coverage defense in Florida

2013Co. v. Block Marina Inv., Inc., 544 So.2d 998 (Fla.1989), the notice requirement only applies where coverage exists under an insurance policy, but the insurer seeks to assert a coverage defense. “[T]he term ‘coverage defense,’ as used in section 627.426(2), means a defense to coverage that otherwise exists.

1989In AIU Insurance Company v. Block Marina Investment, Inc., 544 So.2d 998 (Fla. 1989) the supreme court refused to extend coverage to a particular loss specifically excluded from the policy, which coverage had been asserted to exist because of the insurance company's failure to comply with the provisions of section 627.426(2), Florida Statutes (1985), which prohibits the denial of coverage "based on a particular coverage defense" where the insurer has failed to give the insured certain notices required by the statute.

2018Co. v. Alicia Diagnostic, Inc., 961 So. 2d 1091, 1092 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (stating that “an insurer would be prejudiced by having to litigate either a bad faith claim or an unfair settlement practices claim in tandem with a coverage claim, because the evidence used to prove either bad faith or unfair settlement practices could jaundice the jury’s view on the coverage issue”); see also Progressive Select Ins.

2018Co. v. Alicia Diagnostic, Inc., 961 So. 2d 1091, 1092 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (stating that “an insurer would be prejudiced by having to litigate either a bad faith claim or an unfair settlement practices claim in tandem with a coverage claim, because the evidence used to prove either bad faith or unfair settlement practices could jaundice the jury’s view on the coverage issue”); see also Progressive Select Ins.

2025See Tower Hill Prime Ins. v. Bermudez, 388 So. 3d 165 , 170 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023); see also Jones v. Federated Nat'l Ins., 235 So. 3d 936, 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (reviewing de novo whether trial court applied the correct coverage doctrine in its jury instructions); cf. Samiian v. Johnson, 302 So. 3d 966 , 980 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (reviewing de novo whether trial court erred in allowing jury to determine causation and damages in a bad faith case).

2022Co. v. Myrick, 969 So. 2d 1121, 1124 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (finding the involvement of the judicial system was necessary where the insurer was asserting a coverage defense).

2018Co. v. Shockley, 951 So. 2d 20, 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“[The insurer] will suffer irreparable harm, which includes discovery of its accident file, if it is forced to defend against both the [uninsured motorist] claim and the bad faith claim simultaneously.”).

2014Co. v. O’Hearn, 975 So.2d 633, 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (stating that “[t]here is an abundance of case law that holds that a first-party bad faith claim does not accrue until there has been a final determination of both liability and damages in an underlying coverage claim”).

2006If, on the other hand, a coverage defense is determined successful in whole or in part, then Allstate would either not be liable, or would be liable only in part for the amount." 751 So.2d at 761 (citation omitted).

2006See OneBeacon, 898 So.2d at 115 ; Hartford, 864 So.2d at 1271-73 ; General Star, 741 So.2d at 1261 .

2004Assuming that we should use the CTC Development definition in interpreting this policy, the result still would not support Travelers' argument that a claim brought under Turner's objectively-substantially-certain standard, by definition and as a matter of law, cannot be considered a claim for "bodily injury by accident " and, therefore, necessarily falls outside the scope of the policy's coverage clause. [13] The flaw in this argument is that the CTC Development definition evaluated intent or expectation from the insured's subjective point of view. 720 So.2d at 1072 .

2004In defining the term "accident" in the coverage clause, we looked to the scope of the exclusionary clause on the ground that all "pertinent provisions [of the policy] should be read in pari materia. " Id. at 1075 (quoting Nationwide Mut.

2003The insured relies on the theory of estoppel which this court first recognized in Florida in Cigarette Racing Team, Inc. v. Parliament Insurance Co., 395 So.2d 1238, 1239-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), in which we explained: The issue on appeal is whether this case is controlled by the general rule that insurance coverage cannot be extended by waiver or estoppel or the exception to the rule that, when an insurance company assumes the defense of an action with knowledge of the lack of coverage, it may be estopped to raise the coverage defense.

1996These courts reach this conclusion based upon their emphasis on a distinction made in the coverage clause between the main policy period and discovery or tail period: Given the clear dichotomy drawn in [the Coverage Clause] between the "policy period" and the "discovery period," coupled with reference in the same clause to the nature of notice that can be given during the policy period under [the Notice of Claims Clause], we cannot conclude that the term "policy period"—as used in both [the Notice of Claims Clause] and [the Coverage Clause]—may reasonably be interpreted to encompass the "disco

1996These courts reach this conclusion based upon their emphasis on a distinction made in the coverage clause between the main policy period and discovery or tail period: Given the clear dichotomy drawn in [the Coverage Clause] between the "policy period" and the "discovery period," coupled with reference in the same clause to the nature of notice that can be given during the policy period under [the Notice of Claims Clause], we cannot conclude that the term "policy period"—as used in both [the Notice of Claims Clause] and [the Coverage Clause]—may reasonably be interpreted to encompass the "disco

1995Co. v. Melendez, 550 So.2d 156, 158 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (unpaid medical bill after auto accident), the court stated: "Based on the Florida Supreme Court's holding in Kujawa , it is not only proper to join a first party bad faith claim with a coverage claim, but it also appears that abatement is not necessary because the insured is not entitled to a broader scope of discovery in the first party bad faith cause of action." (citing Kelly ). [5] Whether one uses the rationale of Kujawa, Zayas and Melendez (no need to abate bad faith action because insurer's work product and attorney-client privile

1991See United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. American Fire and Indemnity Company, 511 So.2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), approved in A.I.U.