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6 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1988–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kelley v. Iantoscagreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Kelley v. Ian-tosca, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 147, 155 (2010) (if it is clear from the record that a loss falls squarely within a stated policy exclusion, denial of coverage and resulting summary judgment are proper). 14 In sum, the evidence of the summary judgment record placed the claimed loss indisputably outside the coverage clause for loss by reason of an event of collapse and inside the exclusionary clause for loss by reason of earth movement. | 1 | 1 |
Ranger Insurance v. Air-Speed, Inc.green1 sentence2007Co. v. Air-Speed, Inc., 9 Mass.App.Ct. 403 , 406 n.9 (1980) (“[t]hat burden did not shift merely because it was the insurer which initiated the declaratory judgment proceedings”). | 1 | 1 |
Feinberg v. Commercial Union Insurancegreen1 sentence2004Co., 54 Mass.App.Ct. 587, 592 (2002), the court stated that “(ejxclusion provisions should be interpreted in a commonsense manner with due attention to the circumstances of the accident giving rise to a coverage claim.” In this case, the circumstances involve a train of events that began with the act or omission of an employee, and ended with different results in different locations. | 1 | 1 |
Cardin v. Royal Insurance Co. of Americagreen1 sentence1988Co., 394 Mass. 450, 456-457 (1985). *712 Within the discretion the statutes give the commissioner to decide the terms of a standard motor vehicle policy, he has the right to define the coverage which the standard motor vehicle policy will provide. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Highlands Insurance v. Aerovox Inc.
green
2 sentences2007Co. v. Aerovox, Inc., 424 Mass. 226 , 230 & n.8 (1997) (claimant under insurance policy “bears the initial burden of prov[ing] that the loss [is] within the description of the risks covered’ exclusion in same paragraph as coverage clause “is considered part of the coverage clause for purposes of burden of proof); Ranger Ins. 1998Co. v. Aerovox Inc., 424 Mass. 226 , 232 n.8 (“determining which party bears the burden of proving an exclusion is dependent on the location of the exclusion in the insurance policy: where the exclusion is in the same paragraph as the coverage clause, the exclusion is considered part of the coverage clause for purposes of burden of proof, but where the exclusion is in a separate and distinct part of the insurance policy, the exclusion is treated separately from the coverage clause and the burden shifts to the insurer” (citations omitted)). | 2 | 1998–2007 |
Western Alliance Insurance v. Gill
green
2 sentences2006The insurer “may have expected the provision to sweep broadly,” but the court must interpret and apply the pollution exclusion “in a commonsense manner with due attention to the circumstances of the accident giving rise to a coverage claim.” Id. 2006Entering judgment in favor of the insured, the court stated that “the exclusion should not reflexively be applied to acci dents arising during the course of normal business activities simply because they involve a ‘discharge, dispersal, release or escape’ of an ‘irritant or contaminant.’ ’’ Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.