coverage clause in Washington

2009Here, the action is based on negligence and misrepresentation. ¶ 64 The Petersons also argue their claim is a coverage claim, based on the definition of "coverage" contained in Kroeger v. First National Insurance Co., 80 Wash.App. 207 , 908 P.2d 371 (1995).

2009App. 207 , 908 P.2d 371 (1995).

2009Here, the action is based on negligence and misrepresentation. ¶ 64 The Petersons also argue their claim is a coverage claim, based on the definition of "coverage" contained in Kroeger v. First National Insurance Co., 80 Wash.App. 207 , 908 P.2d 371 (1995).

2009Here, the action is based on negligence and misrepresentation. ¶64 The Petersons also argue their claim is a coverage claim, based on the definition of “coverage” contained in Kroeger v. First National Insurance Co. of America, 80 Wn.

2023In this way, Washington law “impose[s] an independent coverage requirement, mandating that health plans for medical and 36 P.E.L., P.L. & J.L. v. Premera Blue Cross, No. 101561-5 surgical care cover mental health treatment as well.” Hansen, 902 F.3d at 1060 (citing O.S.T., 181 Wn.2d 691 ).

2023In this way, Washington law “impose[s] an independent coverage requirement, mandating that health plans for medical and 36 P.E.L., P.L. & J.L. v. Premera Blue Cross, No. 101561-5 surgical care cover mental health treatment as well.” Hansen, 902 F.3d at 1060 (citing O.S.T., 181 Wn.2d 691 ).

1999Tyrrell summary judgment and denying summary judgment to Farmers by deciding the facts constituted a “motor vehicle accident.” The standard of review of a summary judgment order appears in Schaaf v. Highfield, 127 Wn.2d 17, 21 , 896 P.2d 665 (1995) and Chen v. State, 86 Wn.

1999Tyrrell summary judgment and denying summary judgment to Farmers by deciding the facts constituted a “motor vehicle accident.” The standard of review of a summary judgment order appears in Schaaf v. Highfield, 127 Wn.2d 17, 21 , 896 P.2d 665 (1995) and Chen v. State, 86 Wn.

1999Tyrrell summary judgment and denying summary judgment to Farmers by deciding the facts constituted a “motor vehicle accident.” The standard of review of a summary judgment order appears in Schaaf v. Highfield, 127 Wn.2d 17, 21 , 896 P.2d 665 (1995) and Chen v. State, 86 Wn.

1992Co. v. Kent, 12 Wn.

1979In Tijerina v. Cornelius Christian Church, 273 Ore. 58 , 539 P.2d 634 (1975), the Oregon Supreme Court had considered whether a *288 church lot on which plaintiff broke his leg while playing ball was "agricultural land" within the coverage of the immunity statute.

1979In Tijerina v. Cornelius Christian Church, 273 Ore. 58 , 539 P.2d 634 (1975), the Oregon Supreme Court had considered whether a *288 church lot on which plaintiff broke his leg while playing ball was "agricultural land" within the coverage of the immunity statute.

1976If, in determining the coverage provided by the policy, “the intention of the parties thereto is to be gathered from the whole instrument,” (Hollingsworth v. RobLumber Co., 182 Wash. 74, 79 , 45 P.2d 614 (1935)), even a possible lack of ambiguity in one of the policy’s exclusions may not prevent the overall policy coverage from being ambiguous with respect to Medicare: Whether a document is or is not ambiguous is a matter of impression rather than of definition.

1976If, in determining the coverage provided by the policy, “the intention of the parties thereto is to be gathered from the whole instrument,” (Hollingsworth v. RobLumber Co., 182 Wash. 74, 79 , 45 P.2d 614 (1935)), even a possible lack of ambiguity in one of the policy’s exclusions may not prevent the overall policy coverage from being ambiguous with respect to Medicare: Whether a document is or is not ambiguous is a matter of impression rather than of definition.

1946Co., 221 Wis. 208 , 265 N. W. 575 , was somewhat broader than those commonly involved in the adjudicated cases, and insured against death resulting from “personal bodily injury . . . effected directly and independently of all other causes through accidental means, and which injury causes total and continuous inability to engage in any and every kind of business or labor.” The phrases “through external violence” and “directly or indirectly,” commonly found in contracts of this kind, do not occur in this policy.

1946Co., 221 Wis. 208 , 265 N. W. 575 , was somewhat broader than those commonly involved in the adjudicated cases, and insured against death resulting from “personal bodily injury . . . effected directly and independently of all other causes through accidental means, and which injury causes total and continuous inability to engage in any and every kind of business or labor.” The phrases “through external violence” and “directly or indirectly,” commonly found in contracts of this kind, do not occur in this policy.

1941In MacKay v. Department of Labor & Industries, 181 Wash. 702 , 44 P. (2d) 793 , in construing this phrase we quoted from In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497 , 102 N. E. 697 , L.

1941In MacKay v. Department of Labor & Industries, 181 Wash. 702 , 44 P. (2d) 793 , in construing this phrase we quoted from In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497 , 102 N. E. 697 , L.

1941In MacKay v. Department of Labor & Industries, 181 Wash. 702 , 44 P. (2d) 793 , in construing this phrase we quoted from In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497 , 102 N. E. 697 , L.