workable standard in Connecticut

1999Stow v. Converse, 4 Conn. 17 , 33 . (1821). "`A workable test [of the substantial truth of the statement] is whether the libel as published would have a different effect on CT Page 6819 the mind of the reader from which the pleaded truth would have produced.'" Griffin v. Clemow, 28 Conn. Sup. 109 , 111 , 251 A.2d 415 (1968), quoting Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19 , 23 ." "It is not necessary for the defendant to prove the truth of every word of the libel.

1968In Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19, 23 , it was stated: “A workable test is whether the libel as published would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced. ‘When the truth is so near to the facts that fine and shaded distinctions must be drawn and words pressed out of their ordinary usage to sustain a charge of libel, no legal harm has been done’.” In Stow v. Converse, supra, our Supreme Court said: “The term substance is used by way of contradistinction, from the letter and form of a charge; and although the latter is not req

1999Stow v. Converse, 4 Conn. 17 , 33 . (1821). "`A workable test [of the substantial truth of the statement] is whether the libel as published would have a different effect on CT Page 6819 the mind of the reader from which the pleaded truth would have produced.'" Griffin v. Clemow, 28 Conn. Sup. 109 , 111 , 251 A.2d 415 (1968), quoting Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19 , 23 ." "It is not necessary for the defendant to prove the truth of every word of the libel.

1968In Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19, 23 , it was stated: “A workable test is whether the libel as published would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced. ‘When the truth is so near to the facts that fine and shaded distinctions must be drawn and words pressed out of their ordinary usage to sustain a charge of libel, no legal harm has been done’.” In Stow v. Converse, supra, our Supreme Court said: “The term substance is used by way of contradistinction, from the letter and form of a charge; and although the latter is not req

2009Both parties, however, at various times, have admitted to Kennish's qualifications in at least some aspect of premises security. [7] "Inasmuch as neither party argues for a different harmless [impropriety] standard in civil cases than the well established [likely] would [have] affect[ed] the result standard recently applied in Prentice v. Dalco Electric, Inc., [ 280 Conn. 336, 358 , 907 A.2d 1204 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1266 , 127 S.Ct. 1494 , 167 L.Ed.2d 230 (2007)], and Dinan v. Marchand, supra, 279 Conn. at 567 , 903 A.2d 201 , we apply that formulation in the present case, notwithst

2009Both parties, however, at various times, have admitted to Kennish's qualifications in at least some aspect of premises security. [7] "Inasmuch as neither party argues for a different harmless [impropriety] standard in civil cases than the well established [likely] would [have] affect[ed] the result standard recently applied in Prentice v. Dalco Electric, Inc., [ 280 Conn. 336, 358 , 907 A.2d 1204 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1266 , 127 S.Ct. 1494 , 167 L.Ed.2d 230 (2007)], and Dinan v. Marchand, supra, 279 Conn. at 567 , 903 A.2d 201 , we apply that formulation in the present case, notwithst

2009Both parties, however, at various times, have admitted to Kennish's qualifications in at least some aspect of premises security. [7] "Inasmuch as neither party argues for a different harmless [impropriety] standard in civil cases than the well established [likely] would [have] affect[ed] the result standard recently applied in Prentice v. Dalco Electric, Inc., [ 280 Conn. 336, 358 , 907 A.2d 1204 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1266 , 127 S.Ct. 1494 , 167 L.Ed.2d 230 (2007)], and Dinan v. Marchand, supra, 279 Conn. at 567 , 903 A.2d 201 , we apply that formulation in the present case, notwithst

2009Both parties, however, at various times, have admitted to Kennish's qualifications in at least some aspect of premises security. [7] "Inasmuch as neither party argues for a different harmless [impropriety] standard in civil cases than the well established [likely] would [have] affect[ed] the result standard recently applied in Prentice v. Dalco Electric, Inc., [ 280 Conn. 336, 358 , 907 A.2d 1204 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1266 , 127 S.Ct. 1494 , 167 L.Ed.2d 230 (2007)], and Dinan v. Marchand, supra, 279 Conn. at 567 , 903 A.2d 201 , we apply that formulation in the present case, notwithst

2009Both parties, however, at various times, have admitted to Kennish's qualifications in at least some aspect of premises security. [7] "Inasmuch as neither party argues for a different harmless [impropriety] standard in civil cases than the well established [likely] would [have] affect[ed] the result standard recently applied in Prentice v. Dalco Electric, Inc., [ 280 Conn. 336, 358 , 907 A.2d 1204 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1266 , 127 S.Ct. 1494 , 167 L.Ed.2d 230 (2007)], and Dinan v. Marchand, supra, 279 Conn. at 567 , 903 A.2d 201 , we apply that formulation in the present case, notwithst

