reasoning analysis in Michigan

1972Kavanagh, and concurred with by Justices Dethmers and Adams, wrote: “The primary issue raised below and saved for appeal in this cause is whether the 60-day notice requirement of § 8 of chapter 22 of the general highway statute is constitutionally infirm when applied to a plaintiff rendered mentally or physically incapacitated by the alleged tortious act of a state or municipal defendant giving rise to the asserted cause of action.” (P 167.) # # * “ * * * we reject and overrule the reasoning under the rule in Moulter [v Grand Rapids, 155 Mich 165 (1908)], supra, and condemn the purely capricio

1972KAVANAGH, and concurred with by Justices DETHMERS and ADAMS, wrote: "The primary issue raised below and saved for appeal in this cause is whether the 60-day notice requirement of § 8 of chapter 22 of the general highway statute is constitutionally infirm when applied to a plaintiff rendered mentally or physically incapacitated by the alleged tortious act of a state or *622 municipal defendant giving rise to the asserted cause of action." (P 167.) * * * "* * * we reject and overrule the reasoning under the rule in Moulter [v Grand Rapids, 155 Mich 165 (1908)], supra, and condemn the purely capr

2017Pearson , 157 Mich. App. at 71 -72 , 403 N.W.2d 498 .

2017Pearson , 157 Mich. App. at 71 -72 , 403 N.W.2d 498 .

2017See alsoMCL 333.1111(1) ; MCL 333.7121(2) ; People v. Thompson , 477 Mich. 146 , 155 n. 9, 730 N.W.2d 708 (2007). 3 Our decision today rests in large part on the reasoning and analysis performed by this Court in Pearson , wherein we similarly determined that growing marijuana is not protected by the personal-use exception.

2017See alsoMCL 333.1111(1) ; MCL 333.7121(2) ; People v. Thompson , 477 Mich. 146 , 155 n. 9, 730 N.W.2d 708 (2007). 3 Our decision today rests in large part on the reasoning and analysis performed by this Court in Pearson , wherein we similarly determined that growing marijuana is not protected by the personal-use exception.

1999Unless it is “manifest that the wcac exceeded its reviewing power,” reviewing courts should ordinarily defer to the judgment of the wcac. [York, supra at 378-379 , citing Holden, supra at 267-269 .] D.

1998Holden, supra, p 268 .

1938It is within the reasoning of the rule laid down in Holman v. Railway Co., 114 Mich. 208 , and 11 Encyclopedia of Evidence, p. 391 et seq., and notes.” In Johnson v. E.

1909It is within the reasoning of the rule laid down in Holman v. Railway Co., 114 Mich. 208 , and 11 Enc. of Evidence, p. 391 et seq., and notes.

2015Armstrong, 490 Mich at 291 .

2011In Ayres , this Court distinguished public registration from historical punishments such as branding, shaming, and banishment because public registration “ ‘does nothing more than provide for compilation of and public accessibility to information that is already a matter of public record.’ ” Ayres, 239 Mich App at 15 , quoting Kelley , 961F Supp at 1110. 7 Ayres further noted that the registration requirement does not impose any suffering, restraint, or obligation and stated: “The notification provisions themselves do not touch the offender at all.

2008OUR DISAGREEMENT WITH MISSOURI v BRADSHAW While we have given thoughtful consideration to the reasoning and analysis employed by our fellow jurists in Missouri, our conclusion is directly contrary to Bradshaw, supra. We decline to follow the reasoning of Bradshaw for several reasons.

2003To the contrary, I agree with the reasoning and analysis applied by Judge Bandstra in his opinion in Zdrojewski , as well as that of Judge Hoekstra in Phillips v Mirac, Inc, 251 Mich App 586 ; 651 NW2d 437 (2002).

2003To the contrary, I agree with the reasoning and analysis applied by Judge Bandstra in his opinion in Zdrojewski , as well as that of Judge Hoekstra in Phillips v Mirac, Inc, 251 Mich App 586 ; 651 NW2d 437 (2002).

2000In keeping the delicate balance we have been careful to limit the scope of federal intrusion into state criminal adjudications and to safeguard the States' interest in the integrity of their criminal and collateral proceedings. [ Williams v. Taylor, ___ U.S. ___, 120, S.Ct. 1479, 1490, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).] [9] The district court expressed its confusion regarding the standard of review employed by this Court, implying either that it believed this Court had applied the wrong standard of review or that this Court had applied the proper standard in an improper fashion. 88 F. Supp. 2d at 777 .

2000In keeping the delicate balance we have been careful to limit the scope of federal intrusion into state criminal adjudications and to safeguard the States' interest in the integrity of their criminal and collateral proceedings. [ Williams v. Taylor, ___ U.S. ___, 120, S.Ct. 1479, 1490, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).] [9] The district court expressed its confusion regarding the standard of review employed by this Court, implying either that it believed this Court had applied the wrong standard of review or that this Court had applied the proper standard in an improper fashion. 88 F. Supp. 2d at 777 .

2000However, the district court lacks similar authority to require this Court to specify the reasoning and analysis employed in resolving matters of state law because the district court does not exercise appellate review over the decisions of this Court. [11] In Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 517 , 98 S.Ct. 824 , 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that a state court's decision is not subject to collateral attack in a federal court simply because the state court failed to articulate on the record all the factors that informed the deliberate exercise of that court's di

2000However, the district court lacks similar authority to require this Court to specify the reasoning and analysis employed in resolving matters of state law because the district court does not exercise appellate review over the decisions of this Court. [11] In Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 517 , 98 S.Ct. 824 , 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that a state court's decision is not subject to collateral attack in a federal court simply because the state court failed to articulate on the record all the factors that informed the deliberate exercise of that court's di

2000Thus, while the “not limited to” language that precedes the list informs us that the list is not exhaustive, the catch-all informs us that when drawing out of the situations listed a standard of applicable characteristics, the class of defendants should not be limited in a manner that would have the effect of excluding persons under “lawful imprisonment by due process of law ... .” 3 By placing this language both before and after the list of particulars, the Legislature has clearly signaled its intent that the law should apply only when the assault is committed by those “lawfully imprisoned.”

