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8 Alaska opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Welyczko v. Air, Inc.green2 sentences2016Thus, the reasoning and analysis of DelfCos-tello control in the instant case."); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358, 363-64 (10th Cir.1984) (applying the limitations period recognized in DelCostello to a hybrid action}; Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239, 241 (2d Cir.1984) (applying the limitations period recognized in DelCostello to a hybrid action); Sisco v. Consol. 2016Thus, the reasoning and analysis of DelCostello control in the instant case.”); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358, 363-64 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying the limitations period recognized in DelCostello to a hybrid action); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239, 241 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying the limitations period recognized in DelCostello to a hybrid action); Sisco v. Consol. | 2 | 2 |
Robert T. Sisco v. Consolidated Rail Corp. And United Transportation Uniongreen2 sentences2016Rail Corp., 732 F.2d 1188, 1191-94 (3rd Cir.1984) (applying the NLRA statute of limitations period to an action against a union for breach of the duty of fair representation); Hunt v. Mo. Pac. 2016Rail Corp., 732 F.2d 1188, 1191-94 (3rd Cir. 1984) (applying the NLRA statute of limitations period to an action against a union for breach of the duty of fair representation); Hunt v. Mo. Pac. | 2 | 2 |
Frank E. Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., and Association of Flight Attendants, Defendantsgreen2 sentences2016Thus, the reasoning and analysis of DelfCos-tello control in the instant case."); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358, 363-64 (10th Cir.1984) (applying the limitations period recognized in DelCostello to a hybrid action}; Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239, 241 (2d Cir.1984) (applying the limitations period recognized in DelCostello to a hybrid action); Sisco v. Consol. 2016Thus, the reasoning and analysis of DelCostello control in the instant case.”); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358, 363-64 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying the limitations period recognized in DelCostello to a hybrid action); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239, 241 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying the limitations period recognized in DelCostello to a hybrid action); Sisco v. Consol. | 2 | 2 |
Coffin v. Stategreen1 sentence2022It is hard to see how the jury could have failed to consider whether using deadly force was reasonable from Jones-Nelson’s perspective: jury instructions must be read as a whole;2 the preceding jury instructions explained that the jury must decide whether the defendant reasonably believed deadly force was necessary; and we presume that the jury follows the instructions as written.3 But because I agree with the court’s reasoning that the error concerning the degree of force permitted is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I agree with its ultimate conclusion to reverse the judgment. 1 Jones | 1 | 1 |
Marquinn Jones-Nelson v. State of Alaskagreen1 sentence2022It is hard to see how the jury could have failed to consider whether using deadly force was reasonable from Jones-Nelson’s perspective: jury instructions must be read as a whole;2 the preceding jury instructions explained that the jury must decide whether the defendant reasonably believed deadly force was necessary; and we presume that the jury follows the instructions as written.3 But because I agree with the court’s reasoning that the error concerning the degree of force permitted is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I agree with its ultimate conclusion to reverse the judgment. 1 Jones | 1 | 1 |
Byron F. Geisinger v. State of Alaska, State of Alaska v. Byron F. Geisingergreen1 sentence2022It is hard to see how the jury could have failed to consider whether using deadly force was reasonable from Jones-Nelson’s perspective: jury instructions must be read as a whole;2 the preceding jury instructions explained that the jury must decide whether the defendant reasonably believed deadly force was necessary; and we presume that the jury follows the instructions as written.3 But because I agree with the court’s reasoning that the error concerning the degree of force permitted is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I agree with its ultimate conclusion to reverse the judgment. 1 Jones | 1 | 1 |
Brooks v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2018First, in Brooks we were deciding only whether the initiative process was “clearly inapplicable” to natural resource issues, and we did not address whether the initiative in that case (which would have banned the use of snares for trapping wolves) 49 Id. (quoting Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Alaska 1999)). 50 971 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1999). 51 Pebble, 215 P.3d at 1077 (emphasis added). 52 Id. -20- 7274 was an appropriation.53 And we recently have recognized that past initiatives that purported to “manage” natural resources — including the initiative at issue in Brooks — may in fact have 2018First, in Brooks we were deciding only whether the initiative process was “clearly inapplicable” to natural resource issues, and we did not address whether the initiative in that case (which would have banned the use of snares for trapping wolves) 49 Id. (quoting Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Alaska 1999)). 50 971 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1999). 51 Pebble, 215 P.3d at 1077 (emphasis added). 52 Id. -20- 7274 was an appropriation.53 And we recently have recognized that past initiatives that purported to “manage” natural resources — including the initiative at issue in Brooks — may in fact have | 1 | 1 |
PEBBLE LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. Parnellgreen2 sentences2018First, in Brooks we were deciding only whether the initiative process was “clearly inapplicable” to natural resource issues, and we did not address whether the initiative in that case (which would have banned the use of snares for trapping wolves) 49 Id. (quoting Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Alaska 1999)). 50 971 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1999). 51 Pebble, 215 P.3d at 1077 (emphasis added). 52 Id. -20- 7274 was an appropriation.53 And we recently have recognized that past initiatives that purported to “manage” natural resources — including the initiative at issue in Brooks — may in fact have 2018First, in Brooks we were deciding only whether the initiative process was “clearly inapplicable” to natural resource issues, and we did not address whether the initiative in that case (which would have banned the use of snares for trapping wolves) 49 Id. (quoting Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Alaska 1999)). 50 971 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1999). 51 Pebble, 215 P.3d at 1077 (emphasis added). 52 Id. -20- 7274 was an appropriation.53 And we recently have recognized that past initiatives that purported to “manage” natural resources — including the initiative at issue in Brooks — may in fact have | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. State, Department of Transportation & Public Facilitiesgreen1 sentence1997We applied this reasoning to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies in Moore v. State, Department of Transportation, 875 P.2d 765, 768 (Alaska 1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barcott v. State, Department of Public Safety
green
1 sentence1993A greater margin of error could not be conveniently ignored, without inviting a constitutional challenge. [4] The Intoximeter 3000 was the instrument utilized to perform the breath test in Barcott , as well. 741 P.2d at 227 . [5] These courts do, however, consider deficiencies in the administration of the test and/or operation of the device which may tend to support a defendant's argument that the machine did not, in fact, produce a test result above the legal limit. [6] This observation is not intended to suggest that the Department's use of the Intoximeter 3000 is unauthorized. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Madison v. Alaska Department of Fish & Game
green
1 sentence1992Moreover, the State contends that if individual criteria were used to distinguish first tier users, this would violate the rule known as expressio *367 unius est exclusio alterius. -The State explains that “[t]his rule says that to enumerate specific terms specifically excludes those which are not enumerated.” The State points out that this court followed the reasoning of this rule in Madison when it stated: “If the legislature had intended to define the class of first tier general subsistence users by area of residence, it would not have expressed that factor with respect to only the second t | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Superior Court (Meyers)
green
2 sentences1984The superior court reversed and we affirmed the court’s decision, stating that “we are persuaded by the reasoning of the hearing officer that Templeton’s participation in 1971 and 1972 was that of an owner and operator of gear, rather than that of a crew member_” Templeton, 598 P.2d at 81 . 1984The superior court reversed and we affirmed the court's decision, stating that "we are persuaded by the reasoning of the hearing officer that Templeton's participation in 1971 and 1972 was that of an owner and operator of gear, rather than that of a crew member... ." Templeton, 598 P.2d at 81 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.