2009Both parties, however, at various times, have admitted to Kennish's qualifications in at least some aspect of premises security. [7] "Inasmuch as neither party argues for a different harmless [impropriety] standard in civil cases than the well established [likely] would [have] affect[ed] the result standard recently applied in Prentice v. Dalco Electric, Inc., [ 280 Conn. 336, 358 , 907 A.2d 1204 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1266 , 127 S.Ct. 1494 , 167 L.Ed.2d 230 (2007)], and Dinan v. Marchand, supra, 279 Conn. at 567 , 903 A.2d 201 , we apply that formulation in the present case, notwithst

2009Both parties, however, at various times, have admitted to Kennish's qualifications in at least some aspect of premises security. [7] "Inasmuch as neither party argues for a different harmless [impropriety] standard in civil cases than the well established [likely] would [have] affect[ed] the result standard recently applied in Prentice v. Dalco Electric, Inc., [ 280 Conn. 336, 358 , 907 A.2d 1204 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1266 , 127 S.Ct. 1494 , 167 L.Ed.2d 230 (2007)], and Dinan v. Marchand, supra, 279 Conn. at 567 , 903 A.2d 201 , we apply that formulation in the present case, notwithst

1999Stow v. Converse, 4 Conn. 17 , 33 . (1821). "`A workable test [of the substantial truth of the statement] is whether the libel as published would have a different effect on CT Page 6819 the mind of the reader from which the pleaded truth would have produced.'" Griffin v. Clemow, 28 Conn. Sup. 109 , 111 , 251 A.2d 415 (1968), quoting Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19 , 23 ." "It is not necessary for the defendant to prove the truth of every word of the libel.

1999Stow v. Converse, 4 Conn. 17 , 33 . (1821). "`A workable test [of the substantial truth of the statement] is whether the libel as published would have a different effect on CT Page 6819 the mind of the reader from which the pleaded truth would have produced.'" Griffin v. Clemow, 28 Conn. Sup. 109 , 111 , 251 A.2d 415 (1968), quoting Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19 , 23 ." "It is not necessary for the defendant to prove the truth of every word of the libel.

1999If he succeeds in proving that "the main charge, or gist, of the libel" is true, he need not justify statements or comments which do not add to the sting of the charge or introduce any matter by itself actionable.'" Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107 , 113 , 438 A.2d 1317 (1982), quoting Gatley, Libel and Slander (2d Ed.) p. 178.

1998I cannot comprehend a principled basis for concluding, for example, that the harm that results from either the infringement of the constitutional right to “a public school education that is not substantially impaired by racial and ethnic isolation”; Sheff v. O’Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 24 , 678 A.2d 1267 (1996); or the infringement of constitutional free speech rights is less “special” than the harm that results from the infringement of the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures.

1998I cannot comprehend a principled basis for concluding, for example, that the harm that results from either the infringement of the constitutional right to “a public school education that is not substantially impaired by racial and ethnic isolation”; Sheff v. O’Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 24 , 678 A.2d 1267 (1996); or the infringement of constitutional free speech rights is less “special” than the harm that results from the infringement of the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures.

1985Ed. 2d 274 (1972); Ryszkiewicz v. New Britain, 193 Conn. 589, 597 , 479 A.2d 793 (1984). 14 In searching for an appropriate and workable standard that is consistent with the mandate of Horton I, we may fruitfully borrow a framework of analysis that federal courts have devised to assess the constitutionality of state legislative apportionment plans.

1985Ed. 2d 274 (1972); Ryszkiewicz v. New Britain, 193 Conn. 589, 597 , 479 A.2d 793 (1984). 14 In searching for an appropriate and workable standard that is consistent with the mandate of Horton I, we may fruitfully borrow a framework of analysis that federal courts have devised to assess the constitutionality of state legislative apportionment plans.

1985The Supreme Court of the United States has acknowledged that the equal protection clause, in that context, although it requires “strict scrutiny [of] classifications bearing on the right to vote in state elections”; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 233 , 102 S. Ct. 2382 , 72 L.

1985The Supreme Court of the United States has acknowledged that the equal protection clause, in that context, although it requires “strict scrutiny [of] classifications bearing on the right to vote in state elections”; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 233 , 102 S. Ct. 2382 , 72 L.