reasoning analysis in Texas

2008See Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) ("Though the Supreme Court in Williamson was interpreting the federal rule, our Rule 803(24) contains very similar language, and we find the Supreme Court’s reasoning and analysis persuasive.”). .

2008Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) ("we find the Supreme Court’s reasoning and analysis [in William son] persuasive”); Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 751 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (citing and relying upon Williamson and concluding that cohort’s statements that "we” committed certain criminal acts were sufficiently against the speaker’s interest to be admissible under TexR.

2016See Williams v. Chisolm, 111 S.W.3d 811 , 815 (Tex.App.-Houston [1 st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

2015Edwards then called Matthews. assure both the reviewing court and the litigants that the Matthews admitted he deceived Edwards and told him the trial court's decision resulted from thoughtful deliberation. payments Edwards made to the vendors were for past-due See Williams v. Chisolm, 111 S.W.3d 811, 815 (Tex.App.- balances on orders for other customers, not the customers Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

2008Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) ("we find the Supreme Court’s reasoning and analysis [in William son] persuasive”); Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 751 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (citing and relying upon Williamson and concluding that cohort’s statements that "we” committed certain criminal acts were sufficiently against the speaker’s interest to be admissible under TexR.

2008See Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) ("Though the Supreme Court in Williamson was interpreting the federal rule, our Rule 803(24) contains very similar language, and we find the Supreme Court's reasoning and analysis persuasive."). [23] Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 751 ; Bingham, 987 S.W.2d at 57 . [24] See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603-604 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 .

2008Scott v. State , 162 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2005, pet. ref'd).

2007Scott v. State, 162 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2005, pet. refd).

2017“While we have previously held that a trial court may not grant a new trial solely on the issue of punishment, the reasoning for that rule no longer stands, and a trial court may indeed grant a new trial on punishment.” State v. Davis, 349 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim.

2017"While we have previously held that a trial court may not grant a new trial solely on the issue of punishment, the reasoning for that rule no longer stands, and a trial court may indeed grant a new trial on punishment.” State v. Davis, 349 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim.

2010See 26 S.W.3d at 728 .

2010See 26 S.W.3d at 728 .

2003Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 852 (Tex.1992).

2003Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon , 841 S.W.2d 844, 852 (Tex. 1992).

2008See Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) ("Though the Supreme Court in Williamson was interpreting the federal rule, our Rule 803(24) contains very similar language, and we find the Supreme Court's reasoning and analysis persuasive."). [23] Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 751 ; Bingham, 987 S.W.2d at 57 . [24] See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603-604 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 .

1999See also Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d at 956 ("we find the Supreme Court’s reasoning and analysis [in Williamson ] persuasive.”); Bingham v. State, 987 S.W.2d at 56 ("Nowhere within the text is there any mention of this exception being limited to cases in which the criminal defendant is the declarant of the statements, and there is good reason for this.

2008Thus, the Confrontation Clause analysis and discussion of statements against penal interest made to investigating police officers in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999), has been largely superseded by those two cases, although the reasoning in Lilly is consistent with that in both Crawford and Davis. [48] Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex. Crim.App.1994) ("we find the Supreme Court's reasoning and analysis [in Williamson ] persuasive"); Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 751 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (citing and relying upon Williamson and concluding that

2008Thus, the Confrontation Clause analysis and discussion of statements against penal interest made to investigating police officers in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999), has been largely superseded by those two cases, although the reasoning in Lilly is consistent with that in both Crawford and Davis. [48] Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex. Crim.App.1994) ("we find the Supreme Court's reasoning and analysis [in Williamson ] persuasive"); Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 751 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (citing and relying upon Williamson and concluding that

2025See Hoist Liftruck Mfg., Inc. v. Carruth-Doggett, Inc., 485 S.W.3d 120, 124 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (Frost, C.J., concurring) (discuss- ing split among courts of appeals).

2018See In re Lisa Laser USA, Inc., 310 S.W.3d at 884 ; see also In re Fisher, 433 S.W.3d at 530 (holding that the reasoning and analysis in In re Lisa Laser applies not only to forum selection clauses, but also to venue selection clauses in “major transactions” under Section 15.020).

2018See In re Lisa Laser USA, Inc., 310 S.W.3d at 884 ; see also In re Fisher, 433 S.W.3d at 530 (holding that the reasoning and analysis in In re Lisa Laser applies not only to forum selection clauses, but also to venue selection clauses in “major transactions” under Section 15.020).

2015Evid. 404, as recognized in Mozon, 991 S.W.2d at 845-46 , to support , his assertion that "the trial court’s reasoning and analysis in excluding evidence of Diles’[s] violent past was an abuse of discretion.” Thompson was decided under the .now-superseded common law standard, which allowed the admission of evidence .of prior specific instances of violence to show á victim's character trait for violence.

2015Evid. 404, as recognized in Mozon, 991 S.W.2d at 845-46 , to support his assertion that “the trial court’s reasoning and analysis in excluding evidence of Diles’[s] violent past was an abuse of discretion.” Thompson was decided under the now-superseded common law standard, which allowed the admission of evidence of prior specific instances of violence to show a victim’s character trait for violence.

2013“The written, signed order setting the case for trial is not a substitute for a written, signed order granting a motion for new trial because the order setting the case for trial does not adjudicate the merits of the motion for new trial.” Estate of Townes v. Wood, 934 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).

2012When a defendant fails to object at trial to an error in the jury charge, he is entitled to a reversal only if that error results in “egregious harm.” Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim.

2010See infra pp. 6–7 & n9. [7] See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 2005) (requiring courts construe statutes based on presumption that Legislature intended entire statute to be effective); City of Marshall v. City of Uncertain , 206 S.W.3d 97, 105 (Tex. 2006) (citing City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne , 111 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003)) (stating courts should avoid construing statutes in manner that renders any part of statute meaningless or superfluous). [8] See Dishner , 162 S.W.3d at 377 ; Spiller , 21 S.W.3d at 454 ; Grossnickle , 115 S.W.3d at 252 . [9] Compare Majority opinion, p.

2010See infra pp. 6–7 & n9. [7] See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 2005) (requiring courts construe statutes based on presumption that Legislature intended entire statute to be effective); City of Marshall v. City of Uncertain , 206 S.W.3d 97, 105 (Tex. 2006) (citing City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne , 111 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003)) (stating courts should avoid construing statutes in manner that renders any part of statute meaningless or superfluous). [8] See Dishner , 162 S.W.3d at 377 ; Spiller , 21 S.W.3d at 454 ; Grossnickle , 115 S.W.3d at 252 . [9] Compare Majority opinion, p.

2010See infra pp. 6–7 & n9. [7] See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 2005) (requiring courts construe statutes based on presumption that Legislature intended entire statute to be effective); City of Marshall v. City of Uncertain , 206 S.W.3d 97, 105 (Tex. 2006) (citing City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne , 111 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003)) (stating courts should avoid construing statutes in manner that renders any part of statute meaningless or superfluous). [8] See Dishner , 162 S.W.3d at 377 ; Spiller , 21 S.W.3d at 454 ; Grossnickle , 115 S.W.3d at 252 . [9] Compare Majority opinion, p.