made error in California

2018So the court is bound by the mandates of section 1181 in terms of making a decision." Watts cited People v. Mayorga (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 929 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 830 in support of the court's ability to review his ineffective assistance claim. 15 Despite the court's prior acknowledgment that a defendant could move for a new trial based on an alleged due process violation rather than the statutory grounds listed in section 1181, the court continued to maintain it had no authority to review Watts's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

2018So the court is bound by the mandates of section 1181 in terms of making a decision." Watts cited People v. Mayorga (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 929 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 830 in support of the court's ability to review his ineffective assistance claim. 15 Despite the court's prior acknowledgment that a defendant could move for a new trial based on an alleged due process violation rather than the statutory grounds listed in section 1181, the court continued to maintain it had no authority to review Watts's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

2022Citing Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 , decided on January 9, 2019, approximately nine months before their sentencing hearing, appellants argue that the trial court violated their right to due process by imposing various fines and fees without first finding that they had the ability to pay them.15 Appellants alternately assert that imposition of the sums ordered constitutes excessive punitive sanctions under the Eighth Amendment.

2022Citing Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 , decided on January 9, 2019, approximately nine months before their sentencing hearing, appellants argue that the trial court violated their right to due process by imposing various fines and fees without first finding that they had the ability to pay them.15 Appellants alternately assert that imposition of the sums ordered constitutes excessive punitive sanctions under the Eighth Amendment.

2021More specifically, other than a passing reference to defendant’s age in connection with the court’s prior Romero ruling over two years before—“my analysis under Romero has not changed in light of Penal Code section 3051 referencing now someone under 25 their brains are not fully developed”—the trial court never mentioned, let alone analyzed, the numerous factors Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 identified as bearing on the “ ‘distinctive attributes of youth’ and how these attributes ‘diminish[ed] the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences . . . .’ ” (In re Kirchner (2017) 2

2021More specifically, other than a passing reference to defendant’s age in connection with the court’s prior Romero ruling over two years before—“my analysis under Romero has not changed in light of Penal Code section 3051 referencing now someone under 25 their brains are not fully developed”—the trial court never mentioned, let alone analyzed, the numerous factors Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 identified as bearing on the “ ‘distinctive attributes of youth’ and how these attributes ‘diminish[ed] the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences . . . .’ ” (In re Kirchner (2017) 2

2021More specifically, other than a passing reference to defendant’s age in connection with the court’s prior Romero ruling over two years before—“my analysis under Romero has not changed in light of Penal Code section 3051 referencing now someone under 25 their brains are not fully developed”—the trial court never mentioned, let alone analyzed, the numerous factors Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 identified as bearing on the “ ‘distinctive attributes of youth’ and how these attributes ‘diminish[ed] the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences . . . .’ ” (In re Kirchner (2017) 2

2021More specifically, other than a passing reference to defendant’s age in connection with the court’s prior Romero ruling over two years before—“my analysis under Romero has not changed in light of Penal Code section 3051 referencing now someone under 25 their brains are not fully developed”—the trial court never mentioned, let alone analyzed, the numerous factors Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 identified as bearing on the “ ‘distinctive attributes of youth’ and how these attributes ‘diminish[ed] the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences . . . .’ ” (In re Kirchner (2017) 2

2021More specifically, other than a passing reference to defendant’s age in connection with the court’s prior Romero ruling over two years before—“my analysis under Romero has not changed in light of Penal Code section 3051 referencing now someone under 25 their brains are not fully developed”—the trial court never mentioned, let alone analyzed, the numerous factors Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 identified as bearing on the “ ‘distinctive attributes of youth’ and how these attributes ‘diminish[ed] the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences . . . .’ ” (In re Kirchner (2017) 2

2021More specifically, other than a passing reference to defendant’s age in connection with the court’s prior Romero ruling over two years before—“my analysis under Romero has not changed in light of Penal Code section 3051 referencing now someone under 25 their brains are not fully developed”—the trial court never mentioned, let alone analyzed, the numerous factors Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 identified as bearing on the “ ‘distinctive attributes of youth’ and how these attributes ‘diminish[ed] the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences . . . .’ ” (In re Kirchner (2017) 2

2018Contentions and conclusions Plaintiff contends the trial court made an error of law when it concluded it was impossible to determine "what amount, if any, the jury awarded because of a constructive discharge." For the proposition that the court's ruling was based on a mistaken conclusion of law, plaintiff cites Bermudez v. Ciolek (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1311 , 1324, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 820 .

