workable standard in New Jersey

1997Bond established the principle that where ... an employee is exposed to work conditions which activate or cause a progressive occupational disease, and the existence of such disease remains undisclosed and unknown over a period of time, [and] ... where such employee continues to be exposed to work conditions which aggravate the existing disease [and] ... where the employment under such work conditions was under the aegis of successive employers or insurance carriers, from initial infection of activation to discovery or manifestation ... the most workable rule and that most consistent with the

1997Bond established the principle that where ... an employee is exposed to work conditions which activate or cause a progressive occupational disease, and the existence of such disease remains undisclosed and unknown over a period of time, [and] ... where such employee continues to be exposed to work conditions which aggravate the existing disease [and] ... where the employment under such work conditions was under the aegis of successive employers or insurance carriers, from initial infection of activation to discovery or manifestation ... the most workable rule and that most consistent with the

2018Rather, the instruction mandates the adoption of "a workable standard," id. at 68 , 160 A.3d 1 -one that does "not impose **21 impractical demands on law enforcement" and that balances both "the law's tight timeframe," ibid. , and the limited purpose of detention hearings, which "are not full-scale trials designed to assess guilt," id. at 73 , 160 A.3d 1 , against "the defendants' liberty interests," id. at 68 , 160 A.3d 1 , and the fact that "[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception," ibid. (quoting United States v.

2018Rather, the instruction mandates the adoption of "a workable standard," id. at 68 , 160 A.3d 1 -one that does "not impose **21 impractical demands on law enforcement" and that balances both "the law's tight timeframe," ibid. , and the limited purpose of detention hearings, which "are not full-scale trials designed to assess guilt," id. at 73 , 160 A.3d 1 , against "the defendants' liberty interests," id. at 68 , 160 A.3d 1 , and the fact that "[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception," ibid. (quoting United States v.

1999In Holtzman v. Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649 , 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 975 , 116 S.Ct. 475 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 404 (1995), discussed at length by Judge Stern, the Wisconsin Supreme Court set forth a workable standard for addressing visitation disputes after the break-up of a relationship between the adults.

1999In Holtzman v. Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649 , 533 N.W. 2d 419, 421 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 975 , 116 S.Ct. 475 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 404 (1995), discussed at length by Judge Stern, the Wisconsin Supreme Court set forth a workable standard for addressing visitation disputes after the break-up of a relationship between the adults.

1999In Holtzman v. Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649 , 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 975 , 116 S.Ct. 475 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 404 (1995), discussed at length by Judge Stern, the Wisconsin Supreme Court set forth a workable standard for addressing visitation disputes after the break-up of a relationship between the adults.

1999In Holtzman v. Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649 , 533 N.W. 2d 419, 421 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 975 , 116 S.Ct. 475 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 404 (1995), discussed at length by Judge Stern, the Wisconsin Supreme Court set forth a workable standard for addressing visitation disputes after the break-up of a relationship between the adults.

1999In Holtzman v. Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649 , 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 975 , 116 S.Ct. 475 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 404 (1995), discussed at length by Judge Stern, the Wisconsin Supreme Court set forth a workable standard for addressing visitation disputes after the break-up of a relationship between the adults.

1999In Holtzman v. Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649 , 533 N.W. 2d 419, 421 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 975 , 116 S.Ct. 475 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 404 (1995), discussed at length by Judge Stern, the Wisconsin Supreme Court set forth a workable standard for addressing visitation disputes after the break-up of a relationship between the adults.

1988Accordingly, we hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. [ 453 U.S. at 459-460 , 101 S.Ct. at 2863-2864 , 69 L.Ed. 2d at 774-775 ; footnotes omitted; emphasis added].

1988Accordingly, we hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. [ 453 U.S. at 459-460 , 101 S.Ct. at 2863-2864 , 69 L.Ed. 2d at 774-775 ; footnotes omitted; emphasis added].

