workable test in Michigan

2017The parties shall include among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether the rebuttable presumption of undue influence set forth in In re Powers Estate, 375 Mich 150 (1965), when used as a means to determine the testator’s intent, is a workable rule that sufficiently protects the testator when the testator’s lawyer violates MRPC 1.8(c); (2) whether this Court’s adoption of MRPC 1.8(c) warrants overruling In re Powers Estate; and (3) if In re Powers Estate is overruled, whether a violation of MRPC 1.8(c) should bear on the validity of the gift provided to the testator’s lawyer under the testamenta

2017The parties shall include among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether the rebuttable presumption of undue influence set forth in In re Powers Estate, 375 Mich 150 (1965), when used as a means to determine the testator’s intent, is a workable rule that sufficiently protects the testator when the testator’s lawyer violates MRPC 1.8(c); (2) whether this Court’s adoption of MRPC 1.8(c) warrants overruling In re Powers Estate; and (3) if In re Powers Estate is overruled, whether a violation of MRPC 1.8(c) should bear on the validity of the gift provided to the testator’s lawyer under the testamenta

1998In People v Dixon, 85 Mich App 271, 280-281 ; 271 NW2d 196 (1978), this Court held that when the police have “more than a mere suspicion” that the suspect is wanted for the crime, the officer cannot return the suspect to the scene of the crime but must take him to the police station and have a lineup at which counsel is present. 4 In People v Turner, 120 Mich App 23, 36 ; 328 NW2d 5 (1982), this Court, recognizing that police officers are “neither lawyers nor high wire trapeze artists,” as well as the “practical difficulties that police have in following rules designed to balance constitutiona

1998In People v Dixon, 85 Mich App 271, 280-281 ; 271 NW2d 196 (1978), this Court held that when the police have “more than a mere suspicion” that the suspect is wanted for the crime, the officer cannot return the suspect to the scene of the crime but must take him to the police station and have a lineup at which counsel is present. 4 In People v Turner, 120 Mich App 23, 36 ; 328 NW2d 5 (1982), this Court, recognizing that police officers are “neither lawyers nor high wire trapeze artists,” as well as the “practical difficulties that police have in following rules designed to balance constitutiona

1990In Plowman, supra, pp 430-431 , the Court quoted from LaBar v Cooper, 376 Mich 401, 405-406 ; 137 NW2d 136 (1965), which in turn quoted 1 Honig *416 man & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 416, as follows: Subrule 118.4 [now MCR 2.118(D)] is intended to introduce a more liberal and workable test, borrowed from the Federal rules.

1986Nevertheless, the new plaintiff is today usually allowed to take advantage of the former action if the original plaintiff had, in any capacity, either before or after the commencement of suit, an interest in the subject matter of the controversy.” (Emphasis supplied.) [ 18 Mich App 279 .] In Plowman, supra, p 430 , the Court quoted from the Supreme Court in LaBar v Cooper, 376 Mich 401, 405-406 ; 137 NW2d 136 (1965), which quoted from 1 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 416, as follows: "Subrule 118.4 is intended to introduce a more liberal and workable test, borrow

2024This rational-jury standard appears to be consistent with Beck and its progeny, and it is a workable standard that trial courts can use when sentencing a defendant who was convicted of a particular charge but also acquitted of another related charge. [Id. at 425.] We review departure sentences for reasonableness by determining “whether the trial court abused its discretion by violating the ‘principle of proportionality’ . . . ‘which requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.’ ” Steanhouse,

2024This rational-jury standard appears to be consistent with Beck and its progeny, and it is a workable standard that trial courts can use when sentencing a defendant who was convicted of a particular charge but also acquitted of another related charge. [Id. at 425.] We review departure sentences for reasonableness by determining “whether the trial court abused its discretion by violating the ‘principle of proportionality’ . . . ‘which requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.’ ” Steanhouse,

2020In Pioneer, however, this Court recently held that the “ ‘non-exclusive list of factors’ ” set forth by then Chief Justice MARKMAN in his concurring opinion in Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co v ACE American Ins Co, 503 Mich 903 ; 919 NW2d 394 (2018), “present[ed] a workable framework” for balancing the equities to determine whether rescission is an appropriate remedy.

2009Because the split decision in Petersen v. Magna Corp., 484 Mich. 300 , 773 N.W.2d 564 (2009), failed to provide a workable standard concerning the circumstances under which a magistrate "may" prorate attorney fees, I would remand this case to the Court of Appeals to consider defendants' argument that the award of an attorney fee on unpaid medical benefits was erroneous.

