reasoning analysis in West Virginia

2022Explaining the reasoning for this standard, we stated that “[a] motion for judgment on the pleadings presents a challenge to the legal effect of given facts rather than on proof of the facts themselves.” Syl. pt. 2, in part, Copley, id.

1997Explaining the reasoning for this standard, we stated that “[a] motion for judgment on the pleadings presents a challenge to the legal effect of given facts rather than on proof of the facts themselves.” Syl. pt. 2, in part, Copley, id.

2024The reasoning for the requirement was outlined in Erwin, which held that the “explanation will provide the attorney a meaningful opportunity to address the specific concerns of the court and present evidence to support his claim.” Erwin, 202 W.

2024Va. at 143 , 502 S.E.2d at 718 .

2017In fact, in Syllabus Point 2 of Huffman v. Goals Coal Co., 223 W.Va. 724 , 679 S.E.2d 323 (2009), this Court held: This Court does not sit as a superlegisla-ture, commissioned to pass upon the political, social, economic or scientific merits of statutes pertaining to proper subjects of legislation.

2017In fact, in Syllabus Point 2 of Huffman v. Goals Coal Co., 223 W.Va. 724 , 679 S.E.2d 323 (2009), this Court held: This Court does not sit as a superlegisla-ture, commissioned to pass upon the political, social, economic or scientific merits of statutes pertaining to proper subjects of legislation.

2014Dorev persuasively reasoned that “[i]f the State cannot take title to property without ensuring the satisfaction of existing tax liens when exercising powers unique to government, then surely it cannot do so when it stands in the same position ás any other buyer on the open market.” Yet another reason to reject the application of the merger doctrine to this case is gleaned from the reasoning for such doctrine as discussed in State v. Locke, 29 N.M. 148 , 219 P. 790 (1923), a case cited in Armstrong and heavily relied upon by the DOA.

2014Dorev persuasively reasoned that “[i]f the State cannot take title to property without ensuring the satisfaction of existing tax liens when exercising powers unique to government, then surely it cannot do so when it stands in the same position ás any other buyer on the open market.” Yet another reason to reject the application of the merger doctrine to this case is gleaned from the reasoning for such doctrine as discussed in State v. Locke, 29 N.M. 148 , 219 P. 790 (1923), a case cited in Armstrong and heavily relied upon by the DOA.

1979In State v. Sheppard, 49 W.

1949We think this case falls within the reasoning of the rule laid down in the case of Simpson v. Stanton, 119 W.

1949Va. 235 , 193 S. E. 64 , and the authorities there cited.