coverage claim in New Jersey

2022After obtaining an assignment of the coverage claim against American Modern and filing an amended complaint naming plaintiff as Mortimer's and Weirback's assignee in their third-party action against American Modern, plaintiff appealed, arguing the motion judge had erred in failing to apply the incidental-activity exception to the policy's business-pursuit exclusion and in relying on Carroll, 272 N.J.

2011Co. of N. Am. v. Anthony Amadei Sand & Gravel, Inc., 162 N.J. 168, 177-78 , 742 A.2d 550 (1999), the claim plaintiff advanced was not a coverage claim, but a Rova Farms bad faith claim we determine to be a breach of contract claim.

2011Co. of N. Am. v. Anthony Amadei Sand & Gravel, Inc., 162 N.J. 168, 177-78 , 742 A.2d 550 (1999), the claim plaintiff advanced was not a coverage claim, but a Rova Farms bad faith claim we determine to be a breach of contract claim.

2009Citing Transamerica Insurance Co. v. National Roofing, Inc., 108 N.J. 59 , 527 A. 2d 864 (1987), Atlantic contends that Myron was not a successful litigant in the Illinois actions because those courts did not adjudicate the merits of the coverage claim.

2009Citing Transamerica Insurance Co. v. National Roofing, Inc., 108 N.J. 59 , 527 A. 2d 864 (1987), Atlantic contends that Myron was not a successful litigant in the Illinois actions because those courts did not adjudicate the merits of the coverage claim.

2008The "public interest" in providing compensation to "victims of negligence" was an essential component of the Court's rationale for adopting the "appreciable *166 prejudice" rule in Cooper, supra, 51 N.J. at 94 , 237 A. 2d 870 .

2008The "public interest" in providing compensation to "victims of negligence" was an essential component of the Court's rationale for adopting the "appreciable *166 prejudice" rule in Cooper, supra, 51 N.J. at 94 , 237 A. 2d 870 .

2008This ruling also enabled PAIC to obtain a greater contribution from Illinois National to the settlement of the Schmidt estate’s claim than it could have recovered if it had pursued the coverage claim in its own name; under Cosmopolitan, supra, 28 N.J. at 564 , 147 A.2d 529 , Illinois National would have been subject, in such an action, to liability for only half the $1,850,000 settlement amount, or $925,000, which is $75,000 less than the $1,000,000 the trial court awarded West Amwell acting on PAIC’s behalf.

2008This ruling also enabled PAIC to obtain a greater contribution from Illinois National to the settlement of the Schmidt estate’s claim than it could have recovered if it had pursued the coverage claim in its own name; under Cosmopolitan, supra, 28 N.J. at 564 , 147 A.2d 529 , Illinois National would have been subject, in such an action, to liability for only half the $1,850,000 settlement amount, or $925,000, which is $75,000 less than the $1,000,000 the trial court awarded West Amwell acting on PAIC’s behalf.

2006Co., 134 N.J. 1, 88 , 629 A. 2d 831 (1993) (after a finding of no "occurrence" under the coverage clause, there was no need to address the potential exclusions), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245 , 114 S.Ct. 2764 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 878 , rehearing denied, 512 U.S. 1277 , 115 S.Ct. 25 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 923 (1994).

2006Co., 134 N.J. 1, 88 , 629 A. 2d 831 (1993) (after a finding of no "occurrence" under the coverage clause, there was no need to address the potential exclusions), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245 , 114 S.Ct. 2764 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 878 , rehearing denied, 512 U.S. 1277 , 115 S.Ct. 25 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 923 (1994).

2006Co., 134 N.J. 1, 88 , 629 A. 2d 831 (1993) (after a finding of no "occurrence" under the coverage clause, there was no need to address the potential exclusions), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245 , 114 S.Ct. 2764 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 878 , rehearing denied, 512 U.S. 1277 , 115 S.Ct. 25 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 923 (1994).

