made rule in Oklahoma

2018The trial court made inquiry when another juror reported hearing Juror Y say "that they should place him in a box in the ground for what he has done." Id ., 2006 OK CR 5 , ¶ 19 n.3, 128 P.3d at 535 n.3.

2018The trial court made inquiry when another juror reported hearing Juror Y say "that they should place him in a box in the ground for what he has done." Id ., 2006 OK CR 5 , ¶ 19 n.3, 128 P.3d at 535 n.3.

1973In Baeza v. State, Okl.Cr., 478 P.2d 903 (1970) we stated in the second Syllabus : “The charge of Carrying a Firearm After Former Conviction of a Felony, 21 O.S.1961, § 1283, must be tried in a two stage proceeding as set forth in Harris v. State, Okl.Cr., 369 P.2d 187 .

1973In Baeza v. State, Okl.Cr., 478 P.2d 903 (1970) we stated in the second Syllabus : “The charge of Carrying a Firearm After Former Conviction of a Felony, 21 O.S.1961, § 1283, must be tried in a two stage proceeding as set forth in Harris v. State, Okl.Cr., 369 P.2d 187 .

1947Ward, 111 Okla. 73 , 238 P. 429 , Lexington Land Co. v. Holland, supra. It is indisputable that, had the court made such inquiry when considering the oral application for appointment, it would have been informed of matters which subsequently appeared, to wit, plaintiffs would not likely prevail in their action, having previously been adjudged by this same court to have no claim or title to this property.

1947Ward, 111 Okla. 73 , 238 P. 429 , Lexington Land Co. v. Holland, supra. It is indisputable that, had the court made such inquiry when considering the oral application for appointment, it would have been informed of matters which subsequently appeared, to wit, plaintiffs would not likely prevail in their action, having previously been adjudged by this same court to have no claim or title to this property.

1939Prior to our adoption of this section from Kansas the Supreme Court of that state held, in Stewart et al. v. Scully, 46 Kan. 491 , 26 P. 957 , that: “Where a defendant applies to have a judgment which was rendered without other service than by publication opened up, and that he be permitted to make a defense, he may, in the discretion of the court, be required to pay all costs before his application will oe granted; but a formal offer, by answer or otherwise, to pay costs is not a prerequisite to the hearing or granting of the application.” Recognizing that the statute does not require a forma

1934The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal affirmative defense to the defendant (see Tiger v. Brown, 130 Okla. 83 , 265 P. 124 , and Amer.

1934The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal affirmative defense to the defendant (see Tiger v. Brown, 130 Okla. 83 , 265 P. 124 , and Amer.

1932A. 800, and the case of Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U. S. 150 , and Colgate v. Roberts, 85 Ind. 464 , and several more cases are cited to the effect that in a case of this sort the court made the error and not the receiver, and that the receiver is not responsible.

1932A. 800, and the case of Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U. S. 150 , and Colgate v. Roberts, 85 Ind. 464 , and several more cases are cited to the effect that in a case of this sort the court made the error and not the receiver, and that the receiver is not responsible.

1927In Childress v. State, 31 Okla.

1924In the ease of Scott v. Lafayette Gas Co. (Ind. App.) 86 N. E. 495 , the court said: “When the language of a contract is of doubtful construction, the interpretation by the parties themselves is entitled to great weight, and may control, and the construction thus placed by them will be adopted by the court, unless it be at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the contract.” (Smith v. Board of Comm., 6 Ind. App. 153 , 33 N. E. 243 ; Ralya v. Atkins Co., 157 Ind. 331 , 61 N. E. 726 ; Ewing v. Wilson, 132 Ind. 223 , 31 N. E. 64 , 19 L.

1924In the ease of Scott v. Lafayette Gas Co. (Ind. App.) 86 N. E. 495 , the court said: “When the language of a contract is of doubtful construction, the interpretation by the parties themselves is entitled to great weight, and may control, and the construction thus placed by them will be adopted by the court, unless it be at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the contract.” (Smith v. Board of Comm., 6 Ind. App. 153 , 33 N. E. 243 ; Ralya v. Atkins Co., 157 Ind. 331 , 61 N. E. 726 ; Ewing v. Wilson, 132 Ind. 223 , 31 N. E. 64 , 19 L.