2019The Court considers the following non-exclusive factors, adopted both from Loigman and from Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 (1995), to provide a workable framework for a court order for the production of student records under N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(e)(15): (1) the type of student record requested; (2) the information that the student record contains; (3) the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure of the student record; (4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship between the educational agency and the student and his or her parents or guardians; (5) the extent to which discl

2018Rather, the instruction mandates the adoption of "a workable standard," id. at 68 , 160 A.3d 1 -one that does "not impose **21 impractical demands on law enforcement" and that balances both "the law's tight timeframe," ibid. , and the limited purpose of detention hearings, which "are not full-scale trials designed to assess guilt," id. at 73 , 160 A.3d 1 , against "the defendants' liberty interests," id. at 68 , 160 A.3d 1 , and the fact that "[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception," ibid. (quoting United States v.

2018Rather, the instruction mandates the adoption of "a workable standard," id. at 68 , 160 A.3d 1 -one that does "not impose **21 impractical demands on law enforcement" and that balances both "the law's tight timeframe," ibid. , and the limited purpose of detention hearings, which "are not full-scale trials designed to assess guilt," id. at 73 , 160 A.3d 1 , against "the defendants' liberty interests," id. at 68 , 160 A.3d 1 , and the fact that "[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception," ibid. (quoting United States v.

2018Rather, the instruction mandates the adoption of "a workable standard," id. at 68 , 160 A.3d 1 -one that does "not impose **21 impractical demands on law enforcement" and that balances both "the law's tight timeframe," ibid. , and the limited purpose of detention hearings, which "are not full-scale trials designed to assess guilt," id. at 73 , 160 A.3d 1 , against "the defendants' liberty interests," id. at 68 , 160 A.3d 1 , and the fact that "[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception," ibid. (quoting United States v.

2018In doing so, we adopted the *555 three-step test set forth in Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S. 329 , 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353 , 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997), id. at 475, 477 , 95 A.3d 210 , which we will now refine in light of Gonzaga University v. Doe , 536 U.S. 273 , 283, 122 S.Ct. 2268 , 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002), for defining when a statute confers an individual substantive right. **331 In accordance with Tumpson , the first step is determining whether the Legislature "intended the statute" to confer a "benefit" on an individual. 218 N.J. at 475 , 477 , 95 A.3d 210 (citing Blessing , 520 U.S. at 340

2018In doing so, we adopted the *555 three-step test set forth in Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S. 329 , 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353 , 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997), id. at 475, 477 , 95 A.3d 210 , which we will now refine in light of Gonzaga University v. Doe , 536 U.S. 273 , 283, 122 S.Ct. 2268 , 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002), for defining when a statute confers an individual substantive right. **331 In accordance with Tumpson , the first step is determining whether the Legislature "intended the statute" to confer a "benefit" on an individual. 218 N.J. at 475 , 477 , 95 A.3d 210 (citing Blessing , 520 U.S. at 340

2018In doing so, we adopted the *555 three-step test set forth in Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S. 329 , 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353 , 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997), id. at 475, 477 , 95 A.3d 210 , which we will now refine in light of Gonzaga University v. Doe , 536 U.S. 273 , 283, 122 S.Ct. 2268 , 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002), for defining when a statute confers an individual substantive right. **331 In accordance with Tumpson , the first step is determining whether the Legislature "intended the statute" to confer a "benefit" on an individual. 218 N.J. at 475 , 477 , 95 A.3d 210 (citing Blessing , 520 U.S. at 340

2018In doing so, we adopted the *555 three-step test set forth in Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S. 329 , 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353 , 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997), id. at 475, 477 , 95 A.3d 210 , which we will now refine in light of Gonzaga University v. Doe , 536 U.S. 273 , 283, 122 S.Ct. 2268 , 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002), for defining when a statute confers an individual substantive right. **331 In accordance with Tumpson , the first step is determining whether the Legislature "intended the statute" to confer a "benefit" on an individual. 218 N.J. at 475 , 477 , 95 A.3d 210 (citing Blessing , 520 U.S. at 340

2018We have looked to federal jurisprudence construing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to formulate a workable standard for identifying a substantive right under the Civil Rights Act. 4 Id. at 474-77 , 95 A.3d 210 .

