8 Rhode Island opinions name it 1 courts 1994–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ferreira v. Strackgreen2 sentences1999We noted in Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682 (R.I.1994) that: “In the past this court has recognized the difficulty of crafting a workable test to determine whether a duty exists in a particular case. * * * (‘[T]he problem of duty is as broad as the whole law of negligence, and * * * no universal test for it ever has been formulated’) * * *. 1996See Ferreira, 636 A.2d at 685 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Muhammadgreen1 sentence2023See Muhammad, 451 P.3d at 1073 (“[T]o conclude that one cell phone ping is not a search, provided it lasts less than six hours, yet hold 10 Detective Sohn testified that defendant’s phone was “pinged” four times. - 22 - multiple or longer pings do qualify as search is not a workable analysis.”).11 To do so would be to draw an arbitrary line, unrelated to an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. | 1 | 1 |
D'Ambra v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., D'Ambra, 114 R.I. at 648-49 , 338 A.2d at 527 (observing that “the problem of duty is as broad as the whole law of negligence, and that no universal test for it ever has been formulated,” quoting Prosser, Torts § 53 (4th ed. 1971)); Radigan v. W.J. 1994See, e.g., D'Ambra, 114 R.I. at 648-49 , 338 A.2d at 527 (observing that “the problem of duty is as broad as the whole law of negligence, and that no universal test for it ever has been formulated,” quoting Prosser, Torts § 53 (4th ed. 1971)); Radigan v. W.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smiler v. Napolitano
green
2 sentences2021Lusi Construction, Inc., 934 A.2d at 798 (quoting Smiler v. Napolitano, 911 A.2d 1035 , 1039 n.5 (R.I. 2006)), we hold that this provision is not self-executing. 2007Smiler, 911 A.2d at 1039 n. 5. | 2 | 2007–2021 |
Oliver v. United States
green
2 sentences2023In both Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), and Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), the Supreme Court warned against such an ad hoc analysis, explaining that a case-by-case approach would not provide law enforcement with a workable framework and thus a categorical approach was necessary. 2023Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181 ; Riley, 573 U.S. at 398. - 23 - 573 U.S. at 385). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
A.F. Lusi Construction, Inc. v. Rhode Island Convention Center Authority
green
1 sentence2021Lusi Construction, Inc., 934 A.2d at 798 (quoting Smiler v. Napolitano, 911 A.2d 1035 , 1039 n.5 (R.I. 2006)), we hold that this provision is not self-executing. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Coker v. Georgia
green
2 sentences2004The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” In Coker v. Geor *467 gia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 , 97 S.Ct. 2861 , 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that a death sentence was grossly disproportionate to the .crime of raping an adult woman and, thus, violated the Eighth Amendment. -The Court concluded that “a punishment is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless an 2004The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” In Coker v. Geor *467 gia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 , 97 S.Ct. 2861 , 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that a death sentence was grossly disproportionate to the .crime of raping an adult woman and, thus, violated the Eighth Amendment. -The Court concluded that “a punishment is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless an | 1 | 2004–2004 |
In Re Doe
green
2 sentences2000Although we had previously invalidated attempts by the General Assembly to enact statutes that required a complete ban on the production of health care information through compulsory legal process in Al-monte and Bartlett , both supra, in In re Doe we declared § 5-37.3-6.1, 5 the latest *825 foray in the Legislature’s unflagging efforts to create a workable rule of judicial privilege for health care information, to be “a means by which information could be disclosed in a judicial proceeding without obviating a patient’s right to contest the disclosure.” In re Doe, 717 A.2d at 1133 . 2000We held that the requirement that an individual whose health care information is sought to be disclosed be provided with notice and an opportunity to contest such disclosure, in light of a statutory presumption in favor of privacy of the records, is “a permissible balance between a party’s interest in maintaining the confidentiality of his or her personal health care records and the court’s need to access relevant information.” Id. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.