1924In the ease of Scott v. Lafayette Gas Co. (Ind. App.) 86 N. E. 495 , the court said: “When the language of a contract is of doubtful construction, the interpretation by the parties themselves is entitled to great weight, and may control, and the construction thus placed by them will be adopted by the court, unless it be at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the contract.” (Smith v. Board of Comm., 6 Ind. App. 153 , 33 N. E. 243 ; Ralya v. Atkins Co., 157 Ind. 331 , 61 N. E. 726 ; Ewing v. Wilson, 132 Ind. 223 , 31 N. E. 64 , 19 L.

1924In the ease of Scott v. Lafayette Gas Co. (Ind. App.) 86 N. E. 495 , the court said: “When the language of a contract is of doubtful construction, the interpretation by the parties themselves is entitled to great weight, and may control, and the construction thus placed by them will be adopted by the court, unless it be at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the contract.” (Smith v. Board of Comm., 6 Ind. App. 153 , 33 N. E. 243 ; Ralya v. Atkins Co., 157 Ind. 331 , 61 N. E. 726 ; Ewing v. Wilson, 132 Ind. 223 , 31 N. E. 64 , 19 L.

1924In the ease of Scott v. Lafayette Gas Co. (Ind. App.) 86 N. E. 495 , the court said: “When the language of a contract is of doubtful construction, the interpretation by the parties themselves is entitled to great weight, and may control, and the construction thus placed by them will be adopted by the court, unless it be at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the contract.” (Smith v. Board of Comm., 6 Ind. App. 153 , 33 N. E. 243 ; Ralya v. Atkins Co., 157 Ind. 331 , 61 N. E. 726 ; Ewing v. Wilson, 132 Ind. 223 , 31 N. E. 64 , 19 L.

1924In the ease of Scott v. Lafayette Gas Co. (Ind. App.) 86 N. E. 495 , the court said: “When the language of a contract is of doubtful construction, the interpretation by the parties themselves is entitled to great weight, and may control, and the construction thus placed by them will be adopted by the court, unless it be at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the contract.” (Smith v. Board of Comm., 6 Ind. App. 153 , 33 N. E. 243 ; Ralya v. Atkins Co., 157 Ind. 331 , 61 N. E. 726 ; Ewing v. Wilson, 132 Ind. 223 , 31 N. E. 64 , 19 L.

1924In the ease of Scott v. Lafayette Gas Co. (Ind. App.) 86 N. E. 495 , the court said: “When the language of a contract is of doubtful construction, the interpretation by the parties themselves is entitled to great weight, and may control, and the construction thus placed by them will be adopted by the court, unless it be at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the contract.” (Smith v. Board of Comm., 6 Ind. App. 153 , 33 N. E. 243 ; Ralya v. Atkins Co., 157 Ind. 331 , 61 N. E. 726 ; Ewing v. Wilson, 132 Ind. 223 , 31 N. E. 64 , 19 L.

1924J., page 546, we find the author uses the following language: “Where the parties to a contract have given it a practical construction by their conduct, as by acts in partial performance, such construction is entitled to great, if not controlling weight, in determining its proper interpretation, particularly where such interpretation is agreed on before any controversy has arisen.” In the case of Bearman v. Dux, Oil & Gas Co., 64 Okla. 147 , 166 Pac. 199 , this court made this rule applicable in the construction of an oil and gas lease.

1924However, this question is no longer open in this court, having- been settled in the decision in the case of Garland v. Zebold, 98 Okla. 6 , 223 Pac. 682 .

1924However, this question is no longer open in this court, having- been settled in the decision in the case of Garland v. Zebold, 98 Okla. 6 , 223 Pac. 682 .

1924J., page 546, we find the author uses the following language: “Where the parties to a contract have given it a practical construction by their conduct, as by acts in partial performance, such construction is entitled to great, if not controlling weight, in determining its proper interpretation, particularly where such interpretation is agreed on before any controversy has arisen.” In the case of Bearman v. Dux, Oil & Gas Co., 64 Okla. 147 , 166 Pac. 199 , this court made this rule applicable in the construction of an oil and gas lease.