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27 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanassegreen2 sentences2021In Eagle Mountain, we noted that attorney-client concerns “are just as likely to be implicated when a legal malpractice claim is involuntarily assigned . . . but we have concluded such transfers do not violate public policy as a general matter.” Id. ¶ 33 (citing Tanasse, 1999 UT 49, ¶ 13 ). 2019Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 2002 UT 18, ¶ 13 , 44 P.3d 699 (“Given that choses in action are amenable to execution . . . it follows that a defendant can purchase claims, i.e., choses in action, pending against itself and then move to dismiss those claims.”); see also Snow, 1999 UT 49, ¶ 9 (“[W]e hold that a legal malpractice claim, like any other chose in action, may ordinarily be acquired by a creditor through attachment and execution.”); Lamoreaux v. Black Diamond Holdings, LLC, 2013 UT App 32, ¶ 16 , 296 P.3d 780 . 12 UTAH R. | 3 | 8 |
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fieldinggreen2 sentences2026Id. at 1286, 1289 . 2008Smith, Legal Malpractice § 8.13 (2008 ed.) [hereinafter Legal Malpractice ]. ¶ 23 We have established the elements required for a legal malpractice claim based on a breach of fiduciary duty: "(1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) breach of the attorney's fiduciary duty to the client; (8) causation, both actual and proximate; and (4) damages suffered by the client." Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1290 ; see also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 49 (2000). | 1 | 2 |
Christensen & Jensen, P.C. v. Barrett & Dainesgreen2 sentences2021“The elements required for a legal malpractice claim based on a breach of fiduciary duty [are]: (1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) breach of the attorney’s fiduciary duty to the client; (3) causation, both actual and proximate; and (4) damages suffered by the client.” Christensen & Jensen, 2008 UT 64, ¶ 23 (cleaned up). 20190552-CA 27 2021 UT App 2 Phillips v. Skabelund Appellants asserted they were damaged when Skabelund “enforced the note . . . by foreclosing the trust deed and directing the sale of the [Property] . . . to satisfy it.” Appellants sought the difference between the inter 2018Smith, Legal Malpractice § 21.1, at 3 (2013 ed.) ). 14 Eastman , 242 Ill.Dec. 623 , 721 N.E.2d at 1158 . 15 Christensen & Jensen, 2008 UT 64 , ¶ 21, 194 P.3d 931 (quoting Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman , 584 P.2d 894 , 904 (Utah 1978) (Maughan, J., dissenting) ). 16 Id. (citation omitted). 17 Id. ¶ 23 ; see also id. ¶¶ 22-23 ("In a legal malpractice action based on negligence, a plaintiff must prove '(i) an attorney-client relationship; (ii) a duty of the attorney to the client arising from their relationship; (iii) a breach of that duty; (iv) a causal connection between the breach | 1 | 2 |
Jensen v. Younggreen2 sentences2019See Utah Code § 78B-2-307(3) ; see also Jensen v. Young , 2010 UT 67 , ¶ 15, 245 P.3d 731 ("The limitations period for a legal malpractice claim is four years."). 2019See Utah Code § 78B-2-307(3) ; see also Jensen v. Young , 2010 UT 67 , ¶ 15, 245 P.3d 731 ("The limitations period for a legal malpractice claim is four years."). | 1 | 2 |
Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Kollergreen1 sentence2023And we stated that “these issues require a level of expertise in the field of family law, and an expert was therefore necessary to aid the jury in identifying the attorney standard of care for filing petitions to modify child support.” Id.; see also Preston & Chambers, PC v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260, 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (affirming a court’s dismissal of a legal malpractice claim for lack of expert testimony where the “allegations included claims concerning water rights, eminent domain, and negligent services,” and agreeing with the trial court’s statement that “to suggest that the claims are | 1 | 1 |
Fordham v. Oldroydgreen2 sentences2020Instead, Cypress cites our opinion in Tanasse to argue that we should enact a new exception to the general rule that “a legal malpractice claim, like any other chose in action, may ordinarily be acquired by a creditor through attachment and execution.”17 But our decision in Tanasse does not justify a departure from the plain language of rules 64 and 64E. __________________________________________________________ itself, and we will not read additional limitations into rule 4(b) that the language cannot bear.” (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted)). 14 Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 2020Instead, Cypress cites our opinion in Tanasse to argue that we should enact a new exception to the general rule that “a legal malpractice claim, like any other chose in action, may ordinarily be acquired by a creditor through attachment and execution.”17 But our decision in Tanasse does not justify a departure from the plain language of rules 64 and 64E. __________________________________________________________ itself, and we will not read additional limitations into rule 4(b) that the language cannot bear.” (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted)). 14 Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, | 1 | 1 |
