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24 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1940–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Republic Lloydsgreen2 sentences2012See Akin, 927 S.W.2d at 630 (“In the absence of a settlement offer on the entire contract claim, or other compelling circumstances, severance is not required.”) [Emphasis added]; In re Republic Lloyds, 104 S.W.3d 354, 358 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (“Thus, pursuant to Akin , a severance is required when the insurer has made a settlement offer on the entire *236 breach of contract claim.”) [Emphasis added]. 2012See Akin , 927 S.W.2d at 630 (“In the absence of a settlement offer on the entire contract claim , or other compelling circumstances, severance is not required.”)[Emphasis added]; In re Republic Lloyds , 104 S.W.3d 354, 358 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding)(“Thus, pursuant to Akin , a severance is required when the insurer has made a settlement offer on the entire breach of contract claim .”) [Emphasis added]. | 6 | 6 |
Liberty National Fire Insurance Co. v. Akingreen2 sentences2012See Akin, 927 S.W.2d at 630 (“In the absence of a settlement offer on the entire contract claim, or other compelling circumstances, severance is not required.”) [Emphasis added]; In re Republic Lloyds, 104 S.W.3d 354, 358 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (“Thus, pursuant to Akin , a severance is required when the insurer has made a settlement offer on the entire *236 breach of contract claim.”) [Emphasis added]. 2012See Akin , 927 S.W.2d at 630 (“In the absence of a settlement offer on the entire contract claim , or other compelling circumstances, severance is not required.”)[Emphasis added]; In re Republic Lloyds , 104 S.W.3d 354, 358 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding)(“Thus, pursuant to Akin , a severance is required when the insurer has made a settlement offer on the entire breach of contract claim .”) [Emphasis added]. | 6 | 6 |
Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co.green2 sentences2025Lamar Homes Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas., 242 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2007). 2008We express no opinion on whether the coverage rule for determining if a claim occurs during the term of the OneBeacon policy is the same for bodily injury and property damage claims. 33 . 242 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex.2007). 34 . | 2 | 3 |
Stroburg v. Insurance Company of North Americagreen2 sentences2000“Independent” as used in the coverage clause means “solely,” “only,” and “standing alone.” Stroburg, 464 S.W.2d at 829 . 2000See id. | 2 | 2 |
Wachovia Bank, National Ass'n v. Schmidtgreen2 sentences2024See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118-19 (2001) (construing FAA exclusion narrowly despite broad interpretation of comparable language in FAA’s coverage provision). “[I]dentical language may convey varying content when used in different statutes, sometimes even in different provisions of the same statute.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 , 537, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 , 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) (plurality opinion).10 10 See, e.g., Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 313-14 , 126 S. Ct. 941 , 163 L.Ed.2d 797 (2006) (“located” has different meanings in different pro 2024See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118-19 (2001) (construing FAA exclusion narrowly despite broad interpretation of comparable language in FAA’s coverage provision). “[I]dentical language may convey varying content when used in different statutes, sometimes even in different provisions of the same statute.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 , 537, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 , 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) (plurality opinion).10 10 See, e.g., Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 313-14 , 126 S. Ct. 941 , 163 L.Ed.2d 797 (2006) (“located” has different meanings in different pro | 1 | 1 |
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adamsgreen1 sentence2024See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118-19 (2001) (construing FAA exclusion narrowly despite broad interpretation of comparable language in FAA’s coverage provision). “[I]dentical language may convey varying content when used in different statutes, sometimes even in different provisions of the same statute.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 , 537, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 , 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) (plurality opinion).10 10 See, e.g., Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 313-14 , 126 S. Ct. 941 , 163 L.Ed.2d 797 (2006) (“located” has different meanings in different pro | 1 | 1 |