2018In doing so, we adopted the *555 three-step test set forth in Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S. 329 , 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353 , 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997), id. at 475, 477 , 95 A.3d 210 , which we will now refine in light of Gonzaga University v. Doe , 536 U.S. 273 , 283, 122 S.Ct. 2268 , 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002), for defining when a statute confers an individual substantive right. **331 In accordance with Tumpson , the first step is determining whether the Legislature "intended the statute" to confer a "benefit" on an individual. 218 N.J. at 475 , 477 , 95 A.3d 210 (citing Blessing , 520 U.S. at 340

1997Under N.J.S.A 34:15-31, which governs occupational disease claims, causation must be established in a material degree, which is defined as “a degree substantially greater than de minimus.” See N.J.S.A 34:15-7.2; Fiore v. Consolidated Freightways, 140 N.J. 452 , 659 A.2d 436 (1995) (holding that the definition of “in a material degree” in N.J.S.A 34:15-7.2 applies to N.J.S.A. 34:15-31).

1997Under N.J.S.A 34:15-31, which governs occupational disease claims, causation must be established in a material degree, which is defined as “a degree substantially greater than de minimus.” See N.J.S.A 34:15-7.2; Fiore v. Consolidated Freightways, 140 N.J. 452 , 659 A.2d 436 (1995) (holding that the definition of “in a material degree” in N.J.S.A 34:15-7.2 applies to N.J.S.A. 34:15-31).

1994Super. 30, 35 , 516 A. 2d 265 (App.Div. 1986), certif. denied 107 N.J. 104 , 526 A. 2d 177 (1987), we endeavored to announce a workable test for deciding whether convictions for possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose should merge with the substantive offense.

1994Super. 30, 35 , 516 A. 2d 265 (App.Div. 1986), certif. denied 107 N.J. 104 , 526 A. 2d 177 (1987), we endeavored to announce a workable test for deciding whether convictions for possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose should merge with the substantive offense.

1994Super. 30, 35 , 516 A. 2d 265 (App.Div. 1986), certif. denied 107 N.J. 104 , 526 A. 2d 177 (1987), we endeavored to announce a workable test for deciding whether convictions for possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose should merge with the substantive offense.

1994We held that to avoid merger four factors must be present: (1) the defendant must have been charged in the indictment with possession of the weapon with a broader unlawful purpose, either generally or specifically, than using the weapon to kill or assault the victim of the greater offense, (2) the evidence must support a finding that the defendant had a broader unlawful purpose, (3) the judge must have instructed the jury of the difference between possession with the specific unlawful purpose of using the weapon against the victim of the greater offense and a broader unlawful purpose and (4) t

1990Absent evidence of passion/provocation, sequential charges usually provide a workable framework for orderly deliberations. [Citation omitted.] In murder cases in which there is evidence of passion/provocation, however, a court must take additional care in issuing clear instructions. [ Ante at 223, 574 A. 2d at 965-966 .] In capital cases the court should not only give the jury the most complete range of verdict choices covering possible homicide offenses, but also assure it the widest opportunity to determine guilt and decide which offense, if any, is justified by the evidence.

1990Recognizing that “[m]alice adds nothing to the legal analysis of an allegedly defamatory statement,” we recently adopted a more workable standard: Although we discard the label [of malice], we adhere to the principle that to overcome a qualified or conditional privilege, a plaintiff must establish that the publisher knew the statement to be false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity____ With or without the term, the critical determination is whether, on balance, the public interest in obtaining information outweighs the individual’s right to protect his or her reputation. [Da

1990Recognizing that “[m]alice adds nothing to the legal analysis of an allegedly defamatory statement,” we recently adopted a more workable standard: Although we discard the label [of malice], we adhere to the principle that to overcome a qualified or conditional privilege, a plaintiff must establish that the publisher knew the statement to be false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity____ With or without the term, the critical determination is whether, on balance, the public interest in obtaining information outweighs the individual’s right to protect his or her reputation. [Da

1990See Burke v. Deiner, 97 N.J. 465, 481 (1984) (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 , 84 S.Ct. 710, 726 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 706 (1964)); Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176 , 197 n. 10 (1982) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 , 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3008 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 808 (1974)).

1980That case established the rule that, where an employee is exposed to work conditions which activate or cause a progressive occupational disease, and the existence of such disease remains undisclosed and unknown over a period of time, ... the most workable rule and that most consistent with the philosophy and public policy of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to hold liable that employer *336 or carrier during whose employment or coverage the disease was disclosed as above noted, i.e. by medical examination, work incapacity, or manifest loss of physical function. [ Id. at 311 .] Bond was amplif