reasoning rule in Alabama

1921The reasoning on which the rule rests is said to be that the court, when engaged in the trial of criminal action, "will not take notice of the manner in which a witness has possessed himself of papers or other chattels, subjects of evidence, which are material and properly offered in evidence" (People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351 , 68 N.E. 636 , 98 Am.

1921The reasoning on which the rule rests is said to be that the court, when engaged in. the trial of a criminal action, “will not take notice of the manner in which a witness has possesséd himself of papers or other chattels, subjects of evidence, which are material and properly offered in evidence” (People v. Adams, 170 N. Y. 351 , 68 N. E. 636 , 98 Am.

2009In Power v. Larabee, 3 N.D. 502 , 57 N.W. 789 (1894), and Mohan v. Smith, 30 Minn. 259 , 15 N.W. 118 (1883), both cited by the supreme court in Kelly in support of the reasoning behind the rule, the Supreme Court of North Dakota and the Supreme Court of Minnesota, respectively, determined that the rule should be followed when selling property en masse would interfere with the mortgagor’s right of redemption by requiring him or her to redeem the property in its entirety, rather than allowing the mortgagor to redeem those particular parcels that are valuable to him or her for a lesser price than

2009In Power v. Larabee, 3 N.D. 502 , 57 N.W. 789 (1894), and Mohan v. Smith, 30 Minn. 259 , 15 N.W. 118 (1883), both cited by the supreme court in Kelly in support of the reasoning behind the rule, the Supreme Court of North Dakota and the Supreme Court of Minnesota, respectively, determined that the rule should be followed when selling property en masse would interfere with the mortgagor’s right of redemption by requiring him or her to redeem the property in its entirety, rather than allowing the mortgagor to redeem those particular parcels that are valuable to him or her for a lesser price than

2009In Power v. Larabee, 3 N.D. 502 , 57 N.W. 789 (1894), and Mohan v. Smith, 30 Minn. 259 , 15 N.W. 118 (1883), both cited by the supreme court in Kelly in support of the reasoning behind the rule, the Supreme Court of North Dakota and the Supreme Court of Minnesota, respectively, determined that the rule should be followed when selling property en masse would interfere with the mortgagor’s right of redemption by requiring him or her to redeem the property in its entirety, rather than allowing the mortgagor to redeem those particular parcels that are valuable to him or her for a lesser price than

2009In Power v. Larabee, 3 N.D. 502 , 57 N.W. 789 (1894), and Mohan v. Smith, 30 Minn. 259 , 15 N.W. 118 (1883), both cited by the supreme court in Kelly in support of the reasoning behind the rule, the Supreme Court of North Dakota and the Supreme Court of Minnesota, respectively, determined that the rule should be followed when selling property en masse would interfere with the mortgagor’s right of redemption by requiring him or her to redeem the property in its entirety, rather than allowing the mortgagor to redeem those particular parcels that are valuable to him or her for a lesser price than

1987We agree with and adopt the reasoning and analysis of the Supreme Court of Florida in Gulf Insurance Co. v. Dolan, Fertig, Curtis , 433 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1983), a case factually similar to the present case.

1970In view of the fact that we cannot reconcile some of the reasoning in Benson Hardware Co. v. Jones, supra, and Jackson v. Farley, 212 Ala. 594 , 103 So. 882 (1925), with cases which we have decided both prior to and subsequent to the time they were decided, we have no alternative but to overrule those cases insofar as they are in conflict with the legal points set out in this decision.

1970In view of the fact that we cannot reconcile some of the reasoning in Benson Hardware Co. v. Jones, supra, and Jackson v. Farley, 212 Ala. 594 , 103 So. 882 (1925), with cases which we have decided both prior to and subsequent to the time they were decided, we have no alternative but to overrule those cases insofar as they are in conflict with the legal points set out in this decision.

1933It was upon the reasoning and principle of this case that this court was led to adopt the views of Chief Justice McClellan, over those of Justice Coleman, in the case of Kennedy v. First National Bank of Tuscaloosa, 107 Ala. 170 , 18 So. 396 , 36 L.