Yates v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118-19 (2001) (construing FAA exclusion narrowly despite broad interpretation of comparable language in FAA’s coverage provision). “[I]dentical language may convey varying content when used in different statutes, sometimes even in different provisions of the same statute.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 , 537, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 , 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) (plurality opinion).10 10 See, e.g., Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 313-14 , 126 S. Ct. 941 , 163 L.Ed.2d 797 (2006) (“located” has different meanings in different pro 2024See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118-19 (2001) (construing FAA exclusion narrowly despite broad interpretation of comparable language in FAA’s coverage provision). “[I]dentical language may convey varying content when used in different statutes, sometimes even in different provisions of the same statute.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 , 537, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 , 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) (plurality opinion).10 10 See, e.g., Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 313-14 , 126 S. Ct. 941 , 163 L.Ed.2d 797 (2006) (“located” has different meanings in different pro | 1 | 1 |
Mid-Century Insurance Co. of Texas v. Lindseygreen2 sentences2005The Brown court applied the coverage test from Mid-Century Insurance Co. of Texas v. Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d 153, 157 (Tex.1999); that test, although not absolute, provides that, for coverage to exist under the policy language quoted above, (1) the accident must have arisen out of the inherent nature of the automobile, as such; (2) the accident must have arisen within the automobile’s territorial limits, and the actual use must not have terminated; and (3) the automobile must not merely contribute to cause the condition producing the injury, but must instead itself produce the injury. 2005Brown, 123 S.W.3d at 622 -23 (citing Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d at 157 ). | 1 | 1 |
Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.green2 sentences1990Property insurance, unlike liability insurance, is unconcerned with establishing negligence or otherwise assessing tort liability." Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 48 Cal.3d 395 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 292, 298 , 770 P.2d 704, 710 (1989) (citation omitted). 1990Property insurance, unlike liability insurance, is unconcerned with establishing negligence or otherwise assessing tort liability." Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 48 Cal.3d 395 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 292, 298 , 770 P.2d 704, 710 (1989) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Pan American Life Insurance Co. v. Youngbloodgreen1 sentence1982See Stroburg v. Insurance Co. of North America, 464 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex.1971); Pan American Life Insurance Co. v. Youngblood, 569 S.W.2d 951, 956 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rsui Indemnity Company v. the Lynd Company
green
1 sentence2024Finally, Marsh, which is aligned with Patterson in this appeal, argues that Patterson must prevail unless Ohio Casualty “could establish an unambiguous exception to the coverage for defense costs found in the Underlying Policy.” It cites Insurance Code § 554.002, which places the burden of establishing an exclusion on the insurer, and our decision in RSUI, where we explained that we construe an ambiguous contract in favor of the insured. 466 S.W.3d at 140 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
McMillin v. State Farm Lloyds
green
1 sentence2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 24 McMillin v. State Farm Lloyds, 180 S.W.3d 183 (2005) Although we will render judgment that the McMillins are entitled to $990.13 for expenses incurred to prevent further damage, the date by which State Farm received all documents relating to the Coverage A claim is not relevant to the $990.13 recovery; the jury was not asked to find the date by which State Farm received all documents relating to their claim for damage-prevention expenses, and the McMillins do not complain about the absence of such a question or finding. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lunsford v. Morris
green
1 sentence2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 Aranda v. O'Neill, Not Reported in S.W.2d (1988) sought was overly broad, burdensome, oppressive, or sought Aranda asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in discovery of irrelevant material. failing to grant all of its requested discovery because the insurance companies, by not producing evidence in support In Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471 (Tex.1988), the of their motion for protection, failed to follow the proper supreme court found that a defendant's net worth is relevant procedure to obtain the protective order as required by to | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Weisel Enterprises, Inc. v. Curry
green
1 sentence2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 Aranda v. O'Neill, Not Reported in S.W.2d (1988) sought was overly broad, burdensome, oppressive, or sought Aranda asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in discovery of irrelevant material. failing to grant all of its requested discovery because the insurance companies, by not producing evidence in support In Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471 (Tex.1988), the of their motion for protection, failed to follow the proper supreme court found that a defendant's net worth is relevant procedure to obtain the protective order as required by to | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Texas Farmers Insurance Co. v. Cooper
green
1 sentence2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
OneBeacon Insurance v. Don's Building Supply, Inc.
