legal malpractice claim in Mississippi

2026In Crist v. Loyacono, 65 So. 3d 837, 842-43 (¶15) (Miss. 2011), the supreme court stated: When a legal-malpractice claim is based on an allegation of breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the acts constituting a violation of the attorney’s fiduciary duty; (3) that the breach proximately caused the injury; and (4) the fact and extent of the injury.

2015The first essential element of a legal-malpractice claim is “the existence of an attorney-client relationship.” Crist, 65 So.3d at 843 (¶ 15).

2008To recover in a legal malpractice claim, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the "[e]xistence of a lawyer-client relationship[,] (2) [n]egligence on the part of the lawyer in handling [the matter] entrusted to him[, and] (3) [p]roximate cause of injury." Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So.2d 626, 633 (Miss.1987). ¶ 20.

2008To recover in a legal malpractice claim, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the "[e]xistence of a lawyer-client relationship[,] (2) [n]egligence on the part of the lawyer in handling [the matter] entrusted to him[, and] (3) [p]roximate cause of injury." Hickox v. Holleman , 502 So.2d 626 , 633 (Miss. 1987). ¶ 20.

2012The elements of a legal-malpractice claim require: (1) an attorney-client relationship, (2) “negligence on the part of the lawyer in handling his client’s affairs entrusted to him,” and (8) “proximate cause of the injury.” Byrd v. Bowie, 933 So.2d 899, 904 (¶ 15) (Miss.2006).

2011To prevail in a legal-malpractice claim, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the following: “(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship, (2) negligence on the part of the lawyer in handling his client’s affairs entrusted to him, and (3) proximate cause of the injury.” Byrd v. Bowie, 933 So.2d 899, 904 (¶ 15) (Miss.2006) (citing Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, 687 So.2d 1205, 1215 (Miss.1996)).

2022Martin v. Hixson, 145 So. 3d 1124, 1128 (Miss. 2014)).

2022Martin, 145 So. 3d at 1129 (¶12) (quoting Crist, 65 So. 3d at 842-43 (¶15)).

2016The dissent also argues that the discovery rule does not apply because the Board's order was not "secretive or inherently undiscovera-ble.” Our Supreme Court has held that the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations on a legal malpractice claim if the plaintiff satisfies either of two alternative standards— the " ‘secret or inherently undiscoverable' standard” or the “layman standard.” Evans, 121 So.3d at 924 (¶ 22) (quoting Channel, 954 So.2d at 421 (¶¶ 19-20)).

2016For ease of reading, we refer to it here as the dissent. 8 The dissent also argues that the discovery rule does not apply because the Board’s order was not “secretive or inherently undiscoverable.” Our Supreme Court has held that the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations on a legal malpractice claim if the plaintiff satisfies either of two alternative standards—the “‘secret or inherently undiscoverable’ standard” or the “layman standard.” Evans, 121 So. 3d at 924 (¶22) (quoting Channel, 954 So. 2d at 421 (¶¶19-20)).

2011To prevail in a legal-malpractice claim, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the following: “(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship, (2) negligence on the part of the lawyer in handling his client’s affairs entrusted to him, and (3) proximate cause of the injury.” Byrd v. Bowie, 933 So.2d 899, 904 (¶ 15) (Miss.2006) (citing Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, 687 So.2d 1205, 1215 (Miss.1996)).

2005Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, 687 So.2d 1205, 1215 (Miss.1996).

1991See, e.g., Hickox By And Through Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So.2d 626, 636 (Miss. 1987); United Companies Mortgage of Mississippi, Inc. v. Jones, 465 So.2d 1083, 1084 (Miss. 1985); Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So.2d 926, 927-28 (Miss. 1982).

1991See, e.g., Hickox By And Through Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So.2d 626, 636 (Miss.1987); United Companies Mortgage of Mississippi, Inc. v. Jones, 465 So.2d 1083, 1084 (Miss.1985); Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So.2d 926, 927-28 (Miss.1982).

1991See, e.g., Hickox By And Through Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So.2d 626, 636 (Miss. 1987); United Companies Mortgage of Mississippi, Inc. v. Jones, 465 So.2d 1083, 1084 (Miss. 1985); Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So.2d 926, 927-28 (Miss. 1982).

1991See, e.g., Hickox By And Through Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So.2d 626, 636 (Miss.1987); United Companies Mortgage of Mississippi, Inc. v. Jones, 465 So.2d 1083, 1084 (Miss.1985); Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So.2d 926, 927-28 (Miss.1982).

2025Id. at 349 (¶29) (citing Est. of St.

2022In a legal-malpractice claim, “a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a lawyer-client relationship, negligence on the part of the lawyer in handling his client’s affairs entrusted to him, and some injury proximately caused by the lawyer’s negligence.” Trigg v. Farese, 266 So. 3d 611, 621 (Miss. 2018) (internal quotation 13 marks omitted) (quoting Est. of St.

2022Byrd, 992 So. 2d at 1207 (¶13). ¶25.

2022Id. at 1203 (¶1).

