44 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1932–2024 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rollins v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024The trial court held that Hawkins was not entitled to attorney fees, despite having substantially prevailed on the merits of the case and being awarded post-remand costs, merely because he petitioned “as a pro se litigant, and a pro se litigant such as Hawkins is not entitled to attorney’s fees under VFOIA even if he is a licensed attorney and substantially prevails on the merits of the case.” “In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, ‘we review the trial court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.’” Rollins v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 73, 79 (2001) (q 2024“In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, ‘we review the trial court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.’” Rollins v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 73, 79 (2001) (quoting Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 187, 193 (1998)). | 31 | 31 |
Timbers v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024The trial court held that Hawkins was not entitled to attorney fees, despite having substantially prevailed on the merits of the case and being awarded post-remand costs, merely because he petitioned “as a pro se litigant, and a pro se litigant such as Hawkins is not entitled to attorney’s fees under VFOIA even if he is a licensed attorney and substantially prevails on the merits of the case.” “In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, ‘we review the trial court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.’” Rollins v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 73, 79 (2001) (q 2024“In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, ‘we review the trial court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.’” Rollins v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 73, 79 (2001) (quoting Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 187, 193 (1998)). | 29 | 29 |
Auer v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2023“In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, ‘we review the trial court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.’” Auer v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 637, 643 (2005) (quoting Rollins v. Commonwealth, 37 16 During argument on the motion, Bista’s trial counsel reiterated that R.P.’s cross-examination during the preliminary hearing did not satisfy the Confrontation Clause because after the hearing, the Commonwealth brought an additional charge, Bista received more discovery and school records, R.P. admitted to falsely testifying at the preliminary hearing, and th 2023“In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, ‘we review the trial court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.’” Auer v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 637, 643 (2005) (quoting Rollins v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 73, 79 (2001)). | 8 | 8 |
Witt v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2023“The measure of the burden of proof with respect to factual questions underlying the admissibility of evidence is proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Campos v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 690, 702 (2017) (quoting Witt v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 670, 674 (1975)). 2023“The measure of the burden of proof with respect to factual questions underlying the admissibility of evidence is proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Campos v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 690, 702 (2017) (quoting Witt v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 670, 674 (1975)). | 3 | 3 |
Justo Mazariegos Campos v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen2 sentences2023“The measure of the burden of proof with respect to factual questions underlying the admissibility of evidence is proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Campos v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 690, 702 (2017) (quoting Witt v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 670, 674 (1975)). 2023“The measure of the burden of proof with respect to factual questions underlying the admissibility of evidence is proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Campos v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 690, 702 (2017) (quoting Witt v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 670, 674 (1975)). | 3 | 3 |
Walshaw v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2020“The purpose of an indictment ‘is to give an accused notice of the nature and character of the accusations against him in order that he can adequately prepare to defend against his accuser.’” Walshaw v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 103, 109 (2004) (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 193, 198 (2003)). 2014“The purpose of an indictment ‘is to give an accused notice of the nature and character of the accusations against him in order that he can adequately prepare to defend against his accuser.’” Walshaw v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 103, 109 , 603 S.E.2d 633, 636 (2004) (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 193, 198 , 578 S.E.2d 803, 806 (2003)). | 2 | 2 |
King v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2020“The purpose of an indictment ‘is to give an accused notice of the nature and character of the accusations against him in order that he can adequately prepare to defend against his accuser.’” Walshaw v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 103, 109 (2004) (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 193, 198 (2003)). 2014“The purpose of an indictment ‘is to give an accused notice of the nature and character of the accusations against him in order that he can adequately prepare to defend against his accuser.’” Walshaw v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 103, 109 , 603 S.E.2d 633, 636 (2004) (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 193, 198 , 578 S.E.2d 803, 806 (2003)). | 2 | 2 |