St. Jeor v. Kerr Corporationgreen2 sentences2020Jeor, 2015 UT 49, ¶ 13 . 16 Id. (“It would be fundamentally unfair for this court to alter course post hoc and foreclose [a party’s] suit simply because [the other party] disagrees with the outcome of the rule.”). 17 1999 UT 49, ¶ 9 . 2020Jeor, 2015 UT 49, ¶ 13 . 16 Id. (“It would be fundamentally unfair for this court to alter course post hoc and foreclose [a party’s] suit simply because [the other party] disagrees with the outcome of the rule.”). 17 1999 UT 49, ¶ 9 . | 1 | 1 |
Boyd v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2018"The general rule is that a plaintiff will not be permitted to characterize a tort action as one in contract in order to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations." DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co. , 926 P.2d 835 , 842 n.13 (Utah 1996) (cleaned up); see also Boyd v. Jones , 85 Fed.Appx. 77 , 80 (10th Cir. 2003) ("Under Utah law, a plaintiff will not be permitted to characterize a tort action as one in contract in order to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations." (cleaned up) ). ¶ 9 The Moshiers' complaint alleged (1) professional misconduct, (2) breach of contract, and (3) breach of fid | 1 | 1 |
Kommavongsa v. Haskellgreen1 sentence2017Kommavongsa, 67 P.3d at 1078 ("Although certainly a client who assigns the legal malpractice claim loses control over the lawsuit, and cannot drop the lawsuit upon realizing the full extent of the waiver, the waiver itself is no broader if the claim is assigned than if the client brings the lawsuit himself or herself — the attorney must still preserve those confidences and secrets that are not reasonably necessary to the defense of the claim.”). 42 . | 1 | 1 |
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combegreen1 sentence2017See id. ¶5 Harstad and the law firm filed a motion for summary judgment listing the facts they claimed were undisputed, supporting the motion with Harstad’s sworn statement, which included attached communications between Rusk and Harstad. | 1 | 1 |
Brigham Truck & Implement Co. v. Fridalgreen1 sentence2015L.Rev. 747, 754 (2012) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, & Drake v. Tanasse, 1999 UT 49, ¶¶ 12-14 , 980 P.2d 208 (determining that permitting a law firm to purchase a legal malpractice claim against itself violates public policy in part because then "the appropriate value of the legal malpractice claim will never be fairly determined"); Brigham Truck & Implement Co. v. Fridal, 746 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (noting that a sale was commercially reasonable because "[the public, upon proper notice, was imvited to par | 1 | 1 |
Johnson Cotton Co. v. Cannongreen2 sentences2015Public sales are "made at auction to the highest bidder" and allow "all persons ... the right to come in and bid." Johnson Cotton Co. v. Cannon, 242 S.C. 42 , 129 S.E.2d 750, 755 (1963). 2015Public sales are "made at auction to the highest bidder" and allow "all persons ... the right to come in and bid." Johnson Cotton Co. v. Cannon, 242 S.C. 42 , 129 S.E.2d 750, 755 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
Younan v. Carusogreen1 sentence2013See, eg., Younan v. Caruso, 51 Cal. App.4th 401 , 59 CalRptr.2d 108, 107 (1996) ("[The habeas standard for gauging the effectiveness of trial counsel is the same as in a legal malpractice action...."); Belford v. McHale Cook & Welch, 648 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) ("The first step of the Strickland standard and the breach element of legal malpractice are identical, i.e., counsel must act reasonably."). | 1 | 1 |
Belford v. McHale Cook & Welchgreen1 sentence2013See, eg., Younan v. Caruso, 51 Cal. App.4th 401 , 59 CalRptr.2d 108, 107 (1996) ("[The habeas standard for gauging the effectiveness of trial counsel is the same as in a legal malpractice action...."); Belford v. McHale Cook & Welch, 648 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) ("The first step of the Strickland standard and the breach element of legal malpractice are identical, i.e., counsel must act reasonably."). | 1 | 1 |
| K.J.B., Inc. v. Drakulichgreen | 1 | 1 |
Wagner v. Sellingergreen1 sentence2010Specifically, the plaintiffs in these cases did not sustain any actual damage, which is a required element of a legal malpractice claim, until there was an adverse ruling in the underlying suit, See Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, ¶ 41 , 70 P.3d 17 (defining actual damages as an element of a legal malpractice claim); see also Welborn, 608 So.2d at 336 (holding that until an adverse ruling was made on the plaintiff's motion for a new evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff did not sustain any injury for which damages could be awarded); Wagner, 847 A.2d at 1156 (holding that | 1 | 1 |
| Lucey v. Law Offices of Pretzel & Stouffer, Charteredgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Adams v. Paulgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Cornettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Welborn v. Shipmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Huff v. Roachgreen | 1 | 1 |
Huff v. Roachgreen1 sentence2010Id.; see also Huff v. Roach, 125 Wash.App. 724 , 106 P.3d 268, 270 (2005) (indicating that the statute of Hmitations begins to run on a legal malpractice claim when the attorney "misse[s] the statute of limitations, effectively invading [his client's] legal interests"); see also Adams v. Paul, 11 Cal.4th 583 , 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 , 904 P.2d 1205, 1209 (1995) ("In the 'classic missed statute situation, in which the attorney negligently fails to file the underlying lawsuit within the applicable statutory period and does nothing further, the plaintiff suffers actual harm at the time the statutory | 1 | 1 |
