workable standard in California

1959Indeed, such attempts have been made without avail.” And in People v. Berry (1955), 44 Cal.2d 426, 433 [8] [ 282 P.2d 861 ], we unanimously repeated that arguments for change in the test should be made to the Legislature rather than the courts.

1959Indeed, such attempts have been made without avail.” And in People v. Berry (1955), 44 Cal.2d 426, 433 [8] [ 282 P.2d 861 ], we unanimously repeated that arguments for change in the test should be made to the Legislature rather than the courts.

2018(Accord, City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905 , 919, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 483 , 182 P.3d 1027 ["we may reasonably infer that [our Legislature] intended an interpretation producing practical and workable results"].) Treating an interim decision not to prosecute as definite ignores the practical realities of criminal investigations.

2018(Accord, City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905 , 919, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 483 , 182 P.3d 1027 ["we may reasonably infer that [our Legislature] intended an interpretation producing practical and workable results"].) Treating an interim decision not to prosecute as definite ignores the practical realities of criminal investigations.

1999(See People v. Lloyd (1998) 17 Cal.4th 658, 667 , 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 224 , 951 P.2d 1191 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.) [chronicling 15 previous attempts by this court to articulate the scope of the certificate of probable cause requirement].) Our jurisprudence "gives fresh meaning to the phrase, `[We're] from the government and [we're] here to help you.'" ( U.S. v. Gomez (9th Cir.1996) 92 F.3d 770, 772 .) It is as if we were trying to render the certificate of probable cause requirement, which is designed "to promote judicial economy" ( People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 75 , 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 851

1999(See People v. Lloyd (1998) 17 Cal.4th 658, 667 , 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 224 , 951 P.2d 1191 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.) [chronicling 15 previous attempts by this court to articulate the scope of the certificate of probable cause requirement].) Our jurisprudence "gives fresh meaning to the phrase, `[We're] from the government and [we're] here to help you.'" ( U.S. v. Gomez (9th Cir.1996) 92 F.3d 770, 772 .) It is as if we were trying to render the certificate of probable cause requirement, which is designed "to promote judicial economy" ( People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 75 , 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 851

1999(See People v. Lloyd (1998) 17 Cal.4th 658, 667 , 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 224 , 951 P.2d 1191 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.) [chronicling 15 previous attempts by this court to articulate the scope of the certificate of probable cause requirement].) Our jurisprudence "gives fresh meaning to the phrase, `[We're] from the government and [we're] here to help you.'" ( U.S. v. Gomez (9th Cir.1996) 92 F.3d 770, 772 .) It is as if we were trying to render the certificate of probable cause requirement, which is designed "to promote judicial economy" ( People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 75 , 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 851

1999(See People v. Lloyd (1998) 17 Cal.4th 658, 667 , 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 224 , 951 P.2d 1191 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.) [chronicling 15 previous attempts by this court to articulate the scope of the certificate of probable cause requirement].) Our jurisprudence "gives fresh meaning to the phrase, `[We're] from the government and [we're] here to help you.'" ( U.S. v. Gomez (9th Cir.1996) 92 F.3d 770, 772 .) It is as if we were trying to render the certificate of probable cause requirement, which is designed "to promote judicial economy" ( People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 75 , 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 851

2020(See Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 952 [the wage orders are intended to accord workers “a modicum of dignity and self-respect”].) Apple’s personal convenience argument rings especially hollow with regard to personal Apple technology devices, such as an iPhone.

2012(See Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 19 [the scope of the search must be commensurate with the rationale authorizing it].) Justice Liu urges that our holding “defines the scope of a valid search in terms that exceed the scope of the parole search condition.” (Conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 938.) Our colleague would hold that a properly conducted parole search is limited to “the parolee’s person and to ‘any property under [the parolee’s] control.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2511, subd. (b)4.) 20 He contends that the “available authority interprets ‘control’ mo

2011In the case of a nuisance abatement, the Commission could not “impose conditions to protect coastal resources,” because the power to do so “would improperly circumscribe the power of a local government to abate nuisances.” (IL 78-73, supra, p. 3, fn. 3.) However, the opinion added that “[i]f the owner’s activity exceeds the amount necessary to abate the nuisance, the owner of course must obtain a coastal permit for that additional work.” (Id. at p. 4.) These authorities point to an appropriate and workable rule that has been endorsed by Commission staff and which we adopt here: “[W]here a loca

2011In the case of a nuisance abatement, the Commission could not “impose conditions to protect coastal resources,” because the power to do so “would improperly circumscribe the power of a local government to abate nuisances.” (IL 78-73, supra, p. 3, fn. 3.) However, the opinion added that “[i]f the owner’s activity exceeds the amount necessary to abate the nuisance, the owner of course must obtain a coastal permit for that additional work.” (Id. at p. 4.) These authorities point to an appropriate and workable rule that has been endorsed by Commission staff and which we adopt here: “[W]here a loca

2011In the case of a nuisance abatement, the Commission could not “impose conditions to protect coastal resources,” because the power to do so “would improperly circumscribe the power of a local government to abate nuisances.” (IL 78-73, supra, p. 3, fn. 3.) However, the opinion added that “[i]f the owner’s activity exceeds the amount necessary to abate the nuisance, the owner of course must obtain a coastal permit for that additional work.” (Id. at p. 4.) These authorities point to an appropriate and workable rule that has been endorsed by Commission staff and which we adopt here: “[W]here a loca

