense attorney, reasoning that “tactical decisions do not constitute grounds for a legal malpractice action”). *875 We conclude that respondent’s failure to assert self defense was a deliberate trial strategy resulting from the exercise of professional judgment.

1994Wartnick v. Moss & Barnett, 490 N.W.2d 108, 112 (Minn.1992).

2007See, e.g., Admiral Merchs., 494 N.W.2d at 266 (citing Marker to note that an attorney may be liable to a third-party beneficiary “when the client’s sole purpose is to benefit the third party directly,” but proceeding to reverse summary judgment based on its application of the Lucas factors, including “the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect” the nonclient) (emphasis added).

2007See Admiral Merchs., 494 N.W.2d at 266 (reversing a grant of summary judgment on a legal-malpractice claim in part because there were genuine issues of material fact and because “the question of whether an attorney-client relationship existed” under a third-party beneficiary theory “should be determined by the fact finder”).

2011Antone involved a plaintiff who had retained counsel to draft a premarital contract. 720 N.W.2d at 337 .

2007See Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Minn.1999) (holding that cause of action accrues in a legal malpractice claim when “some” damage occurs); see also Antone v. Mirviss, 720 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Minn.2006) (holding that “some” damage means “compensable” damage).

2007The original source of the “sole purpose” language in Minnesota is Marker, 313 N.W.2d at 5 .

2002Co. v. Vaccari, 310 Minn. 97, 99 , 245 N.W.2d 844 , 846 (1976). [2] The district court's dismissal with prejudice of all of Farmland's claims was inconsistent with its conclusion that Farmland could maintain a legal malpractice claim against Erstad & Riemer under the doctrine of equitable subrogation. [3] Given that the district court's order dismissed all of Farmland's claims, it is unclear what was accomplished by the court of appeals' reversal of the district court on this issue. [4] We have recognized an exception to this rule, extending an attorney's duty to a nonclient in a "narrow range

2004Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150 , 179 N.W.2d 288, 293-94 (1970).

2004Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150 , 179 N.W.2d 288, 293-94 (1970).

1998Grimm v. O’Connor, 392 N.W.2d 40, 42, 43 (Minn.App.1986).

1988In Grimm v. O’Connor, 392 N.W.2d 40 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), respondent was hired as appellants’ attorney to execute a contract for deed.

1998O’Connor & Han-nan relies on the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision in Wagener v. McDonald to support its position. 509 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. App.1993).

1998Id.

2016Noske v. Friedberg, 670 N.W.2d 740, 746 (Minn. 2003). 12 certain course of action), review denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 1991).

2016See Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 177-78 (Minn. 1986) (Simonett, J., concurring specially) (noting that negligent and reckless misrepresentation “both judge the representer’s state of mind by an objective standard of due care,” and reckless representation is wholly distinct from a claim of intentional misrepresentation, which requires the representer to have the “intent to deceive”). 7 II.

2015The case cited by the court of appeals for that proposition, Fontaine v. Steen, 759 N.W.2d 672, 677 (Minn.App.2009), relied on Sorenson v. St.

2014Although expert testimony generally is required to prove causation in a legal-malpractice claim, see, e.g., Fontaine, 759 N.W.2d at 677; Schmitz, 783 N.W.2d at 741 , expert testimony is not required if “the conduct complained of can be evaluated adequately by a jury in the absence of expert testimony,” Hill, 312 Minn. at 337 , 252 N.W.2d at 116 .

2014Although expert testimony generally is required to prove causation in a legal-malpractice claim, see, e.g., Fontaine, 759 N.W.2d at 677; Schmitz, 783 N.W.2d at 741 , expert testimony is not required if “the conduct complained of can be evaluated adequately by a jury in the absence of expert testimony,” Hill, 312 Minn. at 337 , 252 N.W.2d at 116 .

