workable rule in Pennsylvania

2021Mission Pennsylvania, 212 A.3d at 138 - 39. 11 The Department repeatedly employs the phrase “iterative redactions” without further elaboration, or suggestion that it constitutes a term of art.

2021Mission Pennsylvania, 212 A.3d at 138 - 39. 11 The Department repeatedly employs the phrase “iterative redactions” without further elaboration, or suggestion that it constitutes a term of art.

1985The Commonwealth, in turn, argues that the delay was excusable because of exigent circumstances, the presence of which constitute an exception to the six-hour rule: "Six hours provides a workable rule which can readily be complied with in the absence of exigent circumstances." Commonwealth v. Davenport, supra 471 Pa. at 286 n. 7, 370 A.2d at 306 n. 7; see also Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A.2d 288 (1983); Commonwealth v. Keasley, 501 Pa. 461 , 462 A.2d 216 (1983); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144 , 454 A.2d 1004 (1982); Commonwealth v. Williams, 313 Pa.Superior Ct. 243, 459

1985The Commonwealth, in turn, argues that the delay was excusable because of exigent circumstances, the presence of which constitute an exception to the six-hour rule: "Six hours provides a workable rule which can readily be complied with in the absence of exigent circumstances." Commonwealth v. Davenport, supra 471 Pa. at 286 n. 7, 370 A.2d at 306 n. 7; see also Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A.2d 288 (1983); Commonwealth v. Keasley, 501 Pa. 461 , 462 A.2d 216 (1983); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144 , 454 A.2d 1004 (1982); Commonwealth v. Williams, 313 Pa.Superior Ct. 243, 459

2022Moore, supra at H4.

2022Indeed, the Kennedy Court acknowledged that the high Court’s “earlier opinions” had “suggest[ed] a broader rule,” and criticized those earlier formulations as “broad and somewhat amorphous[.]” Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676-78 .

2013Thus, we have substantial flexibility in reevaluating Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003), and crafting a workable framework; in my view, a limited waiver approach fits comfortably within that latitude.

2013Thus, we have substantial flexibility in reevaluating Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003), and crafting a workable framework; in my view, a limited waiver approach fits comfortably within that latitude.

2000Costello, 747 A.2d at 853 .

1998It is not easy to graft a workable rule of law from the Seitz holding, although it appears *711 clear that a presumption exists that all communications between husband and wife are "confidential." See Hancharik, 534 Pa. at 442-44 , 633 A.2d at 1078 .

1998It is not easy to graft a workable rule of law from the Seitz holding, although it appears *711 clear that a presumption exists that all communications between husband and wife are "confidential." See Hancharik, 534 Pa. at 442-44 , 633 A.2d at 1078 .

1997Shoemaker & Son, Inc., 432 Pa.Super. 230 , 239 n. 1, 637 A.2d 1358 , 1363 n. 1 (1994) (Beck, J., dissenting); see also Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 , 85 S.Ct. 234 , 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964) (discussing the “good cause” requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 35, from which Pa. R.C.P. 4010 is drawn).

1997Shoemaker & Son, Inc., 432 Pa.Super. 230 , 239 n. 1, 637 A.2d 1358 , 1363 n. 1 (1994) (Beck, J., dissenting); see also Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 , 85 S.Ct. 234 , 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964) (discussing the “good cause” requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 35, from which Pa. R.C.P. 4010 is drawn).

1993A special danger or peculiar risk exists where: (1) the risk is foreseeable to the employer of the independent contractor, “i.e., a reasonable person, in the position of the employer, would foresee the risk and recognize the need to take special measures; and (2) the risk is different from the usual and ordinary risk associated with the general type of work done, Le., the specific project or task chosen by the employer involves circumstances that are substantially out-of-the-ordinary.” Id. at 53 , 528 A.2d at 1358 .

1993A special danger or peculiar risk exists where: (1) the risk is foreseeable to the employer of the independent contractor, “i.e., a reasonable person, in the position of the employer, would foresee the risk and recognize the need to take special measures; and (2) the risk is different from the usual and ordinary risk associated with the general type of work done, Le., the specific project or task chosen by the employer involves circumstances that are substantially out-of-the-ordinary.” Id. at 53 , 528 A.2d at 1358 .

1991When interpreting the words of a statute, the rules of construction require that “words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326 , 446 A.2d 583 (1982).

1991When interpreting the words of a statute, the rules of construction require that “words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326 , 446 A.2d 583 (1982).