| Lenahan v. RUSSELL L. FORKEY, PAgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lattimore v. Bergmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Parker v. Graham & Jamesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eastman v. Flor-Ohio, Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Jones Lang Wootton USA v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRaegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fusco v. Faucigreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bessgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Barbergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thornton v. Squyresgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Green v. Leibowitzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Daniel L. Tappen, M. D. v. Law Lamar Ager, M. D.green | 1 | 1 |
| Beecy v. Pucciarelligreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Luckyred | 1 | 1 |
| Associated Ready Mix, Inc. v. Douglasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tanasse v. Snowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Denham v. Farmers Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harline v. Barkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lamoreaux v. Black Diamond Holdings, LLC
neutral
2 sentences2019Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 2002 UT 18, ¶ 13 , 44 P.3d 699 (“Given that choses in action are amenable to execution . . . it follows that a defendant can purchase claims, i.e., choses in action, pending against itself and then move to dismiss those claims.”); see also Snow, 1999 UT 49, ¶ 9 (“[W]e hold that a legal malpractice claim, like any other chose in action, may ordinarily be acquired by a creditor through attachment and execution.”); Lamoreaux v. Black Diamond Holdings, LLC, 2013 UT App 32, ¶ 16 , 296 P.3d 780 . 12 UTAH R. 2019Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 2002 UT 18, ¶ 13 , 44 P.3d 699 (“Given that choses in action are amenable to execution . . . it follows that a defendant can purchase claims, i.e., choses in action, pending against itself and then move to dismiss those claims.”); see also Snow, 1999 UT 49, ¶ 9 (“[W]e hold that a legal malpractice claim, like any other chose in action, may ordinarily be acquired by a creditor through attachment and execution.”); Lamoreaux v. Black Diamond Holdings, LLC, 2013 UT App 32, ¶ 16 , 296 P.3d 780 . 12 UTAH R. | 2 | 2019–2020 |
Applied Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Eames
green
2 sentences2019Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 2002 UT 18, ¶ 13 , 44 P.3d 699 (“Given that choses in action are amenable to execution . . . it follows that a defendant can purchase claims, i.e., choses in action, pending against itself and then move to dismiss those claims.”); see also Snow, 1999 UT 49, ¶ 9 (“[W]e hold that a legal malpractice claim, like any other chose in action, may ordinarily be acquired by a creditor through attachment and execution.”); Lamoreaux v. Black Diamond Holdings, LLC, 2013 UT App 32, ¶ 16 , 296 P.3d 780 . 12 UTAH R. 2019Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 2002 UT 18, ¶ 13 , 44 P.3d 699 (“Given that choses in action are amenable to execution . . . it follows that a defendant can purchase claims, i.e., choses in action, pending against itself and then move to dismiss those claims.”); see also Snow, 1999 UT 49, ¶ 9 (“[W]e hold that a legal malpractice claim, like any other chose in action, may ordinarily be acquired by a creditor through attachment and execution.”); Lamoreaux v. Black Diamond Holdings, LLC, 2013 UT App 32, ¶ 16 , 296 P.3d 780 . 12 UTAH R. | 2 | 2013–2019 |
Nielsen v. Lebaron
green
1 sentence2023Kylie also asserted LeBaron breached its fiduciary duty to her “by providing a check which either [Mr.] Nielsen or [Ms.] Nielsen could individually cash[] rather than requiring both [Mr.] Nielsen and [Ms.] Nielsen . . . [to cash the check together].” But Kylie does not raise this issue on appeal, so we do not address it. 20210357-CA 3 2023 UT App 29 Nielsen v. Lebaron contending that Kylie could not establish either the duty element or the causation element of a legal malpractice claim. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Kendall v. Utah Estate Planners PLLC
green
1 sentence2023When the plaintiff did not designate an expert witness in support of the legal malpractice claim, the former 20210786-CA 15 2023 UT App 82 Kendall v. Utah Estate Planners attorneys moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Phillips v. Skabelund
green
1 sentence2021“The elements required for a legal malpractice claim based on a breach of fiduciary duty [are]: (1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) breach of the attorney’s fiduciary duty to the client; (3) causation, both actual and proximate; and (4) damages suffered by the client.” Christensen & Jensen, 2008 UT 64, ¶ 23 (cleaned up). 20190552-CA 27 2021 UT App 2 Phillips v. Skabelund Appellants asserted they were damaged when Skabelund “enforced the note . . . by foreclosing the trust deed and directing the sale of the [Property] . . . to satisfy it.” Appellants sought the difference between the inter | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp.
