made error in Iowa

2009Id.

2009Id.

2019Id. at *4–5.

2003See State v. Caldwell, 828 A.2d 765, 768 (Maine 2003) (holding waiver of rights in context of drug court process, while permissible, must still be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary); cf. State v. Tovar, 656 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Iowa) (stating waivers of constitutional rights “not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences”), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 44 , 156 L.Ed.2d 703 (2003).

2003See State v. Caldwell, 828 A.2d 765, 768 (Maine 2003) (holding waiver of rights in context of drug court process, while permissible, must still be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary); cf. State v. Tovar, 656 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Iowa) (stating waivers of constitutional rights “not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences”), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 44 , 156 L.Ed.2d 703 (2003).

1981In Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713 , 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968), this court made an exception to the common law right of un-emancipated minor children to sue their parents.

1981In Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713 , 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968), this court made an exception to the common law right of un-emancipated minor children to sue their parents.

1966See Arnold v. Arnold, supra, 257 Iowa 429, 434 , 133 N.W.2d 53, 57 ; Hand v. Hand, supra, 257 Iowa 643, 652 , 133 N.W.2d 63, 69 ; Smith v. Smith, 258 Iowa 557 , 139 N.W.2d 453 .

1966See Arnold v. Arnold, supra, 257 Iowa 429, 434 , 133 N.W.2d 53, 57 ; Hand v. Hand, supra, 257 Iowa 643, 652 , 133 N.W.2d 63, 69 ; Smith v. Smith, 258 Iowa 557 , 139 N.W.2d 453 .

1966See Arnold v. Arnold, supra, 257 Iowa 429, 434 , 133 N.W.2d 53, 57 ; Hand v. Hand, supra, 257 Iowa 643, 652 , 133 N.W.2d 63, 69 ; Smith v. Smith, 258 Iowa 557 , 139 N.W.2d 453 .

1966See Arnold v. Arnold, supra, 257 Iowa 429, 434 , 133 N.W.2d 53, 57 ; Hand v. Hand, supra, 257 Iowa 643, 652 , 133 N.W.2d 63, 69 ; Smith v. Smith, 258 Iowa 557 , 139 N.W.2d 453 .

1947In the Henderson case, supra, we said: “Appellant having filed its claim as an ordinary claim for deposit, and the receiver having classified the claim as such, and so reported it to the court, and the court having passed upon the claim and approved and allowed same, and the town having failed to intervene at the hearing on the claim, it could not, after such final hearing, intervene, and have reviewed and set aside the final order of the court made at the hearing.” In Leadville Coal Co. v. McCreery, 141 U. S. 475 , 12 S. Ct. 28 , 35 L.

1947In the Henderson case, supra, we said: “Appellant having filed its claim as an ordinary claim for deposit, and the receiver having classified the claim as such, and so reported it to the court, and the court having passed upon the claim and approved and allowed same, and the town having failed to intervene at the hearing on the claim, it could not, after such final hearing, intervene, and have reviewed and set aside the final order of the court made at the hearing.” In Leadville Coal Co. v. McCreery, 141 U. S. 475 , 12 S. Ct. 28 , 35 L.

1929If a fact is asserted as a fact, and it is false, he who makes the statement, even though he did not know of the falsity thereof, is, nevertheless, liable therefor, — citing Davis v. Central Land Co., 162 Iowa 269 ; Hess v. McCardell, 182 Iowa 1121 ; Ulch v. Wessel, 184 Iowa 134 .

1929If a fact is asserted as a fact, and it is false, he who makes the statement, even though he did not know of the falsity thereof, is, nevertheless, liable therefor, — citing Davis v. Central Land Co., 162 Iowa 269 ; Hess v. McCardell, 182 Iowa 1121 ; Ulch v. Wessel, 184 Iowa 134 .

1929If a fact is asserted as a fact, and it is false, he who makes the statement, even though he did not know of the falsity thereof, is, nevertheless, liable therefor, — citing Davis v. Central Land Co., 162 Iowa 269 ; Hess v. McCardell, 182 Iowa 1121 ; Ulch v. Wessel, 184 Iowa 134 .

1929The second proposition is that the principal is liable for the fraudulent act of his agent in the course and within the scope of his employment, though in fact the principal did not authorize the practice of such acts, — citing Ellison v. Stockton, supra. ' The third proposition is that the lack of knowledge óh the part of the vendor as to the truth of the statement's made is no defense.

1891The showing, in brief, is that the defendant before the trial made inquiry of a great many persons that he supposed knew, or would be likely to know, of the relations of said Boggess with women, or touching any of the matters in issue in said case, and in each and every instance pursued each and every line or hint of evidence with diligence, to the full extent of his ability, etc. The particular criticism upon the showing, is that it does not show of whom inquiries were made, so as to leave the question of diligence one for the court, and not the affiant, and Smith v. Wagaman, 58 Iowa, 11 , is