1986“The definition of a ‘clearly mandated public policy’ as one that ‘strikes at the heart of a citizen’s social right, duties and responsibilities,’ set forth in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124 , 52 Ill.Dec. 13 , 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981), appears to provide a workable standard for tort action.” ]Novose v. Nationwide Ins.

1986“The definition of a ‘clearly mandated public policy’ as one that ‘strikes at the heart of a citizen’s social right, duties and responsibilities,’ set forth in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124 , 52 Ill.Dec. 13 , 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981), appears to provide a workable standard for tort action.” ]Novose v. Nationwide Ins.

1986Co., 721 F.2d 984 [894] (3rd C.R. [Cir.] 1983). at 899.

1985The Commonwealth, in turn, argues that the delay was excusable because of exigent circumstances, the presence of which constitute an exception to the six-hour rule: “Six hours provides a workable rule which can readily be complied with in the absence of exigent circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Davenport, supra 471 Pa. at 286 n. 7, 370 A.2d at 306 n. 7; see also Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A.2d 288 (1983); Commonwealth v. Keasley, 501 Pa. 461 , 462 A.2d 216 (1983); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144 , 454 A.2d 1004 (1982); Commonwealth v. Williams, 313 Pa.Superior Ct. 243, 459

1985The Commonwealth, in turn, argues that the delay was excusable because of exigent circumstances, the presence of which constitute an exception to the six-hour rule: "Six hours provides a workable rule which can readily be complied with in the absence of exigent circumstances." Commonwealth v. Davenport, supra 471 Pa. at 286 n. 7, 370 A.2d at 306 n. 7; see also Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A.2d 288 (1983); Commonwealth v. Keasley, 501 Pa. 461 , 462 A.2d 216 (1983); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144 , 454 A.2d 1004 (1982); Commonwealth v. Williams, 313 Pa.Superior Ct. 243, 459

1985The Commonwealth, in turn, argues that the delay was excusable because of exigent circumstances, the presence of which constitute an exception to the six-hour rule: “Six hours provides a workable rule which can readily be complied with in the absence of exigent circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Davenport, supra 471 Pa. at 286 n. 7, 370 A.2d at 306 n. 7; see also Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A.2d 288 (1983); Commonwealth v. Keasley, 501 Pa. 461 , 462 A.2d 216 (1983); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144 , 454 A.2d 1004 (1982); Commonwealth v. Williams, 313 Pa.Superior Ct. 243, 459

1985The Commonwealth, in turn, argues that the delay was excusable because of exigent circumstances, the presence of which constitute an exception to the six-hour rule: "Six hours provides a workable rule which can readily be complied with in the absence of exigent circumstances." Commonwealth v. Davenport, supra 471 Pa. at 286 n. 7, 370 A.2d at 306 n. 7; see also Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A.2d 288 (1983); Commonwealth v. Keasley, 501 Pa. 461 , 462 A.2d 216 (1983); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144 , 454 A.2d 1004 (1982); Commonwealth v. Williams, 313 Pa.Superior Ct. 243, 459

1983Although the continuing vitality of the Davenport rule as a whole is subject to speculation after Commonwealth v. Blady, 492 Pa. 285 , 424 A.2d 864 (1981) (Larsen, J., dissenting, joined by Flaherty, J.), and Commonwealth v. Bennett, 498 Pa. 656 , 450 A.2d 970, 971-972 (1982) (Flaherty, J. concurring, joined by Hutchinson, J.) [see also, Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144, 151 , 454 A.2d 1004, 1008 (1982) (Concurring Opinion of McDermott, J.) ], it is clear that a majority of this Court has recognized the implicit “exigent circumstances qualification.” Commonwealth v. Keasley, 501 Pa. 461 ,

1983Although the continuing vitality of the Davenport rule as a whole is subject to speculation after Commonwealth v. Blady, 492 Pa. 285 , 424 A.2d 864 (1981) (Larsen, J., dissenting, joined by Flaherty, J.), and Commonwealth v. Bennett, 498 Pa. 656 , 450 A.2d 970, 971-972 (1982) (Flaherty, J. concurring, joined by Hutchinson, J.) [see also, Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144, 151 , 454 A.2d 1004, 1008 (1982) (Concurring Opinion of McDermott, J.) ], it is clear that a majority of this Court has recognized the implicit “exigent circumstances qualification.” Commonwealth v. Keasley, 501 Pa. 461 ,

1982Korpela, supra; Wade, On Product "Design Defects" And Their Actionability, 33 Vand.L.Rev. 551, 551-52 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Wade ); Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand.L.Rev. 593, 648 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Birnbaum ); Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485 , 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., supra note 5. *624 The problem of devising a workable standard of "defect" which accomplishes the twin objectives of limiting a supplier's liability to injuries caused by ident