green
2 sentences2020Instead, Cypress cites our opinion in Tanasse to argue that we should enact a new exception to the general rule that “a legal malpractice claim, like any other chose in action, may ordinarily be acquired by a creditor through attachment and execution.”17 But our decision in Tanasse does not justify a departure from the plain language of rules 64 and 64E. __________________________________________________________ itself, and we will not read additional limitations into rule 4(b) that the language cannot bear.” (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted)). 14 Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 2020Instead, Cypress cites our opinion in Tanasse to argue that we should enact a new exception to the general rule that “a legal malpractice claim, like any other chose in action, may ordinarily be acquired by a creditor through attachment and execution.”17 But our decision in Tanasse does not justify a departure from the plain language of rules 64 and 64E. __________________________________________________________ itself, and we will not read additional limitations into rule 4(b) that the language cannot bear.” (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted)). 14 Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Cougar Canyon v. The Cypress Fund
green
1 sentence2020Although the procedural rules have been amended since we issued our decision in Tanasse, “choses in action remain ‘amenable (Continued) 4 Cite as: 2020 UT 28 Opinion of the Court ¶12 Because the property subject to execution under our rules of procedure includes all causes of action, the legal malpractice claim in this case is subject to execution. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Chard v. Chard
green
1 sentence2019In October 2016, after the district court’s ruling on the initial motions, Landlords filed a separate 20180585-CA 7 2019 UT App 209 Chard v. Chard lawsuit seeking to evict TTR from the three locations where TTR was still behind on its rent obligations. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Cabaness v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2018The district court reasoned that because "the jury verdict on Plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract provides an adequate basis for the award of noneconomic damages," the court "need not address the Defendants' arguments regarding Plaintiff's claims for professional negligence and negligent training." 23 Cabaness v. Thomas , 2010 UT 23 , ¶ 72, 232 P.3d 486 (citation omitted). 24 Christensen & Jensen, P.C. v. Barrett & Daines , 2008 UT 64 , ¶ 26, 194 P.3d 931 (citation omitted). 25 Cabaness , 2010 UT 23 , ¶ 72, 232 P.3d 486 . 26 Id. ¶ 75. 27 Id. (quoting Beck v. 2018The district court reasoned that because "the jury verdict on Plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract provides an adequate basis for the award of noneconomic damages," the court "need not address the Defendants' arguments regarding Plaintiff's claims for professional negligence and negligent training." 23 Cabaness v. Thomas , 2010 UT 23 , ¶ 72, 232 P.3d 486 (citation omitted). 24 Christensen & Jensen, P.C. v. Barrett & Daines , 2008 UT 64 , ¶ 26, 194 P.3d 931 (citation omitted). 25 Cabaness , 2010 UT 23 , ¶ 72, 232 P.3d 486 . 26 Id. ¶ 75. 27 Id. (quoting Beck v. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman
green
2 sentences2018Smith, Legal Malpractice § 21.1, at 3 (2013 ed.) ). 14 Eastman , 242 Ill.Dec. 623 , 721 N.E.2d at 1158 . 15 Christensen & Jensen, 2008 UT 64 , ¶ 21, 194 P.3d 931 (quoting Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman , 584 P.2d 894 , 904 (Utah 1978) (Maughan, J., dissenting) ). 16 Id. (citation omitted). 17 Id. ¶ 23 ; see also id. ¶¶ 22-23 ("In a legal malpractice action based on negligence, a plaintiff must prove '(i) an attorney-client relationship; (ii) a duty of the attorney to the client arising from their relationship; (iii) a breach of that duty; (iv) a causal connection between the breach 2018Smith, Legal Malpractice § 21.1, at 3 (2013 ed.) ). 14 Eastman , 242 Ill.Dec. 623 , 721 N.E.2d at 1158 . 15 Christensen & Jensen, 2008 UT 64 , ¶ 21, 194 P.3d 931 (quoting Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman , 584 P.2d 894 , 904 (Utah 1978) (Maughan, J., dissenting) ). 16 Id. (citation omitted). 17 Id. ¶ 23 ; see also id. ¶¶ 22-23 ("In a legal malpractice action based on negligence, a plaintiff must prove '(i) an attorney-client relationship; (ii) a duty of the attorney to the client arising from their relationship; (iii) a breach of that duty; (iv) a causal connection between the breach | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Doit, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co.
