made error in North Carolina

2012The reviewable findings of fact were to be based on the evidence presented at the 5 April and 1 May 2007 hearings and to support the Board’s decision to deny petitioner’s application. 8 As noted above, “[a] decision of this Court on a prior appeal constitutes the law of the case, both in sub *280 sequent proceedings in the trial court and on a subsequent appeal.” Lea Co., 323 N.C. at 699 , 374 S.E.2d at 868 .

2012The reviewable findings of fact were to be based on the evidence presented at the 5 April and 1 May 2007 hearings and to support the Board’s decision to deny petitioner’s application. 8 As noted above, “[a] decision of this Court on a prior appeal constitutes the law of the case, both in sub *280 sequent proceedings in the trial court and on a subsequent appeal.” Lea Co., 323 N.C. at 699 , 374 S.E.2d at 868 .

2011Defendant relies on Mishler v. Mishler, 90 N.C.

2009Baker, 338 N.C. at 565 , 451 S.E.2d at 597 .

2009Baker, 338 N.C. at 565 , 451 S.E.2d at 597 .

2003In State v. Cannon, 326 N.C. 37 , 387 S.E.2d 450 (1990), the trial court made inquiry of defense counsel concerning the possibility of a negotiated plea after a lengthy voir dire hearing.

2003In State v. Cannon, 326 N.C. 37 , 387 S.E.2d 450 (1990), the trial court made inquiry of defense counsel concerning the possibility of a negotiated plea after a lengthy voir dire hearing.

1992In affirming the trial court’s denial of counsel, this Court made the analysis, to wit: “The instant case presents no unusually complex issues of law or fact which would necessitate the appointment of counsel.” Daugherty v. Daugherty, 62 N.C.

1992App. 318 , 302 S.E.2d 664 (1983) presented the same question.

1990Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181 , 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979), disapproved by Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437 , 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981).

1990Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181 , 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979), disapproved by Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437 , 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981).

1990Agency, this court made an analysis of the appealability of interlocutory judgments and concluded that there are two means of appealing judgments which are interlocutory. 93 N.C.

1990App. 20 , 376 S.E.2d 488 (1989), disc. review denied, 324 N.C. 577 , 381 S.E.2d 772 .

1990Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181 , 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979), disapproved by Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437 , 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981).

1990Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181 , 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979), disapproved by Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437 , 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981).

1986App. 331 , 328 S.E. 2d 818 (1985) this Court made an exception to this rule in a case in which the plaintiff alleged she was discharged for refusing to commit perjury.

1960Bank v. Slaughter, 250 N.C. 355 , 108 S.E. 2d 594 ; In re Will of Crawford, 246 N.C. 322 , 98 S.E. 2d 29 .

1960Bank v. Slaughter, 250 N.C. 355 , 108 S.E. 2d 594 ; In re Will of Crawford, 246 N.C. 322 , 98 S.E. 2d 29 .

1960Bank v. Slaughter, 250 N.C. 355 , 108 S.E. 2d 594 ; In re Will of Crawford, 246 N.C. 322 , 98 S.E. 2d 29 .

1960Bank v. Slaughter, 250 N.C. 355 , 108 S.E. 2d 594 ; In re Will of Crawford, 246 N.C. 322 , 98 S.E. 2d 29 .

1933Neither Smith v. Miller, 158 N. C., 98 , nor Callahan v. Flack, ante, 106, is in conflict with this position. *340 The parties have requested that we determine the question of priority between the claims above stated, but as to any other contentions we make no adjudication beyond the holding that the complaint states a cause of action and that the trial court made no error in overruling the demurrer.

1932In S. v. Mills, supra, the declaration was, “I am dying, I have been shot three times, I am bound to die”; and in S. v. Shouse, 166 N. C., 306 , “I know I am going to die from the wound.” In S. v. Quick, 150 N. C., 820 , the language of the deceased is recorded to have been, “He is going to die”; in S. v. Watkins, 159 N. C., 480 , “They had killed him”; and in S. v. Franklin, 192 N. C., 723 , “He was killed.” Proof of all these declarations was held to be competent. *289 In the present case the trial court made no error in admitting similar proof.