1982Korpela, supra; Wade, On Product "Design Defects" And Their Actionability, 33 Vand.L.Rev. 551, 551-52 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Wade ); Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand.L.Rev. 593, 648 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Birnbaum ); Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485 , 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., supra note 5. *624 The problem of devising a workable standard of "defect" which accomplishes the twin objectives of limiting a supplier's liability to injuries caused by ident

1982For the benefit of the bench, the bar and the citizens of the Commonwealth, this Court is obliged to articulate a workable standard guilty plea colloquy. “[T]he evolving patchwork of colloquy requirements places an onerous burden of uncertainty on the trial court, and affords numerous grounds for challenges to the content of the colloquy.” 498 Pa. at 356 n. 2, 446 A.2d at 598 n. 2.

1982For the benefit of the bench, the bar and the citizens of the Commonwealth, this Court is obliged to articulate a workable standard guilty plea colloquy. "[T]he evolving patchwork of colloquy requirements places an onerous burden of uncertainty on the trial court, and affords numerous grounds for challenges to the content of the colloquy." 498 Pa. at 356 n. 2, 446 A.2d at 598 n. 2.

1977In no case have we held that a delay of six hours or more was, not an “unnecessary delay.” See e. g., Commonwealth v. Lasch, 464 Pa. 259 , 346 A.2d 547 (1975); Commonwealth v. Cullison, 461 Pa. 301 , 336 A.2d 296 (1975); Commonwealth v. Barilak, 460 Pa. *287 449, 333 A.2d 859 (1975); Commonwealth v. Showalter, 458 Pa. 659 , 328 A.2d 841 (1974); Commonwealth v. Parker, 458 Pa. 381 , 327 A.2d 128 (1974); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 458 Pa. 281 , 327 A.2d 43 (1974); Commonwealth v. Cherry, 457 Pa. 201 , 321 A.2d 611 (1974); Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569 , 319 A.2d 419 (1974); Commonwealth v.

1977In no case have we held that a delay of six hours or more was, not an “unnecessary delay.” See e. g., Commonwealth v. Lasch, 464 Pa. 259 , 346 A.2d 547 (1975); Commonwealth v. Cullison, 461 Pa. 301 , 336 A.2d 296 (1975); Commonwealth v. Barilak, 460 Pa. *287 449, 333 A.2d 859 (1975); Commonwealth v. Showalter, 458 Pa. 659 , 328 A.2d 841 (1974); Commonwealth v. Parker, 458 Pa. 381 , 327 A.2d 128 (1974); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 458 Pa. 281 , 327 A.2d 43 (1974); Commonwealth v. Cherry, 457 Pa. 201 , 321 A.2d 611 (1974); Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569 , 319 A.2d 419 (1974); Commonwealth v.

1977In no case have we held that a delay of six hours or more was, not an “unnecessary delay.” See e. g., Commonwealth v. Lasch, 464 Pa. 259 , 346 A.2d 547 (1975); Commonwealth v. Cullison, 461 Pa. 301 , 336 A.2d 296 (1975); Commonwealth v. Barilak, 460 Pa. *287 449, 333 A.2d 859 (1975); Commonwealth v. Showalter, 458 Pa. 659 , 328 A.2d 841 (1974); Commonwealth v. Parker, 458 Pa. 381 , 327 A.2d 128 (1974); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 458 Pa. 281 , 327 A.2d 43 (1974); Commonwealth v. Cherry, 457 Pa. 201 , 321 A.2d 611 (1974); Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569 , 319 A.2d 419 (1974); Commonwealth v.

1977In no case have we held that a delay of six hours or more was, not an “unnecessary delay.” See e. g., Commonwealth v. Lasch, 464 Pa. 259 , 346 A.2d 547 (1975); Commonwealth v. Cullison, 461 Pa. 301 , 336 A.2d 296 (1975); Commonwealth v. Barilak, 460 Pa. *287 449, 333 A.2d 859 (1975); Commonwealth v. Showalter, 458 Pa. 659 , 328 A.2d 841 (1974); Commonwealth v. Parker, 458 Pa. 381 , 327 A.2d 128 (1974); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 458 Pa. 281 , 327 A.2d 43 (1974); Commonwealth v. Cherry, 457 Pa. 201 , 321 A.2d 611 (1974); Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569 , 319 A.2d 419 (1974); Commonwealth v.