Thomas C. Shooltz v. Jane Hoffman Shooltzgreen2 sentences2016STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review decisions involving the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion by the trial court.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 437, 445-46 , 650 S.E.2d 859, 863 (2007). “‘[A] trial court “by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”’ ‘In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, “we review the trial court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.”’” Auer v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App 637, 643, 621 S.E.2d 140, 143 (2005) (first quoting Shooltz v. Shooltz, 27 Va. App. 264, 271 , 498 S.E.2d 437, 441 (1998), then qu 2016STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review decisions involving the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion by the trial court.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 437, 445-46 , 650 S.E.2d 859, 863 (2007). “‘[A] trial court “by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”’ ‘In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, “we review the trial court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.”’” Auer v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App 637, 643, 621 S.E.2d 140, 143 (2005) (first quoting Shooltz v. Shooltz, 27 Va. App. 264, 271 , 498 S.E.2d 437, 441 (1998), then qu | 2 | 2 |
Hassan Christopher Atkins v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen1 sentence2023“Hearsay is ‘a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’” Atkins v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 1, 8 (2017) (quoting Va. R. | 1 | 1 |
Estelle v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2023The trial court made an error of law when it implicitly ruled that the Commonwealth’s identification of Mr. Williams as a sexually violent predator would not undermine his right to a fair trial, which is “a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Holbrook v. Flynngreen1 sentence2023The Commonwealth’s identification of Mr. Williams as a “sexually violent predator” at the outset of the jury trial was inherently prejudicial because it created “an unacceptable risk . . . of impermissible factors coming into play.” Porter, 276 Va. at 261 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570 (1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2022We need not decide whether Rigdon meets the statutory definition of victim because the record demonstrates that her testimony and written statement were admissible under Rock v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 254 (2005).3 In Rock, we held that nothing in the Crime Victim and Witness Rights Act prohibits a court from admitting relevant evidence or testimony from other witnesses who do not meet the statutory definition of “victim.” Id. at 261-63 ; see also Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 363 (1998) (noting that a “court must take into account a wide range of information” at sentencing). | 1 | 1 |
Timothy Kenneth Bartley v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen1 sentence2022On brief, however, the Commonwealth assigned error only to the following: “The Trial Court clearly erred when it found an officer seized Appellee by pointing at Appellee’s pocket during a consensual encounter.” Rule 5A:20(e) requires “that an appellant’s opening brief contain ‘[t]he principles of law, the argument, and the authorities relating to each question presented.’” Bartley v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 740, 744 (2017).3 We find this argument was defaulted. | 1 | 1 |
Twine v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2022“In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, ‘we review the trial court’s . . . legal conclusions de novo.’” Twine v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 224, 231 (2006) (quoting Rollins v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 73, 79 (2001)). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2016STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review decisions involving the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion by the trial court.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 437, 445-46 , 650 S.E.2d 859, 863 (2007). “‘[A] trial court “by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”’ ‘In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, “we review the trial court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.”’” Auer v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App 637, 643, 621 S.E.2d 140, 143 (2005) (first quoting Shooltz v. Shooltz, 27 Va. App. 264, 271 , 498 S.E.2d 437, 441 (1998), then qu 2016STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review decisions involving the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion by the trial court.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 437, 445-46 , 650 S.E.2d 859, 863 (2007). “‘[A] trial court “by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”’ ‘In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, “we review the trial court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.”’” Auer v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App 637, 643, 621 S.E.2d 140, 143 (2005) (first quoting Shooltz v. Shooltz, 27 Va. App. 264, 271 , 498 S.E.2d 437, 441 (1998), then qu | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2008See Martin v. Phillips, 235 Va. 523, 529 , 369 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1988) (holding that a trial court made an error of law when it applied the incorrect standard of proof), overruled on other grounds by Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. Beckner, 268 Va. 23, 33 , 597 S.E.2d 34, 39 (2004); Gulfstream Building Assocs., Inc. v. Britt, 239 Va. 178, 183 , 387 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1990) (noting that application of a preponderance standard of proof, rather than the clear and convincing standard of proof, was error in a case that involved fraud). 2008See Martin v. Phillips, 235 Va. 523, 529 , 369 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1988) (holding that a trial court made an error of law when it applied the incorrect standard of proof), overruled on other grounds by Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. Beckner, 268 Va. 23, 33 , 597 S.E.2d 34, 39 (2004); Gulfstream Building Assocs., Inc. v. Britt, 239 Va. 178, 183 , 387 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1990) (noting that application of a preponderance standard of proof, rather than the clear and convincing standard of proof, was error in a case that involved fraud). | 1 | 1 |