2018Co., 941 9 See Peoples Bank of Biloxi, 171 So. 3d at 509-10 (¶¶17-22) (finding that the Harrison County Chancery Clerk’s negligence claim against a bank for paying on a forged check accrued on date when the Chancery Clerk, had he exercised reasonable diligence, could have requested missing bank statements that would have revealed the bank’s negligence); Spann v. Diaz, 987 So. 2d 443, 449-50 (¶19) (Miss. 2008) (finding that a client’s legal malpractice claim accrued on the date the court handed down its order denying, as time-barred, her lawyer’s motion to add a doctor as a defendant in the med

2018See Peoples Bank of Biloxi , 171 So.3d at 509-10 (¶¶ 17-22) (finding that the Harrison County Chancery Clerk's negligence claim against a bank for paying on a forged check accrued on date when the Chancery Clerk, had he exercised reasonable diligence, could have requested missing bank statements that would have revealed the bank's negligence); Spann v. Diaz , 987 So.2d 443 , 449-50 (¶ 19) (Miss. 2008) (finding that a client's legal malpractice claim accrued on the date the court handed down its order denying, as time-barred, her lawyer's motion to add a doctor as a defendant in the medical mal

2018Co., 941 9 See Peoples Bank of Biloxi, 171 So. 3d at 509-10 (¶¶17-22) (finding that the Harrison County Chancery Clerk’s negligence claim against a bank for paying on a forged check accrued on date when the Chancery Clerk, had he exercised reasonable diligence, could have requested missing bank statements that would have revealed the bank’s negligence); Spann v. Diaz, 987 So. 2d 443, 449-50 (¶19) (Miss. 2008) (finding that a client’s legal malpractice claim accrued on the date the court handed down its order denying, as time-barred, her lawyer’s motion to add a doctor as a defendant in the med

2018See Peoples Bank of Biloxi , 171 So.3d at 509-10 (¶¶ 17-22) (finding that the Harrison County Chancery Clerk's negligence claim against a bank for paying on a forged check accrued on date when the Chancery Clerk, had he exercised reasonable diligence, could have requested missing bank statements that would have revealed the bank's negligence); Spann v. Diaz , 987 So.2d 443 , 449-50 (¶ 19) (Miss. 2008) (finding that a client's legal malpractice claim accrued on the date the court handed down its order denying, as time-barred, her lawyer's motion to add a doctor as a defendant in the medical mal

2018Donovan v. Burwell , 199 So.3d 725 , 732 (¶ 23) (Miss.

2018Donovan v. Burwell, 199 So. 3d 725, 732 (¶23) (Miss.

2018Co., 941 9 See Peoples Bank of Biloxi, 171 So. 3d at 509-10 (¶¶17-22) (finding that the Harrison County Chancery Clerk’s negligence claim against a bank for paying on a forged check accrued on date when the Chancery Clerk, had he exercised reasonable diligence, could have requested missing bank statements that would have revealed the bank’s negligence); Spann v. Diaz, 987 So. 2d 443, 449-50 (¶19) (Miss. 2008) (finding that a client’s legal malpractice claim accrued on the date the court handed down its order denying, as time-barred, her lawyer’s motion to add a doctor as a defendant in the med

2018See Peoples Bank of Biloxi , 171 So.3d at 509-10 (¶¶ 17-22) (finding that the Harrison County Chancery Clerk's negligence claim against a bank for paying on a forged check accrued on date when the Chancery Clerk, had he exercised reasonable diligence, could have requested missing bank statements that would have revealed the bank's negligence); Spann v. Diaz , 987 So.2d 443 , 449-50 (¶ 19) (Miss. 2008) (finding that a client's legal malpractice claim accrued on the date the court handed down its order denying, as time-barred, her lawyer's motion to add a doctor as a defendant in the medical mal

2016The statute of limitations for a legal-malpractice claim' “begins to run on the date that the client learns or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should learn of his lawyer’s negligence.” Evans v. Howell, 121 So.3d 919, 923 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.2013).

2016The dissent also argues that the discovery rule does not apply because the Board's order was not "secretive or inherently undiscovera-ble.” Our Supreme Court has held that the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations on a legal malpractice claim if the plaintiff satisfies either of two alternative standards— the " ‘secret or inherently undiscoverable' standard” or the “layman standard.” Evans, 121 So.3d at 924 (¶ 22) (quoting Channel, 954 So.2d at 421 (¶¶ 19-20)).

2012Century 21 Deep S. Props., Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So.2d 359, 873 (Miss.1992).

2012Co. v. Weiss, 194 P.3d 1063, 1066 (Colo.Ct.App.2008) (Unless fraud or malice is involved, a legal-malpractice claim must be based upon an attorney-client relationship.). .

2007Since Lancaster's complaint was by *773 one incarcerated and acting pro se, "we take that fact into account and, in our discretion, credit not so well pleaded allegations, [citations omitted] to the end that a prisoner's meritorious complaint may not be lost because inartfully drafted." Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So.2d 1242, 1246 (Miss.1991) (citing Moore v. Ruth, 556 So.2d 1059, 1061 (Miss.1990)). ¶ 17.

2007Since Lancaster's complaint was by *773 one incarcerated and acting pro se, "we take that fact into account and, in our discretion, credit not so well pleaded allegations, [citations omitted] to the end that a prisoner's meritorious complaint may not be lost because inartfully drafted." Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So.2d 1242, 1246 (Miss.1991) (citing Moore v. Ruth, 556 So.2d 1059, 1061 (Miss.1990)). ¶ 17.

1994NOTES [1] The majority does cite our recent case of Stevens v. Lake, 615 So.2d 1177, 1181 (Miss. 1993), but strangely ignores our holding therein that in the absence of fraud the statute in a legal malpractice claim under § 15-1-49 begins to run from the date of the act of malpractice, not when it is discovered.