green
1 sentence2018"The general rule is that a plaintiff will not be permitted to characterize a tort action as one in contract in order to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations." DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co. , 926 P.2d 835 , 842 n.13 (Utah 1996) (cleaned up); see also Boyd v. Jones , 85 Fed.Appx. 77 , 80 (10th Cir. 2003) ("Under Utah law, a plaintiff will not be permitted to characterize a tort action as one in contract in order to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations." (cleaned up) ). ¶ 9 The Moshiers' complaint alleged (1) professional misconduct, (2) breach of contract, and (3) breach of fid | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Eastman v. Messner
green
2 sentences2018Smith, Legal Malpractice § 21.1, at 3 (2013 ed.) ). 14 Eastman , 242 Ill.Dec. 623 , 721 N.E.2d at 1158 . 15 Christensen & Jensen, 2008 UT 64 , ¶ 21, 194 P.3d 931 (quoting Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman , 584 P.2d 894 , 904 (Utah 1978) (Maughan, J., dissenting) ). 16 Id. (citation omitted). 17 Id. ¶ 23 ; see also id. ¶¶ 22-23 ("In a legal malpractice action based on negligence, a plaintiff must prove '(i) an attorney-client relationship; (ii) a duty of the attorney to the client arising from their relationship; (iii) a breach of that duty; (iv) a causal connection between the breach 2018Smith, Legal Malpractice § 21.1, at 3 (2013 ed.) ). 14 Eastman , 242 Ill.Dec. 623 , 721 N.E.2d at 1158 . 15 Christensen & Jensen, 2008 UT 64 , ¶ 21, 194 P.3d 931 (quoting Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman , 584 P.2d 894 , 904 (Utah 1978) (Maughan, J., dissenting) ). 16 Id. (citation omitted). 17 Id. ¶ 23 ; see also id. ¶¶ 22-23 ("In a legal malpractice action based on negligence, a plaintiff must prove '(i) an attorney-client relationship; (ii) a duty of the attorney to the client arising from their relationship; (iii) a breach of that duty; (iv) a causal connection between the breach | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Moler v. CW Management Corp.
green
2 sentences2018Corp. , 2008 UT 46 , ¶ 17, 190 P.3d 1250 , including under the at-issue rationale, and here it is Prior Counsel, not the Krahenbuhls, who have attempted to place the Krahenbuhls' privileged communications with Successor Counsel at issue. ¶14 Prior Counsel additionally argue that a plaintiff filing a legal malpractice claim against one attorney in an underlying lawsuit waives the attorney-client privilege as to all the attorneys who represented the plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit. 2018Corp. , 2008 UT 46 , ¶ 17, 190 P.3d 1250 , including under the at-issue rationale, and here it is Prior Counsel, not the Krahenbuhls, who have attempted to place the Krahenbuhls' privileged communications with Successor Counsel at issue. ¶14 Prior Counsel additionally argue that a plaintiff filing a legal malpractice claim against one attorney in an underlying lawsuit waives the attorney-client privilege as to all the attorneys who represented the plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
green
2 sentences2010Specifically, the plaintiffs in these cases did not sustain any actual damage, which is a required element of a legal malpractice claim, until there was an adverse ruling in the underlying suit, See Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, ¶ 41 , 70 P.3d 17 (defining actual damages as an element of a legal malpractice claim); see also Welborn, 608 So.2d at 336 (holding that until an adverse ruling was made on the plaintiff's motion for a new evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff did not sustain any injury for which damages could be awarded); Wagner, 847 A.2d at 1156 (holding that 2010Specifically, the plaintiffs in these cases did not sustain any actual damage, which is a required element of a legal malpractice claim, until there was an adverse ruling in the underlying suit, See Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, ¶ 41 , 70 P.3d 17 (defining actual damages as an element of a legal malpractice claim); see also Welborn, 608 So.2d at 336 (holding that until an adverse ruling was made on the plaintiff's motion for a new evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff did not sustain any injury for which damages could be awarded); Wagner, 847 A.2d at 1156 (holding that | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Ellefsen v. Roberts green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Roberts v. Holland & Hart green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Schroeder v. Hudgins green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.