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20 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ex parte Wattersgreen2 sentences2025Cf. Ex parte Watters, 212 So. 3d at 182 (denying a mandamus petition because 'it [was] not abundantly clear from the face of [the plaintiff's] complaint whether the survival statute dictate[d] 10 SC-2024-0174 and SC-2024-0184 dismissal of the legal-malpractice claim because the issue whether the claim sound[ed] in tort, in contract, or in both for that matter, [was] sharply disputed by the parties'). 2025Cf. Ex parte Watters, 212 So. 3d at 182 (denying a mandamus petition because 'it [was] not abundantly clear from the face of [the plaintiff's] complaint whether the survival statute dictate[d] 10 SC-2024-0174 and SC-2024-0184 dismissal of the legal-malpractice claim because the issue whether the claim sound[ed] in tort, in contract, or in both for that matter, [was] sharply disputed by the parties'). | 5 | 5 |
Valentine v. Wattersgreen2 sentences2023Indeed, while expert testimony is ordinarily required to defeat summary judgment on a legal-malpractice claim, this Court has recognized an exception "where a legal-service provider's want of skill or lack of care is so apparent as to be understood by a layperson 15 SC-2022-0813 and requires only common knowledge and experience to understand it." Valentine v. Watters, 896 So. 2d 385, 394 (Ala. 2004). 2011This Court has stated “that an exception to the general requirement that a plaintiff present expert testimony in support of a legal-malpractice claim occurs where a legal-service provider’s want of skill or lack of care is so apparent as to be understood by a layperson and requires only common knowledge and experience to understand it.” Valentine v. Watters, 896 So.2d 385, 394 (Ala.2004). | 3 | 4 |
Rosemont, Inc. v. Marshallgreen2 sentences2010See Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 851 So.2d 33, 38 (Ala.2002) (stating that expert testimony is not required in a case “ ‘ “where want of skill or lack of care is so apparent ... as to be understood by a layman, and requires only common knowledge and expertise to understand it.” ’ ” (quoting Tuscaloosa Orthopedic Appliance Co. v. Wyatt, 460 So.2d 156, 161 (Ala.1984))).’ “896 So.2d at 391. [The supreme c]ourt agreed with Valentine. “[The supreme c]ourt noted that the statutory scheme for establishing a legal-malpractice claim is similar to the requirements imposed by the Alabama Medical Liability 2010This Court thoroughly examined the exception to the expert-testimony requirement in medical-malpractice actions “ ‘where the want of skill or lack of care is so apparent as to be within the comprehension of the average layman and thus requires only common knowledge and experience to understand it.’ ” 896 So.2d at 392 (quoting Rosemont, Inc. v. Marshall, 481 So.2d 1126, 1129-30 (Ala.1985)). | 2 | 2 |
BE&K INC. v. Bakergreen1 sentence2016See BE&K, Inc. v. Baker, 875 So.2d 1185, 1189 (Ala.2003) (holding that “this Court will not expand its review on permissive appeal beyond the question of law stated by the trial court”). | 1 | 1 |
Dubreuil v. Wittgreen2 sentences2010McIntyre v. Rumsey, 80 P.3d 1201 (Kan.Ct.App.2003) (unpublished opinion) (stating that expert testimony is not necessary where the attorney’s breach of duty is so clear and obvious that the determination that the attorney deviated from the standard of care is within the common knowledge of the trier of fact); Dubreuil v. Witt, 80 Conn.App. 410, 418 , 835 A.2d 477, 483 (2003) (stating that the exception to the need for expert testimony applies when “the defendant’s conduct was such an obvious and gross want of care and skill that the neglect would be clear to the average layperson”); Roberts v. 2010McIntyre v. Rumsey, 80 P.3d 1201 (Kan.Ct.App.2003) (unpublished opinion) (stating that expert testimony is not necessary where the attorney’s breach of duty is so clear and obvious that the determination that the attorney deviated from the standard of care is within the common knowledge of the trier of fact); Dubreuil v. Witt, 80 Conn.App. 410, 418 , 835 A.2d 477, 483 (2003) (stating that the exception to the need for expert testimony applies when “the defendant’s conduct was such an obvious and gross want of care and skill that the neglect would be clear to the average layperson”); Roberts v. | 1 | 1 |
