made error in Georgia

2025Co., 289 Ga. 1, 5 (3) ( 709 SE2d 267 ) (2011) (“We will not reverse the trial court’s decision to grant or deny an interlocutory injunction unless the trial court made an error of law that contributed to the decision, there was no evidence on an element essential to relief, or the court manifestly abused its discretion.” (punctuation omitted)); Kinard, 278 Ga. at 149 (“The trial court has broad discretion under OCGA § 9–5–8 in deciding whether to grant a request for an interlocutory injunction.”). 28 SRB Inv.

2025Co., 289 Ga. 1, 5 (3) ( 709 SE2d 267 ) (2011) (“We will not reverse the trial court’s decision to grant or deny an interlocutory injunction unless the trial court made an error of law that contributed to the decision, there was no evidence on an element essential to relief, or the court manifestly abused its discretion.” (punctuation omitted)); Kinard, 278 Ga. at 149 (“The trial court has broad discretion under OCGA § 9–5–8 in deciding whether to grant a request for an interlocutory injunction.”). 28 SRB Inv.

2025Servs., 289 Ga. at 5 (3) (“We will not reverse the trial court’s decision to grant or deny an interlocutory injunction unless the trial court made an error of law that contributed to the decision, there was no evidence on an element essential to relief, or the court manifestly abused its discretion.” (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied)); Daneshgari, 361 Ga. App. at 543 (“[T]he decision of whether to grant equitable relief—such as an interlocutory injunction—is generally a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision should be sustained on appeal w

2021“The grant or denial of an interlocutory injunction will not be reversed on appeal unless the trial court made an error of law that contributed to the decision, there was no evidence on an element essential to relief, or the court manifestly abused its discretion.” City of Waycross v. Pierce County Bd. of Comms., 300 Ga. 109, 111 (1) ( 793 SE2d 389 ) (2016).

2022We will not reverse the decision to grant an interlocutory injunction “unless the trial court made an error of law that contributed to the decision, there was no evidence on an element essential to relief, or the court 3 Faircloth and Sexton’s motion to dismiss is denied. 9 manifestly abused its discretion.”(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Nemchik v. Riggs, 300 Ga. 363, 366 (2) ( 792 SE2d 347 ) (2016).

2022We will not reverse the decision to grant an interlocutory injunction “unless the trial court made an error of law that contributed to the decision, there was no evidence on an element essential to relief, or the court 3 Faircloth and Sexton’s motion to dismiss is denied. 9 manifestly abused its discretion.”(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Nemchik v. Riggs, 300 Ga. 363, 366 (2) ( 792 SE2d 347 ) (2016).

2025While these claims remain pending below, they do not appear to be relevant to the interlocutory-injunction motion at issue on appeal. 13 It is well established that the reason for granting interlocutory injunctions is to “preserve the status quo, as well as to balance the conveniences of the parties, pending a final adjudication of the case.”26 Furthermore, the decision of whether to “grant equitable relief—such as an interlocutory injunction—is generally a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision should be sustained on appeal when there has been no

2025While these claims remain pending below, they do not appear to be relevant to the interlocutory-injunction motion at issue on appeal. 13 It is well established that the reason for granting interlocutory injunctions is to “preserve the status quo, as well as to balance the conveniences of the parties, pending a final adjudication of the case.”26 Furthermore, the decision of whether to “grant equitable relief—such as an interlocutory injunction—is generally a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision should be sustained on appeal when there has been no

2017See Waldrip v. State, 267 Ga. 739, 743 (6) ( 482 SE2d 299 ) (1997) (trial court did not err in allowing the State to repeatedly refer to the pending charges against a defendant at the competency proceeding; the nature of the charges was relevant to the competency determination and the court properly charged the jury on its role), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Archie v. State, 248 Ga. App. 56, 57 (1) n.3 ( 545 SE2d 179 ) (2001). 3.

2017See Waldrip v. State, 267 Ga. 739, 743 (6) ( 482 SE2d 299 ) (1997) (trial court did not err in allowing the State to repeatedly refer to the pending charges against a defendant at the competency proceeding; the nature of the charges was relevant to the competency determination and the court properly charged the jury on its role), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Archie v. State, 248 Ga. App. 56, 57 (1) n.3 ( 545 SE2d 179 ) (2001). 3.

2017See Waldrip v. State, 267 Ga. 739, 743 (6) ( 482 SE2d 299 ) (1997) (trial court did not err in allowing the State to repeatedly refer to the pending charges against a defendant at the competency proceeding; the nature of the charges was relevant to the competency determination and the court properly charged the jury on its role), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Archie v. State, 248 Ga. App. 56, 57 (1) n.3 ( 545 SE2d 179 ) (2001). 3.