2009Because the split decision in Petersen v. Magna Corp., 484 Mich. 300 , 773 N.W.2d 564 (2009), failed to provide a workable standard concerning the circumstances under which a magistrate "may" prorate attorney fees, I would remand this case to the Court of Appeals to consider defendants' argument that the award of an attorney fee on unpaid medical benefits was erroneous.

1999Smith, supra at 612-613 . *386 With respect to the current state of the highway exception to governmental immunity, we turn to the expressions of our Supreme Court, which stated: We acknowledge that our prior opinions readily evidence “this Court’s badly fractured view of what the Legislature has divined in its efforts to provide this exception,” and that, even in individual cases, we have produced “badly fractured opinions.” In this case, we have attempted to clearly state a workable principle that is faithful to the plain language of the highway exception, read in its proper context, and the

1998In People v Dixon, 85 Mich App 271, 280-281 ; 271 NW2d 196 (1978), this Court held that when the police have “more than a mere suspicion” that the suspect is wanted for the crime, the officer cannot return the suspect to the scene of the crime but must take him to the police station and have a lineup at which counsel is present. 4 In People v Turner, 120 Mich App 23, 36 ; 328 NW2d 5 (1982), this Court, recognizing that police officers are “neither lawyers nor high wire trapeze artists,” as well as the “practical difficulties that police have in following rules designed to balance constitutiona

1998In People v Dixon, 85 Mich App 271, 280-281 ; 271 NW2d 196 (1978), this Court held that when the police have “more than a mere suspicion” that the suspect is wanted for the crime, the officer cannot return the suspect to the scene of the crime but must take him to the police station and have a lineup at which counsel is present. 4 In People v Turner, 120 Mich App 23, 36 ; 328 NW2d 5 (1982), this Court, recognizing that police officers are “neither lawyers nor high wire trapeze artists,” as well as the “practical difficulties that police have in following rules designed to balance constitutiona

1995However, I believe that Wolf v Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 13 F3d 189 (CA 6, 1993), persuasively established a workable framework for analyzing the issue before us.

1995However, I believe that Wolf v Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 13 F3d 189 (CA 6, 1993), persuasively established a workable framework for analyzing the issue before us.

1989In Valentine v General American Credit, Inc, 420 Mich 256, 261 ; 362 NW2d 628 (1984), this Court declared that mental distress damages were not recoverable in an action for breach of employment contract, although the denial of such damages would "leave the plaintiff with less than full recovery...." [27] Judge Keeton suggested that the injured person's recovery be limited to "an amount equal to the insured's net assets which are not exempt from legal process." While we would not so limit the injured person's recovery, we otherwise agree with his analysis: (4) Comment: Liability to the Extent o

1989In Valentine v General American Credit, Inc, 420 Mich 256, 261 ; 362 NW2d 628 (1984), this Court declared that mental distress damages were not recoverable in an action for breach of employment contract, although the denial of such damages would "leave the plaintiff with less than full recovery...." [27] Judge Keeton suggested that the injured person's recovery be limited to "an amount equal to the insured's net assets which are not exempt from legal process." While we would not so limit the injured person's recovery, we otherwise agree with his analysis: (4) Comment: Liability to the Extent o

1986People v Waddell, 132 Mich App 171, 173 ; 347 NW2d 13 (1984); People v Jackson, 123 Mich App 423, 429 ; 332 NW2d 564 (1983), lv den 417 Mich 1100 .35 (1983).

1986People v Waddell, 132 Mich App 171, 173 ; 347 NW2d 13 (1984); People v Jackson, 123 Mich App 423, 429 ; 332 NW2d 564 (1983), lv den 417 Mich 1100 .35 (1983).

1986People v Waddell, 132 Mich App 171, 173 ; 347 NW2d 13 (1984); People v Jackson, 123 Mich App 423, 429 ; 332 NW2d 564 (1983), lv den 417 Mich 1100 .35 (1983).

1986People v Waddell, 132 Mich App 171, 173 ; 347 NW2d 13 (1984); People v Jackson, 123 Mich App 423, 429 ; 332 NW2d 564 (1983), lv den 417 Mich 1100 .35 (1983).

1985In 1971, Justice Levin, as judge of the Court of Appeals, authored State Highway Comm v L & L Concession Co, 31 Mich App 222 ; 187 NW2d 465 (1971).

1985In 1971, Justice Levin, as judge of the Court of Appeals, authored State Highway Comm v L & L Concession Co, 31 Mich App 222 ; 187 NW2d 465 (1971).

1984My reasons for adopting this standard are set forth in my concurring opinion in Kelleher v Kuchta, 138 Mich App 45 ; 359 NW2d 224 (1984).

1984My reasons for adopting this standard are set forth in my concurring opinion in Kelleher v Kuchta, 138 Mich App 45 ; 359 NW2d 224 (1984).

