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7 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Truck Insurance Exchange v. Marks Rentals, Inc.green2 sentences1992This Court assumed for purposes of the declaratory judgment action that the employee was acting in the scope of her employment, pointing out that this issue ‘is one which must be resolved in the underlying tort suit,’ 288 Md., id. at 430, n. 1 , 418 A.2d 1187 . 1981Exch. v. Marks Rentals, supra, 288 Md. at 433 , with regard to language in the coverage clause of a liability insurance policy, we stated: "Although language which is merely general in nature or imprecisely defined is not necessarily ambiguous, ... an ambiguity does arise if, to a reasonably prudent layman, the language used is susceptible of more than one meaning.” In our view, the word "occurrence” is reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning and, therefore, is ambiguous. | 1 | 2 |
Faber v. Roelofsgreen1 sentence1996It reasoned that accepting Mutual’s contention “would result in rewriting the last phrase of the coverage clause to read ‘arising out of the negligent ... use of the automobile.’ That is not how the policy reads.” Id. at 822. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Price v. Howard County General Hospital
green
1 sentence2006The Circuit Court’s alternative position, that the Maryland policy underlying an “unfair competition” tort case “outweighs the policy of the privilege,” and the court’s reliance on Price v. Howard County General Hospital, supra, 950 F.Supp. 141 , were also clearly in error. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Bou-Mer-Fran Coal, Inc., Appeal Of
neutral
2 sentences1989Co., 596 F.Supp. 954 (M.D.Pa.1984), aff'd without op, 770 F.2d 1067 (3d Cir. 1985), the coverage clause read: “The Company will pay on behalf of the Insureds all Loss the Insureds shall be legally obligated to pay for any civil claim or claims first made against them because of a Wrongful Act, provided that the claim is first made during the policy period and written notice of said claim is received by the Company during the policy period.” Id. at 958. 1989Co., 596 F. Supp. 954 (M.D.Pa. 1984), aff'd without op, 770 F.2d 1067 (3d Cir.1985), the coverage clause read: "The Company will pay on behalf of the Insureds all Loss the Insureds shall be legally obligated to pay for any civil claim or claims first made against them because of a Wrongful Act, provided that the claim is first made during the policy period and written notice of said claim is received by the Company during the policy period." Id. at 958. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Insurance
green
2 sentences1989Co., 100 N.J. 304 , 495 A.2d 395 (1985), the coverage clause of the insuring agreement read: “To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as money damages because of any claim or claims first made against the insured and reported to the company during the policy period, arising out of an act or omission of the insured in rendering or failing to render professional services for others____” Id. at 307 , 495 A.2d at 396-97 . 1989Co., 100 N.J. 304 , 495 A.2d 395 (1985), the coverage clause of the insuring agreement read: “To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as money damages because of any claim or claims first made against the insured and reported to the company during the policy period, arising out of an act or omission of the insured in rendering or failing to render professional services for others____” Id. at 307 , 495 A.2d at 396-97 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
City of Harrisburg v. International Surplus Lines Insurance
green
2 sentences1989Co., 596 F.Supp. 954 (M.D.Pa.1984), aff'd without op, 770 F.2d 1067 (3d Cir. 1985), the coverage clause read: “The Company will pay on behalf of the Insureds all Loss the Insureds shall be legally obligated to pay for any civil claim or claims first made against them because of a Wrongful Act, provided that the claim is first made during the policy period and written notice of said claim is received by the Company during the policy period.” Id. at 958. 1989Co., 596 F. Supp. 954 (M.D.Pa. 1984), aff'd without op, 770 F.2d 1067 (3d Cir.1985), the coverage clause read: "The Company will pay on behalf of the Insureds all Loss the Insureds shall be legally obligated to pay for any civil claim or claims first made against them because of a Wrongful Act, provided that the claim is first made during the policy period and written notice of said claim is received by the Company during the policy period." Id. at 958. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. Barefield
green
1 sentence1972While the proscribed activity continues, the insurance is suspended as if it had never been in force.’ ” Id. at 620 . citing Travelers Assn. v. Prinsen, 291 U. S. 576, 581 , 54 S. Ct. 502 , 78 L. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Travelers Protective Assn. of America v. Prinsen
green
2 sentences1972While the proscribed activity continues, the insurance is suspended as if it had never been in force.’ ” Id. at 620 . citing Travelers Assn. v. Prinsen, 291 U. S. 576, 581 , 54 S. Ct. 502 , 78 L. 1972While the proscribed activity continues, the insurance is suspended as if it had never been in force.’ ” Id. at 620 . citing Travelers Assn. v. Prinsen, 291 U. S. 576, 581 , 54 S. Ct. 502 , 78 L. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Universal Indemnity Ins. v. North Shore Delivery Co.
neutral
1 sentence1972While the proscribed activity continues, the insurance is suspended as if it had never been in force.’ ” Id. at 620 . citing Travelers Assn. v. Prinsen, 291 U. S. 576, 581 , 54 S. Ct. 502 , 78 L. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Elmer F. Wheeler v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
green
1 sentence1971The exclusion clause also discloses that the named insured or any member of his family were not to be covered.” (Emphasis in original) 438 F. 2d at 732 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Minners v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
1 sentence1971Co., *213 170 N.W.2d 223 (Minn. 1969), which had before it a coverage clause, a definition of “insured” and a household exclusion clause, which are substantially identical with those found in the case at bar. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.