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16 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Morrisgreen2 sentences2014See Morris, 154 Ariz. at 119 , 741 P.2d at 252 (adopting “[t]he better result” that “permit[s] the insurer to raise the coverage defense, and also permit[s] an *540 insured to protect himself from the risk of noncoverage or excess judgment” when insurer defends under a reservation of rights). 2014See Morris, 154 Ariz. at 119 , 741 P.2d at 252 (adopting “[t]he better result” that “permit[s] the insurer to raise the coverage defense, and also permit[s] an *540 insured to protect himself from the risk of noncoverage or excess judgment” when insurer defends under a reservation of rights). | 3 | 7 |
Lone Star OB/GYN Associates v. Aetna Health Inc.green2 sentences2016Cf. 42 C.F.R. § 422.566 (providing that an MA Organization’s refusal to provide medical services to an enrollee is an “organization determination” governed by the Act); Lone Star OB/GYN Assocs. v. AETNA Health Inc., 579 F.3d 525, 531 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that a coverage claim includes a determination of what benefits are covered under the terms of a plan). 2016Cf. 42 C.F.R. § 422.566 (providing that an MA Organization’s refusal to provide medical services to an enrollee is an “organization determination” governed by the Act); Lone Star OB/GYN Assocs. v. AETNA Health Inc., 579 F.3d 525, 531 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that a coverage claim includes a determination of what benefits are covered 1 When RenCare was decided, Medicare Part C referred to “Medicare+Choice plans.” In 2003, Congress renamed those plans “Medicare Advantage plans.” See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, Pub. | 3 | 3 |
Waddell v. Titan Ins. Co., Inc.green2 sentences2004Co., 207 Ariz. 529, ¶ 19 , 88 P.3d 1141, 1146 (App.2004). ¶ 30 To alleviate this tension, the court in Morris opted for a “better result” that “per-mites] the insurer to raise the coverage defense, and also permit[s] an insured to protect himself from the risk of noncoverage or excess judgment, while at the same time protecting the insurer from unreasonable agreements between the claimant and the insured.” Morris, 154 Ariz. at 119 , 741 P.2d at 252 . 2004Co., 207 Ariz. 529, ¶ 19 , 88 P.3d 1141, 1146 (App.2004). ¶ 30 To alleviate this tension, the court in Morris opted for a “better result” that “per-mites] the insurer to raise the coverage defense, and also permit[s] an insured to protect himself from the risk of noncoverage or excess judgment, while at the same time protecting the insurer from unreasonable agreements between the claimant and the insured.” Morris, 154 Ariz. at 119 , 741 P.2d at 252 . | 2 | 2 |
Commercial Union Insurance v. Lewis & Rocagreen2 sentences2017See Lewis & Roca, 183 Ariz. 250, 257-58 , 902 P.2d 1354 (holding that the limitations period for filing a claim against an attorney who had advised an insurer to deny a coverage claim did not commence when a lawsuit was filed against the insurer, but instead began when a court rul *446 ing in the coverage lawsuit made clear that the position advanced by the lawyer was incorrect). ¶ 17 Applying that approach here, we conclude that the superior court erred by finding that the limitations period necessarily commenced upon the IRS’s issuance of a notice of deficiency. 2017See Lewis & Roca, 183 Ariz. 250, 257-58 , 902 P.2d 1354 (holding that the limitations period for filing a claim against an attorney who had advised an insurer to deny a coverage claim did not commence when a lawsuit was filed against the insurer, but instead began when a court rul *446 ing in the coverage lawsuit made clear that the position advanced by the lawyer was incorrect). ¶ 17 Applying that approach here, we conclude that the superior court erred by finding that the limitations period necessarily commenced upon the IRS’s issuance of a notice of deficiency. | 1 | 1 |
Do Sung Uhm v. Humana, Inc.green2 sentences2015Uhm, 620 F.3d at 1143-44 ; see Heckler, 466 U.S. at 618 , 104 S.Ct. 2013 (coverage claim involved denial of coverage for certain surgical procedures); Giesse, 476 F.Supp.2d at 740, 743 (coverage claim involved denial of benefits for post-hospital skilled nursing facility). 2015Uhm, 620 F.3d at 1145 (in establishing a wholly collateral claim, a plaintiff “may be able to prove elements of [his tort] causes of action without regard to any of the provisions of the [Medicare] Act relating to the provision of benefits”); McCall, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 271 , 21 P.3d at 1200 (because the plaintiffs “may be able to prove the elements of some or all of their causes of action without regard, or only incidentally, to Medicare coverage determinations,” the court held that “none of their causes of action seeks, at bottom, payment or reimbursement of a Medicare claim or falls within the | 1 | 1 |
Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc.green1 sentence2015See RenCare, 395 F.3d at 558 (holding that services for which payment was sought by provider had been approved by the MAO and, therefore, the dispute was a payment dispute, not a coverage dispute subject to Medicare appeals process); Lakeland, 871 So.2d at 382-83 (payment dispute concerning delay in payment for covered services was not subject to Medicare appeals process); Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc., 237 S.W.3d 338, 340, 344 (Tex.2007) (payment dispute between MAO and provider as to liability of MAO for covered services due to insolvency by MAO’s subsidiary was not subject to Me | 1 | 1 |
Lakeland Anesth., Inc. v. United Health. of La.green1 sentence2015See RenCare, 395 F.3d at 558 (holding that services for which payment was sought by provider had been approved by the MAO and, therefore, the dispute was a payment dispute, not a coverage dispute subject to Medicare appeals process); Lakeland, 871 So.2d at 382-83 (payment dispute concerning delay in payment for covered services was not subject to Medicare appeals process); Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc., 237 S.W.3d 338, 340, 344 (Tex.2007) (payment dispute between MAO and provider as to liability of MAO for covered services due to insolvency by MAO’s subsidiary was not subject to Me | 1 | 1 |
Giesse v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Servicesgreen1 sentence2015Uhm, 620 F.3d at 1143-44 ; see Heckler, 466 U.S. at 618 , 104 S.Ct. 2013 (coverage claim involved denial of coverage for certain surgical procedures); Giesse, 476 F.Supp.2d at 740, 743 (coverage claim involved denial of benefits for post-hospital skilled nursing facility). | 1 | 1 |
Montefiore Medical Center v. Teamsters Local 272green2 sentences2015Montefiore, 642 F.3d at 327-28 (based on ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B), an action “to recover benefits due” or to “enforce ... rights under the terms of the plan” is a coverage claim subject to ERISA’s civil remedy provisions). 2015See RenCare, 395 F.3d at 558 (holding that services for which payment was sought by provider had been approved by the MAO and, therefore, the dispute was a payment dispute, not a coverage dispute subject to Medicare appeals process); Lakeland, 871 So.2d at 382-83 (payment dispute concerning delay in payment for covered services was not subject to Medicare appeals process); Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc., 237 S.W.3d 338, 340, 344 (Tex.2007) (payment dispute between MAO and provider as to liability of MAO for covered services due to insolvency by MAO’s subsidiary was not subject to Me | 1 | 1 |
Affiliated Professional Home Health Care Agency v. Shalalagreen1 sentence2015Uhm, 620 F.3d at 1141-42 ; see Affiliated Prof'l Home Health Care Agency v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 282 , 286 (5th Cir.1999) (finding that claims, despite being presented as constitutional claims, were inextricably intertwined with a claim of entitlement to Medicare benefits and subject to the Medicare administrative appeals procedure). ¶ 31 Here, the Providers seek to avoid the mandatory Medicare administrative procedure by casting their claims as payment *567 disputes that do not arise under Medicare. | 1 | 1 |
Rencare, Ltd. v. Humana Health Plan of Texas, Inc., Doing Business as Humana Health Plan of San Antonio Humana Hmo of Texas, Inc.green1 sentence2015See RenCare, 395 F.3d at 558 (holding that services for which payment was sought by provider had been approved by the MAO and, therefore, the dispute was a payment dispute, not a coverage dispute subject to Medicare appeals process); Lakeland, 871 So.2d at 382-83 (payment dispute concerning delay in payment for covered services was not subject to Medicare appeals process); Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc., 237 S.W.3d 338, 340, 344 (Tex.2007) (payment dispute between MAO and provider as to liability of MAO for covered services due to insolvency by MAO’s subsidiary was not subject to Me | 1 | 1 |
Heckler v. Ringergreen2 sentences2015Uhm, 620 F.3d at 1143-44 ; see Heckler, 466 U.S. at 618 , 104 S.Ct. 2013 (coverage claim involved denial of coverage for certain surgical procedures); Giesse, 476 F.Supp.2d at 740, 743 (coverage claim involved denial of benefits for post-hospital skilled nursing facility). 2015Uhm, 620 F.3d at 1143-44 ; see Heckler, 466 U.S. at 618 , 104 S.Ct. 2013 (coverage claim involved denial of coverage for certain surgical procedures); Giesse, 476 F.Supp.2d at 740, 743 (coverage claim involved denial of benefits for post-hospital skilled nursing facility). | 1 | 1 |
Rashid v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences2012Rashid, 163 Ariz. at 275 , 787 P.2d at 1071 (“[T]he exceptions permitted are those allowed by the statutes, not those insurers may put in the policy.”). 2012Rashid, 163 Ariz. at 275 , 787 P.2d at 1071 (“[T]he exceptions permitted are those allowed by the statutes, not those insurers may put in the policy.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona v. Vagnozzi
green
