coverage clause in New York

2017Mr. Carlson also points to evidence concerning the underwriting of the policies, which demonstrates that DHL's policies were priced to cover MVP's trucks ***299 as hired autos. 1 If the schedule of hire exists, its *496 **106 production is essential to determination of the full content of the contract; it would be error to dismiss the coverage claim based on only part of a contract, particularly where a highly germane portion is missing. 2 If the schedule of hire has been lost or destroyed, it would likewise be error to dismiss the coverage claim, because Mr. Carlson would be entitled to attem

2017Mr. Carlson also points to evidence concerning the underwriting of the policies, which demonstrates that DHL's policies were priced to cover MVP's trucks ***299 as hired autos. 1 If the schedule of hire exists, its *496 **106 production is essential to determination of the full content of the contract; it would be error to dismiss the coverage claim based on only part of a contract, particularly where a highly germane portion is missing. 2 If the schedule of hire has been lost or destroyed, it would likewise be error to dismiss the coverage claim, because Mr. Carlson would be entitled to attem

2017Mr. Carlson also points to evidence concerning the underwriting of the policies, which demonstrates that DHL's policies were priced to cover MVP's trucks ***299 as hired autos. 1 If the schedule of hire exists, its *496 **106 production is essential to determination of the full content of the contract; it would be error to dismiss the coverage claim based on only part of a contract, particularly where a highly germane portion is missing. 2 If the schedule of hire has been lost or destroyed, it would likewise be error to dismiss the coverage claim, because Mr. Carlson would be entitled to attem

2017Based on our rules of policy interpretation, it is the policy's language (see Lend Lease, 28 NY3d at 681 ; Consolidated Edison Co., 98 NY2d at 221 ), not the drafter's explanation of that language, that drives a coverage analysis. - 11 - - 12 - No. 57 must refer to "proximate cause" because "'but for' causation cannot be partial" (id. at 10).

2017Based on our rules of policy interpretation, it is the policy’s language (see Lend Lease, 28 NY3d at 681 ; Consolidated Edison Co., 98 NY2d at 221 ), not the drafter’s explanation of that language, that drives a coverage analysis. .

2017Based on our rules of policy interpretation, it is the policy’s language (see Lend Lease, 28 NY3d at 681 ; Consolidated Edison Co., 98 NY2d at 221 ), not the drafter’s explanation of that language, that drives a coverage analysis. .

2000Co., supra, 85 NY2d, at 102 ).

1998(Neuwirth v Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 62 NY2d 718, 719 .) Defendants chose, instead, to ignore the merits of the coverage claim and argued, inter alia, AMIC’s lack of privity and the inapplicability of Insurance Law § 3420 (b), neither of which has merit.

1996Co. v Mucatel, 127 Misc 2d 1045 , affd 119 AD2d 1017 , affd 69 NY2d 777 ; cf., Matter of Allstate Ins.

1996Co. v Mucatel, 127 Misc 2d 1045 , affd 119 AD2d 1017 , affd 69 NY2d 777 ; cf., Matter of Allstate Ins.

1979Corp., 38 Misc 2d 578 , mod 34 AD2d 569 .) This limitation on the coverage finds expression not only in the coverage clause itself but also in exclusion (c) which provides that the "policy does not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of any act or omission of the named insured or any of his employees, other than the general supervision of work performed for the named insured by the designated contractor.” There are no allegations in the Greenfield complaint that the County negligently supervised the Greenfield work.

1979Corp., 38 Misc 2d 578 , mod 34 AD2d 569 .) This limitation on the coverage finds expression not only in the coverage clause itself but also in exclusion (c) which provides that the "policy does not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of any act or omission of the named insured or any of his employees, other than the general supervision of work performed for the named insured by the designated contractor.” There are no allegations in the Greenfield complaint that the County negligently supervised the Greenfield work.

1940Co., 182 App. Div. 742 ; affd., 230 N. Y. 532 .) The language of the coverage clause should be interpreted to avoid a forfeiture of the policy unless it clearly appears that a forfeiture was intended.

1940(Paskusz v. Philadelphia Casualty Co., 213 N. Y. 22 .) The complaint in the action brought by Hirsch, the patient, against the appellant, his physician, alleged that in violation of his contract to remove certain markings from the face of Hirsch, the appellant had performed various operations which resulted in extensive scars, discolorations and distortion of the mouth and face of Hirsch.

1940Co., 182 App. Div. 742 ; affd., 230 N. Y. 532 .) The language of the coverage clause should be interpreted to avoid a forfeiture of the policy unless it clearly appears that a forfeiture was intended.