2018Contentions and conclusions Plaintiff contends the trial court made an error of law when it concluded it was impossible to determine "what amount, if any, the jury awarded because of a constructive discharge." For the proposition that the court's ruling was based on a mistaken conclusion of law, plaintiff cites Bermudez v. Ciolek (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1311 , 1324, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 820 .

2015(People v. Cromp (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 476, 478 .) However, we address appellant’s contention that he suffered prejudice as a result of the denial of the instruction.

2015(People v. Cromp (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 476, 478 .) However, we address appellant’s contention that he suffered prejudice as a result of the denial of the instruction.

2015“Even if a trial court has stated both proper and improper reasons for a sentence choice, ‘a reviewing court will set aside the sentence only if it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a lesser sentence had it known that some of its reasons were improper.’ ” (Jones, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 861 .) As explained ante, in the present case, the mitigating circumstance relied upon by Lopez is weakly mitigating at best.

2014"A trial court's decision to impose a particular sentence is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal 'unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.'" (People v. Jones (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 853, 860 .) Showing the trial court made an error in considering a factor in sentencing is not, by itself, a sufficient ground for reversal.

1974In reversing the conviction, the appellate court commented as follows on the trial judge’s questioning of Edwards, at pages 644-645: “It is true that if no adverse interest exists and none is claimed, the representation of more than one defendant by a single attorney is permissible. [Citations.] “In People v. Meacham, 84 Cal.App.2d 193 [ 190 P.2d 262 ] [contrary to the situation in the instant case], the court made no inquiry to ascertain if there might be a conflict, no objection was made to the trial judge and there was nothing to indicate that there was any conflict.” The court, nevertheles

1974In reversing the conviction, the appellate court commented as follows on the trial judge’s questioning of Edwards, at pages 644-645: “It is true that if no adverse interest exists and none is claimed, the representation of more than one defendant by a single attorney is permissible. [Citations.] “In People v. Meacham, 84 Cal.App.2d 193 [ 190 P.2d 262 ] [contrary to the situation in the instant case], the court made no inquiry to ascertain if there might be a conflict, no objection was made to the trial judge and there was nothing to indicate that there was any conflict.” The court, nevertheles

2025Although the statute does not specify who has the burden of proof in an outpatient status hearing, California courts, including this division, have uniformly placed the burden on the defendant to show he is either no longer mentally ill or not dangerous. ( McDonough, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1475; People v. Cross (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 63, 72 ; Sword, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 621, 624.) We see no reason to adopt a different rule now.

2025Although the statute does not specify who has the burden of proof in an outpatient status hearing, California courts, including this division, have uniformly placed the burden on the defendant to show he is either no longer mentally ill or not dangerous. ( McDonough, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1475; People v. Cross (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 63, 72 ; Sword, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 621, 624.) We see no reason to adopt a different rule now.

2024First, because we presume the court followed the law unless shown otherwise ( Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376–377), we cannot presume that the court’s credits error implies an error in its understanding of section 654’s discretion.

2024(Ulster County, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 157 , citing Leary, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 30 .) The Ulster County Court observed that prior cases had therefore treated mandatory presumptions as susceptible to facial challenges, unlike a permissive presumption or inference.

2024(Ulster County, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 157 , citing Leary, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 30 .) The Ulster County Court observed that prior cases had therefore treated mandatory presumptions as susceptible to facial challenges, unlike a permissive presumption or inference.

2024(Ulster County, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 157 , citing Leary, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 30 .) The Ulster County Court observed that prior cases had therefore treated mandatory presumptions as susceptible to facial challenges, unlike a permissive presumption or inference.

2023As noted above, however, “A trial judge’s on-the-record oral recitation of reasons for imposing sanctions is insufficient.” (Childs v. PaineWebber Incorporated, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 996 .) Instead, the reasons must be recited in detail in the written order.

2023(Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 26 .) And since intent was clearly at issue in the case, Keller’s counsel was not ineffective in acknowledging that intent “may be” at issue.

2022(Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 573 .) In these circumstances, “the court should inquire whether [appointed counsel] could be replaced by another . . . appointed counsel who would be able to bring the case to trial within the statutory period.” (Id. at p. 572.) It does not appear the court made such an inquiry when it granted the second continuance.

2022“When the trial court knows, or reasonably should know, of the possibility of a conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel, it is required to make inquiry into the matter.” (People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 836 .) Here, the trial court made such inquiry. 9 On appeal, defendant alleges that the Marsden hearing held in the trial court, was “not the ‘best way’ to address” the issue of whether counsel had adequately communicated to him a plea offer of four years on a section 136.1 charge.