James V. Mazuca & Associates v. Schumanngreen1 sentence2010McIntyre v. Rumsey, 80 P.3d 1201 (Kan.Ct.App.2003) (unpublished opinion) (stating that expert testimony is not necessary where the attorney’s breach of duty is so clear and obvious that the determination that the attorney deviated from the standard of care is within the common knowledge of the trier of fact); Dubreuil v. Witt, 80 Conn.App. 410, 418 , 835 A.2d 477, 483 (2003) (stating that the exception to the need for expert testimony applies when “the defendant’s conduct was such an obvious and gross want of care and skill that the neglect would be clear to the average layperson”); Roberts v. | 1 | 1 |
Tuscaloosa Orthopedic Appliance Co. v. Wyattgreen1 sentence2010See Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 851 So.2d 33, 38 (Ala.2002) (stating that expert testimony is not required in a case “ ‘ “where want of skill or lack of care is so apparent ... as to be understood by a layman, and requires only common knowledge and expertise to understand it.” ’ ” (quoting Tuscaloosa Orthopedic Appliance Co. v. Wyatt, 460 So.2d 156, 161 (Ala.1984))).’ “896 So.2d at 391. [The supreme c]ourt agreed with Valentine. “[The supreme c]ourt noted that the statutory scheme for establishing a legal-malpractice claim is similar to the requirements imposed by the Alabama Medical Liability | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte HealthSouth Corp.green1 sentence2010See Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 851 So.2d 33, 38 (Ala.2002) (stating that expert testimony is not required in a case “ ‘ “where want of skill or lack of care is so apparent ... as to be understood by a layman, and requires only common knowledge and expertise to understand it.” ’ ” (quoting Tuscaloosa Orthopedic Appliance Co. v. Wyatt, 460 So.2d 156, 161 (Ala.1984))).’ “896 So.2d at 391. [The supreme c]ourt agreed with Valentine. “[The supreme c]ourt noted that the statutory scheme for establishing a legal-malpractice claim is similar to the requirements imposed by the Alabama Medical Liability | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Huttongreen2 sentences2010McIntyre v. Rumsey, 80 P.3d 1201 (Kan.Ct.App.2003) (unpublished opinion) (stating that expert testimony is not necessary where the attorney’s breach of duty is so clear and obvious that the determination that the attorney deviated from the standard of care is within the common knowledge of the trier of fact); Dubreuil v. Witt, 80 Conn.App. 410, 418 , 835 A.2d 477, 483 (2003) (stating that the exception to the need for expert testimony applies when “the defendant’s conduct was such an obvious and gross want of care and skill that the neglect would be clear to the average layperson”); Roberts v. 2010McIntyre v. Rumsey, 80 P.3d 1201 (Kan.Ct.App.2003) (unpublished opinion) (stating that expert testimony is not necessary where the attorney’s breach of duty is so clear and obvious that the determination that the attorney deviated from the standard of care is within the common knowledge of the trier of fact); Dubreuil v. Witt, 80 Conn.App. 410, 418 , 835 A.2d 477, 483 (2003) (stating that the exception to the need for expert testimony applies when “the defendant’s conduct was such an obvious and gross want of care and skill that the neglect would be clear to the average layperson”); Roberts v. | 1 | 1 |