2 sentences2004Id. at 447 , 675 P.2d at 707 ; see also Morris, 154 Ariz. at 120, 121 , 741 P.2d at 253, 254 (noting that, under Vagnozzi “insurers are not even bound by litigated issues as to which there was a conflict of interest” and that insurer on remand was “not bound by any factual stipulations” and was “free to litigate the facts of the coverage defense”). ¶ 44 Based on Restatement § 58 and Vag-nozzi AAU asserts that the very fact that it defended the underlying cases under a reservation of rights, in and of itself, establishes there was a patent conflict of interest between it and TAA/City on all asp 2004Id. at 447 , 675 P.2d at 707 ; see also Morris, 154 Ariz. at 120, 121 , 741 P.2d at 253, 254 (noting that, under Vagnozzi “insurers are not even bound by litigated issues as to which there was a conflict of interest” and that insurer on remand was “not bound by any factual stipulations” and was “free to litigate the facts of the coverage defense”). ¶ 44 Based on Restatement § 58 and Vag-nozzi AAU asserts that the very fact that it defended the underlying cases under a reservation of rights, in and of itself, establishes there was a patent conflict of interest between it and TAA/City on all asp | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2017An award of bad faith damages based upon an alleged inadequate or unreasonable investigation is foreclosed when there is no coverage for the claim, see id., however, an insured need not prevail on a coverage claim for breach of contract in order to recover for bad faith premised on other evidence. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
McCall v. PacifiCare of California, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015Uhm, 620 F.3d at 1145 (in establishing a wholly collateral claim, a plaintiff “may be able to prove elements of [his tort] causes of action without regard to any of the provisions of the [Medicare] Act relating to the provision of benefits”); McCall, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 271 , 21 P.3d at 1200 (because the plaintiffs “may be able to prove the elements of some or all of their causes of action without regard, or only incidentally, to Medicare coverage determinations,” the court held that “none of their causes of action seeks, at bottom, payment or reimbursement of a Medicare claim or falls within the | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Main & Associates, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
green
2 sentences2015Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 90 So.3d at 164 ; cf. Montefiore Med. 2015Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 90 So.3d at 167 ; see Lone Star OB/GYN Assoc, v. Aetna Health Inc., 579 F.3d 525, 531 (5th Cir.2009) (holding that a coverage claim involves a “determination of benefits under the terms of a plan — i.e., what is ‘medically necessary’ or a ‘Covered Service’ ”). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Miller v. Shugart
green
1 sentence1999The court, relying on a Minnesota case, Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729 (Minn.1982), concluded: The better result would permit the insurer to raise the coverage defense, and also permit an insured to protect himself from the risk of noncoverage or excess judgment, while at the same time protecting the insurer from unreasonable agreements between the claimant and the insured. 154 Ariz. at 119 , 741 P.2d at 252 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
McCollum v. Insurance Co. of North America
green
2 sentences1984Although the liability policy at issue there was not identical with the one sub judice, it did contain the same coverage clause for “injury to or destruction of tangible property.” INA argued that the loss of anticipated profits did not constitute “injury to or destruction of tangible property.” The court concluded that “it is our opinion that the INA policy did not cover the intangible losses of future profits on land purchases.” (Emphasis supplied). 132 Ariz. at 132 , 644 P.2d at 286 . 1984Although the liability policy at issue there was not identical with the one sub judice, it did contain the same coverage clause for “injury to or destruction of tangible property.” INA argued that the loss of anticipated profits did not constitute “injury to or destruction of tangible property.” The court concluded that “it is our opinion that the INA policy did not cover the intangible losses of future profits on land purchases.” (Emphasis supplied). 132 Ariz. at 132 , 644 P.2d at 286 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Alexander
green
2 sentences1983State v. Alexander, 108 Ariz. 556 , 503 P.2d 777 (1972); Udall & Livermore, Law of Evidence § 74, at 141 (2d ed. 1982). 1983State v. Alexander, 108 Ariz. 556 , 503 P.2d 777 (1972); Udall & Livermore, Law of Evidence § 74, at 141 (2d ed. 1982). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Dickerson v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences1978The rule of Dickerson v. Hartford Accident, 56 Ariz. 70 , 105 P.2d 517 (1940), does not apply to the language involved here. 1978The rule of Dickerson v. Hartford Accident, 56 Ariz. 70 , 105 P.2d 517 (1940), does not apply to the language involved here. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.