reasoning analysis in Utah

2007The reasoning for the requirement that litigants make an affirmative effort to bring an expert witness into trial before the witness will be declared unavailable under rule 32 is that "[u]nlike the typical [fact] witness whose involvement with the case may depend on the fortuity of his observing a particular event and whose presence at trial is often involuntary, a party ordinarily has the opportunity to choose the expert witness whose testimony he desires and invariably arranges for his presence privately, by mutual agreement, and for a fee." Caron, 643 N.E.2d at 474 (quoting Carter-Wallace,

2007The reasoning for the requirement that litigants make an affirmative effort to bring an expert witness into trial before the witness will be declared unavailable under rule 32 is that "Iulnlike the typical [fact] witness whose involvement with the case may depend on 'the fortuity of his observing a particular event and whose presence at trial is often involuntary, a party ordinarily has the opportunity to choose the expert witness whose testimony he desires and invariably arranges for his presence privately, by mutual agreement, and for a fee." Caron, 643 N.E.2d at 474 (quoting CarterWallace,

2007The reasoning for the requirement that litigants make an affirmative effort to bring an expert witness into trial before the witness will be declared unavailable under rule 32 is that "[u]nlike the typical [fact] witness whose involvement with the case may depend on the fortuity of his observing a particular event and whose presence at trial is often involuntary, a party ordinarily has the opportunity to choose the expert witness whose testimony he desires and invariably arranges for his presence privately, by mutual agreement, and for a fee." Caron, 643 N.E.2d at 474 (quoting Carter-Wallace,

2007The reasoning for the requirement that litigants make an affirmative effort to bring an expert witness into trial before the witness will be declared unavailable under rule 32 is that "Iulnlike the typical [fact] witness whose involvement with the case may depend on 'the fortuity of his observing a particular event and whose presence at trial is often involuntary, a party ordinarily has the opportunity to choose the expert witness whose testimony he desires and invariably arranges for his presence privately, by mutual agreement, and for a fee." Caron, 643 N.E.2d at 474 (quoting CarterWallace,

2021And in exercising our discretion, we should remember that our preservation rules exist “to serve judicial economy and to prevent a defendant from failing to object to an issue in the hopes of reversal of a conviction on appeal.” Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 19 ; see also Salt Lake City v. Josephson, 2019 UT 6, ¶ 10 , 435 P.3d 255 (“When parties fail to preserve issues, we do not receive the benefit of a trial judge’s reasoning and analysis on the issue at hand.” (cleaned up)). ¶28 With these principles in mind, if the merits of a claim can easily be resolved in favor of the party asserting that the

2019The overarching consideration is not whether the party from whom the unlicensed contractor seeks to recover has the exact same technical knowledge and expertise as that expected of the contractor, but whether that party "is within the class of persons whom the licensing statute is designed to protect," see George , 672 P.2d at 735 , that is, the "lay public," see Pacific Chromalox , 787 P.2d at 1326 .

2019The overarching consideration is not whether the party from whom the unlicensed contractor seeks to recover has the exact same technical knowledge and expertise as that expected of the contractor, but whether that party "is within the class of persons whom the licensing statute is designed to protect," see George , 672 P.2d at 735 , that is, the "lay public," see Pacific Chromalox , 787 P.2d at 1326 .

2017This is especially helpful in a case, like this one, involving the correct interpretation and application of precedent interpreting the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure-rules that our district courts live and breathe every day. ¶ 26 On the merits, this case calls for a clarification of Coroles v. State , 2015 UT 48 , 349 P.3d 739 .

2017This is especially helpful in a case, like this one, involving the correct interpretation and application of precedent interpreting the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure-rules that our district courts live and breathe every day. ¶ 26 On the merits, this case calls for a clarification of Coroles v. State , 2015 UT 48 , 349 P.3d 739 .

2013We recognize the existence of some cases that have allowed testimony about the consistency of another's statements under the reasoning that rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not prohibit "testimony from which a fury could infer the veracity of the witness." State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, 114 , 5 P.3d 642 (emphasis added); see, eg., State v. Bair, 2012 UT App 106, ¶ 47 , 275 P.3d 1050 ; State v. Cruz, 2002 UT App 106U, para. 1, 2002 WL 538038 .

2013We recognize the existence of some cases that have allowed testimony about the consistency of another's statements under the reasoning that rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not prohibit "testimony from which a fury could infer the veracity of the witness." State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, 114 , 5 P.3d 642 (emphasis added); see, eg., State v. Bair, 2012 UT App 106, ¶ 47 , 275 P.3d 1050 ; State v. Cruz, 2002 UT App 106U, para. 1, 2002 WL 538038 .

1990Thereafter, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals applied the same reasoning and analysis to hold subscription lists taxable in Disclosure Information Group v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 72 Md.App. 381 , 530 A.2d 8 (Ct.Spec.App.1987).

1990Thereafter, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals applied the same reasoning and analysis to hold subscription lists taxable in Disclosure Information Group v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 72 Md.App. 381 , 530 A.2d 8 (Ct.Spec.App.1987).

1896It is the established doctrine of the supreme court of the United States, and of the supreme courts of several of the states. [Citing, among other cases, Sibbald v. U. S., 12 Pet. 491 ; Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. 413.] And the reasoning of the doctrine is obvious.