green
1 sentence2008In this case there may be little practical difference between an actual-injury rule and an exposure rule, because, as the Fifth Circuit notes, the homeowners’ petitions alleged that “injury to the home actually began to occur on the occasion of the first penetration of moisture behind the [EIFS] which would have been at such time as the improperly installed sealant joints and sealants began to fail, allowing moisture within the system.” OneBea-con, 496 F.3d at 362 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Brown v. Houston Independent School District
green
1 sentence2005Brown, 123 S.W.3d at 622 -23 (citing Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d at 157 ). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Torchia v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
green
1 sentence1997Id. at 222 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Dominguez
green
1 sentence1996Id. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Lyons v. Millers Casualty Insurance Co. of Texas
green
1 sentence1993Although this evidence is acknowledged to be relevant to the validity of Lyons' coverage claim, the majority declares that neither this nor any other evidence is relevant to Millers' bad faith: Lyons offered no evidence that the reports of Millers' experts were not objectively prepared, or that Millers' reliance on them was unreasonable, or any other evidence from which a factfinder could infer that Millers acted without a reasonable basis and that it knew or should have known that it lacked a reasonable basis for its actions. 866 S.W.2d at 601 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Schwartz v. Jefferson
green
1 sentence1989Id. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Nidiffer
green
2 sentences1942The coverage clause of the contract quoted above clearly obligated the company to pay the sum stipulated “immediately” upon being furnished proof that the insured was totally and permanently disabled, and, that such a state of disability has existed “for a period of six months.” As stated in Missouri State Life Insurance Company v. Nidiffer, 168 Tenn. 584 , 79 S. W. (2d) 1024 , “Before there can be anything due under the policy for total and permanent disability, such disability must have lasted for six months.” The period of permanent disability covered has a definite time of beginning. 1942The coverage clause of the contract quoted above clearly obligated the company to pay the sum stipulated “immediately” upon being furnished proof that the insured was totally and permanently disabled, and, that such a state of disability has existed “for a period of six months.” As stated in Missouri State Life Insurance Company v. Nidiffer, 168 Tenn. 584 , 79 S. W. (2d) 1024 , “Before there can be anything due under the policy for total and permanent disability, such disability must have lasted for six months.” The period of permanent disability covered has a definite time of beginning. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Manufacturers National Bank v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
neutral
1 sentence1941In the first case cited by the defendant the court there defines “misplacement” to mean “to put a thing in the wrong place, or to locate unsuitedly.” In the case cited by us in 218 N.Y.S. 332 , at page 334, par. 2, the Court says: “The meaning of ‘misplacement’ cannot be questioned; It means ‘put in a wrong place.’ ” These definitions are essentially that given by Webster, and are the meanings that are commonly and ordinarily given the term. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Neighbors of Woodcraft v. Hildebrahdt
neutral
2 sentences1940In support of the theory that the assured, having accepted a reinstatement, was bound thereby, two cases are cited: Supreme Ruler of Mystic Circle v. Darwin, 201 Ala. 687 , 79 So. 259 , and Neighbors of Woodcraft v. Hildebrandt, 98 Colo. 231 , 54 P.2d 889 . 1940In support of the theory that the assured, having accepted a reinstatement, was bound thereby, two cases are cited: Supreme Ruler of Mystic Circle v. Darwin, 201 Ala. 687 , 79 So. 259 , and Neighbors of Woodcraft v. Hildebrandt, 98 Colo. 231 , 54 P.2d 889 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Supreme Ruler of Mystic Circle v. Darwin
neutral
2 sentences1940In support of the theory that the assured, having accepted a reinstatement, was bound thereby, two cases are cited: Supreme Ruler of Mystic Circle v. Darwin, 201 Ala. 687 , 79 So. 259 , and Neighbors of Woodcraft v. Hildebrandt, 98 Colo. 231 , 54 P.2d 889 . 1940In support of the theory that the assured, having accepted a reinstatement, was bound thereby, two cases are cited: Supreme Ruler of Mystic Circle v. Darwin, 201 Ala. 687 , 79 So. 259 , and Neighbors of Woodcraft v. Hildebrandt, 98 Colo. 231 , 54 P.2d 889 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.