2017See Waldrip v. State, 267 Ga. 739, 743 (6) ( 482 SE2d 299 ) (1997) (trial court did not err in allowing the State to repeatedly refer to the pending charges against a defendant at the competency proceeding; the nature of the charges was relevant to the competency determination and the court properly charged the jury on its role), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Archie v. State, 248 Ga. App. 56, 57 (1) n.3 ( 545 SE2d 179 ) (2001). 3.

2016See Chambers [v. Peach County], 268 Ga. [672, 673 ( 492 SE2d 191 ) (1997)]; Christopher J.

2011See Chambers, 268 Ga. at 673 ; Christopher J.

1989Jackson v. State, 246 Ga. 459, 460 ( 271 SE2d 855 ) (1980).

1989Jackson v. State, 246 Ga. 459, 460 ( 271 SE2d 855 ) (1980).

2018Thus, "[w]e will not reverse the decision to grant an interlocutory injunction unless the trial court made an error of law that contributed to the decision, there was no evidence on an element essential to relief, or the court manifestly abused its discretion." TMX Finance Holdings, Inc. v. Drummond Financial Svcs. , 300 Ga. 835 , 837, 797 S.E.2d 842 (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). 1.

2018Thus, "[w]e will not reverse the decision to grant an interlocutory injunction unless the trial court made an error of law that contributed to the decision, there was no evidence on an element essential to relief, or the court manifestly abused its discretion." TMX Finance Holdings, Inc. v. Drummond Financial Svcs. , 300 Ga. 835 , 837, 797 S.E.2d 842 (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). 1.

2020Compare Hunt, supra, 268 Ga. App. at 571 (1) (recognizing that if the defendant had objected, the trial court would have had an opportunity either to allow the defendant’s immediate family and any press members to remain in the courtroom or to engage in the four-part Waller inquiry); Chamberlain v. State, 347 Ga. App. 775, 779-780 (2) ( 819 SE2d 303 ) (2018) (after the defense objected to the clearing of the courtroom, the trial court invoked OCGA § 17-8-54, indicated that all persons who did not fall under the statute had to leave during the victim’s testimony, and determined that the defenda

2019Further, “where there is no conflict in the evidence, the judge’s discretion in granting or denying the interlocutory injunction becomes circumscribed by the applicable rules of law.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Shiva Management, LLC v. Walker, 283 Ga. 338, 340 ( 658 SE2d 762 ) (2008).

2019Further, “where there is no conflict in the evidence, the judge’s discretion in granting or denying the interlocutory injunction becomes circumscribed by the applicable rules of law.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Shiva Management, LLC v. Walker, 283 Ga. 338, 340 ( 658 SE2d 762 ) (2008).

2013Ellington, P. J., and Branch, J., concur. 13 See generally Milinavicius v. State, 290 Ga. 374, 377 (4) ( 721 SE2d 843 ) (2012) (appellant’s allegation that trial court gave erroneous jury charge on justified use of force was without merit where the charge as a whole was not an incorrect statement of the law and fairly represented the issue of justification); Arsenault v. State, 257 Ga. App. 456, 457 (2) ( 571 SE2d 456 ) (2002) (where defendant raised an affirmative defense of justification and testified to the same, the state bore the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt)

2013Ellington, P. J., and Branch, J., concur. 13 See generally Milinavicius v. State, 290 Ga. 374, 377 (4) ( 721 SE2d 843 ) (2012) (appellant’s allegation that trial court gave erroneous jury charge on justified use of force was without merit where the charge as a whole was not an incorrect statement of the law and fairly represented the issue of justification); Arsenault v. State, 257 Ga. App. 456, 457 (2) ( 571 SE2d 456 ) (2002) (where defendant raised an affirmative defense of justification and testified to the same, the state bore the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt)

2013Once an affirmative defense is raised, the burden is on the State to disprove it beyond 11 See OCGA § 16-3-21 (a). 12 Terry, supra at 510 (2) (a); see generally Hoffler, supra. 8 a reasonable doubt.” The court then explained justification, and further instructed the jury: “The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not justified.” These were correct statements of the law.13 The court made no error in its jury charge, and Ferguson’s claim cannot make it past the first prong of the plain error review.14 Judgment affirmed.

2013Ellington, P. J., and Branch, J., concur. 13 See generally Milinavicius v. State, 290 Ga. 374, 377 (4) ( 721 SE2d 843 ) (2012) (appellant’s allegation that trial court gave erroneous jury charge on justified use of force was without merit where the charge as a whole was not an incorrect statement of the law and fairly represented the issue of justification); Arsenault v. State, 257 Ga. App. 456, 457 (2) ( 571 SE2d 456 ) (2002) (where defendant raised an affirmative defense of justification and testified to the same, the state bore the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt)

2013Once an affirmative defense is raised, the burden is on the State to disprove it beyond 11 See OCGA § 16-3-21 (a). 12 Terry, supra at 510 (2) (a); see generally Hoffler, supra. 8 a reasonable doubt.” The court then explained justification, and further instructed the jury: “The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not justified.” These were correct statements of the law.13 The court made no error in its jury charge, and Ferguson’s claim cannot make it past the first prong of the plain error review.14 Judgment affirmed.