2007Tort Theory Appellants argue that they had an attorney-client relationship with Dorsey under the tort theory of representation, which provides that “[a]n attorney-client relationship is created whenever an individual seeks and receives legal advice from an attorney in circumstances in which a reasonable person would rely on such advice.” TJD Dissolution Corp. v. Savoie Supply Co., 460 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Minn.App.1990) (quotation omitted).

2006Wartnick, 490 N.W.2d at 113 ; see Glenna v. Sullivan, 310 Minn. 162, 170 , 245 N.W.2d 869, 872-73 (1976); accord Simko v. Blake, 448 Mich. 648 , 532 N.W.2d 842, 848 (1995) (affirming summary judgment for criminal-defense attorney, reasoning that “tactical decisions do not constitute grounds for a legal malpractice action”). *875 We conclude that respondent’s failure to assert self defense was a deliberate trial strategy resulting from the exercise of professional judgment.

2006Wartnick, 490 N.W.2d at 113 ; see Glenna v. Sullivan, 310 Minn. 162, 170 , 245 N.W.2d 869, 872-73 (1976); accord Simko v. Blake, 448 Mich. 648 , 532 N.W.2d 842, 848 (1995) (affirming summary judgment for criminal-defense attorney, reasoning that “tactical decisions do not constitute grounds for a legal malpractice action”). *875 We conclude that respondent’s failure to assert self defense was a deliberate trial strategy resulting from the exercise of professional judgment.

2006But a client cannot prevail on a legal-malpractice claim based on a lawyer’s failure “to pursue a particular strategy.” See Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 776 (Minn.1993) (addressing likelihood of success of malpractice action by indigent client against public defender). “[I]f a negligence claim involves a dispute over a choice of strategies, [the claim] should fail, since honest errors may be made which do not rise to the level of malpractice.” Id. at 776 ; cf. State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627, 635 (Minn.1999) (holding that a decision to focus on self defense rather than intoxication as a d

2006But a client cannot prevail on a legal-malpractice claim based on a lawyer’s failure “to pursue a particular strategy.” See Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 776 (Minn.1993) (addressing likelihood of success of malpractice action by indigent client against public defender). “[I]f a negligence claim involves a dispute over a choice of strategies, [the claim] should fail, since honest errors may be made which do not rise to the level of malpractice.” Id. at 776 ; cf. State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627, 635 (Minn.1999) (holding that a decision to focus on self defense rather than intoxication as a d

2006But a client cannot prevail on a legal-malpractice claim based on a lawyer’s failure “to pursue a particular strategy.” See Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 776 (Minn.1993) (addressing likelihood of success of malpractice action by indigent client against public defender). “[I]f a negligence claim involves a dispute over a choice of strategies, [the claim] should fail, since honest errors may be made which do not rise to the level of malpractice.” Id. at 776 ; cf. State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627, 635 (Minn.1999) (holding that a decision to focus on self defense rather than intoxication as a d

2006Wartnick, 490 N.W.2d at 113 ; see Glenna v. Sullivan, 310 Minn. 162, 170 , 245 N.W.2d 869, 872-73 (1976); accord Simko v. Blake, 448 Mich. 648 , 532 N.W.2d 842, 848 (1995) (affirming summary judgment for criminal-defense attorney, reasoning that “tactical decisions do not constitute grounds for a legal malpractice action”). *875 We conclude that respondent’s failure to assert self defense was a deliberate trial strategy resulting from the exercise of professional judgment.

2006Wartnick, 490 N.W.2d at 113 ; see Glenna v. Sullivan, 310 Minn. 162, 170 , 245 N.W.2d 869, 872-73 (1976); accord Simko v. Blake, 448 Mich. 648 , 532 N.W.2d 842, 848 (1995) (affirming summary judgment for criminal-defense attorney, reasoning that “tactical decisions do not constitute grounds for a legal malpractice action”). *875 We conclude that respondent’s failure to assert self defense was a deliberate trial strategy resulting from the exercise of professional judgment.