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30 Illinois opinions name it 3 courts 1873–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ying Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2025See Ye, 74 F.4th at 461-62. ¶ 42 We reject this reasoning because the rule of interpretation does not apply in this instance. 2025Ye, 74 F.4th at 461-62 . ¶ 43 We reject this reasoning because the rule of interpretation does not apply in this instance. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Rissleygreen1 sentence2026The reasoning for the rule against double enhancement is “premised on the assumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in determining the appropriate range of penalties for that offense.” People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Holmanred2 sentences2022Miller, 567 U.S. at 477 ; see also People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46 . ¶ 40 The Illinois Supreme Court has applied the reasoning and factors of Miller to discretionary sentences of life without parole for juvenile defendants (Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40 ) as well as “de facto life sentences, which it defined as a sentence of over 40 years” (Walker, 2022 IL App (1st) 201151, ¶ 23 ). 2022Miller, 567 U.S. at 477 ; see also People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46 . ¶ 40 The Illinois Supreme Court has applied the reasoning and factors of Miller to discretionary sentences of life without parole for juvenile defendants (Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40 ) as well as “de facto life sentences, which it defined as a sentence of over 40 years” (Walker, 2022 IL App (1st) 201151, ¶ 23 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Walkergreen1 sentence2022Miller, 567 U.S. at 477 ; see also People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46 . ¶ 40 The Illinois Supreme Court has applied the reasoning and factors of Miller to discretionary sentences of life without parole for juvenile defendants (Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40 ) as well as “de facto life sentences, which it defined as a sentence of over 40 years” (Walker, 2022 IL App (1st) 201151, ¶ 23 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Buffergreen1 sentence2022“To prevail on a claim based on Miller and its progeny, a defendant sentenced to an offense committed while a juvenile must show that (1) the defendant was subject to a life sentence, mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto, and (2) the sentencing court failed to consider youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing the sentence.” People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 27 (citing Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40 ). | 1 | 1 |
Nicholson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen1 sentence2013Nicholson, 409 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1988Ed. 993, 1000 , 53 S. Ct. 465, 469 .) The reasoning for the exception has been set forth as follows: “ ‘Since the policy of the privilege is that of promoting the administration of justice, it would be a perversion of the privilege to extend it to the client who seeks advice to aid him in carrying out an illegal or fraudulent scheme. 1988App. at 38-39 ; see also Clark v. United States (1933), 289 U.S. 1, 15 , 77 L.Ed. 993, 1000 , 53 S.Ct. 465, 469 .) The reasoning for the exception has been set forth as follows: "`Since the policy of the privilege is that of promoting the administration of justice, it would be a perversion of the privilege to extend it to the client who seeks advice to aid him in carrying out an illegal or fraudulent scheme. | 1 | 1 |
The People v. Schraeberggreen1 sentence1977(See, e.g., People v. Schraeberg, 347 Ill. 392, 395 (1932).) The State’s reasoning that defense counsel’s action was a “unique strategy” to hold his defense for a subsequent trial is not persuasive. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Len P.