1938The ambiguity thus resulting requires that full force be given to the coverage clause on the basis of limitation of liability of “ Personal Injury Limit one accident $10,000,” rather than “ bodily injuries.” (Bakker v. Ætna Life Insurance Co., 148 Misc. 162 ; affd., 240 App. Div. 880 ; affd., 264 N. Y. 150 .) The soundness of this view is reinforced by a reference to further liability under the “ Special Conditions ” clause in which indemnity is furnished for litigation costs and interest arising from “ claims for injuries to persons.” The latter phrase includes loss of services and is synonym

1938The ambiguity thus resulting requires that full force be given to the coverage clause on the basis of limitation of liability of “ Personal Injury Limit one accident $10,000,” rather than “ bodily injuries.” (Bakker v. Ætna Life Insurance Co., 148 Misc. 162 ; affd., 240 App. Div. 880 ; affd., 264 N. Y. 150 .) The soundness of this view is reinforced by a reference to further liability under the “ Special Conditions ” clause in which indemnity is furnished for litigation costs and interest arising from “ claims for injuries to persons.” The latter phrase includes loss of services and is synonym

1938The ambiguity thus resulting requires that full force be given to the coverage clause on the basis of limitation of liability of “ Personal Injury Limit one accident $10,000,” rather than “ bodily injuries.” (Bakker v. Ætna Life Insurance Co., 148 Misc. 162 ; affd., 240 App. Div. 880 ; affd., 264 N. Y. 150 .) The soundness of this view is reinforced by a reference to further liability under the “ Special Conditions ” clause in which indemnity is furnished for litigation costs and interest arising from “ claims for injuries to persons.” The latter phrase includes loss of services and is synonym

1938The ambiguity thus resulting requires that full force be given to the coverage clause on the basis of limitation of liability of “ Personal Injury Limit one accident $10,000,” rather than “ bodily injuries.” (Bakker v. Ætna Life Insurance Co., 148 Misc. 162 ; affd., 240 App. Div. 880 ; affd., 264 N. Y. 150 .) The soundness of this view is reinforced by a reference to further liability under the “ Special Conditions ” clause in which indemnity is furnished for litigation costs and interest arising from “ claims for injuries to persons.” The latter phrase includes loss of services and is synonym

1938The ambiguity thus resulting requires that full force be given to the coverage clause on the basis of limitation of liability of “ Personal Injury Limit one accident $10,000,” rather than “ bodily injuries.” (Bakker v. Ætna Life Insurance Co., 148 Misc. 162 ; affd., 240 App. Div. 880 ; affd., 264 N. Y. 150 .) The soundness of this view is reinforced by a reference to further liability under the “ Special Conditions ” clause in which indemnity is furnished for litigation costs and interest arising from “ claims for injuries to persons.” The latter phrase includes loss of services and is synonym

1938The ambiguity thus resulting requires that full force be given to the coverage clause on the basis of limitation of liability of “ Personal Injury Limit one accident $10,000,” rather than “ bodily injuries.” (Bakker v. Ætna Life Insurance Co., 148 Misc. 162 ; affd., 240 App. Div. 880 ; affd., 264 N. Y. 150 .) The soundness of this view is reinforced by a reference to further liability under the “ Special Conditions ” clause in which indemnity is furnished for litigation costs and interest arising from “ claims for injuries to persons.” The latter phrase includes loss of services and is synonym

1938The ambiguity thus resulting requires that full force be given to the coverage clause on the basis of limitation of liability of “ Personal Injury Limit one accident $10,000,” rather than “ bodily injuries.” (Bakker v. Ætna Life Insurance Co., 148 Misc. 162 ; affd., 240 App. Div. 880 ; affd., 264 N. Y. 150 .) The soundness of this view is reinforced by a reference to further liability under the “ Special Conditions ” clause in which indemnity is furnished for litigation costs and interest arising from “ claims for injuries to persons.” The latter phrase includes loss of services and is synonym

1938The ambiguity thus resulting requires that full force be given to the coverage clause on the basis of limitation of liability of “ Personal Injury Limit one accident $10,000,” rather than “ bodily injuries.” (Bakker v. Ætna Life Insurance Co., 148 Misc. 162 ; affd., 240 App. Div. 880 ; affd., 264 N. Y. 150 .) The soundness of this view is reinforced by a reference to further liability under the “ Special Conditions ” clause in which indemnity is furnished for litigation costs and interest arising from “ claims for injuries to persons.” The latter phrase includes loss of services and is synonym

1917Co. of North America, 58 id. 292 .) I am unable to see, however, why the defendant is not freed from liability by the last sentence of the coverage clause, wherein it is agreed that the policy should not cover in premises where assured’s property is being manufactured.