informed consent doctrine in Washington

2014Justice Hicks’s separate opinion in Keogan , signed by five justices and controlling on the informed consent issue, see Anaya Gomez, 180 Wn.2d at 620 n.4, addressed the relevant holding from Gates as follows: By thereafter focusing on the diseased heart to the exclusion of everything else, the majority seizes upon a suspicion by Dr. Snyder of a possibility that Keogan may have had angina pectoris to decree that the informed consent doctrine as applied in Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wn.2d 246 , 595 P.2d 919 (1979), controls here.

2014Justice Hicks’s separate opinion in Keogan , signed by five justices and controlling on the informed consent issue, see Anaya Gomez, 180 Wn.2d at 620 n.4, addressed the relevant holding from Gates as follows: By thereafter focusing on the diseased heart to the exclusion of everything else, the majority seizes upon a suspicion by Dr. Snyder of a possibility that Keogan may have had angina pectoris to decree that the informed consent doctrine as applied in Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wn.2d 246 , 595 P.2d 919 (1979), controls here.

2025In Backlund, the court discusses the third element of an informed consent claim which requires the fact finder to determine “whether a reasonably prudent patient in the plaintiff’s situation would have chosen a different treatment option.” Backlund, 137 Wn.2d at 667-68 .

2019An informed consent claim was available in Backlund because “a trier of fact might still have found [the doctor] did not sufficiently inform the patient of risks and alternatives” given that he was aware of the transfusion alternative. 137 Wn.2d at 662 .

2021The Supreme Court began by setting forth the issue before it: “[i]n determining which theory of recovery is available, the issue is whether this is a case of misdiagnosis subject only to negligence or if the facts also support an informed consent claim.” Anaya Gomez, 180 Wn.2d at 617 .

2014Justice Hicks’s separate opinion in Keogan , signed by five justices and controlling on the informed consent issue, see Anaya Gomez, 180 Wn.2d at 620 n.4, addressed the relevant holding from Gates as follows: By thereafter focusing on the diseased heart to the exclusion of everything else, the majority seizes upon a suspicion by Dr. Snyder of a possibility that Keogan may have had angina pectoris to decree that the informed consent doctrine as applied in Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wn.2d 246 , 595 P.2d 919 (1979), controls here.

2015App. 438, 448 , 177 P.3d 1152 (2008))); Backlund v. Univ. of Wash., 137 Wn.2d 651, 667 , 975 P.2d 950 (1999) ("The Legislature has clearly stated what is required [for the third element of an informed consent claim]: the plaintiff must establish that a reasonably prudent patient under similar circumstances would not have consented to the treatment if informed of such material fact or facts[.]'" (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing RCW 7.70.050(1)(c))).

2014At the close of Mr. Anaya’s case, the defense moved for judgment as a matter of law on the informed consent claim. ¶9 The judge granted the motion and dismissed the informed consent claim, concluding that Backlund v. University of Washington, 137 Wn.2d 651 , 975 P.2d 950 (1999), precluded an informed consent claim in misdiagnosis cases.

2007Thomas v. Wilfac, Inc., 65 Wash.App. 255, 262 , 828 P.2d 597 (1992).

2007Thomas v. Wilfac, Inc., 65 Wn.

2017The Washington Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of informed consent in ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospital Medical Center, 81 Wn.2d 12 , 499 P.2d 1 (1972).

2017The Washington Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of informed consent in ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospital Medical Center, 81 Wn.2d 12 , 499 P.2d 1 (1972).

2013Quimby, 45 Wn.

2013Quimby, 45 Wn.

2010RCW 7.70.030(3) specifically defines "[an] injury result[ing] from health care to which the patient or his representative did not consent" as a basis for which a plaintiff could recover damages. "`[H]ealth care'" means "`the process in which [a physician is] utilizing the skills which he had been taught in examining, diagnosing, treating or caring for the plaintiff as his patient.'" Branom v. State, 94 Wash. App. 964, 969-70 , 974 P.2d 335 (1999) (one alteration in original) (quoting Estate of Sly v. Linville, 75 Wash.App. 431, 439 , 878 P.2d 1241 (1994)). ¶ 11 When Savidge examined Young and

2010RCW 7.70.030(3) specifically defines "[an] injury result[ing] from health care to which the patient or his representative did not consent" as a basis for which a plaintiff could recover damages. "`[H]ealth care'" means "`the process in which [a physician is] utilizing the skills which he had been taught in examining, diagnosing, treating or caring for the plaintiff as his patient.'" Branom v. State, 94 Wash. App. 964, 969-70 , 974 P.2d 335 (1999) (one alteration in original) (quoting Estate of Sly v. Linville, 75 Wash.App. 431, 439 , 878 P.2d 1241 (1994)). ¶ 11 When Savidge examined Young and

2008Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270 ; Colyer, 99 Wn.2d at 121 .