2000Thus, while the “not limited to” language that precedes the list informs us that the list is not exhaustive, the catch-all informs us that when drawing out of the situations listed a standard of applicable characteristics, the class of defendants should not be limited in a manner that would have the effect of excluding persons under “lawful imprisonment by due process of law ... .” 3 By placing this language both before and after the list of particulars, the Legislature has clearly signaled its intent that the law should apply only when the assault is committed by those “lawfully imprisoned.”

2000Our consideration of the question should include an examination of (1) the reasoning and analysis of the decisions of the magistrate and the WCAC, (2) the evidence considered or ignored in those decisions, and (3) the care taken, and the nature of the issues involved, in order to determine whether the WCAC acted in a manner consistent with the concept of administrative appellate review. [ Id. ] The limited question we address in this case, as directed by our Supreme Court, is whether defendant was a statutory employer of plaintiff under M.C.L. § 418.171; MSA 17.237(171).

2000Thus, while the “not limited to” language that precedes the list informs us that the list is not exhaustive, the catch-all informs us that when drawing out of the situations listed a standard of applicable characteristics, the class of defendants should not be limited in a manner that would have the effect of excluding persons under “lawful imprisonment by due process of law ... .” 3 By placing this language both before and after the list of particulars, the Legislature has clearly signaled its intent that the law should apply only when the assault is committed by those “lawfully imprisoned.”

2000Thus, while the “not limited to” language that precedes the list informs us that the list is not exhaustive, the catch-all informs us that when drawing out of the situations listed a standard of applicable characteristics, the class of defendants should not be limited in a manner that would have the effect of excluding persons under “lawful imprisonment by due process of law ... .” 3 By placing this language both before and after the list of particulars, the Legislature has clearly signaled its intent that the law should apply only when the assault is committed by those “lawfully imprisoned.”

1999Unless it is “manifest that the wcac exceeded its reviewing power,” reviewing courts should ordinarily defer to the judgment of the wcac. [York, supra at 378-379 , citing Holden, supra at 267-269 .] D.

1996As this opinion makes clear, the Court’s reasoning was in error._ II Unlike its federal counterpart, the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., contains a provision specifically designed to outlaw two forms of sexual harassment: hostile work environment sexual harassment and "quid pro quo sexual harassment.” Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368 ; 501 NW2d 155 (1993); see also Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 64-65 ; 106 S Ct 2399 ; 91 L Ed 2d 49 (1986).

1996As this opinion makes clear, the Court’s reasoning was in error._ II Unlike its federal counterpart, the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., contains a provision specifically designed to outlaw two forms of sexual harassment: hostile work environment sexual harassment and "quid pro quo sexual harassment.” Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368 ; 501 NW2d 155 (1993); see also Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 64-65 ; 106 S Ct 2399 ; 91 L Ed 2d 49 (1986).

1990The reasoning and analysis of cases such as Central Mutual Ins Co v Walter, 143 Mich App 332 ; 372 NW2d 542 (1985), lv den 424 Mich 851 (1985), however, does persuade us that Corrosion Control is not an additional insured. 18 An automobile brought into a service station for repair leaked gasoline onto the station floor.

1990The reasoning and analysis of cases such as Central Mutual Ins Co v Walter, 143 Mich App 332 ; 372 NW2d 542 (1985), lv den 424 Mich 851 (1985), however, does persuade us that Corrosion Control is not an additional insured. 18 An automobile brought into a service station for repair leaked gasoline onto the station floor.

1986Shortridge v Bailey, 145 Mich App 547 ; 378 NW2d 544 (1985).

1986Shortridge v Bailey, 145 Mich App 547 ; 378 NW2d 544 (1985).

1978And, with respect to the "due process” foundation, the Court ruled "[w]ithout definite standards an ordinance becomes an open door to favoritism and discrimination, a ready tool for the suppression of competition through granting of authority to one and the withholding from another”, 344 Mich 693, 700 , citing with approval the reasoning and analysis of Devereaux v Township Board (see fn 10, supra) and Hoyt Bros, Inc v Grand Rapids (see discussion supra) as authority for its conclusion. 14 Finding that there were no standards whatsoever in the ordinance in issue, the Court held the ordinance u

1978And, with respect to the "due process” foundation, the Court ruled "[w]ithout definite standards an ordinance becomes an open door to favoritism and discrimination, a ready tool for the suppression of competition through granting of authority to one and the withholding from another”, 344 Mich 693, 700 , citing with approval the reasoning and analysis of Devereaux v Township Board (see fn 10, supra) and Hoyt Bros, Inc v Grand Rapids (see discussion supra) as authority for its conclusion. 14 Finding that there were no standards whatsoever in the ordinance in issue, the Court held the ordinance u

1971A. Roberts Company v. City of Detroit (1956), 346 Mich 384 .

1911With the construction we place upon it, the declaration is within the reasoning and the rule of Cristan elli v. Saginaw Mining Co., 154 Mich. 423 ( 117 N. W. 910 ).

1911With the construction we place upon it, the declaration is within the reasoning and the rule of Cristan elli v. Saginaw Mining Co., 154 Mich. 423 ( 117 N. W. 910 ).