reasoning rule in Florida

2010In the process, the Third District relied upon the reasoning and rule of law articulated in Yisrael v. State, 938 So.2d 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (en banc) ( Yisrael I ), disapproved in part, 993 So.2d 952 (Fla.2008).

2010In the process, the Third District relied upon the reasoning and rule of law articulated in Yisrael v. State, 938 So.2d 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (en banc) (Yisrael I), disapproved in part, 993 So.2d 952 (Fla.2008).

2007Second, the Court in LaMarche adopted in full the reasoning and analysis of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233 , 405 A.2d 788, 792 (1979), which was based on the same exclusions at issue in La-Marche; specifically, the “insured products” (exclusion “(n)”) and “work performed” (exclusion “(o)”) exclusions.

2007Second, the Court in LaMarche adopted in full the reasoning and analysis of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233 , 405 A.2d 788, 792 (1979), which was based on the same exclusions at issue in La-Marche; specifically, the “insured products” (exclusion “(n)”) and “work performed” (exclusion “(o)”) exclusions.

2012See Interstate Brands Corp. v. Blanco, 50 So.3d 665 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (remanding for entry of order awarding E/C-paid fee only for missed PTD payments, where E/C suspended PTD benefits inadvertently); Interior Custom Concepts v. Slovak, 969 So.2d 1095 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (remanding for entry of order awarding E/C-paid fee for only the missed PTD payments, where E/C suspended PTD benefits temporarily); Barr v. Pantry Pride, 518 So.2d 1309, 1317-18 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (reversing denial of E/C-paid fee on portion of temporary total disability benefits paid without incident after entry of prior

2012See Interstate Brands Corp. v. Blanco, 50 So.3d 665 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (remanding for entry of order awarding E/C-paid fee only for missed PTD payments, where E/C suspended PTD benefits inadvertently); Interior Custom Concepts v. Slovak, 969 So.2d 1095 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (remanding for entry of order awarding E/C-paid fee for only the missed PTD payments, where E/C suspended PTD benefits temporarily); Barr v. Pantry Pride, 518 So.2d 1309, 1317-18 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (reversing denial of E/C-paid fee on portion of temporary total disability benefits paid without incident after entry of prior

2010See Ventura, 973 So.2d at 638 .

2010See Ventura, 973 So.2d at 638 .

2009See Ward, 965 So.2d at 309-11 .

2009V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418, 420 (Fla.1981). *523 We stayed proceedings in this case pending our disposition of Yisrael, in which we: (1) approved the decision of the First District in Gray v. State, 910 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), and (2) disapproved the reasoning and rule of law articulated by the Fourth District in its underlying decision, but ultimately approved the result reached by that court on other grounds.

2008Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 709 So.2d 124, 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

2004In Scott II, the Florida Supreme Court quoted with approval Cagle v. *692 Burns & Roe, Inc., 106 Wash.2d 911 , 726 P.2d 434, 436 (1986), for the following premise: "`[W]rongful termination of employment in violation of public policy can be accurately characterized as an intentional tort.'" 572 So.2d at 903 ; see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 , 119 S.Ct. 1624 , 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999) (holding that federal cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 sound in tort); Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 524 So.2d 642, 643 (Fla.1988) ( Scott I ) (holding that retaliatory di

2004In Scott II, the Florida Supreme Court quoted with approval Cagle v. *692 Burns & Roe, Inc., 106 Wash.2d 911 , 726 P.2d 434, 436 (1986), for the following premise: "`[W]rongful termination of employment in violation of public policy can be accurately characterized as an intentional tort.'" 572 So.2d at 903 ; see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 , 119 S.Ct. 1624 , 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999) (holding that federal cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 sound in tort); Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 524 So.2d 642, 643 (Fla.1988) ( Scott I ) (holding that retaliatory di

2004In Scott II, the Florida Supreme Court quoted with approval Cagle v. *692 Burns & Roe, Inc., 106 Wash.2d 911 , 726 P.2d 434, 436 (1986), for the following premise: "`[W]rongful termination of employment in violation of public policy can be accurately characterized as an intentional tort.'" 572 So.2d at 903 ; see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 , 119 S.Ct. 1624 , 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999) (holding that federal cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 sound in tort); Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 524 So.2d 642, 643 (Fla.1988) ( Scott I ) (holding that retaliatory di

2004In Scott II, the Florida Supreme Court quoted with approval Cagle v. *692 Burns & Roe, Inc., 106 Wash.2d 911 , 726 P.2d 434, 436 (1986), for the following premise: "`[W]rongful termination of employment in violation of public policy can be accurately characterized as an intentional tort.'" 572 So.2d at 903 ; see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 , 119 S.Ct. 1624 , 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999) (holding that federal cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 sound in tort); Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 524 So.2d 642, 643 (Fla.1988) ( Scott I ) (holding that retaliatory di

2004In Scott II, the Florida Supreme Court quoted with approval Cagle v. *692 Burns & Roe, Inc., 106 Wash.2d 911 , 726 P.2d 434, 436 (1986), for the following premise: "`[W]rongful termination of employment in violation of public policy can be accurately characterized as an intentional tort.'" 572 So.2d at 903 ; see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 , 119 S.Ct. 1624 , 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999) (holding that federal cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 sound in tort); Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 524 So.2d 642, 643 (Fla.1988) ( Scott I ) (holding that retaliatory di

2003In McClennan v. American Building Maintenance, 648 So.2d 1214, 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), this Court applied the following reasoning to its analysis of whether the JCC erred in precluding the claimant's attorney from attending the claimant's IME: Whenever a doctor selected by the defendant conducts a physical examination of the plaintiff, there is a possibility that improper questions may be asked and a lay person should not be expected to evaluate the propriety of every question at his peril.

2000See Hershkowitz, 744 So.2d at 1269 .

1997I find the reasoning and analysis of Judge Klein's dissenting opinion in Bradford v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association to be particularly compelling in this regard. 667 So.2d 401, 402-403 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)(Klein, J., dissenting).

1995We agree and find that it is also consistent with our prior decision in Tod and Justice Boyd's statement in In re Estate of Yohn, 238 So.2d 290, 296 (Fla. 1970) (Boyd, J., specially concurring), that "[t]he institution of marriage has been a cornerstone of western civilization for thousands of years and is the most important type of contract ever formed." We emphasize that the justification for the elective share and pretermitted spouse statutes is to protect the surviving spouse of the marriage in existence at the time of death of his or her spouse.

1968See also State v. Barton, Fla.1967, 194 So.2d 241 , which sets forth the reasoning of this rule as developed in a series of federal cases construing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 , which is the federal counterpart of CrRP 1.850.