Feliberty v. Damongreen2 sentences2009Finally, in determining whether a new exception should be recognized, we note that an insured is not otherwise left without a remedy for a law firm’s claimed incompetence, and a law firm is not insulated from liability for wrongdoing; indeed, in the case before us, plaintiff has sought full recovery for his damages in a legal malpractice claim against the firm.” 72 N.Y.2d at 120 , 531 N.Y.S.2d at 782 , 527 N.E.2d at 265 (citations omitted). 2009Finally, in determining whether a new exception should be recognized, we note that an insured is not otherwise left without a remedy for a law firm’s claimed incompetence, and a law firm is not insulated from liability for wrongdoing; indeed, in the case before us, plaintiff has sought full recovery for his damages in a legal malpractice claim against the firm.” 72 N.Y.2d at 120 , 531 N.Y.S.2d at 782 , 527 N.E.2d at 265 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Barrett Mobile Home Transport, Inc. v. McGugingreen1 sentence2005See Barrett v. Mobile Home Transp., Inc. v. McGugin, supra. The Bank's third-party complaint filed on May 31, 2002, was, therefore, timely. | 1 | 1 |
Union Naval Stores Co. v. Pattersongreen2 sentences2002ADC cited only two cases in the memorandum: Panell v. Henslee, 756 So.2d 862 (Ala.1999), was cited for the proposition that if this cause of action is an action to recover on an open or unKquidated account, a summary judgment is proper (Pa-nell involved a legal-malpractice claim), and Union Naval Stores Co. v. Patterson, 179 Ala. 525, 529 , 60 So. 807, 808 (1912), which held: “A contract which is definite in all of its terms, when nothing, under the terms of the contract, is left for future adjustment, whether it be evidenced by a writing or not cannot be considered a mere open account.” Wal-M 2002ADC cited only two cases in the memorandum: Panell v. Henslee, 756 So.2d 862 (Ala.1999), was cited for the proposition that if this cause of action is an action to recover on an open or unKquidated account, a summary judgment is proper (Pa-nell involved a legal-malpractice claim), and Union Naval Stores Co. v. Patterson, 179 Ala. 525, 529 , 60 So. 807, 808 (1912), which held: “A contract which is definite in all of its terms, when nothing, under the terms of the contract, is left for future adjustment, whether it be evidenced by a writing or not cannot be considered a mere open account.” Wal-M | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Herston v. Whitesell
green
2 sentences2002In regard to the Showses' legal-malpractice claim, this Court stated: "In order to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must prove the same elements that must be proven in a negligence action: "`"To recover, the [plaintiff] must prove a duty, a breach of the duty, that the breach was the proximate cause of the injury, and damages." Herston v. Whitesell , 348 So.2d 1054 , 1057 (Ala. 1977). 1982In Herston v. Whitesell , 348 So.2d 1054 (Ala. 1977), an action for legal malpractice was defined as a negligence case. | 2 | 1982–2002 |
Brewer v. Davis
green
2 sentences1995The Court of Civil Appeals relied on Cantrell v. Stewart and Brewer v. Davis, 593 So.2d 67 (Ala.1991), in setting out a broad rule that a legal malpractice claim does not accrue until the entry of an adverse judgment against the complainant. 1995The Court of Civil Appeals relied on Cantrell v. Stewart and Brewer v. Davis, 593 So.2d 67 (Ala.1991), in setting out a broad rule that a legal malpractice claim does not accrue until the entry of an adverse judgment against the complainant. | 2 | 1995–1995 |
Ex Parte Sonnier
green
1 sentence2016In Ex parte Sonnier, 707 So.2d 635 (Ala.1997) (“Sonnier II ”), this Court addressed a similar issue with regard to medical-malpractice claims brought pursuant to the Alabama Medical Liability Act, § 6-5-480 et seq. and § 6-5-540 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 (“the AMLA”). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Brooks v. Hill
green
1 sentence2016Watters cites this Court to Brooks v. Hill, 717 So.2d 759 (Ala.1998), holding that an unfiled claim alleging breach of fiduciary duty does not survive the death of the decedent. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hall v. Fedor
green