1983(Citations and footnote omitted.) In our opinion, the approach taken in Budd, supra, is consistent with the rules governing the accrual of actions with respect to other types of claims alleging tortious injury to the person, Connelly, supra, pp 151-152 , and represents the most workable standard for determining when a plaintiffs cause of action accrues in a legal malpractice action.

1978Under its rubric 5 fall cases where the trial court did affirmatively try to avoid the possibility of coercion, e.g., People v Morton, 77 Mich App 240 ; 258 NW2d 193 (1977), People v Don Francisco Lopez, 65 Mich App 653 ; 237 NW2d 599 (1975); but, there are other cases where the "magic language” test was manipulated to reach a desired result, e.g, People v Waldron, 64 Mich App 648 ; *10 236 NW2d 732 (1975), People v Walker, 58 Mich App 519 ; 228 NW2d 443 (1975).

1978Under its rubric 5 fall cases where the trial court did affirmatively try to avoid the possibility of coercion, e.g., People v Morton, 77 Mich App 240 ; 258 NW2d 193 (1977), People v Don Francisco Lopez, 65 Mich App 653 ; 237 NW2d 599 (1975); but, there are other cases where the "magic language” test was manipulated to reach a desired result, e.g, People v Waldron, 64 Mich App 648 ; *10 236 NW2d 732 (1975), People v Walker, 58 Mich App 519 ; 228 NW2d 443 (1975).

1978Under its rubric 5 fall cases where the trial court did affirmatively try to avoid the possibility of coercion, e.g., People v Morton, 77 Mich App 240 ; 258 NW2d 193 (1977), People v Don Francisco Lopez, 65 Mich App 653 ; 237 NW2d 599 (1975); but, there are other cases where the "magic language” test was manipulated to reach a desired result, e.g, People v Waldron, 64 Mich App 648 ; *10 236 NW2d 732 (1975), People v Walker, 58 Mich App 519 ; 228 NW2d 443 (1975).

1978Under its rubric 5 fall cases where the trial court did affirmatively try to avoid the possibility of coercion, e.g., People v Morton, 77 Mich App 240 ; 258 NW2d 193 (1977), People v Don Francisco Lopez, 65 Mich App 653 ; 237 NW2d 599 (1975); but, there are other cases where the "magic language” test was manipulated to reach a desired result, e.g, People v Waldron, 64 Mich App 648 ; *10 236 NW2d 732 (1975), People v Walker, 58 Mich App 519 ; 228 NW2d 443 (1975).

1978As pointed out in the Borg opinion, it is the gray area between these extremes to which a workable test must address itself." Sprute v Herlihy Mid-Continent Co, supra, p 579. [9] In context it appears that the Court of Appeals intended that "totally disabling" mean totally disabled from working, and that is the meaning which has been given those words in subsequent cases. [10] See Miller v Sullivan Milk Products, Inc, 385 Mich 659, 666 ; 189 NW2d 304 (1971); Hutsko v Chrysler Corp, 381 Mich 99, 102 ; 158 NW2d 874 (1968). [11] MCL 418.361; MSA 17.237(361); Miller v Sullivan Milk Products, Inc,

1978As pointed out in the Borg opinion, it is the gray area between these extremes to which a workable test must address itself." Sprute v Herlihy Mid-Continent Co, supra, p 579. [9] In context it appears that the Court of Appeals intended that "totally disabling" mean totally disabled from working, and that is the meaning which has been given those words in subsequent cases. [10] See Miller v Sullivan Milk Products, Inc, 385 Mich 659, 666 ; 189 NW2d 304 (1971); Hutsko v Chrysler Corp, 381 Mich 99, 102 ; 158 NW2d 874 (1968). [11] MCL 418.361; MSA 17.237(361); Miller v Sullivan Milk Products, Inc,

1978See also 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 58.11, pp XX-XXX-XX-XXX. [12] MCL 418.351; MSA 17.237(351); Sims v R D Brooks, Inc, 389 Mich 91 ; 204 NW2d 139 (1973); Miller v Sullivan Milk Products, Inc, supra, pp 665-666; Hutsko v Chrysler Corp, supra, p 102. [13] Michigan's total and permanent disability definition is apparently unique and is regarded as fundamentally a medical loss definition.

1978See also 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 58.11, pp XX-XXX-XX-XXX. [12] MCL 418.351; MSA 17.237(351); Sims v R D Brooks, Inc, 389 Mich 91 ; 204 NW2d 139 (1973); Miller v Sullivan Milk Products, Inc, supra, pp 665-666; Hutsko v Chrysler Corp, supra, p 102. [13] Michigan's total and permanent disability definition is apparently unique and is regarded as fundamentally a medical loss definition.