2008Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270 , 110 S.Ct. 2841 ; Colyer, 99 Wash.2d at 121 , 660 P.2d 738 .

2007In rejecting the parents' informed consent claim, the court in Miller, id. at 769 , concluded that even though the parents were present in the delivery room, "there was simply no time to obtain their consent to treatment . . . without jeopardizing [the infant's] life" because the infant might survive with treatment but would likely die if treatment were postponed.

2007In rejecting the parents’ informed consent claim, the court in Miller, id. at 769 , concluded that even though the parents were present in the delivery room, “there was simply no time to obtain their consent to treatment . . . without jeopardizing [the infant’s] life” because the infant might survive with treatment but would likely die if treatment were postponed.

2007I would hold as a matter of law that, if an emergency exists such that the duty to obtain informed consent for resuscitation is waived, there is also no duty to stop resuscitation merely because the patient may survive but with permanent disabilities. ¶56 I agree with the majority that the wrongful birth/ wrongful life action recognized in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wn.2d 460 , 656 P.2d 483 (1983), does not apply because there is no allegation of negligent prenatal counseling or procedures.

2007I would hold as a matter of law that, if an emergency exists such that the duty to obtain informed consent for resuscitation is waived, there is also no duty to stop resuscitation merely because the patient may survive but with permanent disabilities. ¶56 I agree with the majority that the wrongful birth/ wrongful life action recognized in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wn.2d 460 , 656 P.2d 483 (1983), does not apply because there is no allegation of negligent prenatal counseling or procedures.

2005Although Washington courts have consistently held article I, section 7 may provide greater protection against warrantless searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment, 2 “ ‘[a] determination that a given state constitutional provision affords enhanced protection in a particular context does not necessarily mandate such a result in a different context.’ ” State v. McKinney, 148 Wn.2d 20, 26 , 60 P.3d 46 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 446 , 909 P.2d 293 (1996)). ¶8 Relying on cases dealing with the informed consent doctrine, Mr. McNabb argues Washing

2005Although Washington courts have consistently held article I, section 7 may provide greater protection against warrantless searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment, [2] "`[a] determination that a given state constitutional provision affords enhanced protection in a particular context does not necessarily mandate such a result in a different context.'" State v. McKinney, 148 Wash.2d 20, 26 , 60 P.3d 46 (2002) (quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Wash.2d 431, 446 , 909 P.2d 293 (1996)). ¶ 8 Relying on cases dealing with the informed consent doctrine, Mr. McNabb argues Washington law prohibits un

2005Although Washington courts have consistently held article I, section 7 may provide greater protection against warrantless searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment, 2 “ ‘[a] determination that a given state constitutional provision affords enhanced protection in a particular context does not necessarily mandate such a result in a different context.’ ” State v. McKinney, 148 Wn.2d 20, 26 , 60 P.3d 46 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 446 , 909 P.2d 293 (1996)). ¶8 Relying on cases dealing with the informed consent doctrine, Mr. McNabb argues Washing

2005Although Washington courts have consistently held article I, section 7 may provide greater protection against warrantless searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment, [2] "`[a] determination that a given state constitutional provision affords enhanced protection in a particular context does not necessarily mandate such a result in a different context.'" State v. McKinney, 148 Wash.2d 20, 26 , 60 P.3d 46 (2002) (quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Wash.2d 431, 446 , 909 P.2d 293 (1996)). ¶ 8 Relying on cases dealing with the informed consent doctrine, Mr. McNabb argues Washington law prohibits un