1932In S. v. Mills, supra, the declaration was, “I am dying, I have been shot three times, I am bound to die”; and in S. v. Shouse, 166 N. C., 306 , “I know I am going to die from the wound.” In S. v. Quick, 150 N. C., 820 , the language of the deceased is recorded to have been, “He is going to die”; in S. v. Watkins, 159 N. C., 480 , “They had killed him”; and in S. v. Franklin, 192 N. C., 723 , “He was killed.” Proof of all these declarations was held to be competent. *289 In the present case the trial court made no error in admitting similar proof.

1932In S. v. Mills, supra, the declaration was, “I am dying, I have been shot three times, I am bound to die”; and in S. v. Shouse, 166 N. C., 306 , “I know I am going to die from the wound.” In S. v. Quick, 150 N. C., 820 , the language of the deceased is recorded to have been, “He is going to die”; in S. v. Watkins, 159 N. C., 480 , “They had killed him”; and in S. v. Franklin, 192 N. C., 723 , “He was killed.” Proof of all these declarations was held to be competent. *289 In the present case the trial court made no error in admitting similar proof.

1932In S. v. Mills, supra, the declaration was, “I am dying, I have been shot three times, I am bound to die”; and in S. v. Shouse, 166 N. C., 306 , “I know I am going to die from the wound.” In S. v. Quick, 150 N. C., 820 , the language of the deceased is recorded to have been, “He is going to die”; in S. v. Watkins, 159 N. C., 480 , “They had killed him”; and in S. v. Franklin, 192 N. C., 723 , “He was killed.” Proof of all these declarations was held to be competent. *289 In the present case the trial court made no error in admitting similar proof.

1932In S. v. Mills, supra, the declaration was, “I am dying, I have been shot three times, I am bound to die”; and in S. v. Shouse, 166 N. C., 306 , “I know I am going to die from the wound.” In S. v. Quick, 150 N. C., 820 , the language of the deceased is recorded to have been, “He is going to die”; in S. v. Watkins, 159 N. C., 480 , “They had killed him”; and in S. v. Franklin, 192 N. C., 723 , “He was killed.” Proof of all these declarations was held to be competent. *289 In the present case the trial court made no error in admitting similar proof.

1923The court made no error in defining “reasonable doubt.” This has been done in a recent case, S. v. Schoolfield, 184 N. C., 723 , where Btacy, c71, said: “A reasonable doubt is not a vain, imaginary, or fanciful doubt, but it is a sane, rational doubt.

1923When it is said that the jury must be satisfied of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is meant that they must be ‘fully satisfied’ (S. v. Sears, 61 N. C., 146 ), or ‘entirely convinced’ (S. v. Parker, 61 N. C., 473 ), or ‘satisfied to a moral certainty’ (S. v. Wilcox, 132 N. C., 1137) of the truth of the charge, S. v. Charles, 161 N. C., 287 .

1923When it is said that the jury must be satisfied of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is meant that they must be ‘fully satisfied’ (S. v. Sears, 61 N. C., 146 ), or ‘entirely convinced’ (S. v. Parker, 61 N. C., 473 ), or ‘satisfied to a moral certainty’ (S. v. Wilcox, 132 N. C., 1137) of the truth of the charge, S. v. Charles, 161 N. C., 287 .

1923When it is said that the jury must be satisfied of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is meant that they must be ‘fully satisfied’ (S. v. Sears, 61 N. C., 146 ), or ‘entirely convinced’ (S. v. Parker, 61 N. C., 473 ), or ‘satisfied to a moral certainty’ (S. v. Wilcox, 132 N. C., 1137) of the truth of the charge, S. v. Charles, 161 N. C., 287 .