1978As pointed out in the Borg opinion, it is the gray area between these extremes to which a workable test must address itself." Sprute v Herlihy Mid-Continent Co, supra, p 579. [9] In context it appears that the Court of Appeals intended that "totally disabling" mean totally disabled from working, and that is the meaning which has been given those words in subsequent cases. [10] See Miller v Sullivan Milk Products, Inc, 385 Mich 659, 666 ; 189 NW2d 304 (1971); Hutsko v Chrysler Corp, 381 Mich 99, 102 ; 158 NW2d 874 (1968). [11] MCL 418.361; MSA 17.237(361); Miller v Sullivan Milk Products, Inc,

1978As pointed out in the Borg opinion, it is the gray area between these extremes to which a workable test must address itself." Sprute v Herlihy Mid-Continent Co, supra, p 579. [9] In context it appears that the Court of Appeals intended that "totally disabling" mean totally disabled from working, and that is the meaning which has been given those words in subsequent cases. [10] See Miller v Sullivan Milk Products, Inc, 385 Mich 659, 666 ; 189 NW2d 304 (1971); Hutsko v Chrysler Corp, 381 Mich 99, 102 ; 158 NW2d 874 (1968). [11] MCL 418.361; MSA 17.237(361); Miller v Sullivan Milk Products, Inc,

1978As pointed out in the Borg opinion, it is the gray area between these extremes to which a workable test must address itself." Sprute v Herlihy Mid-Continent Co, supra, p 579. [9] In context it appears that the Court of Appeals intended that "totally disabling" mean totally disabled from working, and that is the meaning which has been given those words in subsequent cases. [10] See Miller v Sullivan Milk Products, Inc, 385 Mich 659, 666 ; 189 NW2d 304 (1971); Hutsko v Chrysler Corp, 381 Mich 99, 102 ; 158 NW2d 874 (1968). [11] MCL 418.361; MSA 17.237(361); Miller v Sullivan Milk Products, Inc,

1978As pointed out in the Borg opinion, it is the gray area between these extremes to which a workable test must address itself." Sprute v Herlihy Mid-Continent Co, supra, p 579. [9] In context it appears that the Court of Appeals intended that "totally disabling" mean totally disabled from working, and that is the meaning which has been given those words in subsequent cases. [10] See Miller v Sullivan Milk Products, Inc, 385 Mich 659, 666 ; 189 NW2d 304 (1971); Hutsko v Chrysler Corp, 381 Mich 99, 102 ; 158 NW2d 874 (1968). [11] MCL 418.361; MSA 17.237(361); Miller v Sullivan Milk Products, Inc,

1978Under its rubric 5 fall cases where the trial court did affirmatively try to avoid the possibility of coercion, e.g., People v Morton, 77 Mich App 240 ; 258 NW2d 193 (1977), People v Don Francisco Lopez, 65 Mich App 653 ; 237 NW2d 599 (1975); but, there are other cases where the "magic language” test was manipulated to reach a desired result, e.g, People v Waldron, 64 Mich App 648 ; *10 236 NW2d 732 (1975), People v Walker, 58 Mich App 519 ; 228 NW2d 443 (1975).

1978Under its rubric 5 fall cases where the trial court did affirmatively try to avoid the possibility of coercion, e.g., People v Morton, 77 Mich App 240 ; 258 NW2d 193 (1977), People v Don Francisco Lopez, 65 Mich App 653 ; 237 NW2d 599 (1975); but, there are other cases where the "magic language” test was manipulated to reach a desired result, e.g, People v Waldron, 64 Mich App 648 ; *10 236 NW2d 732 (1975), People v Walker, 58 Mich App 519 ; 228 NW2d 443 (1975).

1978Under its rubric 5 fall cases where the trial court did affirmatively try to avoid the possibility of coercion, e.g., People v Morton, 77 Mich App 240 ; 258 NW2d 193 (1977), People v Don Francisco Lopez, 65 Mich App 653 ; 237 NW2d 599 (1975); but, there are other cases where the "magic language” test was manipulated to reach a desired result, e.g, People v Waldron, 64 Mich App 648 ; *10 236 NW2d 732 (1975), People v Walker, 58 Mich App 519 ; 228 NW2d 443 (1975).

1978Under its rubric 5 fall cases where the trial court did affirmatively try to avoid the possibility of coercion, e.g., People v Morton, 77 Mich App 240 ; 258 NW2d 193 (1977), People v Don Francisco Lopez, 65 Mich App 653 ; 237 NW2d 599 (1975); but, there are other cases where the "magic language” test was manipulated to reach a desired result, e.g, People v Waldron, 64 Mich App 648 ; *10 236 NW2d 732 (1975), People v Walker, 58 Mich App 519 ; 228 NW2d 443 (1975).