2005Although Washington courts have consistently held article I, section 7 may provide greater protection against warrantless searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment, 2 “ ‘[a] determination that a given state constitutional provision affords enhanced protection in a particular context does not necessarily mandate such a result in a different context.’ ” State v. McKinney, 148 Wn.2d 20, 26 , 60 P.3d 46 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 446 , 909 P.2d 293 (1996)). ¶8 Relying on cases dealing with the informed consent doctrine, Mr. McNabb argues Washing

2005Although Washington courts have consistently held article I, section 7 may provide greater protection against warrantless searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment, [2] "`[a] determination that a given state constitutional provision affords enhanced protection in a particular context does not necessarily mandate such a result in a different context.'" State v. McKinney, 148 Wash.2d 20, 26 , 60 P.3d 46 (2002) (quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Wash.2d 431, 446 , 909 P.2d 293 (1996)). ¶ 8 Relying on cases dealing with the informed consent doctrine, Mr. McNabb argues Washington law prohibits un

2005Although Washington courts have consistently held article I, section 7 may provide greater protection against warrantless searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment, 2 “ ‘[a] determination that a given state constitutional provision affords enhanced protection in a particular context does not necessarily mandate such a result in a different context.’ ” State v. McKinney, 148 Wn.2d 20, 26 , 60 P.3d 46 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 446 , 909 P.2d 293 (1996)). ¶8 Relying on cases dealing with the informed consent doctrine, Mr. McNabb argues Washing

2005Although Washington courts have consistently held article I, section 7 may provide greater protection against warrantless searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment, [2] "`[a] determination that a given state constitutional provision affords enhanced protection in a particular context does not necessarily mandate such a result in a different context.'" State v. McKinney, 148 Wash.2d 20, 26 , 60 P.3d 46 (2002) (quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Wash.2d 431, 446 , 909 P.2d 293 (1996)). ¶ 8 Relying on cases dealing with the informed consent doctrine, Mr. McNabb argues Washington law prohibits un

2005He also relies on In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wn.2d 545 , 747 P.2d 445 (1987), as supporting his claim that he has the constitutional privacy right to refuse artificial means of nutrition and hydration.

2005He also relies on In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wn.2d 545 , 747 P.2d 445 (1987), as supporting his claim that he has the constitutional privacy right to refuse artificial means of nutrition and hydration.

2000Informed Consent The doctrine of informed consent is “premised on the fundamental principle that ‘[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.’ A necessary corollary to this principle is that the individual be given sufficient information to make an intelligent decision.” Smith v. Shannon, 100 Wn.2d 26, 29 , 666 P.2d 351 (1983) (citations omitted).

2000Informed Consent The doctrine of informed consent is “premised on the fundamental principle that ‘[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.’ A necessary corollary to this principle is that the individual be given sufficient information to make an intelligent decision.” Smith v. Shannon, 100 Wn.2d 26, 29 , 666 P.2d 351 (1983) (citations omitted).

1980In Gates, the court held that a physician has a duty of disclosure whenever he becomes aware of a bodily abnormality which may indicate risk or danger, whether or not the diagnosis has been completed. *330 The Court of Appeals held that no duty to inform had yet arisen in this case because when "there is no diagnosis nor diagnostic procedure involving risk to the patient, there is nothing the doctor can put to the patient in the way of an intelligent and informed choice." Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 22 Wn.

1979App. 366 , 589 P.2d 310 (1979), where we held that refusal of the trial court to give an instruction on the doctrine of informed consent was not error.

2019In Flyte v. Summit View Clinic, a pregnant woman felt ill and visited a clinic. 183 Wn.

2019On the informed consent claim, the trial court instructed the jury that “[a] physician has no duty to disclose treatments for a condition that may indicate a risk to the patient’s health until the physician diagnoses that condition.” Flyte, 183 Wn.

2017Nevertheless, the claim surrounded the alleged failure to gain any consent, not a failure of the veterinarian to disclose material risks, the heart of an informed consent claim. ¶81 Robert Repin also cites Zimmerman v. Robertson, 259 Mont. 105 , 854 P.2d 338 (1993).

2017Nevertheless, the claim surrounded the alleged failure to gain any consent, not a failure of the veterinarian to disclose material risks, the heart of an informed consent claim. ¶81 Robert Repin also cites Zimmerman v. Robertson, 259 Mont. 105 , 854 P.2d 338 (1993).