Gulfstream Building Associates, Inc. v. Brittgreen2 sentences2008See Martin v. Phillips, 235 Va. 523, 529 , 369 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1988) (holding that a trial court made an error of law when it applied the incorrect standard of proof), overruled on other grounds by Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. Beckner, 268 Va. 23, 33 , 597 S.E.2d 34, 39 (2004); Gulfstream Building Assocs., Inc. v. Britt, 239 Va. 178, 183 , 387 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1990) (noting that application of a preponderance standard of proof, rather than the clear and convincing standard of proof, was error in a case that involved fraud). 2008See Martin v. Phillips, 235 Va. 523, 529 , 369 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1988) (holding that a trial court made an error of law when it applied the incorrect standard of proof), overruled on other grounds by Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. Beckner, 268 Va. 23, 33 , 597 S.E.2d 34, 39 (2004); Gulfstream Building Assocs., Inc. v. Britt, 239 Va. 178, 183 , 387 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1990) (noting that application of a preponderance standard of proof, rather than the clear and convincing standard of proof, was error in a case that involved fraud). | 1 | 1 |
Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. Becknergreen2 sentences2008See Martin v. Phillips, 235 Va. 523, 529 , 369 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1988) (holding that a trial court made an error of law when it applied the incorrect standard of proof), overruled on other grounds by Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. Beckner, 268 Va. 23, 33 , 597 S.E.2d 34, 39 (2004); Gulfstream Building Assocs., Inc. v. Britt, 239 Va. 178, 183 , 387 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1990) (noting that application of a preponderance standard of proof, rather than the clear and convincing standard of proof, was error in a case that involved fraud). 2008See Martin v. Phillips, 235 Va. 523, 529 , 369 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1988) (holding that a trial court made an error of law when it applied the incorrect standard of proof), overruled on other grounds by Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. Beckner, 268 Va. 23, 33 , 597 S.E.2d 34, 39 (2004); Gulfstream Building Assocs., Inc. v. Britt, 239 Va. 178, 183 , 387 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1990) (noting that application of a preponderance standard of proof, rather than the clear and convincing standard of proof, was error in a case that involved fraud). | 1 | 1 |
Lee County v. Town of St. Charlesgreen2 sentences2005Charles, 264 Va. 344, 348 , 568 S.E.2d 680, 682 (2002) (citations omitted). “[A] statute should never be construed so that it leads to absurd results.” Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 836, 839 , 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992) (citations omitted). 2005Charles, 264 Va. 344, 348 , 568 S.E.2d 680, 682 (2002) (citations omitted). “[A] statute should never be construed so that it leads to absurd results.” Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 836, 839 , 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2005"In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, 'we review the trial court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.’ ” Rollins v. Commonwealth, 37 Va.App. 73, 79 , 554 S.E.2d 99, 102 (2001) (quoting Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 187, 193 , 503 S.E.2d 233, 236 (1998)); see also Davis v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 12, 14 , 608 S.E.2d 482, 483 (2005). 2005"In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, 'we review the trial court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.’ ” Rollins v. Commonwealth, 37 Va.App. 73, 79 , 554 S.E.2d 99, 102 (2001) (quoting Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 187, 193 , 503 S.E.2d 233, 236 (1998)); see also Davis v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 12, 14 , 608 S.E.2d 482, 483 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Branch v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2005Charles, 264 Va. 344, 348 , 568 S.E.2d 680, 682 (2002) (citations omitted). “[A] statute should never be construed so that it leads to absurd results.” Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 836, 839 , 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992) (citations omitted). 2005Charles, 264 Va. 344, 348 , 568 S.E.2d 680, 682 (2002) (citations omitted). “[A] statute should never be construed so that it leads to absurd results.” Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 836, 839 , 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Langhorne v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2002In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, “we review the trial court’s ... legal conclusions de novo.” Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 187, 193 , 503 S.E.2d 233, 236 (1998). *149 “As a general rule, only under limited circumstances may evidence of other offenses by an accused be admitted to prove the offense at bar.” Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.App. 97, 101 , 409 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1991). 2002In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, “we review the trial court’s ... legal conclusions de novo.” Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 187, 193 , 503 S.E.2d 233, 236 (1998). *149 “As a general rule, only under limited circumstances may evidence of other offenses by an accused be admitted to prove the offense at bar.” Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.App. 97, 101 , 409 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Santobello v. New York
green
1 sentence2024Appellant relies on Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), in support of his argument that Figura’s statements induced him to plead guilty, but that case is not applicable here. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Porter v. Com.
