7 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1955–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cloutiergreen2 sentences1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or. 45, 50-51 , 522 P.2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court" means "could properly be consolidated." [13] Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or. 232 , 484 P.2d 314 , 485 P.2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for p 1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or 45, 50-51 , 522 P2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court” means "could properly be consolidated.” Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or 232 , 484 P2d 314 , 485 P2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for punishment | 2 | 2 |
State v. Linkgreen2 sentences2019The key issue that I take with the majority's approach is that the majority does not articulate a workable standard to determine which sentences are the "most severe" and does not delineate any limit as to which sentences qualify as the "most severe." See 297 Or.App. at 148 , 441 P.3d at 677 ("We need not decide the full contours of what constitutes the harshest or most severe criminal penalties in Oregon. 2019The key issue that I take with the majority's approach is that the majority does not articulate a workable standard to determine which sentences are the "most severe" and does not delineate any limit as to which sentences qualify as the "most severe." See 297 Or.App. at 148 , 441 P.3d at 677 ("We need not decide the full contours of what constitutes the harshest or most severe criminal penalties in Oregon. | 1 | 1 |
State v. McFallgreen1 sentence1970A test of subjective capacity would make legal consequences of confession turn on highly dubious and difficult to determine facts; the results would be a partial return to the burdensome case-by-case adjudications that Miranda was intended to end.” See also State v. McFall, 5 Ariz App 539, 544, 428 P2d 1013, 1018 (1967), vacated 103 Ariz 234, 439 P2d 805 (1968), a case in which a confession was made under the influence of drugs. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Leverich
neutral
2 sentences1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or 45, 50-51 , 522 P2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court” means "could properly be consolidated.” Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or 232 , 484 P2d 314 , 485 P2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for punishment 1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or 45, 50-51 , 522 P2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court” means "could properly be consolidated.” Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or 232 , 484 P2d 314 , 485 P2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for punishment | 2 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Woolard
green
2 sentences1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or 45, 50-51 , 522 P2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court” means "could properly be consolidated.” Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or 232 , 484 P2d 314 , 485 P2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for punishment 1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or 45, 50-51 , 522 P2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court” means "could properly be consolidated.” Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or 232 , 484 P2d 314 , 485 P2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for punishment | 2 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Woolard
green
2 sentences1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or. 45, 50-51 , 522 P.2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court" means "could properly be consolidated." [13] Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or. 232 , 484 P.2d 314 , 485 P.2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for p 1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or 45, 50-51 , 522 P2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court” means "could properly be consolidated.” Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or 232 , 484 P2d 314 , 485 P2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for punishment | 2 | 1980–1980 |
Holger v. Irish
green
2 sentences1993The majority has stated a proposition: "[I]n the usual case, it is not proper to inform the jury * * *, unless that information has independent relevance." 316 Or. at 414 , 851 P.2d at 1130 . 1993The majority has stated a proposition: "[I]n the usual case, it is not proper to inform the jury * * *, unless that information has independent relevance." 316 Or. at 414 , 851 P.2d at 1130 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Dixson
green
2 sentences1990It is.” State v. Dixon/Digby, 307 Or 195, 211 , 766 P2d 1015 (1988). 1990It is.” State v. Dixon/Digby, 307 Or 195, 211 , 766 P2d 1015 (1988). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Clark
green
2 sentences1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or. 45, 50-51 , 522 P.2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court" means "could properly be consolidated." [13] Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or. 232 , 484 P.2d 314 , 485 P.2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for p 1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or. 45, 50-51 , 522 P.2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court" means "could properly be consolidated." [13] Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or. 232 , 484 P.2d 314 , 485 P.2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for p | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. McFall
green
1 sentence1970A test of subjective capacity would make legal consequences of confession turn on highly dubious and difficult to determine facts; the results would be a partial return to the burdensome case-by-case adjudications that Miranda was intended to end.” See also State v. McFall, 5 Ariz App 539, 544, 428 P2d 1013, 1018 (1967), vacated 103 Ariz 234, 439 P2d 805 (1968), a case in which a confession was made under the influence of drugs. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Gleason v. Geary
green
2 sentences1955The two companies involved were not engaged in the same or related purposes, were not mutually or reciprocally interested in a commercial way, nor had the business of one a necessary relation toward or in conjunction with the other.” (Italics supplied.) In Gleason v. Geary, 214 Minn 499, 8 NW2d 808 , the Minnesota court reviewed most of its prior decisions and sought to establish a workable rule. 1955The two companies involved were not engaged in the same or related purposes, were not mutually or reciprocally interested in a commercial way, nor had the business of one a necessary relation toward or in conjunction with the other." (Italics supplied.) In Gleason v. Geary, 214 Minn 499, 8 NW2d 808 , the Minnesota court reviewed most of its prior decisions and sought to establish a workable rule. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.