2006Co., 134 N.J. 1, 88 , 629 A. 2d 831 (1993) (after a finding of no "occurrence" under the coverage clause, there was no need to address the potential exclusions), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245 , 114 S.Ct. 2764 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 878 , rehearing denied, 512 U.S. 1277 , 115 S.Ct. 25 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 923 (1994).

2006Co., 134 N.J. 1, 88 , 629 A. 2d 831 (1993) (after a finding of no "occurrence" under the coverage clause, there was no need to address the potential exclusions), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245 , 114 S.Ct. 2764 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 878 , rehearing denied, 512 U.S. 1277 , 115 S.Ct. 25 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 923 (1994).

2006Co., 134 N.J. 1, 88 , 629 A. 2d 831 (1993) (after a finding of no "occurrence" under the coverage clause, there was no need to address the potential exclusions), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245 , 114 S.Ct. 2764 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 878 , rehearing denied, 512 U.S. 1277 , 115 S.Ct. 25 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 923 (1994).

2001In assessing whether a defendant's coverage claim is embraced by the named insured's vehicle omnibus provision, "the pertinent inquiry is whether the acts of negligence charged to defendants were part of the overall loading or unloading operation so that, in the commission of the negligent acts charged, defendants can be said to have been using the vehicle and thereby became additional insureds under the policy." Kennedy, supra, 147 N.J. at 400 , 688 A. 2d 89 (quoting Cenno, supra, 109 N.J.Super. at 45 , 262 A. 2d 223 ); Smithbower v. Navistar Int'l Transp.

2001In assessing whether a defendant's coverage claim is embraced by the named insured's vehicle omnibus provision, "the pertinent inquiry is whether the acts of negligence charged to defendants were part of the overall loading or unloading operation so that, in the commission of the negligent acts charged, defendants can be said to have been using the vehicle and thereby became additional insureds under the policy." Kennedy, supra, 147 N.J. at 400 , 688 A. 2d 89 (quoting Cenno, supra, 109 N.J.Super. at 45 , 262 A. 2d 223 ); Smithbower v. Navistar Int'l Transp.

2001Corp., 265 N.J.Super. 119, 124 , 625 A. 2d 586 (App.Div.1993) (same).

2001Corp., 265 N.J.Super. 119, 124 , 625 A. 2d 586 (App.Div.1993) (same).

2001In assessing whether a defendant's coverage claim is embraced by the named insured's vehicle omnibus provision, "the pertinent inquiry is whether the acts of negligence charged to defendants were part of the overall loading or unloading operation so that, in the commission of the negligent acts charged, defendants can be said to have been using the vehicle and thereby became additional insureds under the policy." Kennedy, supra, 147 N.J. at 400 , 688 A. 2d 89 (quoting Cenno, supra, 109 N.J.Super. at 45 , 262 A. 2d 223 ); Smithbower v. Navistar Int'l Transp.

2001In assessing whether a defendant's coverage claim is embraced by the named insured's vehicle omnibus provision, "the pertinent inquiry is whether the acts of negligence charged to defendants were part of the overall loading or unloading operation so that, in the commission of the negligent acts charged, defendants can be said to have been using the vehicle and thereby became additional insureds under the policy." Kennedy, supra, 147 N.J. at 400 , 688 A. 2d 89 (quoting Cenno, supra, 109 N.J.Super. at 45 , 262 A. 2d 223 ); Smithbower v. Navistar Int'l Transp.

1998Co., 251 N.J.Super. 493, 499-500 , 598 A. 2d 936 (App.Div.1991), however, we held the absence of express authority to treat a coverage claim as a contested case not to preclude application of that process by the Commission.

1998Co., 251 N.J.Super. 493, 499-500 , 598 A. 2d 936 (App.Div.1991), however, we held the absence of express authority to treat a coverage claim as a contested case not to preclude application of that process by the Commission.

1994Noting further that, as here, the wife was entitled to the coverage when the policy was issued and that premiums for that coverage had been paid, the court observed that "[t]he result of the definitional section of the policy when applied to the coverage clause of the uninsured motorist section was to take from *351 Tina [the wife] coverage that she had when the policy was issued." Ibid.