green
2 sentences2002The Nancy M. decision, in turn, was based on the reasoning and analysis in In re Len P. , 302 Ill. 2002The Nancy M. decision, in turn, was based on the reasoning and analysis in In re Len P., 302 Ill. | 4 | 2000–2002 |
People v. Skelton
green
2 sentences2006The reasoning for such a rule was articulated in People v. Skelton, 83 Ill. 2d 58 (1980), in which the supreme court observed: A[M]any objects, including guns, can be dangerous and cause serious injury, even when used in a fashion for which they were not intended. 2006The reasoning for such a rule was articulated in People v. Skelton, 83 Ill. 2d 58 (1980), in which the supreme court observed: “[M]any objects, including guns, can be dangerous and cause serious injury, even when used in a fashion for which they were not intended. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
McKibben v. Zamora
green
2 sentences2000A contrary rule would discourage such settlements by requiring the plaintiff insured to bring all of his claims together in a single lawsuit and not settle his property damage claim with his own carrier as soon as possible." McKibben , 358 So. 2d at 868 . 2000A contrary rule would discourage such settlements by requiring the plaintiff insured to bring all of his claims together in a single lawsuit and not settle his property damage claim with his own carrier as soon as possible.” McKibben, 358 So. 2d at 868 . | 2 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Beacham
green
1 sentence2023Beacham, 189 Ill. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
1 sentence2022Miller, 567 U.S. at 477 ; see also People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46 . ¶ 40 The Illinois Supreme Court has applied the reasoning and factors of Miller to discretionary sentences of life without parole for juvenile defendants (Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40 ) as well as “de facto life sentences, which it defined as a sentence of over 40 years” (Walker, 2022 IL App (1st) 201151, ¶ 23 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Addison Insurance v. Fay
green
1 sentence2021Thus, although this court has not done so recently, we reiterate that where the evidence before a trial court consists of depositions, transcripts, or evidence otherwise documentary in nature, a reviewing court is not bound by the trial court’s findings and may review the record de novo.” Addison Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d at 453 . ¶ 60 Here, it is undisputed that there was no evidentiary hearing and, therefore, the circuit court considered only documentary evidence, suggesting that de novo review should apply under this court’s jurisprudence. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Hare v. Foster G. McGaw Hospital
green
1 sentence1996McGaw Hospital, 192 Ill. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Northern Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hospital
green
2 sentences1996We agree that there is support in Illinois case law and the Restatement for a cause of action based upon a lost chance of survival, Northern Trust Co., 143 Ill.App.3d 479 , 97 Ill.Dec. 524 , 493 N.E.2d 6 , Chambers, 155 Ill.App.3d 458 , 108 Ill.Dec. 265 , 508 N.E.2d 426 , but we are also persuaded that the reasoning and analysis in Hare v. Foster G. 1996We agree that there is support in Illinois case law and the Restatement for a cause of action based upon a lost chance of survival, Northern Trust Co., 143 Ill.App.3d 479 , 97 Ill.Dec. 524 , 493 N.E.2d 6 , Chambers, 155 Ill.App.3d 458 , 108 Ill.Dec. 265 , 508 N.E.2d 426 , but we are also persuaded that the reasoning and analysis in Hare v. Foster G. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center
green
2 sentences1996We agree that there is support in Illinois case law and the Restatement for a cause of action based upon a lost chance of survival, Northern Trust Co., 143 Ill.App.3d 479 , 97 Ill.Dec. 524 , 493 N.E.2d 6 , Chambers, 155 Ill.App.3d 458 , 108 Ill.Dec. 265 , 508 N.E.2d 426 , but we are also persuaded that the reasoning and analysis in Hare v. Foster G. 1996We agree that there is support in Illinois case law and the Restatement for a cause of action based upon a lost chance of survival, Northern Trust Co., 143 Ill.App.3d 479 , 97 Ill.Dec. 524 , 493 N.E.2d 6 , Chambers, 155 Ill.App.3d 458 , 108 Ill.Dec. 265 , 508 N.E.2d 426 , but we are also persuaded that the reasoning and analysis in Hare v. Foster G. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
In re Smith
neutral
1 sentence1995The Claimant urges us to adopt the reasoning in the claim of In re Application of Smith (1992), 45 Ill. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Ruth v. Benvenutti
green
2 sentences1994Therefore, we follow the reasoning and the rule of Ruth ( 114 Ill. 1994App. 3d 404 , 449 N.E.2d 209 ), and hold that no common law cause of action exists against Granny’s for a willful and wanton violation of the statutory prohibition against happy hours. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ritzheimer v. Insurance Counselors, Inc.
green
1 sentence1990Additionally, we note that the fifth district of our court in Ritzheimer v. Insurance Counselors, Inc. (1988), 173 Ill. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Huck v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.