2 sentences2010McIntyre v. Rumsey, 80 P.3d 1201 (Kan.Ct.App.2003) (unpublished opinion) (stating that expert testimony is not necessary where the attorney’s breach of duty is so clear and obvious that the determination that the attorney deviated from the standard of care is within the common knowledge of the trier of fact); Dubreuil v. Witt, 80 Conn.App. 410, 418 , 835 A.2d 477, 483 (2003) (stating that the exception to the need for expert testimony applies when “the defendant’s conduct was such an obvious and gross want of care and skill that the neglect would be clear to the average layperson”); Roberts v. 2010McIntyre v. Rumsey, 80 P.3d 1201 (Kan.Ct.App.2003) (unpublished opinion) (stating that expert testimony is not necessary where the attorney’s breach of duty is so clear and obvious that the determination that the attorney deviated from the standard of care is within the common knowledge of the trier of fact); Dubreuil v. Witt, 80 Conn.App. 410, 418 , 835 A.2d 477, 483 (2003) (stating that the exception to the need for expert testimony applies when “the defendant’s conduct was such an obvious and gross want of care and skill that the neglect would be clear to the average layperson”); Roberts v. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Young v. Jones
green
2 sentences2004See, e.g., Morlot Carpentry, Inc. v. Phillips, (No. 85-0097-WO, March 26, 1993) (D.Mass.1993) (not published in F.Supp.) (noting, in its discussion of the causation element of a legal-malpractice claim, that “[w]hile ... settlement offers would not be admissible to prove the quantum of damages owed by [the defendant in the underlying action] to the plaintiff under Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, ... they are admissible under Rule 408 for other purposes, such as to show that the plaintiff would likely have recovered on a damage award against [that defendant]”); Young v. Jones, 149 Ga 2004See, e.g., Morlot Carpentry, Inc. v. Phillips, (No. 85-0097-WO, March 26, 1993) (D.Mass.1993) (not published in F.Supp.) (noting, in its discussion of the causation element of a legal-malpractice claim, that “[w]hile ... settlement offers would not be admissible to prove the quantum of damages owed by [the defendant in the underlying action] to the plaintiff under Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, ... they are admissible under Rule 408 for other purposes, such as to show that the plaintiff would likely have recovered on a damage award against [that defendant]”); Young v. Jones, 149 Ga | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Barcelo v. Elliott
green
1 sentence2002In Barcelo v. Elliott , 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996), the Supreme Court of Texas, in addressing the issue "whether an attorney who negligently drafts a will or trust agreement owes a duty of care to persons intended to benefit under the will or trust, even though the attorney never represented the intended beneficiaries," id . at 576, set out a thoughtful discussion of the need for the requirement of privity in such cases. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Hall v. Thomas
green
1 sentence2002(Citations omitted.) "A claim for malpractice requires a showing that in the absence of the alleged negligence the outcome of the case would have been different." Hall v. Thomas , 456 So.2d 67 , 68 (Ala. 1984). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Ex Parte Panell
green
1 sentence2002ADC cited only two cases in the memorandum: Panell v. Henslee, 756 So.2d 862 (Ala.1999), was cited for the proposition that if this cause of action is an action to recover on an open or unKquidated account, a summary judgment is proper (Pa-nell involved a legal-malpractice claim), and Union Naval Stores Co. v. Patterson, 179 Ala. 525, 529 , 60 So. 807, 808 (1912), which held: “A contract which is definite in all of its terms, when nothing, under the terms of the contract, is left for future adjustment, whether it be evidenced by a writing or not cannot be considered a mere open account.” Wal-M | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Sirote & Permutt, PC v. Bennett
green
1 sentence2001This Court, in its more recent decision in Sirote & Permutt, P.C. v. Bennett, 776 So.2d 40 (Ala.2000), again approved an application of the "occurrence" theory for determining when the limitations period on a legal-malpractice claim begins to run. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.