green
1 sentence2023The Commonwealth’s identification of Mr. Williams as a “sexually violent predator” at the outset of the jury trial was inherently prejudicial because it created “an unacceptable risk . . . of impermissible factors coming into play.” Porter, 276 Va. at 261 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570 (1986)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Rock v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2022We need not decide whether Rigdon meets the statutory definition of victim because the record demonstrates that her testimony and written statement were admissible under Rock v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 254 (2005).3 In Rock, we held that nothing in the Crime Victim and Witness Rights Act prohibits a court from admitting relevant evidence or testimony from other witnesses who do not meet the statutory definition of “victim.” Id. at 261-63 ; see also Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 363 (1998) (noting that a “court must take into account a wide range of information” at sentencing). 2022We need not decide whether Rigdon meets the statutory definition of victim because the record demonstrates that her testimony and written statement were admissible under Rock v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 254 (2005).3 In Rock, we held that nothing in the Crime Victim and Witness Rights Act prohibits a court from admitting relevant evidence or testimony from other witnesses who do not meet the statutory definition of “victim.” Id. at 261-63 ; see also Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 363 (1998) (noting that a “court must take into account a wide range of information” at sentencing). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Coppola v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2009“In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, ‘we review the trial court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.’ ” Rollins v. Commomvealth, 37 Va.App. 73, 79 , 554 S.E.2d 99, 102 (2001) (quoting Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 187, 193 , 503 S.E.2d 233, 236 (1998)). *420 Auer v. Commonwealth, 46 Va.App. 687, 643 , 621 S.E.2d 140, 142-43 (2005). “[Discretion is vested in the trial court to determine, subject to the rules of evidence governing admissibility, the evidence which may be adduced in mitigation of the offense.” Coppola, 220 Va. at 253 , 257 S.E. 2009“In determining whether the trial court made an error of law, ‘we review the trial court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.’ ” Rollins v. Commomvealth, 37 Va.App. 73, 79 , 554 S.E.2d 99, 102 (2001) (quoting Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 187, 193 , 503 S.E.2d 233, 236 (1998)). *420 Auer v. Commonwealth, 46 Va.App. 687, 643 , 621 S.E.2d 140, 142-43 (2005). “[Discretion is vested in the trial court to determine, subject to the rules of evidence governing admissibility, the evidence which may be adduced in mitigation of the offense.” Coppola, 220 Va. at 253 , 257 S.E. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Robinson v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2006In Robinson , our Supreme Court recognized an exception to the hearsay rule in shoplifting cases allowing the admission into evidence of the information on price tags affixed to the stolen items of merchandise to establish the value of that merchandise. 258 Va. at 10 , 516 S.E.2d at 479 . 2006In Robinson , our Supreme Court recognized an exception to the hearsay rule in shoplifting cases allowing the admission into evidence of the information on price tags affixed to the stolen items of merchandise to establish the value of that merchandise. 258 Va. at 10 , 516 S.E.2d at 479 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Barnes v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1956In Barnes Commonwealth, 92 Va. 794, 801 , 23 S.E. 784, 786 , this court said that "it is clear that under our statutes, decisions, and practice, whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, they [the courts of this State] can only make amendments in cases in which there is something in the record by which they can be safely made, and that amendments cannot be made upon the individual recollection of the judge, or upon proofs aliunde." That principle was quoted and approved as recently as Teasley Commonwealth, 188 Va. 376, 382 , 49 S.E.2d 604, 606 ; and without exception has been adhered to 1956In Barnes Commonwealth, 92 Va. 794, 801 , 23 S.E. 784, 786 , this court said that "it is clear that under our statutes, decisions, and practice, whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, they [the courts of this State] can only make amendments in cases in which there is something in the record by which they can be safely made, and that amendments cannot be made upon the individual recollection of the judge, or upon proofs aliunde." That principle was quoted and approved as recently as Teasley Commonwealth, 188 Va. 376, 382 , 49 S.E.2d 604, 606 ; and without exception has been adhered to | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Teasley v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1956In Barnes Commonwealth, 92 Va. 794, 801 , 23 S.E. 784, 786 , this court said that "it is clear that under our statutes, decisions, and practice, whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, they [the courts of this State] can only make amendments in cases in which there is something in the record by which they can be safely made, and that amendments cannot be made upon the individual recollection of the judge, or upon proofs aliunde." That principle was quoted and approved as recently as Teasley Commonwealth, 188 Va. 376, 382 , 49 S.E.2d 604, 606 ; and without exception has been adhered to 1956In Barnes Commonwealth, 92 Va. 794, 801 , 23 S.E. 784, 786 , this court said that "it is clear that under our statutes, decisions, and practice, whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, they [the courts of this State] can only make amendments in cases in which there is something in the record by which they can be safely made, and that amendments cannot be made upon the individual recollection of the judge, or upon proofs aliunde." That principle was quoted and approved as recently as Teasley Commonwealth, 188 Va. 376, 382 , 49 S.E.2d 604, 606 ; and without exception has been adhered to | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Virginia Railway & Power Co. v. Leland
green
2 sentences1932The case of Virginia Ry. & P. Co. v. Leland, 143 Va. 920 , 129 S. E. 700 , cited by the plaintiff in error, is readily distinguished from the case at bar. 1932The case of Virginia Ry. & P. Co. v. Leland, 143 Va. 920 , 129 S. E. 700 , cited by the plaintiff in error, is readily distinguished from the case at bar. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.