green
1 sentence1990App. 3d 837, 840 , 453 N.E.2d 1365, 1369 ), we find the reasoning and analysis of the Bailey court to be persuasive. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Wurbs
neutral
2 sentences1988Advice given for those purposes would not be professional service but participation in a conspiracy.’ ” Wurbs, 38 Ill. 1988Advice given for those purposes would not be professional service but participation in a conspiracy.'" Wurbs, 38 Ill. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Perlman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago
green
2 sentences1978App. 3d 784, 798 , 305 N.E.2d 236, 247 , appeal dismissed (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 529 , 331 N.E.2d 65 . 1978App. 3d 784, 798 , 305 N.E.2d 236, 247 , appeal dismissed (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 529 , 331 N.E.2d 65 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago
green
2 sentences1978We concur in the reasoning and analysis of the case law concerning the common fund concept found in Perlman v. First National Bank (1973), 15 Ill. 1978We concur in the reasoning and analysis of the case law concerning the common fund concept found in Perlman v. First National Bank (1973), 15 Ill. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Suvada v. White Motor Co.
green
1 sentence1974As stated in Suvada, “* * ” it seems obvious that public interest in human life and health, the invitations and solicitations to purchase the product and the justice of imposing the loss on the one creating the risk and reaping the profit are present and as compelling in cases involving motor vehicles and other products, where the defective condition makes them unreasonably dangerous to the user, as they are in food cases.” ( 32 Ill.2d 612, 619 .) It would be inconsistent with the reasoning for the rule to allow a dealer of gas to escape liability where a defect in a storage tank furnished by | 1 | 1974–1974 |
People v. Pickett
green
2 sentences1974(People v. Pickett, 54 Ill.2d 280 , 296 N.E.2d 856 .) The reasoning for this rule is that the expense and delay of appeal may be avoided if the motion is meritorious and the reviewing court may be aided by the findings and observations of the trial court with respect to its ruling on the motion. 1974(People v. Pickett, 54 Ill.2d 280 , 296 N.E.2d 856 .) The reasoning for this rule is that the expense and delay of appeal may be avoided if the motion is meritorious and the reviewing court may be aided by the findings and observations of the trial court with respect to its ruling on the motion. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
The People v. Irwin
green
2 sentences1974(People v. Irwin, 32 Ill.2d 441 , 207 N.E.2d 76 .) The reasons for the rule might have been particularly well served in the instant case. 1974(People v. Irwin, 32 Ill.2d 441 , 207 N.E.2d 76 .) The reasons for the rule might have been particularly well served in the instant case. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Commonwealth v. Fontaine
green
2 sentences1972The reasoning for this rule is stated in Commonwealth v. Fontaine (1956), 183 Pa. Super. 45 , 128 A.2d 131 : “Although under our system of jurisprudence the jury is the ultimate trier of facts, it does not foUow that in all instances and at all times men and women called for jury duty are endowed with infallible powers of retention. 1972The reasoning for this rule is stated in Commonwealth v. Fontaine (1956), 183 Pa. Super. 45 , 128 A.2d 131 : “Although under our system of jurisprudence the jury is the ultimate trier of facts, it does not foUow that in all instances and at all times men and women called for jury duty are endowed with infallible powers of retention. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Levy v. Keystone Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1968Co., 209 Pa Super 15, 223 A2d 899 (1966), since the statutory provisions in Pennsylvania and the provisions of the policy involved in the case are similar to the Illinois Statute, chapter 73, section 755A, Ill Rev Stats, and the provisions of the policy involved in this case. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Allen-Garcia Co. v. Industrial Commission
green
1 sentence1960Defendant also relies upon Allen-Garcia Co. v. Industrial Com. 334 Ill. 390 , in support of its contention that Brown was a loaned employee of the Newberg company as a matter of law. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| People v. LaBow neutral | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Allcock v. Loy neutral | 1 | 1916–1916 |
| Cook v. Wood green | 1 | 1873–1873 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.