2013The trial court’s decision will not be reversed on appeal “unless the trial court made an error of law that contributed to the decision, there was no evidence on an element essential to relief, or the court manifestly abused its discretion.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Paramount Tax & Accounting, LLC v. H & R Block Eastern Enterprises, Inc., 299 Ga. App. 596, 597 ( 683 SE2d 141 ) (2009) (abuse of discretion may be found “where the trial court misinterpreted or misapplied the relevant law”). (1) there is a substantial threat that the moving party will suffer irreparable inj

2013The trial court’s decision will not be reversed on appeal “unless the trial court made an error of law that contributed to the decision, there was no evidence on an element essential to relief, or the court manifestly abused its discretion.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Paramount Tax & Accounting, LLC v. H & R Block Eastern Enterprises, Inc., 299 Ga. App. 596, 597 ( 683 SE2d 141 ) (2009) (abuse of discretion may be found “where the trial court misinterpreted or misapplied the relevant law”). (1) there is a substantial threat that the moving party will suffer irreparable inj

2013Ellington, P. J., and Branch, J., concur. 13 See generally Milinavicius v. State, 290 Ga. 374, 377 (4) ( 721 SE2d 843 ) (2012) (appellant’s allegation that trial court gave erroneous jury charge on justified use of force was without merit where the charge as a whole was not an incorrect statement of the law and fairly represented the issue of justification); Arsenault v. State, 257 Ga. App. 456, 457 (2) ( 571 SE2d 456 ) (2002) (where defendant raised an affirmative defense of justification and testified to the same, the state bore the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt)

2013Ellington, P. J., and Branch, J., concur. 13 See generally Milinavicius v. State, 290 Ga. 374, 377 (4) ( 721 SE2d 843 ) (2012) (appellant’s allegation that trial court gave erroneous jury charge on justified use of force was without merit where the charge as a whole was not an incorrect statement of the law and fairly represented the issue of justification); Arsenault v. State, 257 Ga. App. 456, 457 (2) ( 571 SE2d 456 ) (2002) (where defendant raised an affirmative defense of justification and testified to the same, the state bore the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt)

2011See, e.g., Allen v. Hub Cap Heaven, Inc., 225 Ga. App. 533, 540 ( 484 SE2d 259 ) (1997) (“[I]t is error to grant an injunction when the party seeking it has an adequate remedy at law.”).

2011See, e.g., Allen v. Hub Cap Heaven, Inc., 225 Ga. App. 533, 540 ( 484 SE2d 259 ) (1997) (“[I]t is error to grant an injunction when the party seeking it has an adequate remedy at law.”).

2011See also OCGA § 24-9-7 (b); Castillo v. State, 178 Ga. App. 312, 313 (4) ( 342 SE2d 782 ) (1986); Keasler v. State, 165 Ga. App. 561 (1) ( 301 SE2d 915 ) (1983).

2011See also OCGA § 24-9-7 (b); Castillo v. State, 178 Ga. App. 312, 313 (4) ( 342 SE2d 782 ) (1986); Keasler v. State, 165 Ga. App. 561 (1) ( 301 SE2d 915 ) (1983).

2011Although the trial court made the standard inquiry to determine the child’s competence as a witness, Appellant “neither requested this inquiry nor objected to the trial court’s determination, and thus waived any objection concerning [the child’s] competency. [Cits.]” Kelly v. State, 181 Ga. App. 605, 606 (1) ( 353 SE2d 92 ) (1987).

2011Although the trial court made the standard inquiry to determine the child’s competence as a witness, Appellant “neither requested this inquiry nor objected to the trial court’s determination, and thus waived any objection concerning [the child’s] competency. [Cits.]” Kelly v. State, 181 Ga. App. 605, 606 (1) ( 353 SE2d 92 ) (1987).

2003Scott *656 v. State, 213 Ga. App. 84, 87 (2) ( 444 SE2d 96 ) (1994); Jackson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 827, 828 (2) ( 424 SE2d 6 ) (1992).

2003Scott *656 v. State, 213 Ga. App. 84, 87 (2) ( 444 SE2d 96 ) (1994); Jackson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 827, 828 (2) ( 424 SE2d 6 ) (1992).

2003Scott *656 v. State, 213 Ga. App. 84, 87 (2) ( 444 SE2d 96 ) (1994); Jackson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 827, 828 (2) ( 424 SE2d 6 ) (1992).

2003Scott *656 v. State, 213 Ga. App. 84, 87 (2) ( 444 SE2d 96 ) (1994); Jackson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 827, 828 (2) ( 424 SE2d 6 ) (1992).