1918It was there said: “The consensus of opinion at the present day is that such presumption is conclusive, and the period of 20 years, without some distinct act in recognition of the trust, a complete bar.” In Harrison v. Heflin, supra, the reasoning of the rule is discussed at length, and the opinion recognizes that, perhaps, in this state, “greater force and a larger operation has been given the presumption by this court, than the current of authorities sanctions,” but “it has been in obedience to a well-defined public policy, which requires a fixed period of time that shall silence * * * contr

1915It is not conceivable how, consistently Avith the well-established presumption of the continuance of title once shoAvn, inquiry as to the period covered by prior posession, or as to the point at Avhich it determined, can become ma terial. — Clements v. Hays, 76 Ala. 280 .” The reasoning of this rule being founded upon the presumption of title in the plaintiff because of such actual possession, it is difficult to see, that, under the facts of this case, the rule would be of any avail to respondents, as showing any fee-simple title in Adele Rabby under the proof that her title at that time was o

1915It is not conceivable how, consistently Avith the well-established presumption of the continuance of title once shoAvn, inquiry as to the period covered by prior posession, or as to the point at Avhich it determined, can become ma terial. — Clements v. Hays, 76 Ala. 280 .” The reasoning of this rule being founded upon the presumption of title in the plaintiff because of such actual possession, it is difficult to see, that, under the facts of this case, the rule would be of any avail to respondents, as showing any fee-simple title in Adele Rabby under the proof that her title at that time was o

1915It is not conceivable how, consistently Avith the well-established presumption of the continuance of title once shoAvn, inquiry as to the period covered by prior posession, or as to the point at Avhich it determined, can become ma terial. — Clements v. Hays, 76 Ala. 280 .” The reasoning of this rule being founded upon the presumption of title in the plaintiff because of such actual possession, it is difficult to see, that, under the facts of this case, the rule would be of any avail to respondents, as showing any fee-simple title in Adele Rabby under the proof that her title at that time was o

1915It is not conceivable how, consistently Avith the well-established presumption of the continuance of title once shoAvn, inquiry as to the period covered by prior posession, or as to the point at Avhich it determined, can become ma terial. — Clements v. Hays, 76 Ala. 280 .” The reasoning of this rule being founded upon the presumption of title in the plaintiff because of such actual possession, it is difficult to see, that, under the facts of this case, the rule would be of any avail to respondents, as showing any fee-simple title in Adele Rabby under the proof that her title at that time was o

1915It is not conceivable how, consistently Avith the well-established presumption of the continuance of title once shoAvn, inquiry as to the period covered by prior posession, or as to the point at Avhich it determined, can become ma terial. — Clements v. Hays, 76 Ala. 280 .” The reasoning of this rule being founded upon the presumption of title in the plaintiff because of such actual possession, it is difficult to see, that, under the facts of this case, the rule would be of any avail to respondents, as showing any fee-simple title in Adele Rabby under the proof that her title at that time was o

1915It is not conceivable how, consistently Avith the well-established presumption of the continuance of title once shoAvn, inquiry as to the period covered by prior posession, or as to the point at Avhich it determined, can become ma terial. — Clements v. Hays, 76 Ala. 280 .” The reasoning of this rule being founded upon the presumption of title in the plaintiff because of such actual possession, it is difficult to see, that, under the facts of this case, the rule would be of any avail to respondents, as showing any fee-simple title in Adele Rabby under the proof that her title at that time was o

1915It is not conceivable how, consistently Avith the well-established presumption of the continuance of title once shoAvn, inquiry as to the period covered by prior posession, or as to the point at Avhich it determined, can become ma terial. — Clements v. Hays, 76 Ala. 280 .” The reasoning of this rule being founded upon the presumption of title in the plaintiff because of such actual possession, it is difficult to see, that, under the facts of this case, the rule would be of any avail to respondents, as showing any fee-simple title in Adele Rabby under the proof that her title at that time was o

1894I do not think it improper to state here a fact known to all who were members of the court at the time, that the late Chief Justice Stone, who delivered the opinion in the case of- Fellows v. Lewis, supra, and quoted at length by my associates as expressive of .his' views, and also the dissenting opinion in Bolling v. Jones, supra, in the case now before' us, fully concurred in the views and conclusions expressed in the opinion delivered in this case which declared, for the reasons stated, that the petitioner was not entitled to a. homestead exemption.

1894I do not think it improper to state here a fact known to all who were members of the court at the time, that the late Chief Justice Stone, who delivered the opinion in the case of- Fellows v. Lewis, supra, and quoted at length by my associates as expressive of .his' views, and also the dissenting opinion in Bolling v. Jones, supra, in the case now before' us, fully concurred in the views and conclusions expressed in the opinion delivered in this case which declared, for the reasons stated, that the petitioner was not entitled to a. homestead exemption.