2011In the case of a nuisance abatement, the Commission could not “impose conditions to protect coastal resources,” because the power to do so “would improperly circumscribe the power of a local government to abate nuisances.” (IL 78-73, supra, p. 3, fn. 3.) However, the opinion added that “[i]f the owner’s activity exceeds the amount necessary to abate the nuisance, the owner of course must obtain a coastal permit for that additional work.” (Id. at p. 4.) These authorities point to an appropriate and workable rule that has been endorsed by Commission staff and which we adopt here: “[W]here a loca

2008(Roderick, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 277 [although record indicated the petitioner had a long criminal history, court required the Board to hold a new hearing, noting inmate’s age and “the immutability of [his] past criminal history and its diminishing predictive value for future conduct”]; Elkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 498-499 [recognizing that the predictive value of the commitment offense may be very questionable after a long period of time, and concluding that “[g]iven the lapse of 26 years and the exemplary rehabilitative gains made by [the petitioner] over that time, continued

2008(Roderick, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 277 [although record indicated the petitioner had a long criminal history, court required the Board to hold a new hearing, noting inmate’s age and “the immutability of [his] past criminal history and its diminishing predictive value for future conduct”]; Elkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 498-499 [recognizing that the predictive value of the commitment offense may be very questionable after a long period of time, and concluding that “[g]iven the lapse of 26 years and the exemplary rehabilitative gains made by [the petitioner] over that time, continued

2005Otherwise, the Board's case-by-case rulings would destroy the proportionality contemplated by Penal Code section 3041, subdivision (a). ..." ( Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 683 , 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104 , 59 P.3d 174 , italics added.) [2] *447 The majority's standard is not only inconsistent with the pertinent statute and with Rosenkrantz , it does not articulate a workable standard of judicial review.

2005Otherwise, the Board's case-by-case rulings would destroy the proportionality contemplated by Penal Code section 3041, subdivision (a). ..." ( Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 683 , 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104 , 59 P.3d 174 , italics added.) [2] *447 The majority's standard is not only inconsistent with the pertinent statute and with Rosenkrantz , it does not articulate a workable standard of judicial review.

2001(See, e.g., Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery (1998) 19 Cal.4th 714, 729-730 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 506 , 968 P.2d 65 ]; see also Rick’s Electric, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1035 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 ].) These definitions provide a workable rule for section 798.86 penalty purposes. 3 The trial court’s statement of decision indicates that it properly understood and correctly applied the term “willful” to landlord’s conduct for section *830 798.86 penalty purposes.

2001(See, e.g., Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery (1998) 19 Cal.4th 714, 729-730 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 506 , 968 P.2d 65 ]; see also Rick’s Electric, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1035 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 ].) These definitions provide a workable rule for section 798.86 penalty purposes. 3 The trial court’s statement of decision indicates that it properly understood and correctly applied the term “willful” to landlord’s conduct for section *830 798.86 penalty purposes.

2001(See, e.g., Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery (1998) 19 Cal.4th 714, 729-730 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 506 , 968 P.2d 65 ]; see also Rick’s Electric, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1035 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 ].) These definitions provide a workable rule for section 798.86 penalty purposes. 3 The trial court’s statement of decision indicates that it properly understood and correctly applied the term “willful” to landlord’s conduct for section *830 798.86 penalty purposes.

2001(See, e.g., Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery (1998) 19 Cal.4th 714, 729-730 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 506 , 968 P.2d 65 ]; see also Rick’s Electric, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1035 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 ].) These definitions provide a workable rule for section 798.86 penalty purposes. 3 The trial court’s statement of decision indicates that it properly understood and correctly applied the term “willful” to landlord’s conduct for section *830 798.86 penalty purposes.

1999(See also People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1105 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.) [“Thousands upon thousands of more words, and still no closer to a workable standard.”].) As with Gallego, supra, 18 Cal.4th 825 , and In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153 , 959 P.2d 311 ], today’s efforts are “ill-advised and counterproductive . . . , creating a Byzantine system of procedural hurdles, each riddled with exceptions and fact-intensive qualifications, [which] only underminef] their intended purpose [of integrity of judgments, finality, and comity].” (Gallego, supra, 18 Cal.4th a

1999(See also People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1105 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.) [“Thousands upon thousands of more words, and still no closer to a workable standard.”].) As with Gallego, supra, 18 Cal.4th 825 , and In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153 , 959 P.2d 311 ], today’s efforts are “ill-advised and counterproductive . . . , creating a Byzantine system of procedural hurdles, each riddled with exceptions and fact-intensive qualifications, [which] only underminef] their intended purpose [of integrity of judgments, finality, and comity].” (Gallego, supra, 18 Cal.4th a

1999(See also People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1105 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.) [“Thousands upon thousands of more words, and still no closer to a workable standard.”].) As with Gallego, supra, 18 Cal.4th 825 , and In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153 , 959 P.2d 311 ], today’s efforts are “ill-advised and counterproductive . . . , creating a Byzantine system of procedural hurdles, each riddled with exceptions and fact-intensive qualifications, [which] only underminef] their intended purpose [of integrity of judgments, finality, and comity].” (Gallego, supra, 18 Cal.4th a

1999(See also People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1105 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 969 P.2d 146 (cone. opn. of Brown, J.) ["Thousands upon thousands of more words, and still no closer to a workable standard."].) As with Gallego, supra, 18 Cal.4th 825 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 132 , 959 P.2d 290 , and In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153 , 959 P.2d 311 , today's efforts are "ill-advised and counterproductive ..., creating a Byzantine system of procedural hurdles, each riddled with exceptions and fact-intensive qualifications, [which] only undermine[ ] their intended purpose [of integrit