1992Id. at 467 , 591 A.2d 677 .

1992Id. at 467 , 591 A.2d 677 .

1989NOTES [1] A coverage claim was also made against third-party defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company which was not pursued, apparently because that insurer was not at risk. [2] We point out that by this last agreement it appears that Joseph and Joan Hegedus also settled all the claims made as between them respecting the lapse of the insurance and the ultimate responsibility for the Insigna damages. [3] See Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 53 N.J. 463 (1969); Rush, Urology Assoc. v. Kuhn, Smith & Harris, 193 N.J.

1989NOTES [1] A coverage claim was also made against third-party defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company which was not pursued, apparently because that insurer was not at risk. [2] We point out that by this last agreement it appears that Joseph and Joan Hegedus also settled all the claims made as between them respecting the lapse of the insurance and the ultimate responsibility for the Insigna damages. [3] See Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 53 N.J. 463 (1969); Rush, Urology Assoc. v. Kuhn, Smith & Harris, 193 N.J.

1979Co., 73 N.J. 425, 432 (1977), cert. den. 434 U.S. 923 , 98 S.Ct. 402 , 54 L.Ed. 2d 281 (1977) our Supreme Court noted that the meaning and scope of the coverage provided "must be considered in light of our courts' expansive view of the coverage provided by the standard omnibus clause * * *." Courts in other jurisdictions which have considered the issue here involved have generally adopted a broad interpretation of the term "use" and have held the act of towing to be a "use" of the towed vehicle within the meaning of the standard omnibus clause. *340 In State Automobile Mut.

1979Co., 73 N.J. 425, 432 (1977), cert. den. 434 U.S. 923 , 98 S.Ct. 402 , 54 L.Ed. 2d 281 (1977) our Supreme Court noted that the meaning and scope of the coverage provided "must be considered in light of our courts' expansive view of the coverage provided by the standard omnibus clause * * *." Courts in other jurisdictions which have considered the issue here involved have generally adopted a broad interpretation of the term "use" and have held the act of towing to be a "use" of the towed vehicle within the meaning of the standard omnibus clause. *340 In State Automobile Mut.

1979Co., 73 N.J. 425, 432 (1977), cert. den. 434 U.S. 923 , 98 S.Ct. 402 , 54 L.Ed. 2d 281 (1977) our Supreme Court noted that the meaning and scope of the coverage provided "must be considered in light of our courts' expansive view of the coverage provided by the standard omnibus clause * * *." Courts in other jurisdictions which have considered the issue here involved have generally adopted a broad interpretation of the term "use" and have held the act of towing to be a "use" of the towed vehicle within the meaning of the standard omnibus clause. *340 In State Automobile Mut.

1977Co. v. Zullo, 48 N.J. 362 (1966), the Court considered the relationship between the statutory language contained in the Motor Vehicle Security-Responsibility Law, N.J.S.A. 39:6-46(a), quoted above, and the scope of the coverage provided in the standard omnibus clause.

1960Jur. and A.L.R. citations above, as well as in the opinion in the Heinz case, supra. A specific example is Spring v. Hager, 145 Mass. 186 , 13 N.E. 479 ( Sup. Jud.

1960Jur. and A.L.R. citations above, as well as in the opinion in the Heinz case, supra. A specific example is Spring v. Hager, 145 Mass. 186 , 13 N.E. 479 ( Sup. Jud.

1924In Lovewell v. Westchester Insurance Co., 124 Mass. 418 , the coverage was on “fixed and movable machinery, engines, lathes and tools,” and patterns for casting were held included as against a non-liability clause mentioning “patterns.” We reach the same result as in the Massachusetts case, but on the somewhat broader ground, that the language of the coverage clause plainly indicates an intent to insure generally all articles and appurtenances used in the business, including patterns, without regard to catalogued exceptions in the body of the policy.